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The Ph.D. dissertation entitled "Soviet Policy in South 
Asia With Special Reference to Indo-Soviet Relations, 1965-82" 
is an attempt to study the pattern of Soviet policy in South 
Asia and to analyse the various factors and trends of Indo-Soviet 
relations which have grown very cordial and strong in the post 
v/ar era. Relations between these two countries have nov/ come 
to occupy an important place not only in the Subcontinent l)ut 
also in world politics. 
Both geographically and in terms of socio-cultural conti-
nuities and economic infrastructure, India occupies a central 
place among all South Asian countries. The other countries of 
the region like Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Bhutan and Sri Lankn 
have individually and separately more in common with India than 
with each otlier. 
The Soviet presence in this Asian region has proved to be 
more effective and durable than those of its two rivals, the 
United States and China. The search for peace, stability, and 
security in South Asia is a subject of global importance in our 
independent world. The US arms connection with Pakistan is said 
to be the prime cause of many of the problems of the subcontinent, 
reflecting the thesis that the security threats to the subcontinen 
come from outside powers and from the military build up of local 
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states. The intrusion by outside povvrers (and specially the US) 
constituted an interference in tlie natural order of things. 
Soviet Union was directly involved in intra-regional affairs 
in South Asia in the mid 1950s and this reached its high water-
mark in the Tashkent Declaration of 1966. India's military 
reverses in its border clashes with China brought into sharp focus 
the limitation of the South Asia policy that tlio Soviet Union had 
followed till then which was almost exclusively India-centred, 
China's growing role in Pakistan compelled Soviet Union to 
establish its presence in Pakistan and counter China's grc-ing 
influence there. There was a reshaping of Soviet policy towards 
the South Asian region in general and towards Pakistan in narticula 
President Ayub Khan's visit to Moscow in 1967 resulted not only j.n 
trade agreement, economic cooperation, cultural exchange but also 
Soviet supply of arms to Pakistan. India protested against Soviet 
decision. The Soviet Union had assured India that Pakistan would 
not use Soviet arms against India. Since 1970s the Soviet Union 
started getting more involved in the affairs of South Asia. The 
Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation was signed 
on 9 August 1971. The real purpose of the treaty v/as to safeguard 
India's security and strengthen its defence capability. 
One of the main objectives of the Soviet foreign policy it; 
the development of relations of friendship and comprehensi\-e 
cooperation with India. Despite the differences in their socio-
economic systems, the two countries are united by a common loyalty 
to the cause of peace and detente and the ideals developing rela-
tions between the two states on a just and democratic basis. 
India and the Soviet Union have no conflict of national interests 
because of geographical proximity. It is in their common interest 
to develop and strengthen peaceful cooperation and friendly 
relations. 
Indo-Soviet relations started to be built up in the early 
50s and have developed steadly after Nehru's visit to the Soviet 
Union in 1955, followed by the visit of Soviet leaders Khrushchev 
and Bulganin to India in the following year. The Soviet Union has 
stood by India in times of need and supported India's policy of 
nonalignment, peace and national independence, India has also 
supported the Soviet Union's policy of peace and cooperation. The 
open support to India by the Soviet Union on Kashmir issue was a 
landmark in Indo-Soviet relations. In 1957 and 1962 the Soviet 
Union exercised its veto in the Security Council against the 
Western resolutions on Kashmir which supported Pakistan. 
Since the Indo-Pak war of 1965, the Soviet Union has been 
enjoying a special position in the Indian subcontinent among the 
superpowers. The Bangladesh crisis and the Indo-Pak war 1971 had 
further strengthened the position. 
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The Soviet Union and India cooperate effectively on tlie 
international scene, including in the UN and other international 
organisations. Both the countries consistently support the 
strengthening of detente in international relations and its 
extension to all regions of the world, universal and complete 
disarmament under effective international control, the elimina-
tion of war from human existence and the affirmation in inter-
national relations of such principles as the right of each people 
to choose its own political system, the refusal to use force or 
the threat of force, respect for sovereignty and the inviolability 
of frontiers, noninterference in each other's internal affairs 
and cooperation in economic and other spheres on the basis of e 
equality and mutual advantage. 
On the economic front, the high momentum of Soviet aid to 
India, witnessed in the fifties and in the first half of the 
sixties, could not be maintained in the changed economic environ-
ment of the second half of the sixties, and particularly in the 
seventies. Since the second half of the sixties, utilization 
of Soviet aid declined sharply. At the same time, with the deva-
luation of the rupee in 1966, the debt repayments mounted uj^  . 
In recent years, India also began to make repayments in advance. 
The combined effect of all these was that Soviet aid turned 
negative in most of the years except when the §oviet Union pave 
a wheat loan in 1974-75. However, even the wheat loan was repaid 
in 1977 and 1978. With this India has repaid more than what it 
received from the Soviet Union. Thus, in the 1970s there vas not 
only 'zero aid', but there v^ras also a reverse flov/ of resources 
from India to the Soviet Union. 
Similarly, the trade between India and the Soviet Union 
increased at a phenomenal rate in the fifties and sixties. '.s'ithin 
a short period, the Soviet Union acquired a significant positioin 
in India's exports and imports. However, the rate of grov/th of 
Indo-Soviet trade during the seventies slowed dov/n considerably 
as compared to the growth in the first phase as well as in relation 
to the growth of India's trade with some other regions, such as 
ECM, ESCAP, Latin America and OPEC counties. And also there was 
no dramatic change in the composition of India's exports to the 
Soviet Union during the seventies. 
In many ways, despite criticisms within the apparatus of 
government and outside, the connection has grown and become a major 
dimension of the Indian reality. The relationship can be inter-
preted in many ways, although it will be generally agreed thai 
it has been mutually beneficial for both countries particularly 
in times of crisis. 
The study has been divided into seven chapters. The first 
chapter deals with the importanc<2 ol South Asia in international 
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politics. The geographical location of South Asia, its strategic 
importance and its significance in world politics have been 
discussed in this chapter. 
Soviet policy in south Asia is the subject matter of dis-
cussion in chapters II & III. The Soviet approach to various 
developments in the subcontinent and its role perforniance in 
South Asia has been thoroughly examined. An attempt has been 
made to study the Soviet foreign policy in this area in all its 
aspects . 
Since the main thrust of this study is on Indo-Soviet Rela-
tions, more space has been devoted to this subject. The v.hole 
gamut of Indo-Soviet relations has been taken up for a close stud;, 
of actions and inter-actions of the t^i^o very important poivors in 
v.'orld politics. Though the subject is too wide and broad, an 
attempt has been made to cover almost all crucial areas of. a most 
friendly and cordial relationship. Areas, both of cooperation 
and misapprehensions, have been covered. 
Chapter VI of this thesis focuses on economic and cultural 
ties between India and the Soviet Union without which the study 
would remain incomplete. Economic and cultural aspects o£ rela-
tions bet\Nreen the two countries can be termed as catalysts for 
bringing the nations together. 
The study ends with some concluding remarks. The conclu-
sions drawn in this chapter are based on the totalit}- of the 
pattern of Soviet approach in South Asia and the relations 
between India and the Soviet Union. 
SOVIET POLICY TOWARDS SOUTH ASIA 
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO 
INDO-SOVIET RELATIONS, 1965-BZ 
THESIS 
SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF 
Bottor of $I}ilo£(op^p 
IN 
POLITICAL SCIENCE 
BY 
RESHMA 
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY 
ALIQARH (INDIA) 
1989 
T3702 
Ace No. 
)5 
-5" 
t o 
w h i o s e l o v e H a s a l w a y s b e e n i n s p i r- X n g m e 
Dr. Mohammad Ali Kishore , Ph.D 
READER Department of P o l i t i c a l Science Al igarh Muslim Un ive r s i t y , 
Al igarh (U.P.) Ind ia . 
Dated Apr i l 26,1989 
CERTIFICATE 
CzAtii-izd that tht wonk tntxtlzd "Sovlzt Potiay TowoAdi South k&ia 
Itiith SpzcMxl ReiJeAence to Indo-Sovtzt RttatioYU:,, 1965-S2" hjo^ btan com-
pleXtd imdoA my 4.apcAvX6^ on by MA. Reihma. Tht wonk AJ, ofUgincui and 
hcU) bzzn tndzpzndzntty pun^uzd by thz candtdatz. It n.zpoKtb i^omz tntZA^t-
tng obizfivatLoyU) and coyvtAtbatu> to thz zxJjittng knouilzdgz tn thz itzld 
oi lYitznnatLonal RzlatloM. 
I pznmit thz candldatz to ^abrnit thz mnk iofi thz cmoAd oi dzgfizz 
oi Voztofi oi VhJXo&ophy In Potutical Sctzncz oi thz KtigoAh HiUttim Untv-
zU'Oty, Atigcuih. 
{Mohammad Ati ICLithoKz] 
CONTENTS 
PREFACE 
CHAPTER-^ 
IMPORTANCE OF SOUTH ASIA IN INTERNATIONAL 
POLITICS 
A. South Asia As a Streteglc Region, 1 
B. South Asian Security, 10 
C. Superpower Involvement in South Asia, 18 
CHAPTER-II 
SOVIET POLICY IN SOUTH ASIA-I 38 
A. Soviet Involvement : The Background, 41 
B. Soviet Approach to the Indo-Pak Conflict, 60 
C. Diversified Role in South Asia in the 1970s, 71 
CHAPTER-_IIi 
SOVIET POLICY IN SOUTH ASIA-II 89 
A. Soviet Stand on Bangladesh, 89 
B, The Indian Ocean, 99 
C. Soviet Union and the Afghan Imbroglio, 113 
D, South Asian Regional Cooperation, 132 
CHAPTER-_IV 
INDO'SOVIET RELATIONS : 1965«77 147 
A. The Early Phase, 147 
B. Phase-I : 1965-71, 156 
C, The Indo-Sovlet Treaty, 162 
D, Phase-II : 1972-77, 173 
OIAPTER-V 
INDO-SOVIET RELATIONS : 1977-82 
A, Phase-I : 1977-80 : Relations During the 
Janata Regime, 191 
B, Phase-II; 1980-82 : Relations During Indira 
Gandhi's Second Term, 216 
OiAPTER-VI 
ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL RELATIONS 236 
A, Economic Relations, 236 
B, Cultural Relations, 265 
C, Major Soviet-Indian Projects and 
Assistance, 273 
CONCLUSION ... ... 278 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ... ... 303 
PREFACE 
South Asia's seven states can be divided into four cate-
gories. India stands by itself as the largest and most 
populous nation, aspiring to be a major power and in a category 
by itself, India is followed by the region's two middle 
powers — Pakistan and Bangladesh, having approximately the 
same population# although differing in economic and military 
strength. Sri Lanka and Nepal qualify as the small powers 
of the region while Bhutan and Maldives may be described as 
the micro-states. Although each of these states play an 
important role in determining the prospects for peace and 
security in South Asia, the position of middle powers has 
been more important and that of India, clearly decisive. 
The Soviet Union is generally perceived as the dominant 
external power in South Asia since the mid-50s, It was directly 
involved in the intraregional affairs in South Asia and this 
reached its high watermark in the Tashkent Declaration of 
1966. In the post-war period the Soviet Union, jointly with 
young newly free states, stepped up its efforts to consolidate 
peace in Asia. The world knows the constructive role of the 
U.S.S.R. as the initiator and active participant in a number 
of major international conferences and agreements aimed at 
ensuring peace in various parts of the Asian continent. Among 
them are Geneva Conference of 1954 (on a settlement in Korea 
and Indo-China) and of 1962 (on Laos), the Tashkent Meeting 
of 1966 on Vietnam, the Geneva Peace Conference of 1973 on 
the Middle East etc. Both geographically and in terms of 
socio-cultural continuities and economic infrastructure, India 
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occupies a central place among all South Asian countries. 
The other countries of the region like Pakistan, Nepal, Bangla-
desh, Bhutan and Sri Lanka have individually and separately 
more in common with India than with each other. 
The Soviet presence in this Asian region has proved 
to be more effective and durable than those of its two rivals, 
the United States and China. The search for peace, stability, 
and security in South Asia is a subject of global importance 
in our independent world. The U.S. arms connection with 
Pakistan is said to be the prime cause of many of the problems 
of the sxobcontinent, reflecting the thesis that the security 
threats to the sxibcontinent come from outside powers and from 
the military build up of local states. Intrusion by outside 
powers(specially the U.S.) constitutes an interference in the 
natural order of things. 
India's military reverses in its border clashes with 
China brought into sharp focus the limitation of the South 
Asia policy that the Soviet Union had followed till then and 
which was almost exclusively India-centred, China's growing 
role in Pakistan compelled Soviet Union to establish its 
presence in Pakistan and counter China's growing influence 
there. 
There was a reshaping of Soviet policy towards the South 
Asia region in general and towards Pakistan in particular, 
president Ayub Khan's visit to Moscow in 1967 resulted not 
only in trade agreement, economic cooperation and cultural 
exchange, but also Soviet Union supplied arms to Pakistan. 
India protested against the Soviet decision. The Soviet 
Union had assured India that Pakistan would not use Soviet 
arms against India, Since 1970s the Soviet Union started 
getting more Involved in the affairs of South Asia. The 
Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation was 
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signed in August 1971. The real purpose of the Treaty was 
to safeguard India's security and strengthen its defence 
capability. 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s the Soviet Union 
advanced the idea of safeguarding security in Asia by its 
countries and peoples having relations based on -the principles 
of peaceful coexistence. Important initiatives directly 
affecting various parts of Asia were set forth in the peace 
programmes for the 1980s approved by the 26th Congress of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union. 
Peace and stability in India and Pakistan were essential 
for the success of Soviet policy of establishing its influence 
in South Asia. Therefore, the Soviet Union tried to bring 
the two nations closer to each other and for that it adopted 
policies that would maintain its relations with both the 
countries. Obviously the Soviet policy was to wean Pakistan 
away from U.S.A. and China so that it could build up both 
Pakistan and India as a stable peace area as a counterpoise 
to China. But Pakistan insisted that to improve its relations 
with Pakistan the Soviet Government is to stop military 
assistance to India. Thus, this period coincided with some 
alterations in the Soviet policy towards Pakistan. The 
Soviet Government concluded an agreement for Soviet military 
aid to Pakistan in July 1968. But the Soviet Union did not 
take any action to improve its relations with Pakistan at 
the cost of its relations with India. These gestures indicated 
that the Soviets were reappraising the power-position in the 
South Asian region in the light of their external require-
ments and their assessment of the domestic developments in 
India and Pakistan. 
The Soviet Union's principled, internationalist approach 
to the national liberation struggles was demonstrated 
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convincingly during the events linked to the proclamation 
of the independence of the Repxiblic of Bangladesh in 1971. 
Soviet Union was the only permanent member of the Security 
Council to support the liberation struggle of the people of 
Bangladesh, It was the first major power to recognize Bangla-
desh on 24 January 1972. 
South ASis assumes a great significance for the super-
powers because of the strategic importance of the Indian 
Ocean. There are inter-related connotations for the super-
powers, in convenitional and nuclear terms, in this region. 
The Soviet landmass is within easy range of the U,S, nuclear 
submarines operating in the Indian Ocean region. The reverse 
is not true, as the American landmass is far away from the 
Indian Ocean. But there has to be a defensive role for 
the Soviet forces in the Indian Ocean, and South Asian region, 
against the U,S, power. Since this region is well suited 
for the offensive deployment of U.S. strategic forces, the 
U.S.S.R, can play only a defensive role, a counter role in 
this region. An increased U.S, presence in this region will • 
naturally attract increased Soviet presence heightening the 
tension in the region. 
Such ah increased Soviet presence in this region is 
not a potentiality that the Chinese would relish. They treat 
this phenomenon as a "hostile social imperialist encircle-
ment" and want to curtail it. 
Maldives, located in the centre of Indian Ocean, has also 
become a focal point of superpower rivalry during recent years. 
Soon after the British withdrawal in 1976 several countries 
showed interest in obtaining Can, one of the islands of 
Maldives which is important strategically and militarily. The 
last such bid came from the Soviet Union in 1978 which offered 
$1 million for the ostensible purpose of using the base for main-
tenance of its fishing vessels. The Soviet Union is obviously 
looking for a base in the Indian Ocean area to provide a 
strong counterbalance to the American base at Diego Garcia 
which is just 640 km South of Gan, President Gayoom has 
categorically stated that his country would pursue a policy 
of nonalignment and would not provide any base for the 
competing superpowers. 
The Maldives has hardly the means to defend its maritime 
territory or even to keep out the fishing vessels that poach 
in its territorial waters, Maldivians are fully aware of 
this fact that the country is pursuing an astute diplomacy 
of maintaining cordial relationship with as many countries 
as possible from rival blocs. But how long the Maldives could 
continue this delicate balancing exercise in a conflict 
prone area is very difficult to perceive. 
Nestled at the foot of the Himalaya Mountains, the tiny 
Kingdom of Bhutan occupies a strategic position in South Asia. 
The source of threat to Bhutan's territorial integrity in the 
present context is considered to be China. In no other 
country of the South Asian region Sino-Soviet rivalry is as 
apparent as in Nepal, In fact, China's share of economic aid 
to Nepal is massive in comparison to that of the Soviet Union. 
However, the Soviet Union supported Nepal's policy of 
positive nonalignment and of the King's desire not to allow 
Nepal to be an area of tension and a centre for hostilities 
against other countries. 
Geopolitical factors have also played an important part 
in the definition of Soviet policy in South Asia over the 
past two decades. That the U,S,S,R. is separated from South 
Asia by only seventeen miles of Afghan territory is enough 
to ensure concern in Moscow over developments in the s\abcon-
tinent. Probably, since the early 1960s, more important for 
Soviet Union is the long border South Asia shares with China 
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and occasionally violent competition between Peking and 
New Delhi for a hegemonic position in this difficult 
frontier area. 
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan proved that the 
Soviet Union not only has the capability to intervene in 
conflicts outside its frontiers, but also has the political 
will to use that capability as an active instrtjment of foreign 
policy. Though the Soviet Union never touched the inter-
national boundary/ but at a time, in 1980, the Soviet troops 
almost knocked at the Pakistan frontiers. For India, the 
threat came from America's arms supply to Pakistan. Thus in 
order to arrest the threat, it became essential for India to 
localise the Soviet intervention and to see it as a defensive 
action of limited geopolitical import. 
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One of the main objectives of the Soviet foreign policy 
is the development of relations of friendship and comprehen-
sive cooperation with India. Despite the differences in 
their socio-economic systems, the two countries are united 
by a common loyalty to the cause of peace and detente and 
the ideals of developing relations between the two States on 
a just and democratic basis. India and the Soviet Union 
have no conflict of national interests because of geographical 
proximity. It is in their common interest to develop and 
strengthen peaceful cooperation and friendly relations, 
Indo-Soviet relations started to be built up in the 
early 50s and have developed steadyly after Jawaharlal Nehru's 
visit to the Soviet Union in 1955, followed by the visit of 
Soviet leaders Khrushchev to India and Bulganin in the 
vii 
following year. The Soviet Union has stood by India in 
times of need and supported India's policy of nonalignment, 
peace and national independence, India has also supported 
the Soviet Union's policy of peace and cooperation. The 
open support to India by the Soviet Union on Kashmir issue 
was a landmark in Indo-Soviet relations. In 1957 and 1962 
Soviet Union exercised its veto in the Security Council against 
the Western resolutions on Kashmir which supported Pakistan, 
Since the Indo-Pak war of 1965, the Soviet Union has been • 
enjoying a special position in the Indian subcontinent among 
the superpowers. The Bangladesh crisis and the Indo-Pak 
war of 1971 has further strengthened this position. 
The Soviet Union and India cooperate effectively on the 
international scene, including in the U,N, and other inter-
national organisations. Both countries consistently support 
the strengthening of detente in international relations and 
its extension to all regions of the world, universal and 
complete disarmament under effective international control, 
the elimination of war from human existence and the affirma-
tion in international relations of such principles as the 
right of each people to choose its own political system, 
the refusal to use force or the threat of force, respect for 
sovereignty and the inviolability of frontiers, noninter-
ference in each other's internal affairs and cooperation in 
economic and other spheres on the basis of equality and 
mutual advantage. 
On the economic front, the high momentxun of Soviet aid 
to India, witnessed in the fifties and in the first half of the 
sixties, could not be maintained in the changed economic environ-
ment of the second half of the sixties and particularly in the 
seventies. Since the second half of the sixties, utilisation 
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of Soviet aid declined sharply. At the same time with the 
devaluation of the rupee in 1966, the debt repayments 
mounted up. In recent years, India also began to make 
repayments in advance. The combined effect of all these 
was that Soviet aid turned negative in most of the years 
except when the Soviet Union gave a wheat loan which was 
repaid in 1977 and 1978. Thus, in the 1970s, there was not 
only "zero aid' but there was also a reverse flow of 
resources from India to the Soviet Union. 
Similarly, the trade between India and the Soviet Union 
increased at a phenomenal rate in the fifties and sixties. 
Within a short period, the Soviet Union acquired a signi-
ficant position in India's export and imports. However, the 
rate of growth of Indo-Soviet trade during the seventies 
slowed down considerably as compared to the growth in the 
first phase as well as in relation to the growth of India's 
trade with some other regions such as ECM, ESCAP, Latin 
America, and OPEC countries. And also there was no drgjnatic 
change in the composition of India's exports to the Soviet 
Union during the seventies. 
The study has been divided into seven chapters. The 
first chapter deals with the importance of South Asia in 
international politics. The geographical location of South 
Asia, its strategic importance and its significance in world 
politics have been discussed in this chapter. 
Soviet policy in South Asia is the subject matter of 
discussion in chapters II and III. The Soviet approach to 
various developments in the subcontinent and its role 
performance in South Asia has been thouroghly examined. An 
attempt has been made to study the Soviet foreign policy 
in this area in all its aspects. 
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Since the main thrust of this study is on Indo-Soviet' 
relations^ more space has been devoted to this subject. The 
whole gamut of Indo-Soviet relations has been taken up for 
a close study of actions and interactions of the two very 
important powers in world politics. Though the subject is 
too wide and broad, an attempt has been made to cover almost 
all crucial areas of a most friendly and cooixiial relation-
ship. Areas, both of cooperation and misapprehensions, have 
been covered. 
Chapter VI of this dissertation focusses on economic 
and cultural ties between India and Soviet Union without 
which the study would remain incomplete. Economic and 
cultural aspects of relations between two countries can be 
termed as catalyst for bringing the nations together. 
The study ends with some concluding remarks. The conclu-
sions drawn in this chapter are based on the totality of the 
pattern of Soviet policy in South Asia and the relations 
between India and the Soviet Union. 
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C h a p t e r I 
IMPORTANCE OF SOUTH ASIA IN INTERNATIONAL 
POLITICS 
(A) South Asia as a strategic region 
Asia occupies more than one-third of the entire land 
surface of the earth. It Is Inhabited by more than half of 
the world's population. The South East part of the Asian 
continent is washed by two oceans, namely, the Indian Ocean 
and the Pacific Ocean. This vast landmass of Asia has within 
it two of the most ancient and yet living civilizations. Asia 
also is the source of all the religions which history of 
human-kind has created. Apart from this, the entire region 
today has within it the largest variety of political and 
economic structures. A very large part of the territory of 
the Soviet Union lies within Asia. Then there is China. There 
are the three countries of Indo-China, namely, Kampuchea, Loas 
and Vietnam, There is of course the socialist state of North 
Korea, Apart from these states, there is India, There are 
other states some of which are monarchical and some of them 
are even reminiscent of medieval times. 
South Asia is a sub-system of the globular international 
system. Among the various sub-systems. South Asia is parti-
cularly well-endowed with the qualities that protect autonomy 
from the intrusions of global system, at least in political 
and strategic terms. The region contains vast human and 
material resources. Several regional countries possess 
P.N.Haksar, "Introduction" in D.D.Narula and R.R.Sharma, 
Asian Dimension of Soviet Policy, Patriot Pub., New 
Delhi, 1986, p.xi. 
impressive political skills and military establishments 
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to back them up. 
The location of South Asia is favourable — it is well 
defined, defensible, and somewhat out of the line of fire of 
East-West hostilities. It also has, potentially at least, 
two of the most important structural elements stimulating 
autonomy — a significant but manageable external threat and 
a set of regional power dynamics that has been effectively 
clarified by the 1971 Indo-Pak War, most important, perhaps, 
both India and Pakistan have developed considerable skill in 
dealing with the super-powers, and each has developed a 
healthy degree of skepticism about close relationships with 
a super-power patron.'^ 
When the British withdrew from South Asia in 1947, they 
had established their strategic frontiers which included 
Tibet, Western Sinkiang, Pamirs, Afghanistan and Iran. Pakistan 
inherited the geopolitical and geostrategic frontiers of the 
British-Indian government, in Iran, Afghanistan and Western 
Sinkiang. India inherited the North-Eastern frontiers 
entirely continguous with China. Jammu and Kashmir became a 
conflict zone between the feudal prince who ruled Kashmir 
and 80 per cent of his Muslim subjects. The Raja's army was 
unable to deal with the fight for political and social 
justice of his people. This army was defeated by the freedom 
fighters of Gilgit and it has to withdraw from large chunks 
of the state in Poonch, Mirpur and Muzaffarabad. When the 
Raja saw his tiny force dispersed over vast distances and 
increasingly ineffective, he decided to ask for Indian 
assistance while fleeing from Srinagar, although according to 
the principles on which India was partitioned, viz., geographical 
2 Thomas P.Thornton, "The Security of South Asia : Analysis 
and Speculation", in Stephen P.Cohen, ed., The Security of 
South Asiat American and Asian Perspectives, Univ. of 
Illinois Press, 1987. 
3 Ibid, 
continguity and the population composition of the local popu-
lation was to decide if a state could accede to India or 
4 
Pakistan. 
All these conditions had kept India and Pakistan in a 
state of undeclared war and also disabled them to play an 
affective part in international affairs. Ever since the 
liquidation of British colonialism in the subcontinent, the 
Soviet Union has treated South Asian region as strategically 
and politically quite important. Therefore, it took no time 
for the leaders of Moscow to reverse their Stalinist policy 
of isolation, Soviet Union was directly involved in the 
intraregional affairs in South Asia in the mid-fifties and 
this reached its high water mark in the Tashkent Declaration 
of 1966, The Soviet Union is generally perceived as the 
dominant external power in South Asia. The Soviet intervention 
and presence building in this Asian Region has proved to be 
more effective and durable than those of its two rivals, 
5 
the United States and China. 
In the mid-1950s, the United States and the Soviet Union 
became involved in South Asia with different objectives but 
similar motivations. Perhaps the most important distinction 
between Soviet and U.S, involvement in South Asia since the 
mid-fifties concerns the intensity with which the two super-
powers pursued their interests in the region. 
South Asia, specially India, has occupied an important 
place in Soviet strategy. The interests of the U.S.S.R. are 
4 Agha Shaukat Ali, "Geo-strategic Ccanpulsions of Central 
Asia on the Strategy for Peace and Security in South 
Asia", Strategic Studies, vol. 6, Winter/Spring, 1982/83, 
Islamabad. 
5 Leo, E.Rose, "The Super Powers in South Asia", Orbis, a 
Journal of World Affairs, 22(1), 1978-79, p. 395*: 
6 Ibid. 
perceived by Moscow to be strongly affected by developments 
in South Asia, However, this has not been the case for 
Washington/ except for relatively brief period of time and 
under special circxamstances. 
For the most part, the American leadership has viewed 
South Asia with a sense of equanimity, even when developments 
there conflicted with the U.S. objectives in surrounding 
areas. The assumption has been nothing is likely to happen 
in South Asia that will seriously affect vital U.S. interest 
7 
elsewhere in Asia. 
At the end of World War II there was only one super-power, 
the U.S.A., possessing both nuclear weapons and strategic 
mobility. Although the Soviet Union had massively powerful 
land and air forces, it still remained essentially a mighty 
continental power. By acquiring nuclear weapons and ICBMs 
Soviet military power achieved global dimensions. The 1950s 
and 1960s witnessed a rapid build up of the Soviet Union's 
naval and maritime fleets. Although the U.S.A. today can 
probably deploy more powerful military forces practically 
anywhere on the high seas, the Soviet Union has acquired a 
worldwide interposing capability enabling it to deploy one or 
more of its seaborne units in the path of any U.S. fleet seeking 
to intimidate or attack a littoral coxontry. The danger of 
unacceptable escalation, resulting from an open clash with 
the Soviet Units, has in effect severelly curtailed the 
initiative and advantage that its strategic mobility had 
previously conferred on the U.S.A. A side effect has been that 
gunboat diplomacy has now become much less effective than in 
the past. China, despite its nuclear weaponry, still remains a 
continental power and presently lacks the capability to undertake 
Q 
large scale military operations much beyond its borders. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Rathy Sawhny, "US-Soviet-Chinese Relations: Strategic Impact 
on South Asia and Indian Ocean", China Report, Vol.12, 1976. 
There are three great powers, Soviet Union, U.S.A.and 
China whose relevance for the security of South Asia is un-
questioned. All the states of South Asia suffer from a 
measure of domestic instability. All the South Asian peri-
pheral states tend to fear the core nation — India. The 
complimentary economics inherited as a legacy of a colonial 
past rapidly assumed a competitive character. Political 
friction and regional disputes accentuated this trend. 
The super-power interests in South Asia are basically 
converging. Occasionally they become competitive for tactical 
considerations and motivational military aid fans considerable 
political controversy. Indian diversification of her 
military shopping to U.K., France, U.S.A., after the F-16 
announcement is significant. Indian government became much more 
dependent upon the goodwill of the Soviets after defence 
purchases. The strings are implied and long term nonalignment 
being an elastic principle. 
According to Prof. S.D. Muni, South Asia as a region 
has two characteristics. The first is that South Asia is 
an Indo-Centric region. This means that India is central 
to it geographically and in terms of the socio-cultural and 
economic infrastructure of the region, India occupies a 
central place. Countries of the region like Bangladesh, Bhutan, 
Burma, Nepal and Pakistan have a common border with India. 
They are also related to India separately and individually in 
terms of their cultural identities, economic patterns, 
philosophical trends, and historical experience. Conversely, 
9 
there is a bit of India in every other country of South Asia, 
As against this, there is hardly anything of significance 
9 S.D. Muni, 'South Asia', in Mohammed Ayoob, ed., Conflict 
and Intervention in Third World, Vikas, New Delhi, 1980, 
p. 39. 
which is coitunon between one of India's neighbours and another. 
If anything, it is India that is common between them. The 
emergence of Bangladesh in 1971 altered this situation a 
little, but the identities between Pakistan and Bangladesh 
fall within the overall Indo-Centric nature of the region. 
Particularly notable in this respect is the fact that Islam, 
as professed and practised in Bangladesh and Pakistan, is of 
Indo-Islamic cultural stock. Further there was something 
unnatural about the economic links between the eastern and 
western wings of Pakistan in the year prior to 1971. This 
is now evident from the fact that they can never be reforged 
into their original form. The result of this indo-Centric 
nature of South Asia is that no step towards cooperation and 
collaboration can be taken in the region without India 
acquiring the central place in the scheme of things. 
The second characteristic of the South Asian region is 
that it has an unbalanced and asymmetric power structure. The 
nature of this imbalance and asymmetry is such that India 
stands as a dominant power in the region. In terms of size, 
population, resources, base, potential for economic growth, 
military strength and viability of the constitutional and 
political system, India is far too superior to any of its 
neighbours. 
Pakistan brought the super-power influence for the 
first time into the subcontinent, when they entered into 
military pacts which they now make no secret of,was done 
to get free arms against India. The Pakistani leadership 
wanted to play the role assigned to them by the external 
powers in the subcontinent. Given the history of the last 
10 S.D. Muni, 'India and Regionalism in South Asia : A 
Political perspective', in Bimal Prasad, ed,, India's 
Foreign Policy : Studies in Continuity and Change, 
Vikas, New Delhi, 1979, pp.107-8. 
11 S.D.Muni, 'South Asia', in Mohammad Ayoob, ed,, op.cit. 
many centuries when the local rulers had invoked the inter-
vention of external powers for their own parochial interests 
and thereby contributed to the subjugation of the subcontinent 
to foreign rule/ it is totally unrealistic to expect the 
people of the subcontinent to take a charitable view of the 
role of the Pakistani leadership to serve the interests 
of neocolonialism. The Indian attempt to observe restraint 
evoked no response. Between 1947 and 1962, India expanded 
its forces vis-a-vis Pakistan only marginally. On the other 
hand/ the Pakistan expanded its forces almost to reach parity 
with India. Neither in 1965 nor in 1971 India fielded dis-
proportionately large forces against Pakistan on the Western 
front.-^^ 
But when India was in great difficulties and faced the 
Chinese in 1962 and the U.S. President wrote to Field Marshal 
Ayub Khan asking for an assurance that Pakistan would not 
move against India* the American President got a rebuff from 
13 the Pakistani Piresident. 
Relations between India and Soviet Union also improved 
after 1954. The United States felt that if India could not 
join the western camp, it must not join the communist block 
either. Thus India's policy of nonalignment became acceptable 
to Washington, Moscow and Peking, while Pakistan's policy of 
alignment antagonized the communist countries, especially the 
14 Soviet Union. 
During the Indo-China war, 1962, the United States and 
12 Lt.Gen. P.S.Bhagat,'The Shield and the Sword', The 
Statesman, Calcutta, 1967, p.20. 
13 Muhammad Ayxob Khan, Friends not Masters, Oxford, London, 
1967, in J.D.Sethi, Military Aid and Foreign Intervention 
in the Indian Subcontinent, The Institute for Defence 
Studies and Analysis Journal, VC2), Oct., 1972, p.237. 
14 Mohammad Ahsen Chaudhri, "Pakistan and the Changing Pattern 
of Power Relations in South Asia", Pakistan Horizon, 
XXXI(l), 1978, p.72. ' 
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Britain prevented Pakistan from doing anything that might 
hurt India in its moment of despair. The British Secretary 
of State for Commonwealth Affairs, Mr. Duncan Sandys, and 
the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Averell Harriman 
visited the subcontinent. They urged Pakistan to stay 
scrupulously neutral in the India-China conflict and in 
return, they made India agree to start negotiations with 
Pakistan on Kashmir. But the matter did not end there. 
While the India-Pakistan talks on Kashmir were going on, 
the U.K. and the U.S.A. started sending consignments of 
military equipment to India. Pakistan protested but in vain. 
In December 1962, the British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan 
and president Kennedy of the United States met in Nassau and 
decided to give $ 120 million worth of military assistance to 
India on an emergency basis. It was followed, a year later, 
by a further chunk of aid to the tune of $ 60 million. Another 
sixty million dollars worth of aid was committed in 1964, and 
at the same time, it was announced that India would receive 
long term military assistance from the United States of the 
Un^ 
16 
15 
value of $ 100 million a year. The Soviet ion also 
supplied $ 131 million worth of military aid. 
This massive military aid to India tilted the balance of 
power in South Asia to India's advantage. In fact, the United 
States aid to India, was a part of the former's strategy to 
contain China and to win India on to its side in the power 
game. Selig Harrison in his article pointed out that the 
U.S. was thinking more in terms of helping East and South 
East Asia and was losing interest in this region. He seemed 
to suggest that this was a kind of punishment which the U.S.A. 
15 Z.A. Bhutto, Foreign Policy of Pakistan, A collection of 
speeches made in the National Assembly of Pakistan, 1962-64, 
Karachi, Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1964, 
p. 105. 
16 New York Times, New York, 13 May, 1964. 
wanted to met out to India and Pakistan for their quarrelsome 
nature. The fact, however, is that the U,S, while taking a 
direct interest in the defence and economic development of 
East.and South East Asia, has never taken more than a marginal 
interest in South Asia, The same might be true of the Soviet 
Union. She first came to India's aid largely for coldwar 
reasons, AS Pakistan had moved under the U.S, influence, the 
Soviet Union decided to support India. Another reason 
perhaps was that the Soviet Union was not happy with India and 
China moving closer and wanted to compete with China, in 
17 
winning over India's good will. 
In China's security calculations, Pakistan still holds 
a key position, and India has already entered into an agree-
ment of peace and friendship with the Soviet Union — in 
other words, has entered the Soviet version of the Asian 
18 
collective security system. 
Like the U.S.A. and the Soviet union, China's role in 
South Asia is also of a limited character. It has a more direct 
role in South East Asia from Burma to the Phillipines and 
playing a vital role in the trade as well as politics of these 
countries; each one of these countries is bound to take 
note of China's presence in some way or the other, though 
one might doubt how far China can be regarded as a dominant 
power in the sense in which the U.S.A. or the Soviet Union 
are treated as dominant powers, AS long as China is interested 
in maintaining disequilibriiom and dishannony in the South 
Asian region, she has a great deal of nuisance value, but 
19 hardly anything more. 
17 S.P.Verma and K.P.Misra, ed., Foreign Policies in South 
Asia, Orient, Bombay, 1967, p.9. 
18 Agha Shaukat Ali, op.cit. 
19 S.P, Verma and K.P. Misra, op.cit. 
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According to Geoffery Wheeler/ the Soviet Union has 
diplomatic relations with all countries in the region, consi-
derable military and economic aid projects operating in most 
of them, a naval presence in the Indian Ocean with shore 
facilities in India, South Yemen and East Africa, overt or 
clandestine communist activities, and the economic/Social 
and cultural development of Soviet Central Asia on a scale 
SO far unequalled in the countries to which it lies adjacent 
20 
and most recently the invasion of Afghanistan, 
The Soviet government may now have reached the conclusion 
that Soviet communism cannot now be effectively established 
in Asian countries unless supported by a visible military 
presence in Afghanistan, only to find that the coup itself 
carried no weight.in the country as a whole. Once this is 
certain, the consequences of this new venture will be far 
reaching and will profoundly affect Russian future political 
21 
status in South and West Asia* concludes Wheeler, 
From Pakistani's view on South Asian Security all the 
complicating problems surrounding South Asia, a comprehensive 
Indo-Pak concord is a strategic necessity for the peace and 
security of South Asia. The need for greater opportunities 
for travel, trade, scientific,cultural and technical coopera-
tion has often been stressed. The one sector that would 
give content and meaning to this process would be pooling of 
all scientific and technical resources and crash programme 
of total collaboration between India and Pakistan in the 
field of nuclear development. 
(B) South Asian Security 
In South Asia, the emergence of India as a leading 
power has not been quite to the liking of some of the 
20 Quoted by Agha Shaukat Ali/op.cit. 
21 Ibid, 
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countries, specially the U.S.A. in view of its nexus with 
Pakistan and newly fonried alliance with China and some of 
India's smaller neighbours. The vast disparity with India's 
geographical size^ strength, population and resources is 
conveniently forgotten when the security environment of the 
region is discussed. How else could Pakistan even think 
of proposing mutual reduction of armed forces as one of the 
solutions for bringing about peace in the subcontinent. 
Pakistan leaders tend to forget that India — a much larger 
country — has common borders not only with Pakistan but 
also with a n\amber of other countries. In the present 
contex the situation along any one of them can hardly be 
termed as peaceful. It is imperative that India realises 
her position of importance, and her leaders and planners 
start thinking in terms of global security environment 
22 
rather than China and Pakistan only. 
According to K. Subrahmanyam, within the subcontinent 
there is considerable dissonance between India and her 
neighbours, and the seven South Asian nations do not form a 
community with shared values and political systems. India, 
a democracy, is surrounded by two monarchies, three military 
dictatorships and one democracy under a state of emergency 
whose future appears uncertain. One of the major complica-
tions is divided ethnicity across the borders like the 
Mohajirs in Pakistan, people of Bangladesh origin in Assam 
23 
and West Bengal and the Tamils in Sri Lanka. 
In South Asia the main security problems are between 
India and Pakistan, Pakistan consisted of two parts separated 
by foreign land — India. Thus, genuinely it had to be afraid 
22 Lt.General P.N.Kathpalia, National Security perspectives. 
Lancer International, New Delni, 1986, p.12. 
23 K. Subrahmanyam, "India's Security in the Eighties", 
Strategic Analysis, September 1983, p.415, 
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of India. Besides, India had never accepted the religious 
basis of partition, which the Pakistani leaders sought to 
justify. So since its inception Pakistan was in search of 
its separate identity and wanted to establish its distinct 
individual personality. It is because of this that Pakistan 
has been shuttling between South and West Asia, identifying 
itself with either according to its convenience. The lack 
of democracy and passing of powers directly into hands of 
military bureaucratic elite further complicated problems 
for Pakistan. Since dictatorship is inherent in every 
military rule, the military rulers in order to gain popular 
support and to keep themselves in power took foreign help, 
mainly from the U.S. by painting India as the villian of the 
piece. It is to be noted that security interests have taken 
precedence over Islamic fundamentalism and Pakistan, in order 
to assert its parity with India, attacked it three times 
starting as early as 1947 and ending up in 1971 with the 
creation of Bangladesh. In all these wars it was Pakistan 
which attacked India first and started the war. 
It is generally acknowledged that it was the initial 
relationship of the United States with Pakistan that soured 
any prospects of improving relations with India. It is 
generally recognised in the U.S. that this did not imply 
antagonism towards India so much as a strategic need to 
support those states willing to ally themselves with the 
U.S. In India the choice is not always seen as reluctant; 
at times it has been suggested that the U.S.-Pakistan relation-
ship was aimed specifically at India (implying that the Soviet 
Union was a lesser consideration). U.S. arms sales to 
Pakistan were, according to this view, designed to cut India 
down to size as an independent centre of power and to contain 
24 her influence by a built-up of her chief antagonist. 
24 Baldev Raj Nayar, India's Security In A Plural World, 
1977, p.12; also see by the same author, American Geo-
politics and India, Manohar, New Delhi, 1976, 
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The U.S. arms connection with Pakistan is said to be the 
prime cause of many of the problems of the subcontinent, 
reflecting the thesis that the security threats to the sub-
continent come from outside powers and from the military 
build up of local states. The former leads to an incessant 
25 
search for bases to gain a presence. This intrusion by 
outside powers (and especially the U.S.) constituted an 
interference in the natural order of things, a tempering 
with the balance of power. As the relationship between the 
United States and Pakistan grew, India became concerned that 
the U.S. would seek to make the smaller power a real threat 
to India, and that by providing Pakistan with technically 
Superior equipment, it might make Pakistan into an Israel. 
Since 1979-80, outside power interests in South Asian ' 
security have undergone a dramatic reappraisal in reaction 
to the Soviet expansion into Afghanistan and the fragmentation 
of the Northern Tier. In terms of Indian perceptions and 
reaction concern has been expressed less with respect to the 
direct consequence of the Afghan, crisis — the projection of 
Soviet power into an area directly adjacent to the subconti-
nent — than to the adverse chain of events involving a 
broader set of factors which stem from it. The heightened 
strategic importance according to South Asia by the great 
powers in the wake of Afghanistan has stimulated renewed fears 
in India that the region may be transformed into an area of 
27 
super-power competition. 
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan caused serious threat 
to South Asia particularly Pakistan. The Rand Corporation study 
on the "Security of Pakistan" mentions the following security 
25 Ibid., p.32. 
26 Ibid., p.33. 
27 Robert Litwak, 'The Soviet Union in India's Security 
Perspective', in Timothy George and others. Security 
in Southern Asia ; India and the Great Powers, IISS, 
England, 1984, p.110. 
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threats; 
(1) Afghanistan Soviet support for separatist movements 
along the Baluch and Pathan populations of Pakistan. 
(2) Soviet air and artillery strikes at refugee camps 
across the border. 
(3) An attempt by Soviet or Afghan forces to seize a 
salient portion of Pakistani territory in the 
frontier, 
(4) A Soviet sponsored attack by India against Pakistan, 
(5) A coordinated Indian-Soviet-Afghan attack designed 
to fragment Pakistan along ethnic lines. 
Despite Soviet presence in Afghanistan, Pakistan's main 
preoccupation is still with India, Dangers from India continue 
to be the main pretext for Pak-US military relationship and 
import of huge military equipments from U.S. Though United 
States has given $ 3.2 billion worth of aid to meet Soviet 
threat/ yet the stationing of Pakistani troops clearly indicates 
its preoccupation with India, The Rand report says thus: 
"of the Pakistani Army's Six Corps headquarters, only one 
(with two infantry divisions) is located along the Afghan 
border. The remaining five, which control all of the country's 
29 
armor, face India". The Pakistani government even refused 
United States-National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinshi's 
plea to change the deployment from east to west to meet the 
Soviet threat. 
The main threat to India's security comes from not only 
the overwhelming military machines and dynamic social concepts 
but also by the "lengthening shadows of the Russian bear and 
28 Francis Fukuyama, 'Security of Pakistan - A Trip 
Report', by Rand Corporation, September, 1980, p.V. 
29 Ibid., p,8. 
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the Chinese dragon looming large on the country's horizon" 
India's security is not threatened by Pakistan. India is 
worried about the U.S. supplying arms to Pakistan and by 
other powers. Experience shows that whenever Pakistan 
acquired arms from outside^ it has used them against India. 
^s far as China is concerned, it is to be noted that 
Chinese leadership right from 1949 has been interested in 
making China at least an Asian great power if not a super-
power. Accordingly it has been their ambition to curb 
India's growing influence and power in the region by either 
supporting Pakistan or by aiding and helping the insurgents 
in the Indian frontier states along Indo-Burmese border. It 
can be suggested,for example, that the Mizo insurgency could 
not be checked by India because of Chinese help to them. 
The Soviet Union has become a permanent factor in India's 
strategic thinking and has much the same position which the 
U.S. occupies in Pakistan's thinking. According to Rajan 
Menon/ "In terms of India's security concerns the Soviet 
Union plays a dual role as a direct supplier of arms and a 
licenser of certain classes of military hardware produced in 
India. Again the Soviet Union stood by India when this 
country was under heavy pressure from the West — on the 
Kashmir issue and decolonisation of Goa. When the West 
failed to assist meaningfully in the defence preparedness of 
India following the Chinese aggression it was the Soviet 
Union which helped India both by arms transfer on terms 
which would not impose any significant burden on the Indian 
economy and technology transfer in certain sophisticated 
areas. Again, according to Subrahmanyam, when India faced 
the Washington-Peking-Rawalpindi axis during the Bangladesh 
30 Rajan Menon/ "India And The Soviet Union ; A New Stage 
of Relations", Asian Survey, XVIII(7), July, 1978, p. 31. 
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crisis, the Soviet Union provided the counter-vailing power 
which enabled India to liberate Bangladesh. The mutuality 
of strategic interests in South and South East Asia between 
India and the Soviet Union continues to be a basic plank of 
the foreign and security policies of both nations in spite 
31 
of differences over issues like Afghanistan. 
The presence of Soviet forces in Afghanistan had an * 
adverse impact on the security of the sub-continent, just as 
the moving of Chinese forces into Tibet and those of the 
United States based at Diego Garcia have. But Pakistan has 
little credibility in talking about external threat to the 
subcontinent when it had been seeking Chinese help, and 
32 
constructed the Karakoraxn highway. Further there was 
news of signing of a protocol between China and Pakistan for 
the opening of the Khungerah pass in Karakoram highway in 
Pakistan occupied Kashmir. India lodged protest against this, 
India is wary of Chinese designs in the region which consist 
of "an attempt to weaken the central government to encourage 
centrifugal forces, and to look for eventual creation of a 
number of separate states on the Indian subcontinent at 
least some of which would move into close alliance with 
Peking, "•^•^  
There is one and only one way, feels K, Subrahmanyam, ^ 
of ensuring the security of the subcontinent — that is to 
keep the influence of all three powers -— the United States, 
China and the Soviet Union — out of the sxibcontinent. It is 
necessary for all the South Asian countries to maintain 
their non-aligned status and independence of foreign policy, 
31 K.Sxibrahmanyam, Indian Security perspectives, ABC Pub. 
New Delhi, 1982, p.219. 
32 Ibid., p.166, 
3 3 K,Subrahmanyam, "The Asian Balance of Power in the 
Seventies - An Indian View", IPSA Journal, 1968, p,24. 
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India's objection to the U.S. proposal for the supply of 
$ 400 million worth of arms to Pakistan was not because it 
constituted a large induction of arms, but it would mean 
active U.S. involvement in the subcontinent. In the past, 
Pakistan had been led into disastrous misadventures because 
of its over confidence that the U.S. and China would haul 
it out of dangerous situations in which it landed itself. 
The Pakistani leadership, says K. Subrahraanyam, should not 
repeat that kind of mistake again: "If the influence of 
distant United States is brought into the subcontinent, the 
neighbouring Soviet Union will have every justification 
to seek to intervene in the affairs of the subcontinent 
which abuts on its southern borders, and therefore, has 
greater relevance to its security." Observers of India fail 
to understand why the Pakistani leadership should persist 
34 
on such a perilous course. 
Speculation about the future of South Asian security, 
says Thomas P. Thornton, can be discouraging because the 
range of this future seems to be between the undesirable and 
35 the unacceptable. Despite its lack of formal institutions 
or even shared objectives. South Asia definitely constitutes 
a system. 
Nations are drawn into mutual relationships by geographic 
proximity, shared problems, and even mutual hostility, and 
South Asia has all of these in abundance. The South Asian 
subsystem, according to Thomas Thornton, is highly vulnerable 
to outside intrusion or intervention because of the splits 
within it, indeed, in some regards its internal situation is 
about as bad as it can be since the two major members are in 
34 K. Subrahmanyam, Indian Security Perspective, op.cit., 
p. 166. 
3 5 Thomas Perry Thornton, 'The Security of South Asia : 
Analysis and speculation" in Stephen P.Cohen, ed., The 
Security of South Asia; American and Asian Perspectives, 
op. cit. 
18 
especially dangerous imbalance. Pakistan is neither strong 
enough to assert itself effectively against India nor it is 
so weak that it can readily acquiesce in a subordinate position. 
The result of this combination of regional tensions has 
been a remarkable demonstration of how the global (East-West) 
polarization can impose itself onto a regional polarization. 
The outcome, says Thornton, has been the classic inter-
action between the two systems and has presented opportunities 
to the super-powers to intervene in their own interests. 
There have been ups and downs in this relationship that are 
familiar, but it is necessary to focus on the fact that 
(i) these vulnerabilities have led to very high levels of 
outside inteirvention in the past, and (ii) the potential for 
renewed high levels of intervention persists. 
It is also necessary to bear in mind, adds Thornton, that 
the intrusion of global issues upon the South Asian system and 
its individual members is not limited to the traditional 
problems of security and political tensions associated with the 
U.S.-Soviet rivalry, but also includes many of the new global 
issues shch as non-proliferation, human rights and ecology. 
(C) Superpower Involvement in South Asia 
China, India, Pakistan and the Soviet Union constitute 
most of the sprawling Asian landmass and embrace more than a 
third of the earth's total area and some 40 per cent of its 
population. Geographically, the real Asian triangle is 
formed by China, the subcontinent and the U.S.S.R., though 
politically, it is a quadrangle, the subcontinent being shared 
by two unfriendly sovereign states. The U.S.s.R. as well as 
China tend to treat the subcontinent as one geographical 
36 Ibid. 
•36 
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entity, which enables them to exploit the contradictions 
between Pakistan and India. Pakistan's obsession is India, 
and India's obsession is India, which in an esorteric way, 
means Pakistan too. Pakistan casts its shadow on India's 
relationship with the u.S.S.R. and China, India dominantes 
Pakistan's relations with either communist giant. 
The U.S.S.R. has always ranked the Indian subcontinent 
below Europe and East Asia in terms of its interests and 
concerns. The West has been the principal source of modern 
Russian culture under the Czars as well as their communist 
successors. At least since the time of Napoleon the 
principal threats to the security of Russian State especially 
its European heartland have originated in the West,although 
the rise of first Japan and then China in the twentieth 
century have increased Soviet apprehensions about the security 
38 
of their position is Siberia. 
The search for peace, stability, and security in South 
Asia is a subject of global importance in our independent 
world. The Asian continent has several reasons to address 
itself to the problem of security and to the problem of 
bringing peace and tranquality in Asia. In this view of the 
matter, says P.N.Haksar, we should not develop Pavlovian 
reflexes on the question of Asian security just because of 
39 the Soviet union's interest in the matter. 
During the last four decades, peace and security have 
been primary goals in South Asia. War and insecurity have 
resulted in frequent outbreaks of armed conflict, lingering 
territorial disagreement and deepseated enmities. 
37 Bhabani Sen Gupta, The Fulcrum of Asia : Relations Among 
China, India, Pakistan and the USSR, New York, 1970, p.19. 
38 William J.Barnds, "South Asia" in Kurt London, ed.. The 
Soviet Union in World Politics, Westview Press, London, 
1980, p.197. 
39 P.N.Haksar in D.D. Narula and R.R.Sharma, Asian Dimensions 
of Soviet Policy, Patriot Publishers, New Delhi, 1986. 
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Armaments have increased in the quest for security; 
the result has been higher political stakes and increased 
feelings of insecurity due to greater threats from adver-
saries. The presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan/ the 
danger of big-power confrontations, and the potential for 
nuclearization of conflict further underline the need to 
search for effective strategies for resolving the major 
conflicts of the region. 
Superpower involvement in South Asia has been/ and 
continues to be a matter of some concern and controversy, 
specially since the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 
December 1979. There is a great amount of disagreement over 
the perceptions and intentions of both the Soviet Union and 
the United States. While Soviet actions and perceptions are 
obviously more crucial to the outcome of the war in Afghanis-
tan, it is nonetheless important to attempt to delineate 
American views on that conflict and on other potential 
40 threats to peace and security in the region. 
American South Asian policy is shaped by the Soviet 
presence in Afghanistan. Pakistan has been threatened by the 
Afghan conflict in at least three ways. First, care of 
nearly three million Afthan refugees in camps in N.W.F.P. and 
Baluchistan has created a heavy economic burden. There is 
also the potential social or demographic task of assimilating 
the refugees if the conditions for their return to Afthanistan 
cannot be created within a reasonable period of time. Secondly 
the presence of refugee camps in Pakistan has prompted some 
Soviet intrusions and remains a potential stimulxim to more 
extensive military confrontation. Thirdly, continued Soviet 
military presence in Afghanistan implies the threat of Soviet 
40 Raju, G.C, Thomas, "Security Relationship in Southern 
Asia ; Differences in the Indian and American Pers-
pectives", Asian Survey, July, 1981, p.680. 
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diplomatic pressure upon Pakistan and involvement in 
Pakistan's international affairs. 
Six years of sustained attention to Pakistan and its 
neighbours, says Selig S.Harrison,have brought about a degree 
42 
of maturity in America's understanding of South Asia. Yet 
the dilemmas, says Stephen P. Cohen, that faced the U.S. 
in its initial response to the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan 
in late 1979 remain. 
The happenings in Afghanistan and the developments in 
the United States-Pakistan relationship necessarily affected 
the trilateral relationship Indo-U.S. relations entered a 
difficult phase. Americans were disappointed that New Delhi 
had not taken a harder and harsher stand on the question of 
Soviet troops in Afghanistan, and India protested vocally and 
vigorously against U.S. supply of the most advanced and 
lethal armaments to Pakistan. 
The immediate American reaction viewed the occupation of 
Afghanistan as part of wider pattern of Soviet assertion in 
Africa and Asia. The Afghan move was viewed as an extension 
of earlier Central Asian conquests which would probably not 
have taken place if the American strategic position in Iran 
and elsewhere had not fallen so low. The American response 
was an immediate cooling of relations with the Soviet Union, 
including the Olympic boycott, the shelving of the SALT II 
treaty, and the embargo of grain shipments and technology 
to the U.S.S.R. A programme of low level arms support to the 
Mujahideen groups operating in Afghanistan was also 
43 
apparently initiated. 
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Washington being blamed for introducing relatively 
more sophisticated military hardware into the region is 
understandable. But, ironically, it is also credited with 
both intentions and capacity to bring about an India-
Pakistan accord against the best interests of either country. 
Undoubtedly in this perception is the equally erroneous 
assumption that the Soviet Union has a stake in regional 
discord and an arms race between India and Pakistan. 
On the contrary, there is a growing body of enlightened 
opinion in Pakistan that the U.S. wants to foist Indian leader-
ship on that country. According to Dr. Rais A. Khan, the 
purpose of American leverage is to persuade Pakistan to share 
American perceptions of regional cooperation and India's 
44 leadership in South Asia. 
There is a tendency in India to look upon our national 
security only in irrenediate terms. Hence the supply of a 
particular weapon to Pakistan or China is exaggerated in no 
uncertain terms but the question of the Super Powers inten-
tions, the continued cold war vis-a-vis Indian Security are 
played down as questions of secondary importance. F-16s or 
Harpoon are criticised, protests are made in the Parliament 
but the factors behind the questions of these weapons by the 
neighbouring state, and its Super Power connection is easily 
45 forgotten. 
Efforts to bring India and Pakistan closer were a 
feature of U,S. involvement in the region. But the question 
arises: will the United States allow Pakistan to befriend 
India and to lose its most important ally in this region? Will 
44 American Studies International, April, 1985. 
45 Abhay Aggarwal, 'Are the Super Powers Interested 
in India-Pakistan Amity?' Organiser, 14 October, 
1984. 
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the Soviet Union allow India to befriend Pakistan which is 
constantly encouraging Afghan Mujahideen? The basic question, 
says Abhay, is: shall relations between India and Pakistan 
become friendly if Ziaul-Haq's proposals are accepted? 
Generalists may have a positive answer but Pakistani analysts 
deny this by saying that the proposal can create one more 
bone of contention like the 1972 Simla Agreement. According to 
Abhay, if no treaties are to be signed. Super Powers would 
not allow us to be friends, are we then to sit idle and see 
46 the Super Powers play their game. 
United States is very often prompted by a desire to see 
India reassured that military supplies to Pakistan are not 
meant to injure India's interests. But more than such 
diplomatic gestures which failed in every case, India was 
reassured by the United States' ability to use its influence 
in Pakistan towards restraint and avoidance of a military 
solution to Kashmir and the U.S. willingness to lend money for 
47 India's economic development. 
The India-China Border Conflict 1962 s brought new U.S. 
pressure on India to make concessions to Pakistan and led to 
a widespread view in U.S.A., sedulously fostered by Pakistan 
also that in order to effectively meet the Chinese challenge 
India should make up with Islamabad. While fighting with 
China, India was being asked to give away the strategic and 
populated area of Kashmir. The United States strategic 
interests at that time demanded that the Sino-Indian conflict 
should not be enlarged and made more complicated. 
It is interesting to note in this context, that the two 
constants of the India-Pakistan-U.S. relationship have been; 
46 Ibid. 
47 G.S.Bhargava, Super power Involvement, Seminar, August, 
1986, p.41. 
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Pakistan's preoccupation with the perceived threat from India 
and U.S. security concern about the Soviet union. The mutual 
incompatibility between these two interests has not affected 
the relationship between the United States and Pakistan. 
On the other hand, the Soviet Union, since the moment, 
China rebelled, gave all possible assistance to India to 
counter the Chinese hegemonism. As a result India became 
more and more close to the Soviet Union. The presence of 
pro-Soviet communists and other parties in India encouraged 
the ruling party to join hands with the Soviets. 
After the fall of Shah's regime in Iran and Soviet 
invasion in Afghanistan Pakistan has become an important 
country for the United States. It has been able to get among 
other things $ 3.2 billion military and economic aid. Further 
news of joint intelligence sharing between United States and 
Pakistan cannot but force India to join further hands with the 
Soviets to ensure Indian security, even if it suits the Soviet 
strategy interests. 
Some Indians have argued that the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, coupled with the restiveness of Pakistan's ethnic 
minorities, primarily the Baluchis, poses a threat to the 
integrity of that country that augurs ill for India as well. 
They have suggested that India take the initiative to create a 
regional centre of power by reaching an understanding with 
China and Pakistan."* If this plan has not been pursued with 
any great vigour, there are two explanations. The first is 
that the complex disagreements that India has with China and 
Pakistan cannot be quickly settled. The suspicions, entrenched 
perceptions and domestic complications in all three countries 
pose formidable obstacles to speedy diplomacy. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Romesh Thapar, Economic and Political Weekly, Bombay, 
26 Jan., 1980, p.131. 
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In addition, India's primary concern is that the Soviet 
move into Afghanistan will lead the U.S. to arm China and 
Pakistan. To cope with this eventuality, India will not 
impair let .along jettison, what it regards as a tried and 
trusted friendship with the Soviets, who have provided arms 
and political support on the Kashmir issue and during the 
Bangladesh crisis, at crucial junctures. 
These considerations explain India's gingerly response 
to the Afghan crisis. This has ranged from Indira Gandhi's 
initial suggestion that 'other's interventions' in Afghanistan 
explained the Soviet action and Indian abstentions from the 
two condemnatory General Assembly Resolutions, to "innocuously 
worded" calls for the withdrawl of 'foreign troops' from 
Afghanistan. Nevertheless, India has not, unlike Cuba, 
Vietnam, and Ethiopia, supported the Soviet invasion and, 
during the many recent visits exchanged by Indian and Soviet 
officials, has privately but persistently expressed its 
unhappiness with the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. During 
the visit to New Delhi of Gromykgo and Brezhnev (February and 
December 1980) the two sides simply agreed to disagree and 
the communiques omitted any direct reference to the matter. 
The Civil War in East Pakistan which began in March 1971, 
had by that summer settled into a war of attrition. Imme-
diately, united States moved to supply Pakistan 100 M-47 
tanks through Turkey. The reported move was bound to create 
concern in India. An authoritative source in New Delhi 
pointed out that Pakistan's armed forces were nearly half 
the size of India's forces. Pakistan's armour was already 
comparable to that of India and the addition of M-47 tanks 
51 
would confer superiority on it. 
50 Texts in Pravada, 15 Feb.,1980, p.6, quoted by William 
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Defence Minister Swaran Singh told the Rajye Sabha 
on 2 November 1968, that an agreement had already been 
reached in principle that Turkey would supply 100 Patton 
tanks to Pakistan in exchange for more modem tanks for 
Turkey from the United States. India had pointed out, 
he said, to -the countries concerned that such a deal had 
grave implications both in regard to India's own defence 
responsibilities and to the objective of maintenance of 
peace in this subcontinent. India had also pointed out 
to them that these military supplies would make Pakistan 
more intransigent in its attitude towards normalization of 
52 
relations with India. 
On 7 October, 1970, the U.S.Government officially 
announced its decision to resume the supply of lethal 
weapons which induced B-58 bombers and interceptors. The 
U.S. Ambasador in India Keating called a press conference 
to explain that the objective behind the "limited" arms 
supply was to reduce Pakistan's dependence on China and 
4 53 Russia. 
A new situation was emerging in South Asia. A U.S.-
China-Pakistan relationship was beginning to emerge, while 
in East Bengal an elemental resistance to West Punjab 
dominance was brewing which was to draw the Soviet Union 
and India much closer, establishing a new relationship of 
trust and confidence and awareness of the identity of 
interests of the two. 
The U.S. and China were equally interested in protecting 
52 V.P.Dutt, India's Foreign Policy. Vikas, Delhi, 1984, 
p. 99. 
53 The Times of India, 14 October, 1970. 
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the territorial Integrity of the Pakistani State,. Neither 
country could ignore the Bengali demand for self-determination, 
but for their own reasons, they found it impossible to 
support the separatists. Moreover, after the Indo-Soviet 
treaty of August 1971, both the U.S. and China were convinced 
that the conflict in East Pakistan was being perpetuated 
by outside forces. The civil war in Bangladesh therefore 
had remifications far beyond the frontier of the Pakistani 
State. Indian authorities perceived collusion between 
Pakistan, the U.S. and Chine. China and the U.S. were no 
less certain that India and the Soviet Union were determined 
54 to dismember Pakistan. 
The U.S. administration took the ostensible position 
that the East Bengal revolt was a secessionist movement and, 
therefore, justified Yahya Khan's attempt to supress it. 
The U.S. was willing to extend sympathy and material support 
for the relief of the refugees andto bring about a dialogue 
between India and Pakistan to deffuse the tension and strive 
for a settlement. India's plea was that it was not an 
Indo-Pak issue. The military regime in West Pakistan had 
defied the will of the people expressed in the elections 
held under the auspices of the military regime itself, denied 
the majority party in the National Assembly.the right to form 
a government and clamped behind the prison its leaders. 
Sheikh Mujibur Rehman and many of his colleagues. The 
military regime had thus forfieted legitimacy and had no 
mandate to violently suppress the majority of the country, 
which resided in East Bengal. 
When the Indian army crossed into East Pakistan in 
December 1971, all these perceptions were confirmed. The 
54 Lawrence, Ziring, The Subcontinent in World Politics -
India, Its Neighbours and the Great Powers. 
55 V.P.Dutt, India's Foreign Policy, pp.cit., p.101. 
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U.S. felt the Indians would not have violated Pakistan's 
sovereignty had it not been for the support guaranteed it 
by the Soviet Union, In the U.N. India was pressured 
to desist and withdraw its forces behind its own frontier, 
but the Soviet Union sided with India and blocked any 
action in the security Council. While Pakistan waited in 
vain for the Chinese to open a front along the Himalayan chain 
China, the U.S.government decided to show its flag in the 
Bay of Bengal, and a small naval task force led by the 
nuclear carrier 'Enterprise* steamed into Indian waters. 
Undeterred by the American manoeuvre the Indian armed 
forces made short work of the isolated Pakistan garrison in 
East Pakistan, and, with no real sign of tangible external 
support, Bangladesh was recognised as an independent 
sovereign state both by India and the Soviet Union, and in 
the days that followed much more attention was given to the 
fact that Bangladesh was the first country to achieve its 
independence since World War II through the instrument of 
civil war. Even those countries that usually displayed 
sympathy for Pakistan held the view that the Pakistani 
government got what it deserved and that justice had finally 
been done to the Bengalis, though international law had 
been mangled in the process. 
More interesting, during the 1971 Bangladesh crisis 
when the notorious Nixon-Kissinger 'tilt' occurred, 
Pakistan invoked the 1959 Agreement of Cooperation but the 
U.S. would not go beyond despatching the Seventh Fleet 
Task Force into the Bay of Bengal. Although it was perceived 
by India as a U.S. threat to intervene in the Bangladesh 
war, in Pakistan it was dismissied as symbolic. Henry 
Kissinger himself admitted that "over the decades of our 
relationship with Pakistan there had grown a complex body of 
56 Lawrence Ziring, op.cit. 
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communications by the Kennedy and Johnson administration 
going beyond 1959 pact, some verbal/ some in writing, whose 
import was that the U.S. would come to Pakistan's assistance 
57 if she was attacked by India," 
It was Soviet prodding rather than American threat 
which made India declare a unilateral ceasefire. Thus the 
stated U.S. reservations towards Pakistan's efforts to 
include India in the orbit of its security agreements with 
the U.S. and its role in the 1971 crisis underline the 
fact that the Pakistan-U.S. relationship has been both partial 
and assymetrical from the beginning. For the U.S.,countering 
the Soviet Union was more important than siding with Pakistan 
against India, In .case of Pakistan, participation in the 
anti-communist alliances was only a means to fortify itself 
against the perceived threat from India. Pakistan is dis-
pensible for the U.S. especially in the larger global context 
but successive Pakistani regimes have depended heavily on 
58 the U.S., especially for military hardware. 
The trouble which the Super Powers are confronted with 
in South Asia is that in this region there are nations which 
themselves would like to emerge as power centres. Super 
Powers, therefore, do not know as to what role they assign 
to these aspirants in South Asia. The underdeveloped medium 
powers like India which may eventually aspire to be major 
powers,are to be afraid of rather than to be welcomed. And 
therefore, the Super Powers have been pursuing the policy of 
balancing the various aspirations in South Asia. Arms parity 
between India and Pakistan which some people advocate, 
emanates from this feeling. Arms parity may be an understandable 
57 Henry Kissinger, White House Years, Weidenfeld, London 
quoted in G.S.Bhargava, op.cit, 
58 G.S.BhBrgava, op.cit., p.43 
30 
concept; it ensures Indo-Pakistan peace. But the trouble 
is that the concept of arms parity between India and Pakistan 
really does not ensure peace. 
Such a policy, according to Sisir Gupta, seems to imply 
that India and Pakistan must coexist but not cooperate, India 
and Pakistan must live together and yet must not come 
together, and that they must live on the basis of arms parity, 
of institutional distrust. This means that they must 
neutralise each other, and then leave the task of stabilizing 
this region to others. As a scheme, of course, it is 
plausible, except for two things: one, that these aspiring 
nations of South Asia would not be able to play any worthwhile 
role in the wider world, and, two, that the ultimate respon-
sibility for the stabilization of this region would always 
59 
rest with the Super Powers. 
For the Soviet Union and China, Pakistan's international 
role did not matter. For the United States it was a convenient 
cover for obtaining and using influence in Pakistan. It 
worked as long as theU.S. was able to restrain Pakistan 
vis-a-vis India but the Chinese entry into the picture in the 
early 1960s wrecked the arrangement. It was now the turn 
of the Soviet Union to play the role of a mediator in South 
Asia withthe U.S.going quietly along with the effort. The 
Tashkent initiative was followed by Soviet supply of some 
military hardware, including tanks to Pakistan. 
The Soviet Union seems to be more concerned than the 
U.S.A. with South Asian affairs, particularly the Indo-
Pakistani relations, Moscow's emergence considered as the 
59 Sisir Gupta, Role of Major Powers in South Asia; based 
on the Report of a symposium held on the occasion of 
the All India Seminar on Foreign Policies of South 
Asian States held under the auspices of the South Asia 
Studies Centre, Univ. of Rajasthan, Jaipur, 1 to 6 Feb., 
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most influential outside power in the Indo-Pak subcontinent. 
With the intensification of the conflict with China and the 
realization that China was more a rival than an ally, Moscow 
was confronted with the problem of seeking fresh options and 
new friends. Moscow's turning towards India was an early 
move in response to this problem. India was the second 
largest country in Asia and an absence of national irritants, 
the border problems or open support to countries with whom 
India was in conflict as well as a steady convergence of the 
national interests of the two countries facilitated the fast 
development of friendship and cooperative relations. Now 
the Soviet efforts in Pakistan may be linked with the same 
search for option and friends. 
Moscow's ultimate hope and greater expectation is that 
the trangular alliance between Moscow, Islamabad and New 
Delhi would provide a more powerful counterbalance to the 
ambitions of China and the lures of Washington, Moscow has 
stepped up in economic assistance to both India and Pakistan. 
It had adopted a posture of studied but benevolent neutrality 
and all its efforts are aimed at preventing the eruption of 
the hot flames of war once again. 
The emergence of Sovereign independent Bangladesh in 
South Asia has radically altered the physical structure of 
the subcontinent; India emerged out of the conflict as the 
prominent power on the subcontinent. It definitely mad 
India's position stronger in the context of its rivalry 
with China more specially when the U.S. accepted India as a 
major country and recognised its special role of leadership 
in South Asia and promised not to join any grouping directed 
60 V.P. Dutt, 'Role of Major Powers in South Asia', 
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against India. But in actual practise there was very-
little substance behind these U.S. friendly guestures to 
India. The United States as a matter of fact regarded the 
events on the subcontinent tragic and one of the major 
disappointments for U.S. foreign policy in 1971. It virtually 
considered the subcontinent an area of Soviet sphere of 
influence. As an existing balance of power was not favourable 
to the U.S.,it was not happy with existing balance in South 
Asia, that is why within a short span of time following 
India's nuclear explosion in February 1975 the United States 
lifted its 10 year old embargo on the supply of weapons to 
Pakistan and began to emphasise concern about security of its 
63 
old ally Pakistan, 
The Bangladesh experience has been even more painful, 
if less expensive for the Soviet. Once it became obvious in 
mid-1971 that another Indo-Pakistani war was inevitable, 
Moscow openly threw its support behind India and the Bangladesh 
freedom movement. This, according to Leo, E.Rose, was done 
at some sacrifice to the Soviet reputation in West Asia, 
as the Bangladesh war was widely perceived as pitting Islamic 
Pakistan, (supported by China and the U.S.) against Hindu 
India (supported by the Russians). This contributed, if 
only marginally, to the problems the U.S.S.R.has faced in 
64 
maintaining credibility in West Asia. 
Moscow thus had good reason to expect Bangladesh to 
demonstrate its appreciation in tangible ways. Yet once 
again they were disappointed. Soviet efforts to obtain 
access right to a Bangladesh port, for instance, were 
eventually rejected by Dacca reportedly on the advice of the 
Indians. The assassination of President Mujibur Rehman of 
62 U.S.Foreign Policy for the 1970: A Report to Congress by 
Richard Nixon, President of the United States, 30 May, 
1973, Washington, 1973. 
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Bangladesh in 1975 and the installation of a government that 
displayed rather strong anti-Indian and anti-Soviet procli-
vities was another setback. While the new government in 
Dacca had to excercise caution when dealing with India, its 
vastly powerful neighbour, it could safely move to limit 
the presence of the Soviets, The 1977 elections in Sri 
Lanka, unseating a government in which the pro-Soviet 
conununist party was a partner, has produced similar conse-
65 quences in that country. 
Finally, the Soviet relationship with Pakistan that 
started to blossom briefly in the late 1960, barely survived 
the 1971 war, Moscow has indicated on several occasions 
its interests in reviving relations with Pakistan, and the 
Pakistani authorities have generally responded in kind. But 
there are some serious obstacles to any significant movement 
in this direction. Given the importance of the Chinese and 
Americans both to its domestic and its foreign policy, 
Islamabad must be primarily concerned with possible reactions 
in Peking and Washington to any substantial improvement in 
Soviet-Pakistani relations. For its part, Moscow continues to 
tilt towards India in its South Asian policy and thus, in the 
words of Leo, E,Rose, cannot safely ignore the still evident 
tendency in New Delhi to view the expansion of relations with 
Pakistan as potentially detrimental to Indian interests. 
The joint Indo-Soviet declaration signed on 26 October 
1977, indicated the various important issues on which India 
had received, and would continue to received, Soviet 
support. It also revealed that the two countries still 
had many "common purposes", one such purpose and an important 
one at that is to prevent the spread of Chinese influence 
in South Asia, If the Soviet need Indian in their plan to 
65 Ibid, 
66 Ibid. 
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encircle China, India too cannot affort to give up its 
"special" relations with the Soviet Union as long as China 
is a threat to its security. True, on 15 April 1976 when 
China and India announced that they were restoring full 
diplomatic relations after more than thirteen years, it 
appeared as though a thaw had occurred in their mutual 
relations, but the improvement in Sino-Indian relations, 
since then has been painfully slow. The Prime Minister of 
India had said in 1977 that China had been in occupation of 
over 14,000 square miles of Indian territory since the 1962 
"border operations" and that unless this question was settled, 
there cannot be complete understanding between our two 
countries. 
Two things more need to be said here. First, although, 
during the visit of Z.A.Bhutto to China in May 1976, Peking 
stated that it desired "peace" rather than "confrontation" 
in South Asia, continued Chinese political and military 
support for Pakistan and Bangladesh suggests that Peking is 
keeping its option open. It should not escape our attention, 
writes Golam W.Choudhry, that Peking played host to the two 
Zias of this subcontinent in 1977. General Zia-ur-Rehman, 
then the Chief Martial Law Administrator received an 
extremely warm and grand receptioh during his state visit to 
China between 2 and 6 January 1977. Subsequently there were 
reports that China offered as many as 12 sqardrons of MIG-21 
jet fighter planes, but that Dacca was unable to accept 
so many because of "the lack of storage and maintenance 
facilities". China also agreed to train pilots from 
Bangladesh. 
67 The Times of Indie, New Delhi, 1 December, 1977. 
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The Chinese welcomed the Chief Masrhsll Law Administrator 
of Pakistan, General Zia-ul-Haq, later that year, from 14 to 
19 December 1977. During this visit Vice-Premier Teng Hsiao-
Ping extended the customary "unswerving" support to Islamabad's 
efforts to safeguard its "national independence. State soverei-
gnty and interference from outside". He also reiterated his 
country's support for Pakistan's effort to secure the right 
of self determination for the people of Jammu and Kashmir. 
Besides Chinese military aid to Pakistan continues. Evidently, 
China has no desire to stop fishing in the troubled waters of 
the subcontinent in order to improve its relations with India. 
Second, when a 5 member delegation of U.S. senators met 
the prime Minister of India on 5 January, 1978, Morarji Desai 
told them that "no matter what any other nations did, India 
would never have atomic weapons". Earlier he had announced 
that India would not undertake even peaceful explosions. 
Whereas the Desai government has thus allowed its hands to be 
tied on the issue of nuclear weapons, the Chinese army has 
developed an intercontinental ballistic missile with a range 
of 12,800 kilometers. According to a U.S. military expert, 
China now has a stockpile of nuclear weapons amounting to 
several hundred, that its military planning is shifting 
from Mao's concept of people's war towards modern establish-
ment, including nuclear capability by land, sea and air, and 
that its goal is parity with the Soviet Union and the United 
States by the end of this century. In all probability the 
Chinese will not accept their existing frontiers with the 
Soviet Union. Nor ar^ they likely to vacate the Indian 
territories, occupied by them in the late fifties. India 
and the Soviet Union need each other's support on these 
issues. 
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The Soviet union continued to supply military equipment 
to India which created an arms imbalance in the subcontinent. 
The United States did not object to this because it was not 
averse to the Indian ambition to take over some part of 
Britain's role in the Indian Ocean and to counter the influence 
70 
of China in Asia. 
During the Soviet prime Minister Kosygin's visit to 
Islamabad.in April 1968, Pakistan expressed grave concern 
about the supply of Russian Arms to India. The Russian leader, 
71 it was reported, paid no heed to this matter. It led 
Pakistan to think that it was a mistake to sign the Tashkent 
Declaration. Some of the leaders exploited the people's 
anguish to built up a political movement against the regime 
of President Ayub Khan. The political agitation eventually 
led to Ayub's downfall. The chaos and instability that 
followed in Pakistan created turmoil in the South Asian region, 
and led, eventually, to the involvement of a number of outside 
powers in the politics of the subcontinent. In other words, 
domestic issues became the most difficult, indeed tragic 
aspect of Pakistan's foreign policy. Hence it is imparative 
to have some knowledge of Pakistan's domestic problems in order 
to understand the conditions that affected the relations of 
72 the super-powers with the South Asian States. 
United States interest in South Asia had subsided, partly 
as a result of entanglement in Vietnam and partly on account 
of a new vision of the world formulated by the U.S. President, 
Richard N ixon and his principal adviser, Henry Kissinger, in 
July 1971, Mr. Kissinger made a secret trip to Peking which 
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pp. 78-79 • 
37 
resulted in bringing about a rapprochement between China 
and the United States. This development alarmed both India 
73 
and the Soviet union. Foreign Minister of India, Sawarn 
Singh/ told the Indian Parliament "while we welcome the 
rapproachment, we cannot look upon it with equanimity if it 
means the domination of the two countries over this region". 
The Soviet Union was also annoyed at Pa)<istan*s role in 
facilitating Kissinger's trip to Peking and regarded the 
Siho-American rapprochement as a move to counter Soviet 
influence in South Asia to cope with this development in world 
affairs, India and the Soviet Union hastily entered into a 
Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation which had been 
under consideration ever since 1969 when the Soviet leader, 
Leonid Brezhnev, had come out with an Asian Collective 
Security Plan. 
It was clear that India could not carry on the conflict 
with Pakistan in isolation from the great power content. India 
had rightly calculated that the U.S. after having burnt its 
fingers in Vietnam, was not likely to commit troops in any 
other war in Asia, not in the near future at any rate. The 
U.S. influence in Asia was on the decline, though it was not 
quite clear whether the U.S. would reconcile to Soviet 
74 influence in this area. 
However, neither Pakistan nor Bangladesh accept India's 
domination in the region. And the U.S's determination to 
keep its own activities in balance with those of other powers 
has prevented the balance of power in South Asia from tilting 
solely on the side of India and the Soviet Union. 
73 G.W.Choudhury, India. Pakistan. Bangladesh and The 
Great Powers, London, The Free Press, 1975, p.205 
74 K. Subrahmanyam, "India's security". Survival, London, 
The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 
May 1971, p.156 
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Chapter II 
SOVIET POLICY IN SOUTH ASIA - I 
The post-war Soviety policy in Asia is to underline the 
qualitative changes that have come about in international 
politics since the end of the World War II. The beginning 
of the process of the liquidation of the colonial system, the 
assertion of political independence by fommer colonial and 
semi-colonial countries and later their struggle to achieve 
economic independence, all these factors combined together 
with other new world developments, have led to the trans-
formation of international politics of our times. Likewise, 
they have also hastened the process of imparting an Asian 
content in the external norm and conduct of Soviet Society. 
Upon capturing power in November 1917, the Bolsheviks for 
some time were concerned with putting their house in order 
and were obsessed with ideology. They believed that when 
the time came they had only to give a little push and the 
capitalist world would come down crashing and that "the 
colonial slaves of Asia and Africa" would have to wait for 
their liberation until the victory of "proletarian dictator-
ship in Europe", When the desired 'inevitable' did not take 
place, the theory was modified to forge an alliance of 'the 
three basic revolutionary forces, namely, Soviet Russia, 
the working class of the developed capitalist countries and 
2 the national liberation movement of the oppressed peoples.' 
1 Zafar Imam, Ideology and Reality in Soviet Policy in 
Asia, Kalyani Publishers, Delhi, 1975. 
2 Y.Zhukov, and others. The Third World; Prospects and 
Problems, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1970, p.176. 
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Asia saw great political and social ferment during 
this period. For example, in Afghanistan, Emir Amanullah 
raised the banner of revolt against Britaish imperialism. 
J.V.Stalin considered the Afghan struggle for independence 
"objectively revolutionary" in spite of the monarchical 
outlook of the Emir and his followers, for it weakens, 
3 
disorganises, and undermines imperalism." In India, the 
Soviet declaration on the right of nations to self-determina-
tion created considerable interest. An Indian delegation, 
led by Mohammad Hadi", met Lenin on November 23, 1918, appraised 
him of the impact of this declaration on India and expressed 
the hope that "our brothers in great free Russia will extend 
their hand in the cause of liberation of Indian and all peoples 
of the world".'* 
The fundamentals of the political course the Soviet Union 
is following in the international arena, were set forth imme-
diately after the October Revolution in Russia. The Soviet 
government declared its breaking with the foreign policy of 
tzarism. The Soviet government recognised the independence of 
Finland, and declared unequal treaties, which the Czar concluded 
with the countries of the East, null and void. Having denounced 
these, the Soviet government also published all the secret 
treaties, among which there was the 1916 agreement between 
Russia, Great Britain and France on the division of Turkey 
and Iran and others. 
In the conduct of Soviet foreign policy, a distinctly 
western orientation became more and more marked although the 
liquidation of the colonial system in all its forms remained 
3 Cited in Ivan Spector, The Soviet Union and the Muslim World, 
1917-1956, Mimeographed, U.S.A., 1956, p.55 
4 The Hindustan Times, Delhi, 20 November, 1968 
5 Yuri V.Gankovsky, "International Relations, peace and 
Security ; Problems of South Asia in the works of Soviet 
Orientalist", Strategic Studies, Quarterly Journal of the 
Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, VI(2 & %) . 
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one of the primary objectives of Soviet Society and the inter-
national communist movement. It can be legitimately argued 
that such an orientation was called for in view of the pre-
dominant character of international politics of the inter-
war years, and also because of the weak position of socialist 
Russia in the community of Nations. 
Lenin strived to restructure the system of international 
relations on the principles of equality of all nations and 
peoples, so as to open possibilities for the removal of 
mistrust and conflicts, the establishment of a spirit of 
mutual understanding and the successful development of every-
thing valuable that the contemporary civilization has obtained 
through joint efforts. These principles of foreign policy of 
the Soviet Socialist state found their reflection, in 
particular, in the treaties signed by Soviet Russia with Turkey, 
Iran and Afghanistan in 1921, which were based on equality and 
respect of the sovereignty of the parties involved. The 1921 
treaties were, as is known, the first equal treaties these 
three countries of Asia signed with a great power in modern 
7 
and contemporary history. 
Lenin put down the achievement of a democratic universal 
peace as the priority task of the Soviet government. War was 
condemned as the greatest strife against humanity in the 
very first legal act of the Soviet State, "The Decree on 
Peace." Lenin put forward the principle of peaceful co-
existence of states with different social structures as a 
fundamental principle of the Soviet state's foreign policy, 
allowing the attainment of lasting peace between peoples and 
rejecting war as a means of solving conflicts in the inter-
national arena. 
6 Zafar Imam, o p . c i t . 
7 Yuri V.Gankovsky, o p . c i t . 
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(A) Soviet Involvement ; The Background 
Roosevelt and Stalin had several discussions on the 
future of the colonies of Japan as well as of Britain, France 
and the Netherlands. At Teheran they pondered over the 
future of Indo-China and India, and both seemed to agree that 
Q 
India presented a complicated problem. Roosevelt expressed 
himself in favour of political reform in India "from the 
bottom, somewhat on the Soviet line". Stalin stressed the 
complexity and ambiguity of Indian class relationships and 
warned that reforms from the bottom might mean revolution. 
Both the United States and the Soviet Union appeared to 
be in broad agreement on how to tackle the post-war colonial 
problems, until differences began to emerge at the San Francisco 
Conference of the UN. The differences, however, were not 
serious. The Soviets appeared to understand that the American 
retreat from "independence" to "self government" as the 
explicit goal of UN trusteeship was an unavoidable concession 
to the British, The Soviet Union accepted permanent membership 
of the Trusteeship Council, a reversal of their decision not to 
have anything to do with the League of Nations mandate system 
in the thirties. 
At San Francisco the Soviet delegation fought for a more 
radical trusteeship charter, Soviet publicists did not fail 
to point out the contrast between Moscow's progressive 
colonial perspective and the American retreat to "self 
government" but they were not overly critical of the U.S. 
g 
position. 
8 Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, McMills, Vol.11, 
p, 470, quoted in Bhabani Sen Gupta, The Falcurm of Asia : 
Relations Among China, India, Pak and the USSR, Peagus, 
New York, 1970, p,421 
^ Pray ad a, 8 and 9 June, 1945, Also see New Times, 15 Dec, 
1945, pp. 3-6 
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The Soviet Union got the reward it was aiming at. Their 
labours iihpressed the colonial countries of Asia and Africa. 
The Asian sentiment was voiced by Jawaharlal Nehru: "There 
is no doubt that during the last few years there has been 
some disillusionment in India with regard to American 
championship of freedom", he said, "At San Fransisco, the 
Soviet Union took the lead in championing independence for 
subject peoples but other powers fought shy of this and 
tried their utmost to choke it down". 
The Soviet Union came in contact with India in 1946 at the 
Paris peace Conference and at the UN Conference at San 
Francisco. The Indian delegation to the Paris Conference 
consisted of officials who hardly represented the political 
changes that were imminent and the Soviets were highly 
critical of its performance. In a report Pravada described 
all members of the Indian interim government of which Nehru 
was the defecto head, as "representatives of the right wing, 
with the sole exception of Nehru himself"; the Indian 
delegation at Paris was just the "loyal vassal of British 
imperialism". It was even doubtful that the Indian government 
would be able to translate into reality Nehru's aspiration 
for an independent foreign policy. At the Paris Conference 
the Soviet Union expected more objective voting on the part 
of the Indian delegation, but,"we have been confronted once 
again with the impossible situation wherein the Indian 
delegation simply fulfilled its colonial obligation to vote 
in accordance with the will of another country — according 
to the will of Great Britain." 
Molotov had obtained in Paris some idea of Nehru's foreign 
10 Jawahar Lai Nehru, Before and After Independence, A 
Collection of Speeches, 1922-1954, New Delhi, p.376 
11 Pravada, 21 October, 1946 
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policy aspirations from his personal representative V.K. 
Krishna Menon. At the San Francisco Conference, India was 
able to play an independent role especially on the colonial 
question and the Soviet delegation often found the Indian 
delegation voting with it and against the western powers. 
Issues on which the Soviets and India voted together included 
trusteeship/ military bases in trust areas, and racial dis-
crimination. At a luncheon for the Indian delegation at 
San Francisco, Molotov now said that this expectation that 
the "authentic voice of India" would be raised on behalf of 
12 
"progressive causes" had been "so completely fulfilled." 
The visits which Khruschev and Bulganian made in 1955 to 
India/ Burma and Afghanistan marked the beginning both of 
the Soviet foreign aid programme and of the Soviet Union's 
special relationship with India,'vhlle the arms deal with 
Egypt in the same year was the first to be concluded as part 
of a new policy of military aid to non-communist countries. 
It has been estimated that by the time of Khruschev's fall 
about 3 billion dollars worth of arms had been supplied to 
thirteen such countries in the preceding decade amounting 
to nearly half the total of all Soviet economic aid to 
13 
underdeveloped countries in the same period. 
The Soviet stance on India and Pakistan began to harden 
in early 1947. A strong Soviet delegation attended the Asian 
Relations Conference in Nev; Delhi in February. One of its 
members was E. Zhukov/ who also travelled extensively in 
India after the Conference. The Soviet delegation looked at 
the conference with suspicion, many of the delegates were 
surprised when it rose to oppose a resolution to create an 
12 The Hindu, Madras, 8 December, 1946 . 
13 See Thomas W.Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, 1945-70, 
Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1970, p.130, quoted in 
Robin Edmonds, Soviet Foreign Policy 1962-73; The Paradox 
of Super Power, Oxfore Univ.Press, New York, 1975, pp.11-12, 
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14 Asian block. The report on conference that Zhukov made to 
a Moscow meeting of Soviet experts on the colonial question 
revealed an astonishing hostility towards India. The New Delhi 
Conference as a whole did play a useful role, said Zhukov, 
who had words of praise for Egypt, Indonesia, Indo-China and 
Burma. But he attacked Nehru for his "pro-British sentiments, 
his pan-Asianism, his failure to organize Asia in opposition 
to westeen imperialism". 
Zhukov found the Indian Nationalist leaders eager to 
conciliate the West. Nehru had failed to give a class inter-
pretation to Indian independence. Zhukov suspected India of 
harbouring expansionist ambitions in Asia and was quite alarmed 
by the prospect of India and China, either separately or in 
collaboration, filling up the power vacuum in Asia created by 
the defeat of Japan. 
Zhukov found the leadership of the Indian National 
Congress as "big capitalist". The British had neither departed 
from India in reality nor did they intend to do so. "Asia 
is heavily burdened with feudal remnants, and a purifying 
thunderstorm for her, undoubtedly was not only useful, but 
necessary". In his travel accounts Zhukov painted the 
picture of an India that was "weighed down by centuries of 
backwardness", where the proletariat was becoming a "more 
and more important factor in the political life", and a 
"considerable element" in the youth had an admirable "fighthing 
spirit".-"-^  
AS the Soviets did not believe that India was independent, 
it was impossible that they should make an objective assess-
ment of India's non-aligned status or its position in the 
14 "The Asian Conference", International Affairs, Moscow, 
July, 1947, p.303 
15 Pravada, 12 May and 16 May, 1947 
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newly emerging Asian-African world. Zhukov came down heavily 
on the policy of non-alignment, which he chose to describe 
as the so-called "theory of third force". He denounced it as 
"an imperialist device for slandering the Soviet Union by 
16 placing it on the same level with American imperialism." 
In the Soviet scheme of things, there were only two 
paths — the path of "Socialism and progress" followed by 
the Soviet block and the path of "imperialism and decay" 
adopted by the West, TheSoviets could not conceive of a 
third course. They dubbed Nehru reformist when he talked 
of a middle course for India's economic and industrial 
development and its foreign policy. To them Nehru's line of 
argument meant compromising with the "enemy", instead of 
destroying him altogether. Indeed, in all Soviet writings 
during the Stalin period India was never presented to the 
17 Soviet readers as a non-aligned country. 
A few months later, on June 2, 1950, Pravada reported 
that the united States insisted on "forming an aggressive 
block", that a conference of the representatives of a number 
of Asian countries, including Pakistan, India and Ceylon, 
was convened in the Phillipines in May 1950 for this purpose 
at the "initiative" of the United States and that the parti-
cipating governments had long been "collaborating with Anglo-
American Imperialism". However, it was observed that India, 
Pakistan and Ceylon had refused "open declaration of allegiance 
to the aggressive American plan", since they feared "opposition 
18 
of their peoples to such a plan." 
16 Cited in. Vijay Sen Budhraj, Soviet Russia and the Hindustan 
subcontinent, quoted in Raghunath Ram, Super Powers and 
Indo-Pakistan Sub-Continent; Perceptions and Policies, The 
Coxton Press, New Delhi, 1985, p.51 
17 Raghunath Ram, Super Powers and Indo-Pakistan subcontinent; 
Perceptions and Policies, op.cit. 
18 Pravda, 2 June 1950 
46 
India's decision to remain in the Commonwealth of 
Nations, even after the coming into force of the nev consti-
tution which declared India a republic, was criticized. It 
was argued that the membership of the Commonwealth made it 
obligatory for the Indian government constantly to "consult" 
19 
with London on questions of foreign policy. 
As India's first ambassador to the Soviet Union, Mrs. 
Vijayalakshmi Pandit experienced Soviet suspicion and hostility 
during her stay in Moscow. The Kremlin cold-shouldered her, 
believing that Nehru "being too pro-Mountbatten",could not be 
20 
very different from "the ordinary run of imperialist lackeys." 
There was little response from Moscow to Nehru's articulated 
desire for close, friendly relations. Pakistan presented 
the Soviets with an additional problem — the Marxist 
aversion for religion and Moscow's failure to understand 
until very recently, what an American scholar has termed as 
21 Islam's "instrumentality in politics". 
However, India's position on Korea highlighted the 
authenticity of India's policy of non-alignment and led to a 
little warmth in the relations between India and the Soviet 
Union. In his efforts to stop the Korean war, Jawaharlal Nehru 
wrote personal letters to J.V, Stalin in July 1950. Stalin 
replied immediately and his reply was considered to be 
22 
"favourable" and conciliatory in the West. Yet, on the whole, 
India's mediatory efforts during the Korean War were suspected 
in both Peking and Moscow, Chou En-lai called Nehru "The 
running dog of British imperialism". Vyshinsky, though less 
abusive, was more sarcastic, when he observed; "At best you 
19 New Times, 15 March, 1950, No.11, p.3 
20 The Hindustan Times, New Delhi 22 Nov 1955 
21 P.J.Vatikiotis, J.Harris Proctor, ed., "Islam and the 
Foreign Policy of Egypt", Islam and International Relations, 
London, 1965, p.150 
22 R,W. Worth, Soviet Russia in World Politics, Vision, London, 
1963, p.396 
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are dreamers and idealists. At worst you do not understand 
your own position and camouflage horrilole American policy" -
Broadcasts from both countries contained this theme, and the 
Chinese particular indulged in such personal vilification 
23 
of Nehru. 
In the mid-fifties, the Kremlin had neither the wish 
nor the opportunity to begin its new South Asia policy with 
Pakistan, the latter was already a military ally of the U.S. 
Khrushchev and Bulganin undertook their Asian journey in 
late 1955 and determined to offer economic and political 
support to India, which no Indian government, in identical 
external and internal environment, could possibly decline. 
In contrast with this India based South Asia policy of the 
Soviet Union in the mid-fifties, was the tentative gesture 
of friendship Moscow had extended to Pakistan in the late 
forties. Soviet neutrality on the Kashmir issue as it came 
to the Security Council in 1948 was, in itself, an ambiguous 
move; it pleased the Indians, particularly because it was 
couched in language strongly condemning imperialist manoeuvres 
24 to "turn Kashmir into an American base". 
India's refusal to sign a Japanese Peace Treaty in San 
Francisco in 1951 evoked an even more positive, though indirect, 
response from the Soviet Union. During the summer of 1951 
there began a limited cultural exchange programme. More 
significantly, the Soviets started shipping wheat and other 
food-stuffs to India with much fanfare to help it tide over 
25 food crisis in 1951. They also called upon the CPI to work 
within the parliamentary framework of the Indian system. This 
was undoubtedly to the Congress government's advantage. 
23 "India", Round Table, March, 1953, XLIII(170), p.170 
24 Alan Campbell Johnson, Mission V^ ith Mountbatten, London, 
1951, p.287, in Bhabani Sen Gupta, The Falcrum of Asia, 
op.cit. 
25 Pravada, 10 Ji^ ne 1951 
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Also, on the diplomatic front, the Soviet delegate to the 
United Nations, Jacob Malik, rejected the idea of a UN 
plebiscite during a debate on Kashmir in the Security Council 
in 1952, thereby perceptibly moving closer to the Indian 
2 f> 
position. At the session of the Economic Commission for 
Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) held in Singapore in 1951 the 
Soviet delegate indicated the v;illingness of the Soviet Union 
to assist in the industrial development of the newly independent 
states. Other perceptible signs of change in the Soviet 
attitude towards India in 1952 included Soviet participation 
in the International Film Festival and the International 
27 Industrial Exhibition held in Bombay in that year. In April 
1952 India participated in the International Economic Conference 
in Moscow, where the Soviet Union made an offer to increase 
Indo-Soviet trade. However, negotiations were not consummated 
in the form of a trade agreement until after Stalin's death. 
The Soviet Union as a global power is primarily interested 
in holding its allies in Eastern Europe, undermining NATO and 
extending its influence in the Third World. As compared to 
Europe, Asia is clearly of secondary interest to the Soviet 
Union. The evolution of Soviet South Asian policy has been 
of decent origin, a few decades old. The Soviet Union started 
taking interest in South Asia only after the emergence of 
people's Republic of China, creation of SEATO and the estab-
lishment of American bases in South Vietnam, Thailand, 
Phillipines and Pakistan, It was Khrushchev who came to 
recognise the pressing need for securing a firm foothold in 
South Asia for neutralising the power thrust of U.S.A. and 
China. 
Khrushchev's changes in the doctrine of Soviet foreign 
26 J.A.Naik, "Soviet Policy on Kashmir", India Quarterly, 
New Delhi, 24(1), Jan-March 1968, p.52 
27 Pravada, 7 Jan, 1952 
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policy/ coupled with his claim for Soviet ballistic missile 
technology/ contributed to the great schism in the communist 
world/ which became public the year before his fall. Although 
both sides trace the origin of the Sino-Soviet dispute to 
1957/ the Chinese leaders seem unlikely ever to have forgiven 
the Russians for their ambivalent attitude to their cause 
from 1920 onwards. Nevertheless, according to Khrushchev's 
impetuous nature, his conduct of the dispute by public abuse, 
and his attempt to have Chinese doctrines condemned by the 
majority of the international communist movement may well 
have loomed large in the minds of his colleagues when they 
finally decided to remove him from power.^^ 
The world situation took some amusing turn in the early 
1960s with the thawing of East-West relations. Within the world 
communist movement, the first break between the Soviet Union 
and China took place in June 1960 at the Romanian Communist 
Party Congress, The watershed was reached at the meeting of 
eighty-one communist parties held in Moscow in December 1960, 
when in another confrontation Albania supported China, while 
the Indonesian/ North Korean, and North Vietnamese delegates 
remained neutral/ although inclined towards Chinese. 
In October 1961/ at the XXII Congress of the CPSU, to 
which Albania had not been invited, Khrushchev attacked 
Albania — iroplicity China — for opposing the line agreed 
at the XX Congress. Only two-thirds of the parties represented 
at the Congress endorsed the attak on Albania; all the 
Asians remained silent. In the following year/ when by a 
remarkable (but genuine) coincidence the Sino-Indian border 
war broke out two days before the Cuban missile crisis began, 
the two communist governments for a few days lent each other 
moral support. But by the 5 November 1962 the Chinese had 
28 Robin Edmonds, op.cit., pp. 13-14 
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begun to criticize the Soviet withdrawal of missiles from 
Cuba, and the Russians had reverted to their earlier attitude 
of neutrality towards the Sino-Indian dispute,urging the 
need for a negotiated settlement and continuing to provide 
29 
military aid to India. 
Ware between India, the befriending of which had 
enabled the U.S.S.R, to gain much influence in the third 
world, and China, fraternal member of the communist block, 
initially strained the Indo-Soviet relations that had 
developed so well during the preceding eight years. Khrushchev 
described the border fighting as "an outright godsend for the 
30 imperialists", and he had good reason to despair about a 
conflict in which he did not have to favour one side over 
the other. 
Prior to the War, India had hoped that the U.S.S.R.would 
restrain China and in the event of a major armed conflict, 
remain neutral. This hope was not entirely without foundation: 
The Soviet Union did not want to lose friendship of India and 
made it look to the West for help. The U.S.S.R. made its 
position clear in September 1959, three years before the 
outbreak of war, declaring for the first time that it took 
a neutral position in conflict between a communist and a 
non-communist country. But when the War erupted in the midst 
of the Cuban crisis,unity within the communist block against 
the western countries was vital, and the Soviet Union felt 
compelled to show some fraternal feeling towards Peking. 
On October 25, 1962, Pravada and Izvestia praised as 
"constructive" China's three point peace proposal of 
October 1-24, a proposal already rejected by India,and 
29 Ibid., pp. 17-18 
30 Pravda , 13 and 25 December, 1963 
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implicitly blamed India. The Soviet press did not condemn what 
India regarded as Chinese aggression, and it endorsed the 
Chinese views on the McMahon line, India's eastern boundary 
with China. 
During the period that followed not only Sino-Indian 
relations deteriorated, but the relations between India and 
Soviet Union were strengthened considerably. From now 
onwards more Soviet leaders began to visit India and among 
those were Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Kosygin, Suslov, Kozhlov, 
and NiXoyan. Indeed, Khrushchev preferred to be in India 
on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the Sino-Soviet 
Agreement of Friendship and alliance of 1950, which incident 
according to a leading expert of Chinese affairs, tended to 
31 
add to Mao's irritation againstKhrushchev and India. 
When the Sino-Indian dispute could not be resolved 
peacefully, Mao, for his own reasons, launched a large scale 
aggression on India in October 1962. There was nothing to 
show that Russia exhibited either pro-India or pro-China 
behaviour instantly. No Soviet paper carried any news of 
the Sino-Indian war in the following two days. When the 
Chinese forces were on the Indian soil, the American President 
declared the Cuban blockade from 24 October 1962 to the ships 
carrying war material to Cuba. The Cuban blockade, more 
than the Sino-Indian war, was a big embarrasement to the 
Russians, Unlike clashes on the Indian frontier, it came up 
suddenly and unexpectedly, and it placed the Soviet leaders 
in an unenviable predicament. Under the compulsion of deve-
lopments on the Cuban front, Russia made quick moves in the 
32 Sino-Indian War too. 
31 Sisir Gupta, "India and the Soviet Union", Current History, 
March 1963, p.146; Also see J.A.Naik, Soviet Policy towards 
India;From Stalin to Brezhnev, Vikas, Delhi, 1970, p,152 
32 J.A. Naik, op.cit., p.159 
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This turn in the Soviet policy towards India, however, 
came to an early end when the cause which brought it into 
existence had sxobsided. pressed with the American confronta-
tion on Ciiba, the Russian policy to relly her allies round 
her continued so long as it had a mind to meet the U.S. 
challenges. When, however, its Cuban policy changed and 
Russia decided to withdraw the missiles frcan Cuba, its policy 
in the Sino-Indian war once again underwent a change. When 
thus the Soviet authorities decided the Cxiban policy once 
for all they made up their mind to restore the earlier 
Soviet policy of neutrality in the Sino-Indian conflict. 
Russian Offer of Friendship to Pakistan 
While supporting India on the Kashmir issue, Khrushchev 
also said in Srinagar that the Soviet Union would like to have 
friendly relations with Pakistan and "it is no fault of ours 
if such relations have not so far developed. In the interest 
of peace, however, we shall steadily strive for an improvement 
34 
of these relations," In the Supreme Soviet, Khrushchev 
observed that Moscow was willing to meet Pakistan half way in 
35 
establishing friendly relations". This did not mean that 
Moscow wanted Pakistan to travel halfway by extricating 
itBelf from SEATO and the Baghdad Pact. 
Pakistan's participation in the western sponsored 
military alliances and the open Soviet support for India and 
Afghanistan on the Kashmir and Pakhtoonistan issues respectively 
generated bitterness and hostility between Pakistan and the 
Soviet Union, Yet even at this stage, the Soviet Union did not 
33 Ibid., p.155 
34 Bulganin and Khrushchev, Speeches During Sojourn in India, 
Burma and Afghanistan, Tass, New Delhi, 1956 
35 New Times, 5 Jan 1956, No. 2, Docximents, p,23 
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appear to wish to write off Pakistan altogether. In an 
article published in August 1956, Izvestia observed that 
Pakistan was not altogether lost to the West in spite of its 
membership of the South East Asia Treaty Organisation ISEATO) 
36 
and Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO). 
The Soviet Union wanted Pakistan to accept as few 
commitments as possible under the western-sponsored alliance 
system and thereby prevent itself from becoming a source of 
serious tension in the region. Pakistan, it held, "need not 
go the whole hog with the Western countries in its anti-
communism, or, at any rate, anti-Sovietism in view of the 
willingness of the Soviet Union to develop mutual trade and 
cultural relations." The motivation behind the endeavour of 
the Soviet Union to develop friendly relations with Pakistan 
in spite of the latter's openly pro-Western orientation 
appeared to be its concern for its own security. Pakistan's 
strategic location in the subcontinent and the Indian Ocean 
region and its proximity to Soviet Central Asia were facts 
that the Soviet Union could not ignore. In Soviet strategic 
thinking both India and Pakistan were equally important, and 
that is why, in the speech made at a public reception at 
Srinagar on 10 December 1955, Nikita S. Khrushchev, while 
announcing Soyiet support for India's stand on the Kashmir 
question, was nevertheless careful to keep the door open for 
normalizing relations with Pakistan. He said that the 
Soviet Union would like to have "friendly relations with 
Pakistan (and) we shall persistently strive to improve these 
37 
relations." 
36 Izvestia, 14 August 1955; also see "Political Changes 
in Pakistan", International Affairs (Moscow), September 
1955 
37 N.A. Bulganin and N.S. Khrushchev, Visit of Friendship to 
India, Burma, Afghanistan, Moscow, 1956, p.114; also see 
Pravda, 11 Dec 1955 
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Later, in the Supreme Soviet, he again declared: "We on 
our side are ready to meet attempts to establish friendly 
38 
relations with Pakistan." 
The Soviet offer to Pakistan in February 1956 to share 
technical knowledge on the peaceful uses of atomic energy 
was an indication that Pakistan lay well within the scope 
of the Soviet aid programme, premier Bulganin clearly told 
Pakistan that "there are adequate opportunities for mutually 
beneficial economic cooperation between the Soviet Union and 
Pakistan if only there was willingness on both sides." On 
trade, he said, "there exists a practical possibility for 
promotion of trade relations between the two countries". 
He even suggested that it might be desirable to have a 
39 trade agreement between Pakistan and the Soviet union. 
In Moscow, the Rep\ablic Day celebrations in the Pakistani 
embassy were attended by the Soviet Foreign Minister, 
V.M. Molotov, who, in a toast to the new Republic, said: "For 
our part we drink to the establishment of good neighbourly 
40 
relations between Pakistan and the Soviet Union." In 
Karachi, the Soviet Union was represented by A.L.Mikoyan, 
First Vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., 
at the Republic Day festivities. During his stay in Karachi, 
he, among other things, delivered an invitation to the Speaker 
of the Pakistan Constituent Assembly for a Parliamentary 
delegation to visit the U.S.S.R. The invitation was gladly 
41 
accepted, 
38 Ibid., p.291 
39 Izvestia, 7 February 1956 
40 Pakistan Times, 25 March 1956 
41 "World Events", New Times, 29 March 1956 (No.l4), 
p.31; Also see Dawn, 30 March 1956 
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After the coming into power of General Ayxib Khan, 
Pakistan started negotiating with the United States for a new 
military agreement. The Soviet government held that the 
conclusion of a new agreement would complicate the situation 
in South East Asia and the Middle East and warned Pakistan 
that this could involve her in the military ventures of the 
Western powers. Though Pakistan assured that foreign 
military bases on its territory could not be used by the 
foreign military powers against the Soviet Union and the 
peace loving neighbour of Pakistan without the wishes of the 
Pakistani government, the Soviet government again warned 
that the government of Pakistan bore full responsibility for 
the consequences of any steps Pakistan undertook "to transform 
43 her territory into a foreign military base." 
It shows that the Soviets might have known that the 
United States was sending spy planes into Soviet Russia from 
its military bases in West Pakistan, A few months later, on 
May 2/ 1960, when the Soviet Union shot down one such plane, 
the Kremlin sent a strong protest to Karachi, and Khrushchev 
threatened to destroy the Peshawar military base from which 
the U-2 plane (spy plane) was said to have flown. 
Change in Soviet Policy Towards South Asia 
India's military reverses in its border clashes with 
China brought into sharp focus the limitation of the South 
Asia policy that the Soviet Union had followed till then and 
which was almost exclusively India-centered. The Soviet Union 
seemed to have believed till then that India was in a position 
to defend its borders with China. The hxomiliating defeat 
42 "Soviet Government Statement to Government of Pakistan", 
CDSP, March 25, 1959, XI(8), p.32 (from Pravda and 
Izvestia, 20 February 1959 
43 Ibid. 
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that India suffered caused great anxiety in Moscow. Indeed 
there was much greater anxiety in Moscow than in Washington, 
because India appeared to be drifting towards the Western 
camp. India's debacle and its drift towards the Western 
camp signified for the Soviet Union a qualitative change 
in the international situation* particularly in Asia. The 
Soviet Union made an attempt, though half-hearted, to build-up 
44 
India as a counter weight to China. 
By striking a severe blow at India, China upset the 
balance of power in Asia and raised its own prestige at a 
time when there were no signs of improvement in Sino-Soviet 
relations. The Chinese action, therefore^ threatened to 
checkmate Soviet policy in the region. And it looked as 
though Soviet interests were now going to be undermined by 
China rather than by the United States. The widening Sino-
Soviet rift, which coincided with the final breach between 
China and India, was an important development which made a 
great impact on the Soviet thinking on the South Asian 
region. 
China* s growing close relations with Pakistan caused 
concern in Moscow, The Soviet Union did not want a hostile 
Pakistan backed by China. Thus it became essential for the 
Soviet Union to establish its presence in Pakistan and 
counter China's growting influence there, especially when 
India had shown how weak it was vis-a-vis China. 
The growing detente between the super powers, especially 
after the Cuban missiles crisis of October 1962, also contri-
buted to some extent to a re-orientation of Soviet policy. 
44 Selig H.Harrison, "South Asia and U.S. Policy", New 
Republic, Washington, D.C., 11 December 1961, p.11; 
quoted in Raghunath Ram, Super Powers and Indo-Pakistan 
Subcontinent t Perceptions and Policies, op.cit., p.244 
57 
Moscow stepped up Its efforts to improve its relations with 
Pakistan. The agreement on the exploration of oil was 
concluded in the summer of 1961, It provided for, among 
other things, a Soviet loan of Rs. 150 million to be used for 
the purpose of exploring the sources of oil in Pakistan. 
Moreover, just as on the eve of improvements in relations 
with India and Prime Minister Nehru's visit to the U.S.S.R., 
Moscow started translating important Indian books in 1961, 
Soviet Russia began to translate into the Russian language 
works of all major Pakistani writers. Perhaps Moscow was 
preparing the way for playing host to the President of 
45 Pakistan, 
For Pakistan, Kashmir was the touchstone to test the 
friendship of the Soviet union. The 1962 Security Council 
debate on Kashmir provided this opportunity to Pakistan. 
Moscow did not give any assurance to Pakistan, In fact, 
Pakistan invoked the Security Council for the solution of the 
Kashmir dispute with a belief that it would get strong support 
from the West. But the Soviet Union's stand in the Security 
Council did not give any comfort to Pakistan. 
However, the Soviet Union continued to strive resolutely 
to realize its set objective. On 7 October 1963 it concluded 
with Pakistan an air agreement providing for the operation 
of Aeroflot and Pakistan International Airways in each other's 
territories. The two countries also agreed to provide the 
necessary traffic facilities at specified points located in 
46 their respective territories. Pakistan and the Soviet 
47 Union signed a credit agreement on 17 June 1964. This 
agreement provided for a credit of $ 11 million to Pakistan. 
Though the amount involved was small, the credit agreement was 
45 Vijay Sen Budhraj, op.cit., p,135 
^^ Izvestia, 8 October 1963 
47 Dawn, 18 June 1964 
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significant in the sense that it indicated the willingness 
of the Soviet Union to participate in Pakistan's efforts to 
accelerate its economic recovery and development. A few 
days earlier, on 11 June 1964, Pakistan and the Soviet Union 
had signed an agreement on a cultural and scientific exchange 
48 programme for 1964, 
In spite of all these events, Pakistan was not too happy 
with the terms of trade offered by the Soviet union. Pakistani 
leaders expressed unhappiness about the Soviet arms aid to 
India. Commenting on Soviet announcement of large-scale arms 
to India, President Ayub Khan observed that Pakistan was 
seeking to normalize its relations with the Soviet Union* but 
it depended on whether or not the Soviet Union continued to 
49 
arm India against Pakistan. 
There was thus a reshaping of Soviet policy towards the 
South Asian region in general and towards Pakistan in particular. 
In May 1964, when the Kashmir issue was again debated in the 
Security Council, the Soviet representative while reaffirming 
his government's stand that Kashmir was a part of India 
refrained from condemning Pakistan. This was in marked 
contrast with previous Soviet practice. In fact, for the 
first time in many years, the Soviet Union recognized the 
existence of a dispute over Kashmir and called upon India and 
Pakistan to settle it peacefully. The Soviet leaders also 
started discreetly avoiding public pronouncement on the issue. 
In September 1964, when the Indian President S.Radhakrishnan 
visited Moscow, the Soviet Union failed to endorse in the 
joint communique India's position on the Kashmir issue. 
After the fall of Khrushchev in October 1964, the new 
48 I b i d . , 12 June 1964 
*9 I b i d . , 2 October 1964 
50 Indian Express, Delhi , 26 September 1964 
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leadership made significant modifications in the Soviet policy 
towards the Third World in general and towards South Asia in 
particular. The Soviet Union wanted to wean Pakistan away 
from China and United States. For this purpose,the Soviet 
Union adopted a flexible attitude towards Pakistan. The 
Soviet Union welcomed the formation of the Regional Coopera-
tion for Development (RCD) organisation which came into 
existence in July 1964 with Iran, Pakistan and Turkey as 
members, Pravda stated: "Turkey, Iran and Pakistan have 
started to emerge from the isolation imposed on them by the 
U.S.A. and Britain and have developed their dependence and 
(have) simultaneously (manifested) their desire to solve 
problems on their own. 
Pakistan's External Affairs Minister Z.A. Bhutto visited 
Moscow in January 1965. He held high level talks with the 
Soviet leaders on international relations in general and on 
52 Soviet-Pakistan relations in particular. In 1965, President 
Ayub Khan visited the Soviet Union, This was the first ever 
visit of a Pakistani head of government to Moscow. Premier 
Kosygin described Ayub Khan's visit as "a momentous event in 
the history of Soviet-Pakistan relations", and expressed the 
hope that the visit "will contribute to the further strengthen-
ing of mutual understanding and good neighbourliness between 
53 
our two countries." paying warm tributes to the visiting 
dignitairy, he noted that President Ayub Khan's policies had 
greatly contributed to an improvement of his country's 
54 
relations with the Soviet Union. 
The Soviet leaders described the joint communique issued 
51 Pravda, 15 November 1964 
52 Ibid., 13 and 14 January 1965 
53 Ibid., 4 April 1965 
^^ Ibid., 6 April 1965 
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towards the close of the Pakistani president's visit (11 April 
1965) as "A milestone in the Pakistan-Soviet relations". The 
Soviet Dress hailed the communique as indicative of the "dawn 
55 
of a new era in Pakistan-Soviet relations." To quote Dawn; 
"The first important outcome of President Ay\ib Khan's state 
visit to the Soviet Union was the signing of an agreement on 
Pakistan-Soviet trade, economic cooperation,and cultural 
V "56 exchange. 
Thus President Ayub Khan's visit to the Soviet Union was 
a milestone in Soviet-Pakistani relations. The talks between 
the Soviet leaders and the Pakistani President scattered the 
clouds of misunderstanding that had rendered the relations 
between the two countries gloomy for a long time and set them 
on the path of normal relations. Dawn noted that "they broke 
the barriers which Indian diplomacy had succeeded in erecting 
57 between Pakistan and the Soviet Union over the past decade". 
During Lai Bahadur Shastri's visit to the Soviet Union 
more evidence became available on the shift in the Soviet 
attitude. The Soviet Prime Minister, Alexei Kosygin appeared 
as though he did not wish to be drawn into any discussion of 
his country's relations with Pakistan. It is said that 
whenever a controversial issue in Indo-Pakistani relations 
came up in the talks, he would only suggest to the Indian 
prime Minister that "ways must be found leading to a political 
settlement" of the issue. 
(B) Soviet Approach to the Indo-Pak Conflict, 1965 
During the Indo-Pak War 1965, the Soviet Union got the 
opportunity to expand its influence in South Asia, It regarded 
55 Pravda, 11 April 1965 
56 Dawn, 8 April 1965 
57 Ibid., 
58 Ibid., 15 May 1965 
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Pakistan's growing friendship with China almost as a 
betrayal of the U.S.-Pakistan alliance. China's emergence 
on the South Asia scene ostensibly as a friend of Pakistan 
but with the ulterior motive of understanding Soviet 
interests in the area gave an impetus to Soviet diplomacy. 
The Soviet Union played its cards with admirable skill. 
The Soviet Union and United States made significant changes 
in their South Asian policies. Both the super powers had 
come to recognise that stability in South Asia and the 
arresting of Pakistan's drift towards Peking were more 
important than either the strengthening of uS-Pakistani ties 
or Indo-Soviet bonds. United states suspended its arms 
supply to India and Pakistan in September 1965, and made it 
clear that Washington would not give military assistance to 
Pakistan which could lead to Chinese intervention. The Soviet 
Union adopted a neutral stand and gave clear evidence of its 
decision to keep itself out of any Indo-Pakistani armed 
conflict and to treat India and Pakistan equally. 
The Soviet attitude towards the grave situation in the 
Indian subcontinent, which ensued in the spring and autumn of 
1965 could be first seen in a Tass statement on the deteriorat-
ing situation on the Indo-Pakistan border in the Kutch area. 
This statement underscored that solution of problems between 
India and Pakistan by means of war would not help the 
Imperialists in developing the already existing tension in 
other parts of Asia. While citing Shastri Ayub*s statements 
on 9 May 1965 regarding peaceful solution of the existing 
issues, it laid emphasis on the importance of direct and 
peaceful negotiations for India and Pakistan. 
59 Pravda, 12 August 1965 
60 Ibid., 9 May 1965, Translation from materials available 
in Russian language by Dr. S.P. Singh, The Quarterly 
Review of Historical Studies, Calcutta, Apr-June 1983, 
p. 54 
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Throughout the period of War, Soviet news and publicity 
media used the utmost caution in reporting or commenting on 
the developments on the subcontinent. There was no mention 
of Pakistani infiltration into Kashmir till 6 September 1965. 
Thereafter, too, the event was reported only in the form of 
Soviet media quoting Indian sources, and quotations from 
Indian sources were carefully balanced off with quotations 
from Pakistani sources. 
The Soviet concern for peace in South Asia was fully 
contrasted by an incendiary statement of the Chinese government 
on 4 May 1965 which expressed its full sympathy with and 
support to, Pakistan in her fight against "Indian expan-
6 9 
sionism". Similar was the substance of Sino-Pak joint 
communique, issued earlier at the end of President Ayub's 
visit to Peking on 7 March 1965. It is needless to observe 
that Peking's open encouragement to Pakistan certainly shaped, 
to a larger extent, the letter's policy towards the occupation 
6 "J 
of Kashmir by means of war in the following months. 
To prevent an escalation of the conflict, the Soviet 
government initiated intense diplomatic activity.to that 
end. On 4 September, 1965, in bold and unprecedented 
diplomatic initiative, Kosygin urged India and Pakistan to 
cease military operations immediately by withdrawing their 
64 
armies behind the ceasefire line of 1949. 
Towards the end of August 1965, the border situation 
in Kashmir became extremely tense after into this state 
of India and the letter's action against them. The Soviet 
61 Dawn, 29 August 1965 
62 People's Daily, 5 May 1965 
63 See Dally Telegraph, 27 April 1965 
64 Pravda, 12 September, 1965 
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Union called upon both the countries to find out ways to 
liquidate the conflict which would only further aggravate 
their economic problems. In a leading article in the 
Pravda on 24 August, 1965, an observer rightly elaborated 
the Soviet stand on the Indo-Pak War, while referring to 
Soviet respect for India's policy of peaceful coexistence 
and non-alignment, her fight against colonialism and 
respectable place in the world, the observer underlined that 
Soviet aspiration for developing its relations with 
Pakistan proceeded from the assumption that her good neigh-
bourly relations with Pakistan would not weaken her 
friendship, with any third country. Maintenance of relations 
between the Soviet Union and Pakistan, the observer added, 
was the part of the Soviet general policy directed tov;ards 
ensuring peace in Asia and the world. Soviet relation with 
Pakistan, like her traditional friendship with India, would 
be a stabilizing factor for normalisation of relations between 
India and Pakistan as well as for situation in Asia. 
On 7 September 1965, through an officially authorized 
Tass statement, the Soviet Union once aga-in displayed its 
deep concern about the conflict, which was taking place 
"in an area in close proximity to the frontiers of the Soviet 
66 
Union", and reiterated its appeal for an immediate ceasefire. 
While Soviet delegates were discussing adoption of immediate 
measures for restoring peace in Kashmir, Chinese foreign 
Minister Chen Yi paid a surprise visit to Karachi on 4 September 
67 for pledging China's moral and material support to Pakistan. 
The Soviet leadership directed all its energy to maintaining 
Peace in South Asia and thereby preventing any escalation of 
the conflict. The Tass statement warned against exploitation 
of the conflict by certain forces which intensified the conflict 
65 Pravda, 24 August 1965 
66 Ibid., 1 September 1965 
67 H.P.Klans, "China's Role in India-Pakistan Conflict", 
Chia Quarterly, London, Oct-Dec 1965, No.24. 
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by issuing instigating statements and maintained that, if 
the conflict deepend many governments would be involved, 
the conflict would spread over distant regions and such 
forces would have to bear full responsibility for their 
policies and actions. 
On 19 September 1965 Tass released an identical message 
sent by Premier Kosygin to both President Ayub Khan and 
Prime Minister Lai Bahadur Shastri, specifically proposing 
a meeting of the two leaders in a conference to be held on 
"Soviet soil" to resolve peacefully the issues dividing their 
two countries. Kosygin said that he would be willing to 
participate in such a conference if the two sides wanted him 
4. ^ 69 to do so. 
In the hope of direct Chinese intervention against 
India, Pakistan did not pay any heed to two unanimous Security 
Council resolutions (4 September, 6 September) asking for 
ceasefire and withdrawal. This was what China had desired. 
To embolden Pakistan to keep oh fighting, China condemned 
India's "naked aggression" and warned her that "she must 
bear the responsibility for all consequences." China 
denounced the UNO, Soviet Union and U.S. which it contended, 
70 
were "helping" India. 
This was the background of the Tashkent Conference, 
which opened on 4 January 1966. The Prime Minister of India 
and the President of Pakistan held bilateral talks for 
nearly a week to thrash out the differences between their 
countries. In his inaugural speech Kosygin said that he 
was aware of the difficulties entailed in normalizing Indo-
Pakistani relations. 
68 Pravda, 18 September 1965 
69 Ibid., 20 September 1965 
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He, however, still hoped that the meeting would prove 
to be a turning point in the relations between India and 
Pakistan and create a climate of trust and mutual under-
standing facilitating an eventual achievement of normaliza-
71 tion. During the conference Lai Bahadur Shastri stressed 
the importance of signing a "no war pact"and following it up 
with a gradual elimination of differences and disputes. 
Ayub Khan pointed out that a 'no war' pact between nations 
would work only if it was adopted after taking concrete 
72 
steps for settling the disputes that divided them. 
However, on 10 January 1966 the historic Tashkent 
Declaration was signed. 
Soviet Disappointment - The Soviets were soon to suffer 
several diappointments. The President of Pakistan and the 
Prime Minister of India did not meet again. The ministerial 
level meetings held on March 1 and 2, 1966 in Rawalpindi, 
too proved to be failure. Both sides reiterated their 
respective points of view and found themselves as part as 
ever. The joint communique that followed the meeting 
described the talks as exploratory leading to a useful 
exchange of views. Moreover, the two countries blamed each 
other for their strained relations and complained to Moscow 
of one another's alleged breaches of the Tashkent Declaration. 
Secondly, the Tashkent Declaration was not well received 
in Pakistan. Z.A.Bhutto described it as a betrayal and it 
began to be argued that it was merely a "no force" declaration 
which did not prevent Pakistan to resort to war over the 
Kashmir dispute if it was not settled peacefully. The 
hate India campaign received official blessing when the 
government of Pakistan decided to observe 6 September, the 
71 Pravda, 5 January 1966 
72 Ibid. 
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day India attacked the Lahore and Sialkot sectors in 1965, 
73 
as the Defence of Pakistan Day. 
Secondly, Prime Minister A.N. Kosygin in his opening 
speech, and the Soviet press subsequently, reminded both 
India and Pakistan that they achieved victory over colonialism 
through "their common efforts", .that jointly they could 
keep their enemies away from the subcontinent, that the 
normalization of Indo-Pakistani relations would strengthen 
peace in South East Asia, and that "an atmosphere of mutual 
trust and understanding", and economic cooperation between 
them could benefit the two countries. It was argued that the 
economies of India and Pakistan constituted "a single whole 
and that intercourse between them and expansion of trade would 
74 benefit both. But the atmosphere of hostility and mistrust 
continued; all attempts to establish good neighbourly 
relations remained unsuccessful. 
The Soviet Union went ahead with demonstrating to 
Pakistan that it had adopted the policy of treating India 
and Pakistan equally and that it sincerely wished to improve 
the relations with Rawalpindi. Following the Tashkent 
meeting, Soviet Union and Pakistan signed, in January 1966, 
a barter agreement, providing for the exchange of Pakistani 
rice for Soviet vehicles and road-building and engineering 
machinery. In the same year the two countries signed an 
agreement on economic cooperation, which was a positive 
indication of the fact that Moscow had decided to treat 
India and Pakistan alike in the matter of economic aid. Under 
this agreement, the U.S.S.R.undertook to render technical 
and financial assistance in the construction of twenty-one 
projects, including two plants for the production of 
73 Vijaysen Budhraj, op.cit,,p.l71 
74 Kessings Contemporary Archives, Jan 22-29,1966, p.21187 A, 
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electrical machinery, the Guddu Thermal power station, 
fifteen broadcasting houses, a high voltage transmission 
line, and a railway-cum-highway bridge across the river 
Rupsa. It was indeed a major economic assistance agreement. 
Moreover, a number of Soviet delegations and officials 
ranging from a Soviet tennis star to the Soviet Deputy 
Foreign Minister, visited Pakistan in 1966, indicating 
thereby the importance Moscow attached to its friendship 
with Pakistan.''^ 
But all this did not effect Sino-Pakistani ties in any 
way. If the Soviets considered India a counterweight against 
China, the Chinese believed that Pakistan was a counter-
weight against India. The Chinese Head of State, Liu 
Shao-Chi visited Pakistan in March and again in April 1966. 
During his first visit, he stated that "when Pakistan 
resolutely fights against foreign aggression in defence of 
its national independence, sovereignty and territorial 
integrity the 650 million Chinese people will stand unswervingly 
76 
"on its side and give it resolute support and assistance." 
The growing China-Pakistan relations caused much 
uneasiness in Moscow. Rawalpindi was not satisfied with the 
new Soviet policy because India was still getting Soviet 
arms and sophisticated weapons. When Britain and the United 
States placed an embargo on the shipment of arms to India 
and Pakistan in September 1965, the Soviet Union became 
India's primary supplier of aircraft. It is said that while 
the fighting was on, the Soviets agreed to supply India 
with four submarines, destroyer escorts, and naval patrol 
77 
craft. 
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At the invitation of Soviet government. President 
Ayub Khan visited the U.S.S.R, from September 25 to October 
4, 1967. Pakistan, at one time considered to be a "bastion 
of the free world", announced in Moscow that there was 
"need for the immediate ending of the War in Vietnam, in 
acknowledgement of the right of the Vietnamese people to 
settle their own destiny without foreign interference as 
78 
envisaged by the 1954 Geneva Agreement". 
It was clear that to please Moscow, Pakistan had moved 
closer to the Russian view than to that of American on the 
Vietnam issue. President Ayub Khan assured the Soviet 
Prime Minister that his country remained ready and willing 
to negotiate with India on all issues in the spirit of the 
79 Tashkent Declaration. 
For India, the crucial problem was the arms supplies to 
Pakistan and its implications for Soviet policy towards the 
subcontinent. In an editorial in The Times of India, 
Nanporia commented that there persists a tendency in 
New Delhi, to act with alarm and bewildernment to any 
suggestion of a Soviet deviation from its earliest posture and 
more particularly in relation to Pakistan. This can be 
explained only in terms of a failure to grasp the essentials 
of Soviet policy in Asia and to realise that Soviet friend-
ship is not an absolute created for the country's convenience 
... the entire basis of Soviety policy seems to be to 
encourage the 'containment' not only of Chinese Communist 
influence but also that of the United States, It does not 
hope to achieve this by establishing any kind of a 'Soviet 
78 Stated in the Joint Communique, published in October 
1967, Keesing's Contemporary Archives, November 9-11, 
1967, p.22346. 
79 "Pakistan President Ayub Khan's to visit to the Soviet 
Union and France", Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 
Nov. 4-11, 1967, p. 22345B. 
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presence' but by creating conditions in which it is hoped 
nonalignment will acquire an Asian presence, Moscow's 
openly expressed desire for friendlier relations with 
Pakistan, adds Nanporia, should be no cause for hysteria 
in New Delhi, Similarly the possibilities of a minor 
Soviet arms deal with Rawalpindi must be seen in this 
context before surrendering to the infantile conclusion 
that this would be a Soviet 'betrayal'. What could be 
described as Soviet 'tactical neutrality' was implicit in 
its role in Tashkent. Moscow's patient cultivation of 
Rawalpindi is an extension of Mr. Kosygin's well calculated 
80 political initiative in this part of the world. 
Notwithstanding such a great contribution to the political 
stability in South Asia at such a critical juncture, both in 
India and abroad, various sorts of misapprehensions regarding 
changes in Soviet policy towards India were inspired in some 
81 
circles. British journals took, the lead in providing 
food to India's rightist parties by undernoting the lack of 
82 Soviet support to India, the Jana Sangh seized the wind 
83 
out of the British sail. While advocating the need for 
reassement of India's foreign policy, the Swatantra Party 
mouthpiece Swarajya blamed the Soviet Union for equating 
India with Pakistan. 
General Yahya Khan, Commander-in-Chief of the Army of 
Pakistan visited Moscow from June 27 to July 8, 1968, Prime 
Minister Kosygin informed Prime Minister Indira Gandhi on 
July 7, 1968 that the Soviet Union intended to supply arms 
80 N.J.Nanporia, The Times of India, Delhi, 14 July 1966 
81 Times, 14 Aug 1965; also see Pakistan Horizon,XVIII(4), 
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82 New Statesman, London, 3 Sept 1965, p.307 
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84 to Pakistan. The news about the Soviet decision created 
an uproar in India. When informed of the decision, Mrs. 
Gandhi wrote to Premier Kosygin on 10 July 1968 protesting 
against the Soviet decision and pointing out that a Soviet 
supply of arms to Pakistan would bring the close, friendly 
Indo-Soviet relationship under tension and strain. The 
Indian government continued to mount diplomatic pressure 
on Moscow and in August 1968 the Indian President Dr.Zakir 
Husain went on a visit to the U.S.S.R. Apparently a goodwill 
visit, the circumstances of the timing could not be 
discounted and the use of the opportunity to forcefully 
put forward India's apprehensions could not have been 
passed up. 
When the Indian Parliament met in July 1968, the Jan 
Sangh organized a protest demonstration in front of the 
Soviet Embassy's information centre in New Delhi, the first 
of its kind against the Soviets. The following day the Lok 
Sabha rejected Piloo Mody's (Swatantra) adjournment motion 
which sought to ensure the government for failing to 
safeguard India's interests "as signified by the Soviet 
decision to sell arms to Pakistan" by 200 votes to 61, The 
Prime Minister observed that she was not surprised by the 
Soviet decision, that the supply was not big enough to 
strengthen Pakistan to the extent of injuring India's 
interests, that the Soviets had assured her that Pakistan 
would not use Soviet arms against India and that she had no 
reason to believe that the Soviets "would want to injure 
us in any way," she philosophically rationalized; "friend-
ship is not exclusive. If you are friends with one you 
85 
cannot prevent that person from having other friends." 
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Subsequently she told a group of Congress members of 
Parliament that the worlc3 was no more rigidly divided 
into blocs as had previously been and that the Soviet 
Union was also trying to improve its relations with Turkey, 
86 
Iran and Pakistan. No one could object to it. 
If Soviet diplomacy ran into heavy weather in Pakistan, 
certain events in India in the second half of 1969 rehabi-
litated New Delhi's image in Moscow, assured the Soviets 
that their massive investments in Indian economy and defence 
had not gone to waste and created the hope in Moscow that 
political polarisation, then going on in India, would 
ultimately strengthen the hands of the progressive forces. 
The resignation of Morarji Desai, considered to be the most 
outspoken representative of the big monopoly houses in the 
Indian cabinet, nationalization of fourteen Indian banks with 
deposits exceeding Rs. 50 crores; the defeat of Sanjeeva 
Reddy, put up by the rightwing Congress leadership and supported 
by the Swatantra, etc., in the presidential election, and the 
Congress split — all created good impression and retrieved 
New Delhi's stock in the Kremlin. 
(C) Diversified Role in South Asia in the 1970s 
Since the 1970s the Soviet Union started getting more 
involved in the affairs of South Asia than the United States 
or Chine. One result of this deepening involvement is that 
the Soviet role in the region has become diversified. The 
Soviet Union is now as much involved in the security of 
South Asia as it is in its economic and political development. 
This diversified role has been acquired, according to Bhabani 
Sen Gupta, by successful and inexpensive intervention in 
86 The Tribune, 20 July 1968 
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three wars in South Asia — the Sino-Indian border war of 
1962 and the India-Pakisten wars of 1965 and 1971,^"^ 
Vast and significant changes occurred on the Indian 
subcontinent in 1969, necessitating a reappraisal on the 
part of the Soviet Union of its policy towards this area. 
From the Soviet perspective the situation in Pakistan was 
somewhat gloomy: anti-Ayub riots and demonstrations had, 
in both East and West Pakistan, become the order of the day 
since the last quarter of 1968. These demonstrations dis-
approved the thesis of the Soviet experts that President 
Ayub Khan's firm leadership had created something akin to 
op 
political stability in Pakistan. 
something had to be done to restore normalcy in East 
Pakistan and to prevent deterioration in Indo-Pakistan 
relations. The Soviet President, therefore, appealed to 
President Yahya Khan to "stop the bloodshed and repression" 
and "to turn to methods of peaceful settlement." In his 
message he spoke out against the army's action, advised that 
complicated problems in Pakistan "must be solved by political 
means, without the use of force" and warned that the 
"continuation of repressive measures" would make the solution 
of Pakistan's problems more difficult and might prove to be 
"highly detrimental to the vital interests of all the Pakistani 
people". He showed his sympathies for the Awami League 
leaders when he spoke of them as having "received such 
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convincing support from the overwhelming majority." The 
87 Bhabani Sen Gupta, Soviet-Asian Relations in the 1970s 
and Beyond; An interperceptional Study, Praeger, New York, 
1976, p.137 
88 New York Times, 19 Feb 1969 
89 "Message from N.V.Podgorny to the President of Pakistan", 
CDSP, May.4, 1971, Vol. XXIII, No.14, p.36 (from Pravda, 
14 April, 1971). 
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reasons were clear enough: the Awami League's economic 
programme was progressive; its leaders were against Pakistan's 
membership of SEATO and CENTO and desired closer links* 
economic and cultural,with India, Broadly speaking, the 
government of the U.S.S.R. understood the danger posed by 
military action,sympathized with the Awami League leaders, and 
felt that the refugees would return home only if and when the 
military regime in East Pakistan transferred power to the 
representatives of the people. Later, the Indian Foreign 
Minister expressed his sincere gratitude to the Soviet 
government on this occasion during his visit to Moscow in 
June, 1971.^° 
SOVIET PLAN FOR ASIAN SECURITY 
The Indo-Soviet Treaty for 20 years was concluded in a 
sensational situation faced by India. The war between the 
two wings of Pakistan over the Bangladesh issue had forced 
more than 10 million refugees from East Bengal to seek 
shelter in India. India tried in vain to pursuade the 
international agencies and the U.S. to prevail on Pakistan to 
facilitate the return of the refugees, Pakistan was encouraged 
by the U.S. and China in its attempt to crush the revolt in 
East Pakistan^ In 1970 the U.S. supplied arms to Pakistan 
in violation of embargo. Henry Kissinger went to Peking 
and Nixon's visit to China was announced in July 1971. All 
these events made India panicky and it began to search for 
security. Thus the price of better relations between 
Washington and Peking was an improvement in relations between 
91 Moscow and New Delhi. 
90 "Friendly Visit Completed", CDSP, July 6, 1971 (Vol.XXIII, 
No.23), p.16 (from Pravda, June 9, 1971). 
91 Robert Jackson, South Asian Crisis, Vikas, New Delhi, 
1978, p.157. 
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Prime Minister Chou En-Lai's promise of support to 
Islamabad in case "Indian expansionists dare to launch 
aggression against Pakistan"/ continuation of U.S. military 
supplies to Islamabad and the warning of the Special Assistant 
for National Security Affairs to President Nixon, Henry 
A.Kissinger, to the Indian Ambassador to the United States, 
L.K. Jha, that in case China helped Pakistan in a war with 
India, New Delhi, should not count on U.S. support, emboldened 
Pakistan to threaten India with war. In an interview with the 
correspondent of the Financial Times (London)/ the Pakistan 
92 president talked of declaring "general war" on India. Later, 
on July 30, when the President repeated this threat, the Soviet 
press gave it wide publicity. On August 1, Tass quoted 
President Yahya Khan as saying in an interview to foreign 
television companies that Pakistan was very close to war 
against India. It also quoted the Indian press and a French 
news agency to give details of war preparations on the Pakistani 
93 
side of the eastern borders. 
Suspecting WaShington-Peking-Rawalpindi collusion over 
the Bangladesh issue, India was forced to enter into a 
treaty agreement with the Soviet Union. This treaty marked a 
new phase in Indo-Soviet cooperation. As the title suggests, 
it does not merely involve a commitment to peace, friendship 
and cooperation, but to some extent it is a treaty of military 
cooperation. This treaty marked a turning point in India's 
foreign policy. It formalised the Indo-Soviet friendship 
and according to Gromyko it gave a durable international 
legal basis. 
This treaty made India more dependant on Soviet Russia. 
The Statesman described the treaty as "virtually a military 
92 The Times of India, July 20, 1971 
93 Ibid., 2 Aug 1971 
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arrangement? Though Article 4 of the treaty stated that 
Moscow respected New Delhi's policy of non-alignment, "there 
is every evidence of alignment in the treaty almost indis-
95 
tinguishable from a defence pact." 
Besides, it could be argued that this was the first step 
towards the realization of the Soviet plan for Asian 
security. It may be recalled that following the March 1969 
armed conflict between Soviet and Chinese border troops on 
a small disputed Island on the Ussuri River boundary between 
the two major communist powers, Moscow renewed its efforts 
to convince the states on the southern periphery of China 
that Peking was a threat to their security. It also tried 
to bind them together in regional economic cooperation, and 
in June 1969, it publicly stated that the time was ripe for 
building a collective security system in Asia. Though India, 
at that time made it clear that it was not interested in any 
thing more than regional economic cooperation, the Soviets 
did not abandon all hopes. Negotiations about the terms of a 
security pact between the countries continued through 
diplomatic channels. Ultimately in August 1971, finding 
itself isolated and threatened, India accepted the Soviet 
offer. The Soviets perhaps hoped that other countries in 
the region would, in course of time, fall in line, for it 
should not go unnoticed that the day India signed the treaty. 
Foreign Minister Sawaran Singh stated in the Indian Parliament 
that it "will provide a pattern for similar treaties between 
India and other countries in the region." 
The Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin visited India, Pakistan, 
and Afghanistan in May 1969. During his visit he not only 
94 Editorial, The Statesman, Delhi, 10 Aug 1971 
95 I b i d . 
96 The Times of I n d i a , N. D e l h i , 10 Aug 1971 
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assured India of his country's support in its conflict with 
China but stated that India should become strong economically, 
politically and militarily. He seemed to have reverted to 
Khrushchev's policy of building up India so that it could 
shoulder the responsibility of defending the subcontinent 
from "adventurist encroachments on the part of outside 
97 forces which are out for a hegemony in Asia." 
During his visit to Afghanistan and Pakistan later in 
the same month, he urged a speedy settlement of differences 
between Afghanistan and Pakistan and between Pakistan and 
India. He also urged increased regional economic cooperation 
amongthe three countries on a tripartite basis and promised 
that the Soviet Union "would do all it can on its part to 
98 promote this." It is said that General Yahya Khan gave 
the visiting Prime Minister to understand that he was 
enthusiastic about the idea of a regional conference on 
economic cooperation involving Iran, India, Pakistan, Afghanis-
99 tan and Soviet Union. 
The clear possibility of China expanding in the direction 
of the Indian ocean made the Soviet Union propose a system of 
collective security in Asia. The first exposition of this 
system came from Leonid Brezhnev himself at the international 
conference of Communist and Workers' Parties held in Moscow 
in June 1969.'^ °° Thus by mid-1969 the Soviet Union had 
evolved two plans to ensure peace and stability in this region; 
regional economic cooperation and a collective security 
arrangement. Brezhnev did not spell out clearly what kind of 
security arrangement the Soviet Union had in mind. He, however, 
underplayed the military aspect of it by repeating that the 
97 The Indian Express, New Delhi, 8 May 1969; also see 
Patriot, New Delhi, 17 May 1969 
98 The Times of India, New Delhi, 1 June 1969 
99 Ibid., 7 April 1971 
100 Text of Speech, Soviet News, New Delhi, No.5498, 10 June 
1969, p.132. 
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arrangement was not directed against any one nation and 
stressed the economic and political aspects. 
At the same time the Soviet Union has claimed the 
sxibcontinent, because of its geographical closeness to the 
U.S.S.R., virtually as its sphere of influence — a claim 
that is contested by China, although China is not in a position 
to hurt Soviet interests too much. In the 1970s, says.Sen 
Gupta, the Soviets had a spatial large strategic design for 
the interlinking regions of South Asia and the Persian 
Gulf, which none of the regional actors had so far accepted. 
The design is for the security of the two regions, to be 
brought about by multilateral economic cooperation; by 
bilateral settlement of inter-state differences and disputes; 
and, over time, by political and strategic collaboration, all 
of these with Soviet participation and involvement, though 
not formally under Soviet leadership. The Soviet policy 
makers, then, have given themselves the long-term task of 
establishing a broad strategic symmetry in the two inter-
meshing regions. 
Soviet analysts believe that only by the establishment 
of multifaceted regional and interregional cooperation under 
the benign protection of the socialist system, can the two 
regions insulated from imperialist and Chinese intervention. 
This strategic design has introduced a new dynamism into 
Soviet relations with the two major regional powers, India 
and Iran, neither of which is willing to subscribe to the 
Soviet strategic design nor ready to reject it altogether; 
each has its own power interests and ambitions in South 
Asia. The Soviet strategic design for the region has also 
begun to be reflected in its conflict with China and its compe-
titive coexistence with the United States in the Third World. "^ ^^  
101 Bhabani Sen Gupta, Soviet-Asian SeA=g^ jfeetaa, in the 1970s and 
Beyond, op.cit. 
102 Ibid., pp. 137-38 
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The border crisis with China spiralled the defense 
expenditure of India upwards and after the border war of 
1962 defence became its first priority. The need for U.S. 
military aid to the anti-China defence efforts of India 
betrayed^ in Pakistani eyes,the tenuousness of Washington's 
military commitment to Pakistan. In Pakistan perceptions, 
the two super powers were now working together to strengthen 
India, "the mortal enemy of Pakistan". In 1963 Zulfiqar Ali 
Bhutto, then Foreign Minister of Pakistan, asserted that 
••the largest power in Asia", would come to his country's 
rescue if it wete attacked by India''. In the early 
1960s, however, a promise of strategic symmetry in the 
subcontinent came from parallel Soviet and American aid to 
build up India as a countervailing power in Asia in relation 
to the People's Republic of China and from a U.S.initiative, 
in conjunction with Britain, to resolve the deadlock on 
Kashmir. According to Chester Bowles, then U.S. Ambassador 
in New Delhi, Nehru agreed to "support a genuine effort by 
the U.S. government to negotiate a political settlement 
that could end the fighting in South East Asia" that is in 
Vietnam, as well as to "negotiate a ceiling of military 
104 
expenditure with Pakistan." 
The promise proved to be fleeting. The Indian govern-
ment resented the armtwisting by the United States and 
Britain to force it to make concessions to Pakistan on the 
Kashmir.issue, and India abandoned its halfhearted concilia-
tory moves when China, in a tour de force, concluded a 
border agreement with Pakistan, conferring tentative sanction 
on Pakistan control of two thirds of the state of Jammu and 
105 Kashmir.-^^^ 
103 New York Times, 18 July 1963 
104 Chester Bowles, "America and Russia in India, Foreign 
Affairs, quoted in Bhabani Sen Gupta, Soviet South A"sian 
Relations, op.cit. 
105 For details, see Bhabani Sen Gupta, The Fulcrum of Asia: 
Relations among China,India, Pakistah Shd thfi USSK, 
New York, 1970, pp. 131-33 
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The main reason for the withering of the promise probably 
lay in a shift in U.S. priorities after the death of John F. 
Kennedy. This expectation was confirmed in the war between 
India and Pakistan in September 1965. For the first time 
United States remained officially neutral in a war involving 
oneof its allies. The u.S.S.R. and China faced each other as 
direct contenders in the subcontinent. In a major strategic 
initiative, Moscow intervened in the India-Pakistan war, armed 
with the theory of geographical propinquity. The conflict, 
as Kosygin told the Prime Minister of India and the President 
of Pakistan, was taking place in an area close to the borders 
of Soviet State, compelling Moscow to offer its diplomatic 
services to bring the two warring parties together. At the 
same time, the Soviet goverrunent warned other countries to 
keep out of the conflict. Inherent in the Soviet diplomatic 
initiative was the claim that South Asia, being geographically 
close to the U.S.S.R., was a natural sphere of Russian 
interest.^^^ 
The United States lost interest in India on the political 
and developmental planes. Increasing involvement in the Vietnam 
war led to a general U.S. disengagement from the uncommited 
nations of the Third World in terms of economic aid. By the 
mid-1960s, anxiety to avoid direct military conflict with 
Chinese evidently persuaded Lydon Johnson to lower the 
U.S. anti-China profile in South Asia also. According to 
Sen Gupta, Washington found it wiser to conceded to Moscow 
the primary diplomatic and strategic role in South Asia 
because of the greater Soviet stake in containing China and 
because of the relative political unimportance of India to 
the United States. India turned to the Soviet Union and got 
every thing it had asked from the United States, having 
conceded to the Soviet union the major role in controlling 
106 Bhabani Sen Gupta, Soviet South Asian Relations, op.cit.^ 
pp. 139-140. 
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conflict in the subcontinent, could not possibly come to the 
help of Pakistan in an Indo-Pakistan military conflict. After 
the Tashkent Agreement, Moscow gradually unfolded its own 
strategic design for South Asia. The visit by the Shah of Iran 
to the Soviet capital in 1965 had led to an improvement in 
Soviet-Iranian relations, and in 1966 a programme of Soviet 
107 
economic and military assistance to Iran was initiated. 
After the Tashkent accord the Soviets ceased to support 
the Indian position on Kashmir and adopted a posture of 
"Neutrality", which paved the way for a diplomatic initiative to 
improve relations with Pakistan. The transfer of Soviet 
military aid to Pakistan, however, small in quantity, involved 
the risk of alienating India. The Soviets, however, took 
that risk. The 1964-67 period was also one of increasing 
Indian dependence on the united States. The military reverses 
against China followed by the economic crisis had sent India 
Scurring to Washington for military and economic aid. Although 
both Lai Bahadur Shastri and Indira Gandhi, showed keenness 
to maintain the Soviet option, the rightwing swing in the 
policy during this period was patently obvious and was 
generally regarded as the inevitable consequences of the turn 
towards the United States. Possibly, the Soviet interest in 
Pakistan was a reminder and a response: a reminder to India 
of Soviet options in case the Indian tilt towards Washington 
went too far, and a response to Indian domestic and foreign 
policy developnents. 
The problem was very much with India and only acquired 
more serious dimensions in these two years. The Soviet 
strategy clearly was to gradually raise the level of relation-
ship with Pakistan while simultaneously expanding assistance 
107 Ibid. 
108 Dev Murarka's despatch from Moscow, Indian Express, 17 Dec 
1966 
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to India in order to quieten Indian misgivings and soften 
her opposition to a limited amount of arms supply to Pakistan. 
The Soviet media and public pronouncements also underlined 
the desirability of an Indo-Pak rapproachment. As for 
instance, as early as December 1965, a Pravda article had 
claimed that a settlement of the conflict with Pakistan was 
vital to India's economic advance and success in mastering 
109 her present problems and difficulties. 
These themes were repeated in the next two years but 
the issue became more serious for India. The Minister for 
External Affairs, M.C. Chagla told the Rajya Sabha on 8 August 
1967 that the Soviet Union had repeatedly assured India that 
it would not sell lethal weapons to Pakistan and that the 
helicopters reportedly sold to Pakistan could be purchased 
by any country on a commercial basis. He said helicopters 
did not fall within the category of lethal weapons. He held 
out the assurance that "there is absolutely no change in the 
U.S.S.R's attitude towards U.S. Our friendship continues 
without being lessened or being surrounded by dovibts of 
suspicious the U.S.S.R. is most anxious that tension in this 
area should be reduced." 
There was resentment and anger in India, but the times 
had changed, and it did not cost Moscow too much, Kosygin 
personally assured the Indian leaders that the Soviet Union 
continued to regard India as the kingpin of its South Asian 
policy and explained that a Soviet presence in Pakistan was 
the only way to diminish Chinese influence and block "Impe-
tialist intervention" against Indian interests. 
109 Asian Recorder, 8-14 Jan 1966, p.6863 
110 The Times of India, New Delhi 9 Aug 1967 
111 Dawn, July 12 1968 
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The Indians were reassured in 1968 when Kosygin proposed, 
almost immediately after the first transfer of military 
equipment to Pakistan, an economic cooperation conference of 
Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India, with Soviet partici-
pation. It was suggested in the Soviet press that the four 
countries could have profitable trade with the U.S.S.R, 
through the roadways and rail links already existing and 
likely to be constructed between the Soviet Union and 
Afghanistan on the one hand and the Soviet Union and Iran on 
the other. The Afghan government, prompted by the Soviet 
Union, offered to host the proposed conference which never 
took place because of the Pakistani refusal to attend. Thus 
the first attempt to unfold the Soviet strategic design came 
to nothing, although as a price for economic and military 
aid, Pakistan agreed to close down the extensive U.S. intelli-
112 gence facilities in Peshawar, 
During the latter half of the 1960s there was considerable 
anxiety in the Soviet union about the drift of internal 
politics in India and about a possible pro-American shift 
in Indian foreign policy. During the brief Prime Ministership 
of Lai Bahadur Shastri, the primary Soviet concern as judged 
from writings on India in the Soviet press, was to prevent 
the right wing from dominating the Congress party and the 
Indian government. The Soviet media welcomed the election of 
Indira Gandhi as Prime Minister after Shastri's sudden death 
in Tashkent. Within a short time, however, Soviet analysts 
began to note "the growing strength of the (Indian) capitalist 
113 
monopolies with their close foreign ties." 
After the 1967 general elections, in which the Congress 
party lost power in as many as nine states, a Soviet analyst 
112 Bhabani Sen Gupta, Soviet South Asian Relations, op.cit.,Txl40 
113 New Times, Jan 19, 1965 
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identified the cabinet of Indira Gandhi as "a coalition of 
114 the ruling party's centrist and rightist elements". 
The Soviet concern stemmed not only from the analysis 
perception of the rightward drift in the Congress party 
leadership but more particularly from the confrontation 
between the central government in New Delhi and the leftist-
democratic coalitions that ruled West Bengal and Kerala. Both 
coalitions were dominated by the Communist Party of India 
(Marxists (CPI~M), the parallel communist party which had 
been formed in 1964 after a split in the CPI. The Marxists 
were independent of Moscow and Peking but were nevertheless 
generally seen to be pro-Chinese.. What placed the CPSU in 
an embarassing situation was that the pro-Soviet CPI was also a 
partner of the two coalitions, and the confrontation between 
these two state governments and the centre was creating a 
polarization between the Congress Party and the CPI and 
undermining the CPSU line of a broad united front of "democratic 
and left forces"/ meaning the "progressives" in the Congress 
115 Party and the CPI. 
When Kosygin made a suddenly announced visit to New Delhi 
in February 1968, one leading Indian commentator linked its 
significance to that of the Khirushchev-Bulganin tour of India 
116 in 1955. His talks with Indira Gandhi covered the whole 
gamut of subjects from economic affairs to political develop-
ments in India to foreign policy. The communique issued at the 
end of the talks indicated that the Soviet government remained 
fully committed to help India restore its economic health and 
remain steadfast to its foreign policy. Much of the conversa-
tion centered on China, which had built a sizeable presence in 
114 New Times, March 29 1967 
115 Bhabani Sen Gupta, Communism in Indian Politics, Columbia 
Univ. Press, New York, 1972. 
116 Dilip Mukherji, "New Turn in Indo-Soviet Relations", The 
Statesman, 2 Feb 1968 
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Pakistan since Tashkent and was supporting several "revo-
lutionary communist" groups in India in 1968 and projecting 
to these groups a Maoist line of protracted armed struggle 
from rural bases.'^ '^^  Kosygin reportedly pointed out to Indira 
Gandhi that Pakistan was almost the only country with which 
Chinese relations had not been affected by the Cultural 
Revolution/ and he impressed upon her the urgency of a 
parallel Indian and Soviet effort to loosen the Chinese hold 
on Pakistan. The Soviet premier also told her that Moscow 
would like India to fill the vacuvim to be created in the Indian 
Ocean region by the British withdrawl from the Persian Gulf 
by 1971, India could not do this without internal stability 
118 
and without some force of coexistence with Pakistan, 
The Soviet attitude towards Pakistan has never been hostile, 
writes Kalim Bahadur. And this was in spite of the fact that 
the Soviet leaders could not understand and accept that 
religion could be the basis of a state in the modern world. 
They also overlooked the paranoidal anti-communist and anti-
soviet policies of Pakistan's successive rulers. In the years 
after independence, Pakistan's policy makers and leaders were 
119 
more anti-communist th^n even the Americans, 
Until 1962, ideology was an important element in Pakistan 
foreign policy* and translated into practice it meant pre-
ference for the western countries and dislike of communism. 
The new policy won India's friendship readily because it 
professed to be neutral in the East-West cold war and had 
worked for good relations with the communist countries from 
117 Bhabani Sen Gupt^, "A Maoist Line for India", China 
Quarterly, No,33 1968 
118 Dilip Mukherji, pp.cit. 
119 Kalim Bahadur, "India, Pakistan and the Soviet Union in 
Vinod Bhatia, ed., Indo-Soviet Relations t Problems and 
Prospects, Panchsheel Pxiblishers, New Delhi, 1984, p.67 
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the outset of independence. With Pakistan it was not so 
easy to effect a change. Added to the ideological barrier 
was the difficulty that it had been palpable pro-west in her 
foreign policy, and in 1954 had openly subscribed to the 
western system of defence alliances. It was not till Pakistan's 
alliance with the west had cooled off in the wake of the 
latter's arms aid to India in 1962, that the requisite 
climate for a real improvement in Pakistan's relations with 
, 120 the communist world was created. 
A survey of Pakistani opinion after independence will 
vividly illustrate how seriously Pakistanis viewed the threat 
from communism to their spiritual and physical existence and 
will refute the notion that Pakistan tricked a guflible America 
but in reality for use solely against India. On 12 April 1950 
Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan proposed that the United States 
should encourage the idea of territorial guarantees to India 
and Pakistan to allow them to spend more on economic improve-
ment, "which would keep out the potential menace of communism." 
Moscow's image of Pakistan was more unfavourable in com-
parison to India, Pakistan's bid to assume leadership of Pan-
Islamic forces proved a stumbling bloc for the improvement of 
relations with the Soviet Union. Moscow condemned the 
convening of the first Islamic Conference in Karachi. The 
growing pro-west orientation of Pakistan also made the 
Russians suspicious, and there were adverse comments in the 
Soviet press: "Pakistan was being converted into a British 
bridgehead in the East", into a "Second Trans-Jordan of 
enormous dimensions", by allowing the continuation of British 
military bases in its territory under the reactionary ruling 
120 S.M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy, Oxford Univ. 
Press, London, 1973, p.91 
121 The New York Times, 13 Apr 1950 
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circles". The Soviet press suspected a "secret agreement 
of Pakistan with the British tor military bases and speculated 
about the United States negotiating for similar facilities 
123 in the NWFP and elsewhere." Visits by the Americans to 
Pakistan» particularly to the northern areas close to the 
frontier of the Soviet Union and Pakistan's attitude towards 
Korean War also came in for severe criticism in the Soviet 
press. Its support for the US-sponsored resolution on Korea 
in the U.N. General Assembly and the supplies and equipment 
rushed by it to the assistance of the U.N, press in Korea 
124 
were described as the "Service Zeal" of Liaquat Ali Khan. 
In 1953 and 1954, Pakistan was drawn into the U.S.-
sponsored military alliances, CENTO and SEATO. The anti-
Soviet objectives of these military pacts was not obscure. 
Not only that, Pakistan opened its territory for use by U.S. 
forces for actions against the Soviet Union. One example 
of this was the use of Peshawar base by U.S. spy planes on 
their way over the Soviet territory, which culminated in the 
famous u-2 incident in 1961. Not only this, the Pakistani 
leaders went on making anti-Soviet statements particularly 
after the Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case in 1951 and after 
banning the Pakistani Communist Party in 1954, Actually, 
these two actions had been to legitimise growing Pakistan 
collaboration in the military field. Pakistan's successive 
tulers during this period failed to reciprocate all Soviet 
125 gestures and initiatives to improve Pak-Soviet relations. 
It Was only after the military coup by General Ayub Khan 
and when Zulfikar Ali Bhutto joined the government that some 
122 New Times, No.3, 14 Jan 1948, p.9. 
^23 Ibid., 21 Nov 1948 
124 Ibid., No,28, 12 July 1950, pp. 19-20 
125 Kalim Bahadur, op.cit., p. 69. 
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breakthrough v/as achieved in Pak-Soviet relations as indicated 
by the agreement signed in 1960. Under this agreement, 
Moscow agreed to help Pakistan in exploring oil and other 
natural resources. This was followed by grant of loans by 
the Soviet Union to Pakistan. Cultural and trade ties were 
further expanded in 1962-65. In 1965, President Ayub Khan 
visited the Soviet Union. This was the first ever visit of 
a Pakistani head of government to Moscow, During the visit 
comprehensive agreements on the expansion of cultural 
126 
exchange, economic cooperation and trade were signed, A 
Pakistani military mission led by the then Commander-in-rChief 
of the army. Gen, Yahya Khan, paid a ten day visit to the 
Soviet Union during 28 June-July 1968 and it was indicated 
on 8 July that before the delegation left, it had secured 
Moscow's promise for military assistance. 
The Soviet Union was the first country outside the 
sxibcontinent Sheikh Mujibur Rahman visited after being 
installed as the executive head of Bangladesh, Moscow agreed 
to give Bangladesh fifty railway locomotives and offered to 
clear Dhaka and Chittagong ports of mines, the latter move 
had obvious strategic implications. But the Soviets kept their 
127 
aid commitments to a minimal and prudent level. 
The Simla Agreement of 3 July 1972 between the prime 
Minister of India and the Pakistan President was welcomed 
by the Soviet union, Pravda, in an article on the situation 
in Pakistan, called the Simla Agreement "an important step 
along the road of normalisation of Pakistani-Indian relations 
128 
and the whole situation in South Asia," 
Soviet Union might have assumed a bigger role in the 
126 Ibid, 
127 Sheldon W, Simon, "China-Soviet Rivalry in South Asia," 
Asian Survey, July 1973 
128 Pravda, 15 Aug 1972 
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development of Bangladesh if the new nation had adopted the 
Soviet model of "noncapitalist development" under a mobili-
zation system of government. Soviet analysts came to the 
conclusion in 1972-73 that Bangladesh with its extremely 
small and highly fragmented bourgeoisie, its lack of an entre-
preneurial and managerial elite and its preponderance of 
peasants with small holdings, was unsuitable for capitalist 
129 development and parliamentary democracy. 
129 For a detailed study of Soviet analysis of the social 
and economic structure of Bangladesh, see Yun V, Gankovsky, 
"The Social Structure of Society in the people's Republic 
of Bangladesh," Asian Survey, 14, No. 3, Mar 1974 
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Chapter III 
SOVIET POLICY IN SOUTH ASIA - II 
(A) Soviet Stand on Bangladesh 
Soviet Union's attitude to the events in East Pakistan 
in 1970 was cautious and restrained. The Soviet Union wanted 
the settlement of the problem in Eastern wing of Pakistan 
without outside interference. However, with the aggravation 
of the crisis and the inability of military regime of 
Gen, Yahya Khan to find an amicable solution, Soviet Union 
became alarmed at the possibility of western powers fishing 
in troubled waters. Soviet Union wanted a political solution 
to the problem in Bangladesh which meant the transfer of power 
to the elected representatives of the Bengali people without 
which there could be no hope of peace in the region. The 
Soviet attitude should be seen in the context of the appearance 
of the U.S.Sixth Fleet in the Bay of Bengal in December 1971 
and also the aggressive postures of the Maoist-China. 
The supply of arms by the Soviet Union to Pakistan which 
began in 1968 at the expense of considerable heart burning and 
pique in New Delhi, was stopped in April 1970. And when the 
Bangladesh crisis erupted in March 1971, even the sale of spares 
2 
and other components to Pakistan was stopped. By coincidence 
or by design, Indian and Soviet policy concerning the grave 
1 Kalira Bahadur, "India, Pakistan and the Soviet Union," in: 
Vinod Bhatia, ed., 'Indo-Soviet Relations : Problems and 
Prospects', Punchsheel Pub., New Delhi, 1984, p.70 
2 The Times of India, Delhi, 8 July 1971; also see The 
Hindustan Times of the same date. 
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crisis in Pakistan ran parallel through the suiraner of 1971 
until they converged in the autumn, Indira Gandhi was under 
heavy pxiblic opinion pressure to intervene in the Bangladesh 
struggle, to recognize the government-in-exile, and to help 
it raise a "liberation army". 
The Soviet Union was the first major power to intervene 
openly in the Pakistan crisis. Since 1968 Sovie relations 
with Pakistan had produced more frustration than friendship. 
The Soviet leadershad risked Indian displeasure by transferr-
ing military aid to Pakistan, but they had not been able to 
loosen the ties of Pakistan with China nor win the support of 
Pakistan for the regional economic grouping that Moscow had 
been wanting to create. 
The Soviet Union was the first big power to realise the 
gravity of the situation and to see in it a major threat to 
peace and security in South Asia. At a time when both Peking 
and Washington were trying to condone the blood bath in East 
Bengal as an internal affair of Pakistan, the Soviet President 
Nikolas Podgorny in his letter of 2 April 1971 to the Pakistan 
President Yahya Khan, appealed to "stop the bloodshed and 
repressions against the population in East Pakistan", and 
restore methods of peaceful political development. 
The joint Indo-Soviet statement on Gromyko's visit to 
New Delhi to sign the Indo-Soviet Treaty also called for urgent 
steps to be taken in East Pakistan for the achievement of a 
political solution and for the creation of conditions for 
4 
the safe return of the refugees to their houses. 
On 7 October 1971, the spokesman of the Pakistani Foreign 
Office objected to Kosygin's criticism of the Yahya regime's 
3 Pravda, 4 ;^ril 1971 
4 The Times of India, New Delhi, 13 Aug 1971 
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action. He also alleged that the recent Indo-Soviet Treaty had 
"encouraged India to step up provocative activities against 
Pakistan". He asked Moscow to take notice of the aggressive 
disposition of the Indian armed forces against the Pakistan 
borders in both the wings." On October 8, 1971, a joint 
statement of the U.S.S.R. and Algeria declared their "respect for 
the national unity and territorial integrity of Pakistan and 
India". The two states appealed to both New Delhi and Islamabad 
to find a peaceful solution to the problem confronting them 
"according with the principles of non-interference, mutual respect, 
good neighbour relations and the spirit of the Tashkent meeting." 
When a full scale war broke out between India and Pakistan as 
a result of surprise Pakistani air attacks on Indian air fields 
on the evening of 3 December 1971, the Soviet Premier A.N.Kosygin 
declared in his press conference in Denmark that the Soviet Union 
was "quite resolutely" in favour of ending the war and bringing 
about a peaceful settlement between the forces of Bangladesh and 
Pakistan. President Yahya Khan visited the Soviet Union in June 
1970, Speaking at the state banquet given by him in honour of 
Yahya Khan, President Podgorny of Soviet Union said that the 
two countries had no dispute between them and that they valued 
each other's friendship. According to him, therefore, there was 
every reason for the two countries to strength and cement their 
7 
friendship further. In the joint communique issued at the 
end of the visit, the two countries expressed identity of 
views on such international issues as the situation in the 
Middle East, the Vietnam War, and disarmament. It reaffirmed 
their common desire "to strengthen further the existing contacts". 
It also recorded the usefulness of periodical consultations 
5 New Times, No.42, Oct 1971 
6 The Hindustan Times, Delhi, 6 Dec 197 
7 Dawn, 23 June 1970 
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g 
between them "along with lines of Foreign Ministers". As 
regards Indo-Pakistani relations, the conununique expressed 
the firm belief of the Soviet Union that a settlement of 
disputable question, by means of bilateral negotiations in 
the spirit of the Tashkent Declaration would accord with 
the vital interest of both India and Pakistan as well as the 
9 
interests of the peoples of the region as a whole. 
However, Soviet displeasure over the policy of military 
terror in East Bengal was duly conveyed to the rulers of 
Pakistan through Podgorny's note sent to Yahna Khan on the 
April 1971.^° 
Having once conveyed to the Pakistani rulers its disapp-
roval of military methods, Moscow refrained from criticising 
them further throughout the month of April. The Soviet press 
published brief reports but without any comments, regarding 
the events in East Pakistan, in which it quoted mainly 
western and Pakistani sources. Indian sources reporting 
and commenting on the situation, in sharp contrast, were 
referred to only four times in the same month, April 1971 
by Pravda. The official organ of the communist party of the 
Soviet Union and just twice by Izvestia the mouth piece of 
the Soviet Government, 
In the weeks immediately following the 25 March 1971 
military crackdown Pakistan army appeared to be succeeding 
in crushing the spontaneous, sporadic, and almost entirely 
unorganised resistance offered largely by the Bengali personnel 
of the East Bengal Rifles, and East Bengal Regiment, The 
8 Ibid., 27 June 1970 
9 Ibid. 
10 Soviet Review, Supplement to the issue No,3, Vol.IX, Jan 18, 
1972, entitled "Soviet Union and the struggle of the 
Bengaladesh people", Official Documents and Articles. 
^^ Pravda, 1,5,29 and 30 April 1971; also see Izvestia 7 and 
19 April 1971 
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author of an article in the 14 April 1971, issue of the New 
Times seemed to have clearly been influenced by such an 
12 
assessment of the situation. 
For nearly three months the Soviet press followed a policy 
of strict neutrality between India and Pakistan in that it 
published parallel reports from India and Pakistani sources 
without comments. Thus both India and Pakistan versions of 
violation of borders by the other side were carried side by 
side in the columns of Pravda. The paper, while reproducing 
Pakistani claims of growing normalisation of the situation 
in East Bengal* quoted at the same time the Indian reports 
of mounting figures of refugees fleeting into India from 
East Bengal. 
The Indian Foreign Minister, Swaran Singh paid an unofficial 
visit to Moscow in June 1971. During his stay, he had high 
level talks. In the joint communique issued Foreign Ministers 
of both the countries significantly stated the decision of 
the two sides to remain in touch with each other in view of 
"the seriousness of the situation". It also called for 
immediate measures in East Bengal to ensure the cessation of 
refugee outflow to India and steps for the creation of conditions 
of security for the return of the refugees to their homes. It 
reiterated Soviet president Podgorny's appeal of April last 
13 to Yahya Khan for a political settlement in East Bengal. 
Premier Kosygin was quite sympathetic for the prevailing 
conditions in East Bengal. He took an unequivocal stand on the 
question of refugees and said in an election speech to his 
voters! 
"All Who value the principles of hxjmanism must demand the 
^2 New Times, 14 April 1971, No.15, p.9 
13 National Herald, Delhi, 10 June 1971 
94 
creation of necessary condition for the return of refugees 
to their homes, giving to them guarantee of personal security 
and possibility of peacefully living and wor>cing in East 
Pakistan. According to our opinion he further said, such 
measures should be taken by the Pakistani authorities without 
delay. "•'•* 
It must be appreciated that in the problem of refugees 
the Soviet Union saw not only a humanitarian but also a political 
problem. The Soviet Union was keen that a precedent that 
refugees be allowed to return to their homes is firmly estab-
lished, since Soviet Union itself faced a similar problem. The 
fairly substantial influx of refugees from China, especially 
the Chinese Sinkiang though admittedly modest in comparison with 
that in India for the time being could well assume the terri-
torial proportions it had in India. 
In August 1971, the Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko 
came to New Delhi, India, and the U.S.S.R. signed a 20-year 
Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation, designed both to 
stay China's hand and to deter Pakistan from unleashing a war 
on India. This treaty had marked an extension and formalisa-
15 tion of the Soviet Union's role in South Asia. 
Signing the Treaty should not be taken to mean, of course, 
that with its signing Soviet Union came all out in support of 
the struggle for Bangladesh, though there was, indeed, a 
noticeable tilt in the Soviet policy in favour of the struggle. 
For instance, Soviet Union backed India in the latter's opposition 
to the posting of U.N. observers on the Indian side of the 
border with Eist Bengal. 
14 Pravda, 10 June 1971 
15 Mohit Sen, "The Indo-Soviet Treaty", Economic and 
Political Weekly, 25 Sept 1971, pp. 204-7 
16 The Times of India, Delhi, 1 Aug 1971 
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The Indo-Soviet statement of 11 August 1971, which ref-
lected perhaps the Soviet line more than the Indian position, 
categorically declared that "there can be no military solution 
of the (Bangaladesh nationalism) problem". The Soviet press, 
while criticising reactionary and chauvinistic elements in 
India and Pakistan for advocating war as a means of solving 
disputes stressed the need of maintaining peace in the sub-
continent, 
India, however, wanted the Soviet Union to demonstrates 
its friendship with it by taking certain positive steps to 
solve the refugee problem and to use its influence with Pakistan 
to secure a political settlement. This was highlighted by 
Indira Gandhi when she conferred with the Soviet leaders on 
the Bangladesh crisis during her first visit to Moscow on 
18 27-29 September, 1971. A joint statement issued at the end 
19 
of her visit: "The Soviet side", read the statement, "took 
into account the statement by the Prime Minister that the 
government of India is fully determined to take all necessary 
measures to stop the inflow of refugees from East Bengal to 
India and to ensure that those refugees who are already in 
India return to their homeland without delay... Both sides 
consider that the interests of the presentation of peace demand 
that urgent measures should to be taken to reach a political 
solution of the problems which have arisen there paying due 
regards to the wishes, the inalienable rights and lawful 
interests of the people of East Bengal..," 
It was perhaps this welcome turn in the Soviet opinion 
which made India's Eoreign Minister, S. Swaran Singh, bold to 
declare that India could count upon the U.S.S.R. for full 
17 Izvestia, 14 Aug 1971, and Pravda 15 Aug 1971 
18 Soviet Review, New Delhi, 12 Oct 1971, p.36 
19 Full text of the Statement in Pran Chopra, Before and After In> 
Soviet Treaty, New Delhi, S. Chand & Co., 1971, Appendix III 
96 
support in the event of a conflict with Pakistan, and that 
then all the relevant provisions of the Indo-Soviet Treaty 
20 
shall be duly invoked to deal with the aggression. 
Thus, from October onwards, the Soviet Union seemed to 
be following a cautious policy towards the Bangladesh issue. 
It hesitated to identify itself with any particular type of 
political solution; clearly it was not willing to give up 
all its options vis-a-vis Pakistan. It had often stated 
that its friendship with either India or Pakistan was not 
to be at the expense of the other. But a certain shift in the 
Soviet stand was nevertheless evident following Indira Gandhi's 
visit to the Soviet Union. There was a marked upswing in the 
criticism of Pakistan in the Soviet press. The Soviet media 
started playing up the anti-Pakistani resolutions that were 
being passed by various bodies in the Soviet Union. Deputy 
Foreign Minister Nikolai Firyubin, who came to India in the 
fall of October 1971, expressed his full agreement with 
India's assessment of the tense situation in India, which as 
he put it, "endangers the course of peace in the area. «21 
When on 3 December 1971 Pakistan launched a massive attack 
on several Indian cities, the Soviet Union stood firmly behind 
India. Apart from extending its military support the Soviet 
Union used its diplomacy to help the conflict localized. It 
sensed the danger that might flow from a possible Chinese 
involvement in the conflict. Hence as early as 5 December, 
it came out strongly in support of India and issued a warning 
22 to all powers to ke'ep out of the conflict. 
At the U.N. also the Soviet support of India's position 
20 The Statesman, Delhi, 29 Oct 1971 
21 The Times of India, New Delhi, 27 Oct 1971 
22 The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 6 Dec 1971 
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and of the Bangladesh aspirations came loud and clear. The 
U.S. sponsored proposal calling simply for a ceasefire and 
unconditional withdrawal of Indian troops from East Bengal 
was vetoed and resolutely countered by the Soviet Union 
with the insistence that without a political settlement in 
East Bengal which is based on the "lawful rights and interests 
of its people" no permanent peace in the area could be 
achieved. It became clear thus that the Soviet Union was 
determined to prevent interference by outside powers in the 
affairs of the subcontinent which would inevitably materialise, 
had the tensions of the type seen in 1971 continued to 
23 prevail there. 
The emergence of Bangladesh was an event of major importance-, 
in the subcontinent. For India it was a major victory of 
24 democratic socialism. The importance of Bangladesh to the 
U.S.S.R. lies mainly in its impact on the balance of political 
and military power in the subcontinent. Since the 1971 war, 
the objective of Soviet diplomacy in the subcontinent, according 
to Bhabani Sen Gupta, have been (1) to restore stability in 
the context of a balance of power based on Indian primacy; 
(2) to promote normalization of relations towards this end, 
with India and Bangladesh coordinating their negotiating 
positions with regard to Pakistan; and (3) to deny China and 
the United States any role, negative or positive, in the process 
of normalization. These objectives imposed on Moscow the 
quite formidable task of helping the new Republic of Bangladesh 
to its feet, while simultaneously promoting the primacy of 
25 India and endeavoring to mend fences with Pakistan. 
Moscow recognized Bangladesh on January 24, 1972, the first 
23 Izvestia, 11 Dec 1971 
24 V.P. Dutt, India's Foreign Policy, Vikas, New Delhi. 
25 Bhabani Sen Gupta, Soviet-Asian Relations in 1970 and 
Beyond, op.cit., p.157 
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major power, and one of the first nations to do so. Within 
two weeks Pravda announced that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman 
had been invited to pay an official visit to the Soviet 
,T 4 26 Union. 
A trade deal was concluded with Bangladesh in March 
1972 involving the exchange of Soviet equipment and 
material for the traditional exports of the area. Subse-
quent trade-and-aid negotiations resulted in a three year 
pact for a yearly trade worth $ 435 million and a modest 
Soviet commitment to provide the equivalent of $ 3 million 
to finance projects in the public sector. Almost overnight 
some 400 industrial units were created by nationalisation, 
27 including jute and textile owned by Pakistani capitalists. 
The most expensive and important service the Soviet 
Union gave Bangladesh was the clearing of the heavily mined 
shipping channels of Chittagong and Cox's Bazar, free of 
cost. Operating with a 2 unit Soviet fleet, the Russians 
completed the operation in two years, salvaging 17 ships 
Tanging from a 15,000 ton freighter to small coastal ships 
28 
and barges. 
The Soviet Union also welcomed Mujibur Rahman's initia-
tive to conclude a 15 year treaty with India, signed on 19 
March 1972 during the Indian Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi's 
visit to Bangladesh. The treaty was claimed to be inspired 
by common ideals of peace, secularism, democracy, socialism 
and nationalism. 
26 Pravda, 6 Feb 1972 
27 Bhabani Sen Gupta, Soviet South Asian Relations in 1970 
and Beyond, op.cit. 
28 Ibid., p.158 
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(B) Indian Ocean 
(i) The Soviet Strategy; Until the advent of the 1970s the 
overriding external force in the Indian Ocean had been British, 
and to a considerably lesser extent Portugese, Dutch and 
French. In 1968 the British Government announced the phased 
withdrawal of its military presence east of Suez. The British 
decision to withdraw and the concomitant appearance of a 
few Soviet naval vessels in the area shot the once neglected 
Indian Ocean into prominence. It has focused much more on the 
political, economic and military competition between the 
great powers rather than on the aspirations of the littoral 
states, particularly their cooperative endeavours. The vacuum 
created by the British withdrawal was regarded by the super-
powers as to significant and too dangerous to be left to the 
littorals, since the naval powers of the nations bordering 
the Indian Ocean were regarded as too weak to dominate the 
29 Ocean. 
Justifying their naval presence as the continuation of 
traditional policies of securing their vital interests, both 
the United States and the Soviet Union began to increase and 
continued to increase their naval strength in the Indian 
Ocean. Thus the decade of the 1970s witnessed the emergence 
of the Indian Ocean as another theatre of big power rivalry. 
The British decision to withdraw from the area alarmed 
the American and Chinese alike, both believing that the 
resulting power vacuum would be exploited by the Soviet Union. 
The appearance of a few Soviet vessels in the Ocean was 
immediately interpreted as Soviet efforts to step up its 
naval activities in order to fill the vacuum. Not much 
30 
29 Alvin J.Cottrell, and R.M. Burrell, "No Power can Hope to 
Dominate the Indian Ocean", New Middle East, No.36, September 
1971, p.35 • 
30 New York Times, 12 Jan 1968 
100 
weight was accorded at the time to the argument that the 
Soviet naval entry into the Indian Ocean could have been a 
reaction to America's introduction into the region of the 
Polaris-Poseidon nuclear submarine fleet. Neither was it 
considered that the appearance of the Soviet vessels merely 
coincided with Britain's decision to withdraw. Available 
evidence makes it quite clear that the Soviet entry was strongly 
influenced by its determination to achieve seaborne nuclear 
parity with the United States on the one hand, and the 
ongoing competition between the superpowers for political 
influence and economic gains on the other. 
Although the General Assembly passed various resolutions 
regarding the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian 
Ocean as a Zone of peace in 1974 and in 1975 progress towards 
the establishment of peace zone was not impressive mainly 
32 because of the lack of interest shown by the superpowers. 
In the past, superpower capabilities to respond militarily 
to crisis situations in a swift and decisive manner were 
rather limited. Building such a capability was considered in 
the mid-sixties and the proposal was vetoed by a U.S. Congress 
suspicious of wars of intervention in the wake of the Vietnam 
experience. But now both the superpowers have demonstrated 
their capabilities to intervene effectively in the Indian 
Ocean area and also sustain interventionary operations for 
long periods. The Taboz incident in which U.S. ships and 
aircraft operating from Diego Gracia and Egypt in a combined 
operation tried to rescue the American hostages in Iran in 
the summer of 1980, is a case in point. Though the mission 
31 Smolansky, Olas, M., 'Soviet entry into the Indian Ocean : An 
Analysis', in Alvin J.Cottrell and R.M. Burrell, eds.. The 
Indian Ocean ; Its political. Economic and Military Importance, 
praeger. New York, 1972, p.337. 
32 K.P.Misra, International Politics in the Indian Ocean, 
Orbis, V.18, Winter 1977; Also see K.R. Singh, The Indian 
Ocean t Big Power Presence And Local Responses, New Delhi, 
Manohar Book Service, 1977, pp. 204-54 
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failed, it did expose the vulnerabilities of littoral states 
to a combined assault by the U.S. forces. 7 
U.S. interest in the Indian Ocean is part of its overall 
stake in the Asia-Pacific region. U.S. trade with this region 
has overtaken its economic interactions with the EEC and 
accounts for more than one-fourth of all U.S. foreign commerce. 
In 1977 this amounted to $ 62 billion. U.S. exports in the 
same year to ASEAN nations amounted to $ 24 billion. Arguing 
the case for an increase role for the U.S. navy in the 
region/ Admiral Maurice F. Weisner of the U.S. navy had pointed 
out that the "Asia-Pacific region is a major reservoir of 
strategic raw materials, the significance of which has 
sharpened substantially in an era of heightened global 
33 
competition for increasingly scarce resources." 
In a Rand Corporation Study 1977, Prof Guy J.Pauker 
argued forcefully for additional U.S. military capability to 
deal with what he considered the rising third world trade 
unionism. His thesis that the U.S. should be ready to 
respond militarily to instabilities in the third world before 
the establishment of a new international economic order, 
which he interpreted as a demand for redistribution of power 
at the international level, was widely discussed in the 
western strategic circles. Significantly, the Guy Pauker 
thesis appeared at a time when the Carter administration 
was having under consideration the proposal to set up the 
RDF. The RDF was advertised as a deterrent force against 
34 Soviet incursions into the Gulf region. 
The global strategy of thp Western Alliance, spearheaded 
33 P.K.S.Namboodiri/ 'Intervention In The Indian Odean', in 
K.Subrahmanyam, ed.,The Second Cold War, ABC Publishing 
House, New Delhi, 1983, p.61 
34 Ibid., p.62 
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by the United States is undergoing very significant changes. 
These changes are structured on three fundamental factors 
where the U.S. enjoys a lead and superiority over the 
Soviet Union; technology, strategic mobility especially 
of the naval air military forces, and control of natural 
resources. Soviet global strategy exhibits a degree of 
parallelism though inhibited in a large measure by the 
limitations of its capabilities, and thus appears to be more 
reactive rather than initiative. Western global strategy, 
according to Jasjit Singh, manifests itself in three inter-
related main areas: (1) Maintaining a favourable strategic 
balancevis-a-vis the Soviet Union; (ii) Extending control 
and influence over the world's resources which mostly lie 
in the "third world" under-developed/developing countries; 
and (iii) Harnessing advanced and emerging technologies to 
exploit resource base and upgrade capabilities for power 
projection ranging from the deep oceans, through triple-
35 
canopy tropical jungles to outer space. 
From the global perspective, the entry of the Soviet 
Navy in the Indian Ocean is part of the determined efforts of 
the Soviet Union during the past decade to emerge as the 
dominant naval power of the world. The Soviet Navy has 
entered the Indian Ocean after making its presence felt at 
important check points of sea communication like the 
Dardanelles, the Skagerrah Strait, and the Tushima Strait. To 
make its activities more effective the Soviets want to set 
up full-fledged naval bases in the region. Although they 
have not succeeded in setting up such bases so far, the 
treaties they have concluded in recent years with a number of 
countries in the region and the fleet port facilities they 
35 Jasjit Singh, "Pacific Indian Ocean Region", in A.K. 
Subrahmanyam and Air Comde Jasjit Singh, eds,. Global 
Security; Some Issues And Trends, An Indo-German Dialogue, 
Lancer International and IDSA, New Delhi, 1987, p.147 
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have acquired in places like Aden, Iraq, Mauritius, the Sey-
chelles Islands, Somalia, the Socotra Island, Sri Lanka, 
^ 36 etc. 
Though India and the Soviet Union have often voiced their 
opposition to the U.S. naval base in Diego Garcia in the 
Indian Ocean Soviets too have expanded their naval presence 
in the Indian Ocean since 1968. This explains why, during 
prime Minister Indira Gandhi's visit to Moscow in September 
1971, the Soviets merely agreed "to study" the question of 
making the Indian Ocean a Zone of Peace and "to solve it 
37 together with other powers on an equal basis". 
The Soviet strategy in the Indian Ocean region is guided, 
in a large measure, by parameters and objectives similar to 
that of the United'States; and may also be seen to operate in 
bi-planar dimensions, perhaps the strongest incentive flows 
from the function of securing a role for the Soviet Navy to 
support the status of the Soviet Union as a global 'super' 
power. However, since the Soviet Union is lagging behind the 
U.S. in many spheres, especially strategic mobility, technology 
and naval-air capability, its strategy is a reactive one, 
and its policy options based more on responses to U.S. 
38 initiatives. 
The Indian Ocean and its littoral is of special interest 
to the Soviet Union because of their geographic proximity with 
each other, and in more ways than one, the Indian Ocean and 
its littoral constitutes the soft, vulnerable underbelly of 
the Soviet Union in strategic terms. Any U.S. move in this 
36 See B.Vivekananda, 'India and Britain' in Bimal Prasad, 
ed., India's Foreign Policy; Studies in Continuity and 
Change, Vikas, New Delhi, 1979, p.38 
37 Indo-Soviet Joint Statement, 29 September 1971, in Bimal 
Prasad, ed., Indo-Soviet Relations, 1947-1972: A Documen-
tary Study, Bombay, 1973, p.407 
38 Jasjit Singh, op.cit., p.152 
104 
region, feels Jasjit Singh, must be seen by the Soviets as 
hostile and threatening to Soviet security, a subject on 
which the Soviets harbour sensitivities bodering on paranoia. 
The "Choke points" of Suez Canal, Horn of Africa and the 
Malacca Straits region, and the larger "getways" to the 
Indian Ocean dominated by pro-U.S, Australia and South 
Africa not only place server limitations on Soviet ability 
to project power and influence in the Indian Ocean but impose 
an even greater strategic limitation on its ability to 
redeploy and reinforce its naval capabilities in the Pacific 
39 
and Atlantic Ocean. 
It is pertinent to mention that the Soviet Union has 
supplied economic and military hardware including missiles, 
naval ships and aircraft to a nxomber of Indian Ocean nations 
including Egypt,Ethiopia, Somalia, Mozambique, South Yemen, 
40 Iraq, Afghanistan, India, Vietnam and Indonesia. 
In 1976, during Mrs, Gandhi's visit to Moscow there appeared 
to be some change in the Indian Ocean policy of the Soviet Union, 
for the Soviets stated that they were ready "to participate" 
with the other countries concerned in any move to make the 
Indian Ocean a zone of peace. They also supported the desire 
of the peoples of the Indian Ocean region to prevent this 
Ocean "from becoming an arena for (the) setting up of foreign 
military bases."*^ 
presumably they calculated that the increase in their 
naval activity between 1971 and 1976 and their acquisition 
of military bases in Somaliland (which they were forced to 
39 Jasjit Singh, op.cit. 
40 K. Subrahmanyam, "Transfer of Arms and Military Tech-
nology", Strategic Analysis, New Delhi, May, 1987, p.126 
41 "Joint Declaration...", Soviet Review, 21 June, 1975 
p.37 
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to abandon subsequently) had made it possible for them to 
negotiate with the United States, on this issue as equals. 
However, during Prime Minister Morarji Desai's visit, the 
Soviets expressed their support "for the striving of the 
peoples of the area to make the Ocean a zone of peace". And 
in the joint Indo-Soviet declaration, the two countries 
urged the removal of all the foreign military bases existing 
in the Indian Ocean and prevention of establishment of the 
42 
new ones. 
Evidently, the Soviet position on the issue of foreign 
military bases in the Indian Ocean, is definitely quite close 
to that of India. It can be argued that in the age of the 
international ballistic missile, the Soviets do not need 
military bases in the Indian Ocean, By the same logic the 
United States and its allies too do not need such bases in the 
Indian Ocean, especially when it is claimed that "the Soviet 
Union is perfectly well targeted by second strike U.S. missiles 
and submarines stationed in the Pacific and the North 
Atlantic.""*^ 
The western pov/ers also hold that the expansion of the 
Soviet fleet in the Indian Ocean 'endangers the security of 
the United States, Britain, Australia and of the West as a 
44 
whole. This explains why the oil fields around the shores 
of the Persian Gulf are among the few pieces of real estates 
45 
the West might use nuclear weapons to defend. From this it 
42 Ibid., 3 Nov 1977, pp. 21-22 
43 Russell Spurr, "World War in the Indian Ocean: Prospect of 
Super Power Deal", The Times of India, New Delhi,9 Dec 1977 
44 Anthony Harrigar, "Security Interests in the Persian Gulf 
and Western Indian Ocean" in Patrick Wall, ed,, The 
Indian Ocean and the Threat to the VJest ; Four Studies 
. in Global Strategy, London, 1975, p.174 
45 Patrick Seale, 'The Politics of Oil', New Statesman, 
London, 6 Jan 1978 
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follows that for the security of their tanker routes 
through the Persian Gulf and across the Western Indian Ocean 
to Europe, Australia and Japan, the Western Powers must 
maintain and strengthen their military presence in the Indian 
Ocean. It also follows that since in this region Saudi 
Arabia and Iran together control 48 per cent of OPEC 
(Organisation of petroleum Exporting Countries) output, the 
security of these countries and the continuance of the 
existing pro-western governments in them should be "the 
46 prime objective of U.S. foreign policy." 
This was why, in the wakd of the break-up of Pakistan 
(i.e., much before the oil crisit of 1973), when India 
appeared to have become the preeminent power in South Asia, 
Iran started getting from the United States virtually any 
weapons system it wanted. Whereas from 1950 to 1971 Iran was 
allowed to purchase from the United States weapons worth 
$ 1.2 billion, it spent between 1971 and 1976 as much as 
$ 11.8 billion in the United States on military equipment, 
with smaller purchases elsewhere. And U.S. arms sales to 
Saudi Arabia totalled $ 5.8 billion during the period 
1974-76.'^^ 
It is not without significance that these massive arms 
transfers took place after the liberation of Bangladesh, The 
United States realized that Pakistan could no longer serve 
as a counterweight to India. It, therefore, presumably 
decided to built up Iran's military capibility and make it 
as strong as India. Obviously, it wanted Iran to Play the role 
it had believed Pakistan capable of playing in this region 
46 Ibid. 
47 For details. See K.R.Singh, "Iran's Quest for Security, 
India International Centre Quarterly, New Delhi, Vol,4, 
No. 3, July 1977, p. 236, and John CCompbell, "Oil 
Power in the Middle East", Foreign Affairs, New York, 
Vol.56, No.l, Oct 1977, pp.93, 98 
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till 1971. It also wanted Iran to protect its interests 
(i.e., U.S. interests) in the Persian Gulf and in the Arab 
lands south of it. Besides, the huge purchases of modern 
arms by Iran and Saudi Arabia in the United States was a 
profitable business for the U.S. war industry and arms 
dealers. 
Though India has friendly relations with most Gulf States, 
Iran and Saudi Arabia are likely to endanger India's security 
at least indirectly in view of the fact that in most Indo-
Pakistani conflicts in the past Pakistan had received support 
from both Iran and Saudi Arabia. It may be recalled that 
during the last armed conflict between India and Pakistan 
(Dec. 1971), Pakistani aircraft not only sought shelter in 
Iran but also used Iran as a base to fly essential supplies 
to Pakistan, Iranian experts using Iranian materials 
controlled the fire when oil and gas tanks were hit in Karachi. 
Medical facilities and supplies, especially oil, ammunition 
and spare parts, were provided to Pakistan, and Iran shared 
maritime air reconnaissance with Pakistan after the Indian 
49 Navy had blocked the Pakistan coast. 
India has, of course, desisted from criticising U.S. arms 
sales to Iran and Saudi Arabia openly and strongly. Its 
dependence on West Asian oil — the Gulf States supply almost 
two thirds of its oil requirements — and some other consi-
derations prevent it from doing so. Yet is is evident that 
China, Iran, Pakistan and the United States are engaged in an 
effort to contain India. 
The geopolitical imperatives affecting the Pacific-Indian 
Ocean may also be affected by another dimension — the naval 
power of the People's Republic of China (PRC). It is believed 
48 K.R.Singh, op.cit., p.236 
49 Ibid. 
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that PRC plans to create a force of at least 12 nuclear-
missile armed submarines to provide it a nuclear second-strike 
capability. The limited range of its SLMBs may dictate a 
deployment in the north-west Arabian Sea region to provide a 
serious and credible threat against important and critical 
targets in the Soviet Union. This in turn would generate the 
need for home-port facilities in the Indian Ocean. Thus, it may 
be reasonable to expect a revival of Chinese interests and 
activities in the Indian Ocean region in the years ahead. PRCs 
quest for attaining a major world power status would also 
point towards an expansion of its sea power, qualitatively, 
quantitatively, and geographically. Chinese relationships 
and sale of naval ships, submarines and equipment to countries 
of the Indian Ocean littoral may be seen as the early (and 
necessary) foundations on which to build the thrust of this 
expansion of its sea power, both in its search for greater 
role and status in this part of the world as well as a specific 
requirement of nuclear and military strategy against the Soviet 
50 Union, a country perceived as its major adversary. 
(ii) India's Importance in The Region; The importance of India 
in the Indian Ocean is enhanced by its north western coast 
which is very close to the Persian Gulf area. Further south, 
a future Indian navy might gain control over sea lanes leading 
in and out of the Gulf in the direction of the Pacific if the 
Maldives is also included in India's security perimeter. 
Towards South-East Asia, India possesses the Andaman and 
Nicobar Islands, close to Burma, Malaysia, and Indonesia* 
India's North-Eastern coast forms part of the Gulf of Bengal. 
Thus, India has enormous significance for the world power blocks 
on the one hand, and the two rival communist systems on the 
50 Jasjit Singh, op.cit., pp. 152-53 
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other. In the power triangle — the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R, 
and China — India's geopolitical position, and resources 
51 
could be a balancing factor. Thus, geographically, India, 
as the map would show, is of greater significance to the 
52 U.S.S.R. than to U.S.A. or to Europe. 
Moreover, Indian Ocean is assuming greater importance . <• 
for the Soviet Union from economic, political and strategic 
point of view. Through the Ocean flows a considerable part 
of Soviet East-West internal trade, and its importance for 
Soviet domestic trade will increase in the 1980s when larger 
quantities of Siberian oil will have to be transpoii;ed 
53 
across the seas to European Russia, This trade route for 
Soviet Union is the only round the year open marine communi-
cation link between western Soviet Union, which is the centre 
of political activity, greater population density as compared 
54 to the eastern part and industry, with its Par-Eastern ports. 
The Trans-Siberian Railways is the only link between the two 
parts, which may not be able to carry all the increased load of 
traffic. Besides, the eastern part of this railway and especially 
the Soviet Pacific Fleet base at Vladivostok is insecure in the 
55 face of the Chinese threat. 
51 S,N. Chopra, India: An Area Study, Vikas, New Delhi, 1977, 
p.168; Also see Robert H.Donaldson, The U.S.S.R., the 
Siob-Continent and the Indian Oceanx Naval and Political 
Influence in Lawrence Ziring, ed., The Sub-Continent in 
World Politics ; India, Its Neighbours and the Great 
Powers, New York, 1978, p.168, 
52 Ibid. 
53 Richard B.Remnek, "The Soviet Presence in the Indian Ocean: 
Current Realities and Future prospects", A Paper presented 
at the Annual Meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, 
San Franscisco, 1975 
54 A Lodozhsky, "The USSR's Efforts To Turn The Indian Ocean 
Into A Zone Of Peace", International Affairs, Moscow, No.8, 
August 1981, p.44 
55 A.K.Chatterji,"Soviet Strategy in the Indian Ocean", in 
T.T.Poulose, ed,, Indian Ocean Power Rivalry, Yound Asia 
Pub,, New Delhi, 1974, p,9 
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So safeguarding these vital shipping routes across the 
Indian Ocean appears to be a strategic requirement for the 
Soviets. Apart from the need to safeguard these sea routes, 
security of Soviet Central Asia is also affected by it as it is 
common knowledge that the pentagon reinforced the Persian Gulf 
and the Arabian Sea with the latest nuclear submarines carrying 
Trident Strategic missiles with targets in the Soviet Union. 
Soviet anxiety over the U.S.arms build up is related to the 
compulsions of its geography. The length of the Soviet frontiers 
is more than 60,000 kilometers of which not less than two third 
accounts for the sea frontiers. All the vitally important routes 
linking the European with the Asiatic and Far Eastern parts of 
the U.S.S.R. pass through the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean 
and this ice-free southern route is the only link between the 
57 Soviet ports in the Far East and the Black Sea. 
The existing internal land routes cannot be a substitute 
for these more economical and convenient sea routes and thus 
Soviet Union wants to keep the Indian Ocean clear of the American 
and Chinese domination. Soviet Union worries particularly, is the 
arrival of U.S. nuclear sxibmarines in the Ocean, which can endure 
longer and operate at greater depths. The motives of American 
deployment in the area is also clear from a comment made by an 
American military correspondent, that "in the age of missiles 
and nuclear war-heads, the Indian Ocean... serves as a huge 
launch pad for missile carrying submarines, it is as near to 
many Russian military and industrial centres... Moreover within 
the rach of naval missiles there are vast territories of Soviet 
Siberia."^® 
56 M.Kosova, "Pentagon Shadow Over the Indian Ocean", Inter-
national Affairs, Moscow, No.l, January 1980, p.142 
57 V.K.Bhasin, Super Power Rivalry In the Indian Ocean, New 
Delhi, 1981, p.53 
58 Quoted by Collin Cross, The Fall of British Empire, London 
Holder Sloughton, 1968, p.135 
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Furthermore^ the Sino-American thaw developed after a 
sharp deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations especially 
after the clash along Ussuri river. Thus international 
power again got transformed from a two power adverse partner-
ship game into a more complex one which was more unfavourable 
to the U.S.S.R. Indian Ocean has also become a centre of 
power rivalry among the superpowers, and the U.S. had deployed 
Polaris submarines with Poscidom missiles barrell pointed 
towards the Soviet Union. 
The significance and strategic location of Indian sub-
continent, and particularly the land mass of India itself is 
crucial for the Soviet Union. India's strategic location 
in the Indian Ocean gives her a central position in the 
Asian politics. Moreover, India is adjacent to the tier that 
borders on the southern flank of the Soviet Union and has 
enormous significance for the world power blocks on the one 
hand and the two rival communist systems on the other. 
Furthermore, the Soviet dispute with China has at least two 
crucial factors for similarity with the Indian disagreement 
with China. On the one hand, the U.S.S.R. and India both 
have frontier wars over disputed territory with China, and on 
the other, both states share borders with China, Russia in 
the north and India in the south. Thus, the overall geo-
political consideration on the whole advised Soviet Union 
to be close to India. Thus, the Soviet policy towards India* 
according to J. Bandopadhyaya, "is based on mutuality of 
national interests and convergence of political understanding 
of world politics and international relations. Thus, India's 
strategic location in the Indian Ocean gives her a central 
position in Asian politics and adds to her geopolitical 
importance in the world. All major sea and air routes of 
the world pass through India and Indian Ocean are an 
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59 indispensible link in world trade and commercial intercourse." 
From the geographical point of view as Nehru often used to 
say/ India is a kind of bridge between the East and the West 
and becomes inevitably involved in major global issue. 
It must be noted that all the Indian Ocean countries do 
not by any means support the Zone Of Peace concept whole-
heartedly though a majority of them, being non-aligned/ 
certainly do. 
The big powers are so overwhelmingly superior in military 
strength that there is nothing the Indian Ocean states can do 
but build up relentlessly world opinion against the obduracy 
of big powers. The struggle for dismantling all foreign 
bases and evacuation of all foreign forces from the Indian 
Ocean and its maritime states must continue. This might 
eventually affect public opinion in the United States which 
may force the administration to take action in the desired 
direction. 
The littoral states also need to promote economic inter-
dependence among themselves. For policy of resources is an 
important as removal of mutual suspicions. In this way the 
development of the region as a whole may be greater than the 
sum total of the development of individual countries. 
India being the largest country in the region with long 
standing democratic traditions could well take the initiative 
in developing a benevolent, benign and tolerant leadership 
to instil confidence in the smaller nations of the region. 
A regional and consultative approach on all problems may 
gradually convince the nations that India is desirous of helping 
59 J. Bandopadhyaya, The Making of India's Foreign Policy, 
Allied Pub., New Delhi, 1980, p.32 
60 Ibid. 
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and becoming an equal partner and does not wish to dominate 
or exert a dominating influence in the Ocean . 
In dealing with advanced countries of the world, the 
littoral states should take a practical view of the world 
affairs. They must build up adequate defences against the 
threats they face. In this respect India will have to 
shoulder the biggest burden in strengthening and expanding 
its naval and maritime forces and superstructure and thus, 
in close cooperation with the maritime forces of the 
neighbouring countries, in a regional approach, present a 
creaible threshold of deterrence to any potential aggressor. 
Security and self reliance for littoral states can only 
come about by internal strength and stability, economic 
development and self-reliance, and a naval strategy to provide 
effective and credible sea power to defend and safeguard 
national interests. Unitedly they can, in the coming years, 
develop into a reckonable forum-for-peace whose attainment 
by persuasion and negotiation appears despairingly elusive. 
(C) Soviet Union and the Afghan Imbroqlip 
The world was taken by surprise by the events of 27-28 
December 1979 when sizeable number of Soviet troops equipped 
with sophisticated weapons invaded Afghanistan in which 
Hafizullah Amin was killed and Babrak Karmal was installed 
as the new ruler of Afghanistan. The foundations of Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan had been laid much earlier and the 
December 1979 episode was the final act. 
The overthrow of the Daud regime in Afghanistan on April 27, 
1978, was no ordinary event. Afghanistan through the ages had 
seen so many upheavals when kings and conquerors had bitten 
the dust in orgies of massacres and mayhem. But what had 
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happened on that day in April 1978 was the end of a long 
era of succession of autocrats and tyrants. Afghanistan, 
once the backwaters of Asia had now joined the mainstream 
of the progressive comity of nations. Those who had now 
assumed power did not belong to ruling dynasties or powerful 
tribal hierarchies. Unlike past political upheavals it J^'as_ 
not a mere replacement of one ruling clique by another. It 
was a revolution since the power had passed from the repre-
sentatives of a set of exploiting classes to the represen-
tatives of the exploited and the oppressed classes. This 
was reflected in the 30-point programme which the first 
president of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan Nur 
Mohammad Taraki, announced on May 9, 1978.^ •'• 
According to Thomas T. Hammond, the information for pre-
liminary planning by Moscow would have been collected when 
General A. Epishev, the head of the Main Political Adminis-
tration of the Soviet armed forces, made an inspection tour 
of Afghanistan in April 1979? This was followed by the visit 
to Afghanistan by General Ivan G. Pavloski, Deputy Minister 
63 
of Defence from August 1979 to October, 1979. 
In late November 1979, Moscow put its troops in a state 
of alert and reservists were called up to fill up under-
strength combat divisions in the central Asian military 
district. Bridging equipment was moved to the Afghan border.64 
61 Kalim Bahadur, 'The Politics of the Sour Revolution' 
in Kalim Bahadur and others. Inside Afghanistan, Patriot 
Pub., New Delhi, 1985. 
62 Thomas T. Hammound, Red Flag Over Afghanistan, Westview 
Press, Boulder, 1985, p.82 
63 Afghanistan; The Soviet Invasion and its Consequences for 
British Security, London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 
1980, pp.37-38 
64 Patrick J.Ganity, The Soviet Military Status in Afgha-
nistan 1956-1979, "Journal of the Royal United Services 
Institute for Defence Studies, London, Vol.125, No.3, 
September 20, 1980,pp.35-36 
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The Warsaw pact countries had also placed their troops on an 
advanced stage of readiness. By mid-December Moscow had 
airlifted about two battalions of troops with heavy weapons 
into Bagram Air Base, whose management had already fallen into 
65 the Russian hands, 
A statement pxiblished in Pravda on 13 December 1979 
stated that the Soviet Union had decided to grant Afghanistan's 
request,., (for) immediate aid and support to send to 
Afghanistan a limited Soviet military contingent that will be 
used exclusively for assistance in preventing the armed 
interference from the outside. The Soviet contingent will be 
completely pulled out of Afghanistan when the reason that 
necessitated such an action exists no longer. 
By 1 January 1980, fifty thousand Soviet troops were in 
Afghanistan and more were on the way. Thus by January end 1980 
the number of Soviet armed forces in Afghanistan was estimated 
67 
between 80,000 to 100,000. 
The Soviet troops entered Afghanistan during the last week 
of December 1979 in defence of the PDPA regime and its security 
interest in the region. L.,1. Brezhnev considered the acti-
vities of outside powers as posing "a serious threat to Afghan 
fift 
revolution and also to our southern borders." 
Regarding the entry of Soviet troops in Afghanistan Babrak 
Karmal had stated: "Today I declare once more to all the people 
of the world that the entry of the United Soviet contingents 
65 Ibid. 
66 Pravda, 31 Dec 1979 
67 Jamir Phillips, "The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, 
Backgrounder, Washington, D.C., Heritage Foundation, 1980, 
p.3 
68 Kalim Bahadur, "Pakistan Policy Towards Afghanistan", in 
K.P.Misra, ed. Afghanistan in Crisis, Vikas, New Delhi, 
1981, p.99 
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into Afghanistan was in accordance with the request of the 
late Noor Mohammad Taraki and later, of Amin's government, 
and was begun much earlier than the election of Babrak 
Karmal to the responsible position of leadership of the 
Party and the state."^^ Shah Mohammad Dost, the DRA Minister 
of External Affairs has confirmed this. He has also claimed 
that it was Nur Mohammad Taraki who had requested the Soviet 
Union for military assistance under the Treaty of Friendship 
and Mutual Cooperation which Afghanistan had signed with the 
70 Soviet Union on December 5, 1978. 
The emergence of Babrak Karmal regime backed by Soviet 
troops pushed Afghanistan into Soviet orbit and its non-
aligned status was completely undermined. Engineering of 
the April 1978 coup and signing of the Afghan Soviet friendship 
treaty in December 1978 were steps towards the final takeover 
of Afghanistan by Moscow in December 1979. 
International Response; It is one of Newton's Laws that every 
action evokes reaction. Similar analogy is applicable in 
international relations. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
took the world by surprise and was severely condemned and 
criticised. The United Nations General Assembly and Security 
Council have passed resolutions condemning the agression in 
Afghanistan and called for the withdraw of all foreign 
troops from Afghanistan. Besides, the European Economic 
Community (EEC), Organisation of Islamic Countries, Seventh 
and Eighth Nonaligned summits, and other countries have 
69 Excerpts of Interviews and Speeches delivered by Babrak 
Karmal, General Secretary of PDPA, CC and President of 
the ORA, Kabul, 1981, p. 130, quoted in Kalim 
Bahadur, 'The Politics of the Sour Revolution', op.cit., 
p.31 
70 Kalim Bahadur, 'The Politics of the Sour Revolution, 
p.31 
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severely criticized the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
while calling for the unconditional withdrawal of Soviet 
troops from Afghanistan. However, the United States has 
played a leading role in this regard by not only condemning 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan but has taken certain 
steps since 1980 to help resolve the tangle. 
The U.S. Response; The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan proved 
instr\amental in changing U.S. perceptions about Moscow. As 
President Carter said that "the Soviets have seriously mis-
judged our own nation's strength and resolve and our unity 
and determination and the condemnation that has accured to 
71 them by the "World community". They underestimated the 
courage and the tenacity of freedom in that country (Afghanistan) 
and they did not anticipate the world's quick and forceful 
72 
response to their agression. The U.S. reaction to those 
developments irked Moscow and the Soviet media especially 
Pravda accused the united States of "anti-Soviet hysteria 
73 
reminiscent of the lamentable cold war times. To this 
President Carter reacted: "We do not want to return to 
the cold war, we do not want to have a confrontation with the 
Soviet Union. The Soviets have tried to mislead the world, 
74 they have failed". However, the Soviet media continued 
its criticism of Washington while concealing the real facts. 
By January 1980, the Carter administration had realized 
that the Soviet invasion and subsequent occupation of 
Afghanistan posed a challenge to U.S. strategic interests in 
71 Presidential Docviments, No.16, 28 Jan 1980, p.Ill 
72 Ibid., No. 16, 25 Feb 1980, pp.386-87 
"^3 Pravda, 8 Jan 1980 
74 Presidential Documents, No.16, 3 March 1980, p.387 
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the Gulf region and South West Asia and a direct threat to 
its security. As president Carter said on 14 January 1980: 
"Our own nation's security was directly threatened. There is 
no doubt that the Soviet move into Afghanistan, if done 
without adverse consequences, would have resulted in the 
temptation to move again until they reached warm water port 
or until they acquired control over a major portion of the 
world's oil supplies''^... The Soviet Union has altered the 
strategic situation in that part of the world in a very omnious 
fashion.^^ It places the Soviets within aircraft striking 
range of the vital oil resources of the Persian Gulf; it 
threatens a strategically located country Pakistan, (and) it 
poses the prospect of increased Soviet pressure on Iran and 
on other nations of the Middle East." The increasing Soviet 
influence after the April 1978 in Kabul was deterimental to the 
united States strategic interests in the region. Such an 
indication was given by Harold H. Saunders, Assistant Secretary 
for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs in a statement before 
the sxob-committee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House of 
Representatives on 26 SeptemlDer 1979 when he said; "our effort 
to encourage peace and stability in that troubled region is 
clearly made more difficult by Afghanistan's internal unrest 
78 
and exodus of refugees from Afghanistan." The united 
States regretted the "reorientation in Afghan foreign policy 
79 
... away from its traditional genuine non-alignment..." 
Washington also realized that direct interference in Afghanistan 
by any country including the Soviet Union would threaten the 
integrity of that country as well as the peace in the region 
75 Ibid., No.16, 14 Jan 1980, p.41 
"^6 i^i^" 28 Jan 1980, p.165 
77 Ibid., p. 185 
78 Department of State Bulletin, Washington, D.C., Oct 1979 
79 Ibid., Dec 1979 
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and it was a matter of concern to the United States. American 
scholars were also taking pains to show that the Afghan 
revolution and the friendly help the Soviet Union gave to 
defend Afghanistan's independence and sovereignty is in 
reality a smoke-screen to "cover the Soviet desire to fulfil 
Russia's age-old imperial dream of establishing a warm-water 
port on the Indian Ocean from which it could interdict western 
oil supplies... The Kremlin seeks to close the remaining gaps 
in an arch of influence stretching from the Horn of Africa 
81 to Central Asia." Some American scholars are more forthright 
on this crucial issue. According to them "the combined effect 
of the revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
in U.S. perception was that a significant and quite abrupt 
detrioration in the local geopolitical balance had occurred, 
to compensate for which a military response was not only in 
82 
order but imperative. The United States not only condemned 
the Soviet aggression but also took some measures to persuade 
Moscow to vacate the aggression in Afghanistan. 
The specific U.S. measures against the Soviet action in 
Afghanistan were envisaged in his message to the nation on 
4 January 1980 suggesting U.S. measures in this regard; 
i) Blocking grain sales to the Soviet Union beyond the 
8 million metric tons already contracted; this 
means withholding an additional 17 million metric 
tons which the Soviets have already ordered; 
ii) Stopping the sale of high technology and strategic 
items to the Soviet Union including computers and 
oil drilling equipment; 
80 Ibid. 
81 Alfred L. Monks, "The Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan", 
Unpublished paper, quoted by V.D. Chopra, "U.S. per-
ception", in Kalim Bahadur and others. Inside Afgha-
nistan, op.cit., p'.80 
82 Roney W. Jones, "U.S. Interests in the Indian Ocean", 
Unpublished paper, quoted by V.D. Chopra, op.cit. 
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iii) Curbing Soviet fishing privileges in U.S. waters. 
The catch allowed to Soviet fishing fleets in 
1980 would be reduced from 350,000 tons to 75,000 
tons, resulting in an estimated Soviet economic 
loss of 35 million to 60 million; 
iv) Delaying the opening of a new Soviet Consulate 
in New York and an American Consulate in Kiev; 
v) Postponing new cultural and economic exchanges 
between the two countries, now under consideration; 
83 
vi) Boycotting the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow, 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had accelerated the 
process of reinforcements of some form of qualified globalism 
for the U.S. policy. "The invasion appeared to challenge 
the United States to create a policy based on a new national 
consensus, one that required the necessary military power to 
84 
support whatever role it determined to play." 
Reaction in South Asia ; India's perception; The Soviet armed 
intervention in Afghanistan shook all the national capitals in 
the South Asian neighbourhood. This, according to Bhabani Sen 
Gupta, changed the entire course of Afghan history and an 
independent and non-aligned country became a "satellite of 
Soviet Empire". The background of Soviet invasion was laid 
down during the last week of April 1978 when the People's 
Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) seized power with 
Soviet help, by overthrowing and simultaneously killing 
Sardar Mohammad Daoud. Between April 1978 and December 1979, 
the Soviet military advisers and troops had started reaching 
Afghanistan for a virtual takeover. The PDPA regime had 
83 Department of State Bulletin, Washington D.C, Jan 1980 
84 United States International Communication Agency (USICA), 
Chronology of Afghanistan Events; A Retrospective, 
New Delhi, 1980, p.2 
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departed from the traditional path of genuine nonalignment 
and Afghanistan was gradually pushed into the Soviet orbit. 
The Soviet invasion, says Bhabani Das Gupta, finally sealed 
the fate of Afghanistan as an independent and sovereign country. 
Today's Afghanistan is a client and satillite state of Soviet 
Union.®^ 
Major Indian newspapers had given different view of the 
Soviet action. The Hindu called the intervention "clear 
military aggression on the part of the Soviet Union against 
the small nation of Afghanistan and found it reprehensible on 
two counts: first, for its blatant violation of national 
sovereignty supposed to be guaranteed in international law 
and by U.N, Charter; secondly, as a manifestation of super-
power bullying that threatens peace as well as regional 
.^  .. 86 
security . 
The Indian Express took a mellower view of the Soviet 
action: "There is no need to credit Moscow with all kinds of 
malevolent intentions. It is enough that they have placed 
themselves in a better position to intervene in a region 
where disaffected minorities like the Baluchis and the Kurds 
could yield rich opportunities. These are possibilities which 
must cause at least as much concern in India as the possible 
87 threat from Pakistan's newly acquired weaponiry." 
The Hindustan Times saw the two superpowers equally res-
ponsible for the Afghan crisit. "If Soviet intervention is 
to be condemned, so must also be the American. What is more, 
any strengthening of the Pakistan array as a part of the power 
85 Bhabani Sen Gupta, The Afghan Syndrome ; How to Live 
With Soviet Power, Vikas, New Delhi, 1982, p.12. 
86 The Hindu, 1 jan 1980 
87 Indian Express, Delhi, 1 Jan 1980 
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game will only revive the tensions on this sub-continent. Of 
course, the danger to Pakistan from the west is now real. 
This danger is not so much of invasion as of sap and mine, the 
erosion of the authority in the Pathan and Baluchi area. So 
there is every reason to feel nervous. But perhaps all such 
consequences can be limited and the tension on the sub-
88 
continent avoided." 
U.S. supply of arms to Pakistan caused much concern in 
India that it could increase tension in South Asia. Mrs. Gandhi 
attempted to bring back some semblance of balance to the Indian 
position. At a press conference on January 16, 1980, she 
disapproved interference by any foreign power in the affairs 
of another country and said that the Soviet presence in 
Afghanistan had increased tension and moved dangerously closer 
89 to the Indian border. Her Foreign Minister told the Lok 
Sabha: "India has close and friendly relations with the 
government and people of Afghanistan and we are deeply concerned 
and vitally interested in the security, independence, sovereignty, 
and territorial integrity of this traditionally friendly 
neighbour of ours and we believe that they have every right to 
90 Safeguard them." 
Mrs. Gandhi took a regional view of the Afghan crisis 
rather than a spatial global view which prevailed in the 
United States, China and Pakistan. Seen from the pure regional 
angle, the strategic divide in South Asia is between Pakistan 
and India. Pakistan's traditional allies are the United 
States and China, India's the U.S.S.R. In Indira Gandhi's view 
what was needed in the interest of regional stability and 
88 The Hindustan Times, Delhi, 1 Jan 1980 
89 The Indian Express, Delhi, 17 Jan 1980 
90 Quoted in Bimal Prasad, "India and the Afghan crisis,"in 
K.P.Misra, ed., Afghanistan in Crisis, New Delhi, Vikas, 
1981, p.79 
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balance of power, according to Sen Gupta, was to contain the 
Afghan crisis, not to aggravate it and enlarge its context and 
scope. It would be necessary to obtain the withdrawal of the bulk 
of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan within a specific time-
frame. But this would not be possible if the insurgency was 
internationalised and if Pakistan were converted into a base 
for Sino-US military operations against the Soviets in Afghanistan. 
Mrs. Gandhi's policy also implied that while India could 
line with a Marxist Afghanistan passing into the orbit of the 
Soviet block, it could hardly line with a Pakistan rearmed by 
the U.S. and China, everless with a Pakistan destablised and 
perhaps dismembered by the intermeshing impact of great power 
confrontation and internal conflict. Mrs. Gandhi's way to 
stablise the situation and enforce a certain element of 
caution in the actions of Pakistan, the U.S. andChina was to 
unequivocally reaffirm the strategic linkage between India 
and the Soviet Union in the event of a major conflict building 
91 
up in South Asia. 
Pakistani Perception; The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan 
has brought the largest traxima in Pakistan. Since the revo-
lution of April 1978, half a million Afghans had taken refuge 
in Pakistan, thousands of them were actively engaged in an 
armed insurgency against the pro-Soviet regime. That Pakistan 
was training and arming a large number of insurgents and 
permitted other powers, notably the United States, China and 
Egypt, to feed the rebels with arms and ammunitions had been 
92 
common knowledge. Faced with the twin problems of legi-
timacy and tackling the problem of Baluch and Pakhtoon 
91 Bhabani Sen Gupta, "The Necessity of Choice", Seminar, 
New Delhi, No. 246, Feb 1980 
92 For a comprehensive report see The Indian Express, Delhi, 
10 Oct 1979 ^ 
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rationalism, the Pak military regime began look to the Afghan 
rebels for solutions. It started training Afghan refugees 
for insurgency activities with the objective to bring down 
the revolutionary regime and replace it by a friendly 
93 fundamentalist regime to offset the problems in the provinces. 
If the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan poses an un-
precedented threat to Pakistan, Carter's reflexive offer of 
military and economic aid immediately cast Gen. Zia in an 
important international role and ended his isolation from 
the community of polite and civilised governments. Gen. Zia 
clutched at his unexpected luck, but was far from anxious to 
provide the Soviet Union too much. His government's first 
official reaction to the Soviet action was somewhat cautious. 
On a statement issued on Dec. 29, it expressed "gravest 
concern at the Soviet intervention, all the more because the 
victim was an Islamic nation. It called for the immediate 
withdrawal of Soviet troops," Unofficially, however, Pakistan 
Saw the action as part of a grand Soviet design to establish 
hegemony in South Asia, and regarded it as a direct threat 
to the security of Pakistan, Iran and other neighbouring 
94 
countries. 
The Statesman wrote: "Gen, Zia painted a scenario of 
the Gulf region which mirrored American visions. After Soviet 
intervention he said, Afghanistan had become a "big red 
wedge". The question was whether the wedge moved west to Iran 
or east to Pakistan. If it moved west, the entire Gulf would 
be overrun. Either way the prospects were grim. He was 
certain that the Soviets had larger geopolitical designs. 
Otherwise, the presence of 80,000 Russian troops in a rugged 
93 Kalim Bahadur, "Pak Policy Towards Afghanistan", in 
K.P. Misra, Afghanistan in Crisis, op.cit. 
94 The Times of India, Delhi, 3 Jan 1980 
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barren country devoid of any mineral or natural resources did 
not make sense. The Soviet presence in Afghanistan was as much 
a threat to Pakistan as it was to India. More in pain than in 
anger Zia agreed with a reporter that Pakistan perceived Indira 
Gandhi to be "pro-Soviet."^^ 
More than four years after the Soviet military intervention 
in Afghanistan, the Afghan problem was no nearer solution, nor 
did the Soviets seem any closer to establishing stability in 
the country. There was little doubt that Moscow's initial 
expectations that it could draw on the People's Democratic 
Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) and on the pviblic hatred of 
Hafizullah Amin to win popular legitimacy for the Karmal 
government and its own military presence have proved illusory. 
However, despite international censure and the Karmal govern-
ment's inability to consolidate itself fully,there were no signs 
of flagging determination in Moscow. The Soviets appeared to 
be settling down for a longer stay till the task of conso-
96 lidation is completed. 
Within weeks of the Soviet action. President Carter came 
out with a plan of increasing the U.S. military aid to Pakistan, 
reverting the April 1979 decision, which cancelled all aid 
programmes following confirmed reports that Pak was building 
a nuclear plant capable of producing materials suitable for 
97 
nuclear weapons. Further, Carter's Assistant for National 
Security Affairs, Zbigniew Brzezinski stressed the U.S.commitment 
to use armed forces if necessary to help Pakistan preserve 
its territorial integrity. For Zia-ul-Haq the changed situation 
95 The Statesman, 7 Feb 1980; Indian Express, 7 Feb 1980 
96 R.G. Sawhney, "The Afghan Problem: Soviet Options and 
Prospects for a Solution", Strategic Analysis, Vol.VIl/12, 
March 1984, p.990 
97 Quoted in K.Subrahmanyam, "The Afghanistan Problem Prospects 
for Negotiated Settlement", Strategic Analysis, 11(4), 
July 1987 
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offered the best opportunity to seek legitimacy at home 
under the pretext of a new "threat". The same threat was 
also used to seek enormous military aid from the U.S. Zia 
passed the message to the U,S*in this way... if you visualise 
98 the map of the region... then Pakistan deserves attention." 
Reactions of Other South Asian Countries; Bhutan strongly 
99 
objected to the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. 
Nepal's first reaction to the developments in Afghanistan 
was available on 1 January 1980 when a spokesman of the 
foreign ministry issued a statement in Kathmandu saying; "His 
Majesty's Government has been watching events in Afghanistan 
with increasing concern^ Recent developments, including the 
large foreign military presence,in that non-aligned sovereign 
country have deeply aggravated our concern, since they pose 
a danger to peace and stability. His Majesty's government 
believes in the inviolability of the sovereignty, independence 
and territorial integrity of all states and their right to 
determine and chart their own destiny themselves without 
foreign interference. Nepal opposes foreign intervention 
wherever it may occur. Nepal believes as a matter of faith 
and principle that foreign troops be withdrawn forthwith 
within National boundaries." 
At a meeting with foreign press correspondent in Kathmandu 
on 4 January 1980, the Nepal Foreign Minister, K.B. Shahi 
deplored the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and 
called for their early withdrawal. 
98 Kalim Bahadur, "Pakistan Policy Towards Afghanistan", 
in K.P. Misra, op.cit. 
99 S.D.Muni, "Bhutan: South Asian Initiatives", Strategic 
Analysis, 7(12), March 1984, p.loll 
100 Rising Nepal, Kathmandu, English Daily, 2 Jan 1980 
101 Ibid., 5 Jan 1980 
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When the issue of Afghanistan was brought before the 
General Assembly on 14 January 1980, Nepal's permanent repre-
sentative to the U.N.,Uddhave Dev Bhatta, made his country's 
position clear by asserting that the Soviet armed intervention 
in Afghanistan contributed a threat to international peace and 
security and unless eliminated immediately, it would have a 
far-reaching and negative impact on peace, stability and the 
atmosphere of cooperation and understanding of the region and 
beyond. He further addedi "The presence of Soviet troops has 
put at stake not only the sovereignty, independence, and 
territorial integrity of Afghanistan but also the fabric of 
102 
civilised relationships between states. On 15 January 
1980, Nepal voted in favour of a resolution at the emergency 
session of the General Assembly which called for the immediate 
unconditional and total withdrawal of foreign forces from 
^, , ,„. 103 Afghanistan, 
The Nepalese stand on Afghanistan issue was quite different 
from that of India which had abstained from voting in the General 
Assembly on that issue. Nor did Nepal try to link Soviet 
intervention with the Sino-American and Pakistani designs and 
activities in Afghanistan which India had been emphasizing 
right from the beginning of the Soviet action. In fact, the 
Nepalese Foreign Minister K,B,Shahi at a meeting with foreign 
press correspondents in Kathmandu on 4 January 1980, had 
described the U.S, decision to rearm Pakistan as a "bilateral 
affair" but soon corrected himself by adding that "rearming 
of any country in any part of the world will only create 
tension."^^^ 
102 Gorakhpatra, Kathmandu, Nepal Daily, 15 Jan 1980 
103 Rising Nepal, 16 Jan 1980 
104 Ibid,, 5 Jan 1980 
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Nepal also took initiatives to make other small powers of 
the region to realize the gravity of the situation and forge 
unity among them in opposing the Soviet action and remaining 
vigilant against the big powers interference in the intenal 
affairs of a small power. The King of Nepal along with the 
Nepalese foreign Minister visited Sri Lanka, Singapore, Burma, 
Bangladesh and India. The contents of his talks were quite 
relevant in this connection. In a joint communique issued at 
the conclusion of his visit to Sri Lanka on 27 February 1980, 
it was mentioned that His Majesty and President J.R.Jaya-
wardene "reviewed the situation in South East Asia and South 
Asia and noted with serious concern that developments that 
had been taking place there". They "reaffirmed their support 
for the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity 
of Kampuchea and Afghanistan, and the right of those nations 
to decide their destiny themselves without external inter-
105 ference." The two Heads of the States also called for the 
immediate withdrawal of all foreign forces from Kampuchea and 
Afghanistan. In addition, they reiterated their "faith in 
the principles and purposes of the U.N, charter and in the 
policies and principles of non-alignment" and expressed their 
determination to continue to work to strengthen those prin-
ciples. They also expressed the hope that "South Asia will 
be an area of peace, stability and cooperation, and called 
upon all to scruplously respect the non-aligned status of the 
106 
countries of this region." 
The All Nepal National Students* Union, the student wing 
of the Communist Party of Nepal, handed over a memorandum to 
the Soviet Embassy in Kathmandu strongly condemning the Soviet 
105 Sri Krishna Jha, "Nepal's Reactions to the Soviet Military 
Presence in Afghanistan", India Quarterly, Jan-March 
1981 
106 Ibid. 
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military intervention in Afghanistan and "the manner in which 
the Soviet Union in collusion with Indian expansionism have 
undertaken military intervention in Bangladesh, destroyed 
the identity of Sikkim and sought to exert political and 
economic pressure on small countries such as Nepal and Bhutan 
thereby creating danger for peace and stability in the entire 
subcontinent". The memorandxara demanded the immediate and 
unconditional withdrawal of Soviet and Vietnamese forces from 
Afghanistan, Kampuchea and Laos and an end to military 
intervention and expansionism. It also called for the 
107 
abrogation of the Indo-Soviet military pact." 
Under these circumstances the Soviet leadership appears 
to have reassessed its options in Afghanistan, The essence of 
the revised policy clearly underscored by Gorbachev in his 
political report to the 27th Party Congress, In regard to 
Afghanistan he stated: "it is our vital interest that the 
U.S,S.R. should always have good and peaceful relations with 
all its neighbours. This is vitally important objective of 
108 
our foreign policy," 
Gorbachev's support to Najibullah's national reconcilia-
tion moves was a step to facilitate the Geneva talks. Under 
this conciliatory move the Soviet Union intended to establish 
a broad coalition government in Kabul with the participation 
of various insurgent groups based in Pakistan, in which the 
109 
PDPA would retain a dominant role. 
Geneva Talks; The Geneva talks- to find a political solution 
107 Nepal Post, Kathmandu, 16 Jan 1980 
108 "Soviet View of Contemporary World", Excerpts from the 
Political Speech of CPSu General Secretary to the 27th 
Congress. 
109 New Times, No. 13, April 6, 1987, p.67 
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to the Afghan question started in June 1982 in pursuance of 
the resolution passed by the General Assembly. In the wake 
of Pakistan's refusal to recognize the Karmal government in 
Kabul, the U.N. Secretary General and his personal representative, 
Diego Cordovez, made hectic efforts during 1981-82 to help hold 
"proximity talks" between Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran. Diego 
Cordovez held indirect talks with the representatives of 
Pakistan and Iran which led to the first round of talks in 
Geneva in June 1982. Iran refused to take part in the nego-
tiations. There was no outcome of the talks which led to its 
postponement. However, it was agreed that the "proximity 
talks" veered round four main points; 
i) Withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan; 
ii) Non-interference in the internal affairs of states; 
iii) International guarantees of non interference; and 
110 iv) Voluntary return of the refugees to their homes. 
The Soviet Union was a silent observer while Iran preferred 
to be simply "kept informed". Until the middle of 1983, 
resulted in the preparation of 23-page draft agreement for the 
consideration of "concerned parties." The U.N. special 
representative Diego Cordovez claimed that 95 per cent of the 
112 
agreement was in hand. 
But there was no satisfactory outcome because of the 
differing opinions among the concerned parties. The fourth 
round of Geneva Talks held in June 1985 also proved a 
113 failure. However, the eighth round of talks held in Geneva 
110 U.N. Doc. A/37/482, 27 Sep 1982 
111 Munawar Noorani, "Afghanistan Negotiations: Implications 
for the US of an Impasse", Journal of South Asian and 
Middle Eastern Studies", Villanova, Vol.IX, No.3/ Spring 
1986, p.9 
112 "An Accord in the Offing", Far Eastern Economic Review, 
Hong Kong, 9 June 1983, p.28 
113 New York Times, 28 June 1985 
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in the beginning of August 1986 was adjourned on 8 August 
1986, in view of the reported Soviet proposal to "withdraw 
some troops? The diplomatic process initiated by the Secretary 
General of the U.N. with the support of all governments 
concerned and aimed at achieving through negotiations, a 
political settlement of the situation relating to Afghanistan, 
has been successfully brought to an end. 
The personal representative paid an additional visit to 
the area from 8 to 18 March 1986 for consultations. The 
final round of negotiations began as proximity talks at Geneva 
on May 5, 1986, was suspended on 23 May 1986 for consulta-
tions and was resumed from 31 July to 8 August 1986, The 
personal representative visited the area from 20 November to 
3 December 1986 for further consultations and 25 February to 
9 March 1987, and from 7 to 11 September 1987. The personal 
representative again visited the area from 18 January to 
9 February 1988 and the talks resumed at Geneva from 2 March 
to 8 April 1988. 
After more than eight years of bloody strife, the Geneva 
Accord signed on 15th April 1988 between the Pakistan and 
Afghan Foreign Ministers, with the Soviet Union and the 
United States standing guarantee, marked a historic moment in 
the history of this Asian region. The accord only guarantees 
that Pakistan and Afghanistan will not interfere in each other's 
affairs, that they will not encourage or support rebellions or 
secessionist activities under any pretext. What the accord 
does not do is provide a framework for ending the civil strife 
in Afghanistan, Nor is there any agreement between the U.S.S.R. 
and the U.S. on ending military support to their allies in 
Afghanistan so that the conflict will, in a sense now, be a 
114 Larry Jagan, "Summit Surprise?" Economic and Political 
Weekly, Bombay, 21(4), 23 Aug 1986, p.1473 
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fight to the finish for control of Kabul without Najibullah 
having the support of 100,000 Soviet troops, tanks and 
attack helicopters. 
Since May 15, Soviet troops began to leave Afghanistan. 
Before the accord, the Soviets had indicated that they were 
not opposed to a substantially broad based coalition as an 
intrim arrangement, an attitude that had worried the 
Najibullah Government. Shevardnadze, the Foreign Minister, 
told the Soviet news agency Tass that he was not particularly 
worried about the political fortunes of people in Kabul. No 
one, he said, could claim a monopoly of power or "put his 
personal considerations and aspirations above the interests of 
the nation." This is however, as far as the Soviets are 
ready to go. They will accept a newcoalition in Kabul, but 
only if it is not balantly anti-Soviet (as one led by the 
Peshawar based seven party alliance — the Islamic Unity of 
Afghan Mujahidin — might be). It is because of this that the 
Soviets have refused to promise that they will not give 
military aid to any government in Kabul. Their position is 
that Afghan-Soviet relations go back at least a decade before 
the happenings of 1979, and all that is not going to be 
given up for the sake of an expeditious withdrawal. 
(D) South Asian Regional Cooperation 
South Asia has become a major arena of international 
rivalry between major world powers. The consequence is 
that a complex web of strategic, military and ideological 
interests are so jxoxtaposed as to result in divisions within 
the region which throws up obstacles to cooperation. 
Vast changes have occurred in South Asia's geopolitical 
situation during the last decade. Momentous developments in 
133 
1971 — the dismemberment of Pakistan and the emergence of 
Bangladesh as an independent country — created a new South 
Asian environment much more conducive to cooperation than 
conflicts. Since 1947 the South Asian scene had been bede-
villed by the ongoing conflict between India and Pakistan, 
Which reached its climax in the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war. 
Although the war truncated Pakistan, the residual state of 
Pakistan emerged as more viable and geographically compact. 
Since the Simla Agreement of 1972, Pakistan's attitude also 
underwent a radical change. 
A direct result of the Simla Agreement is that the new 
state system in the region is more compact and stable, with 
lesser problems of national identity and integration. Further, 
this resulted in dissolving the artificial balance of power, 
created by external powers, between India and Pakistan. This 
was, earlier, one of the major distortions in the regional 
power structures, a major source of conflict and an impe-
diment to regional cooperation. Since then, the power gap 
between India and her neighbours is so great that any intra-
regional conflict, over regional issues and with regional 
initiative, becomes redundant. This, particularly, made it 
possible for the idea of regional cooperation to take shape. 
As one scholar concludes: "for 1970s, unless there are very 
much great changes indeed. South Asia can be considered to 
be a zone of peace" and when peace prevails cooperation is 
more feasible. 
The idea of South Asian Regional Cooperation took shape 
through a proposal made by President Ziaur Rahman of Bangladesh 
in May 1980, in which he called for a summit meeting of the 
leaders of the seven South Asian countries, to explore the 
possibilities of establishing a framework for regional 
115 Wayne Wilcox, The Emergence of Bangladesh, Washington, 
1973, p.76 
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cooperation. President Ziaur Rehman arguedi "The countries 
of South Asia share many common values that are rooted in 
their social/ ethnic, cultural and historical tradition, 
perceptions about certain specific events or political situa-
tion of the world may differ but such difference do not seem 
to create a gulf between them that cannot be bridged," 
This Bangladesh proposal was endorsed by Napal, Sri Lanka, 
Maldives and Bhutan, but both India and Pakistan were reticent. 
It was a time that Mrs,Indira Gandhi had recently returned to 
power (in January 1980) and her government wanted a closer 
scrutiny of the proposal which had been discussed by the 
govenment of Bangladesh with the Indian government led by the 
Janta Party, At this time India's relations with Pakistan 
and Bangladesh were not very close. Mrs, Gandhi's government 
was apprehensive that the neighbours may collectively try to 
isolate India on global issues and may put pressure on it in 
order to improve their bargaining position vis-a-vis India. 
India also considered unrealistically ambitious the proposal 
of a summit level meeting as a first step for initiating 
117 
regional cooperation without any groundwork. 
The initial reservations of India towards the Bangladesh 
proposal were also because of the Western support behind the 
move. President Carter of the U.S. in his State of Union 
Address on 23 January 1980/ proposed a "cooperative regional 
118 
security framwork," Zbigniew Brezenski, National Security 
Adviser to the U.S. President and Warren Christopher, Deputy 
Secretary of State, visited Pakistan at this time and made an 
offer of U.S. arms and other assistance to help Pakistan meet 
116 S.D. Muni, Regional Cooperation in South Asia, National, 
1984, p.lO 
117 Indian Foreign Minister NGrsimha Rao's Statement in 
Parliament on 25 March 1981, The Statesman,26 March 1981 
118 Department of State Bulletin, Washington, March,1980, 
pp. 35-36 
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119 the situation arising out of Soviet action in Afghanistan. 
Simultaneously, Clark Clifford, emissary of the U,S. President, 
visited India and advised India to "evolve a regional 
approach with Pakistan to the fundamentally changed situation 
120 
which the whole region now faced. 
It was in the context of these developments that India's 
Foreign Minister, Narasimha Rao, asked the U.S. to keep off 
the strategic and security aspects from the regional coopera-
121 tion move. 
SAARC ; From Establishment to the present : The launching of 
the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, or to 
use its popular acronym SAARC, following the Dhaka Summit in 
early December 1985 was the slow, steady and welcome culmina-
tion of the steps initiated by president Ziaur Rehman of 
Bangladesh as early as 1977. The formal process began with 
the meeting of the Foreign Secretaries of the seven countries 
in Colombo in April 1981 and continued with three similar 
meetings in Kathmandu, Islamabad and Dhaka. 
The idea got a push forward in the meeting of the Foreign 
Ministers in New Delhi in August 1983, which accepted the 
concept of regional cooperation for collective self reliance 
through economic growth, social progress and cultural develop-
ment. Nine areas were identified for regional cooperation, 
namely, agriculture, rural development, tele-communications, 
meteorology, health and population, postal service, transport 
service, science and technology and sports, arts and culture. 
Following the meeting of the Foreign Ministers in Thimpu in 
May 1985, the summit meeting of the Heads of States was held 
119 Ibid., p.65 
120 Ibid., April 1980, p.62 
121 The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 30 April 1981 
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in Dhaka in December 1985 and the SAARC was launched amidst 
much euphoria and fanfare. 
The Declaration of its establishment gives the following 
122 
objectives of the SAARC: 
(a) to promote the welfare of the peoples of South Asia 
and to improve their quality of life; 
(b) to accelerate economic growth/ social progress and 
cultural development in the region and to provide all 
individuals the opportunity to live in dignity and to 
reaUse their full potential; 
(c) to promote and strengthen collective self reliance 
among the countries of South Asia; 
(d) to contribute,to mutual trust, understanding and 
appreciation of one another's problems; 
(e) to promote active collaboration and mutual assistance 
in the economic, social, cultural, technical and 
scientific fields; 
(f) to strengthen cooperation with other developing 
countries; 
(g) to strengthen cooperation among themselves in inter-
national forums on matters of common interest; and 
(h) to cooperate with international and regional organi-
zations with similar aims and purposes. 
Though, the SAARC move was made in early 1980, there were, 
however, vague indications in this direction since 1977. In 
1978, when President Carter of the United States and the 
British Prime Minister Callaghan paid visits to South Asia, 
they underlined the need for the South Asian countries to 
forge cooperative linkages amongst themselves. Both these 
Western leaders made it known that if there were definite 
proposals for regional economic cooperation like the harassing 
122 Text ofthe Declaration of the SAARC 
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of water resources, their countries were willing to come 
forward to provide economic assistance and support. 
They also indicated the desirability of even China being 
involved in such cooperation exercises. This was in line with 
the growing rapport between the U.S. and China on regional 
123 South Asian Affairs. 
The idea of regionalism in South Asia found prompt 
support in the West, particularly as it had been voiced by 
the leaders and the regimes sympathetically disposed towards 
the U.S. There were clearly two aspects of this Western 
support to South Asian regionalism. One was the Western offer 
of economic help if South Asian countries could work out 
multilateral regional cooperation projects in areas like. 
The second aspect of Western support was related to the 
security dimension of the region in respect of the U.S. and 
the U.K. had encouraged the move of the whole of South Asia 
being declared a zone of peace. They also wanted the region 
to become a nuclear weapon free zone, in view of India's known 
and Pakistan's aspired nuclear capabilities. The Western 
support for Pakistani proposals in the U.N. on South Asia as a 
zone of peace and as nuclear-weapon free zone during this period 
was a clear indication in this respect. The American and the 
British leaders during the visit to the subcontinent in January 
1978 had also tried to secure firm commitments from India and 
124 Pakistan regarding nuclear non-proliferation. It is 
difficult to say as to what precisely prompted the West in 
their support for regional harmony and peace in South Asia 
123 S.D. Muni, "Strategic Aspects of SAARC", Strategic 
Analysis, VIII(1), April 1984, p.23 
124 Asian Recorder, Jan 22-28, 1978, p.14130, quoted by 
S.D, Muni, *• South Asian Regional Cooperation: Evolution 
and prospects", in K. Subrahraanyam and Air Comde 
Jasjit Singh, eds., Global Security; Some Issues and 
Trends, Lancer International,IDSA, New Delhi, 1987, p.112 
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at that time. But possibly the Carter administration priority 
coupled with the revival of super power tensions in the Indian 
125 Ocean. 
The nature of South Asian events and diplomatic activities 
during the first few months of 1980 were such that president 
Rahman's proposal which underlined his concern for "peace, 
stability and security" in the region, was perceived even in 
Dhaka as a reflection of the Carter doctrine in South Asia. 
South Asian Governments have found it advantageous to 
project assertive and divergent postures towards India in 
their strategies for domestic political sustenance and support 
127 
mobilization. Such intra-regional disharmony has tended 
the South Asian countries to look towards outside powers for 
support to ensure a favourable regional balance. The 
external powers have naturally exploited regional disharmonies 
128 to serve their own strategic interests. 
The United States and China favour this security biased 
approach to SAARC, This aspect of U.S. support to regionalism 
in South Asia has been evident since 1977, particularly since 
1980. The Dhaka summit which endeavoured to give a political 
and strategic profile to SAARC was promptly welcomed by the 
U.S. and China. This is understandable in view of strategic 
interests of these extra-regional powers in the South Asian 
countries. China looks upon SAARC as a conducive factor to 
help it consolidate its growing political and strategic 
129 influence in India's neighbourhood. 
125 Dieter Braun, The Indian Ocean; Region of Conflict or Zone 
of peace, London, 1983, p.27 
126 Holiday Weekly, Dhaka, 27 Jan 1980, quoted in S.D.Muni and 
Jasjit Singh, ed., op.cit., p.13 
127 U.S.Bajpai, India's Security, New Delhi, 1983, Chapter 7 
128 Stanley Wolpert, Roots of Confrontation in South Asia, 
Oxford University Press, New York, 1982 
129 S.D. Muni, "South Asian Regional Cooperation: Evolution and 
Prospects", in Jasjit Singh and K.Subrahmanyam, op.cit. 
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The U.S. and Western interests may also not favour 
SAARC to bring about collective self reliance in the region. 
South Asia has the potential to become a major market for 
Western goods, investments and technologies as a dependent 
rather than a self-reliant region. The Western efforts 
are therefore geared to adjusting South Asia in their desired 
patterns of East-West and North-South relations. If these 
efforts succeed, will a SAARC, incapable of meeting the 
rising developmental aspirations of the millions of South 
Asian people become a viable entity? At the same time, it 
would also be a miracle if SAARC can develop as an autonomous 
reaional factor for peace through development in the face of 
130 
adverse regional and extra regional pressures. 
Thus the outside powers have exploited regional dishar-
monies to serve their own strategic interests. Such dishar-
monies and mutual apprehensions are deliberately played up 
by outside powers. These apprehensions thrive on the domestic 
need of some countries to project an assertive and anti-Indian 
policy for their domestic political sustenance and support 
mobilization. 
SAARC and The Soviet Union : The development of regional 
economic cooperation in South Asia serves as a major factor 
of peace and stability in the region and on the whole Asian 
continent. The Soviet Union supports the efforts of South 
Asian States in this direction as well as of all other peace-
loving states in the Asia Pacific region. 
The Soviet Union and other socialist states are strongly 
in favour of Asia becoming a continent of peace, stability, 
good neighbourliness and cooperation. The u.S.S.R. has taken a 
130 S.D. Muni, "South Asian Regional Cooperation: Evolution 
and Prospects", op.cit., p.124 
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series of new initiatives in this field, aimed at pooling the 
efforts of all Asian States reyardless of their social systems 
which might even include a pan-Asian forum on the whole range 
of questions involving the ensurance of durable peace and 
equitable economic and political cooperation among Asian 
states. The interests of each state in the region necessitate 
the elaboration of a broad concept of security which could be 
based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence developed 
by Asian countries, on the ten Bandung principles on the 
initiatives put forward by the Soviet Union, the Asian socialist 
states, India and other countries, for promoting security in 
Asia and for making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace. Security 
and stability in the region could be made stronger if all 
nuclear powers agreed to stop all nuclear weapon tests notably 
in Asia and in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, and if the 
states of the region refused to participate in the U.S. and 
131 N.A.T.O. plans to militarise space, 
Yuri Kuritsyn, APN political analyst, writes that "the 
results of the summit meeting of seven South Asian countries 
which was in the capital of Bangladesh on December 7 and 8, 
1985, have evoked interest in the Soviet Union. The South 
Asian region adjoins Soviet territory. It holds a strategic 
position in the north of the Indian Ocean, where the busiest 
international sea routes, important for the U.S.S.R. as well, 
are passing. A total of 1,000 million people, i.e., nearly 
25 per cent of the world's population, live there. Therefore, 
it is natural that the Soviet Union wants to have stable 
relations of friendship and cooperation with the people of 
South Asia."^^^ 
131 A. Granovski, "Regional Cooperation in South Asia: A Way 
Stronger Peace, Stability and -^conomic Independence", 
issued by the Information Department of USSR Embassy in 
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The New Edition of the CPSU Progranune whose draft was 
under discussion in the U.S.S.R. at the time of SARC meeting 
in Dhaka on December 7-8, 1985, pointed out: However, 
different newly-free countries may be and whatever road they 
follow, their people are united by a desire to develop indepen-
dently, and to decide their affairs without foreign inter-
ference. The Soviet Union is fully in solidarity with them. 
133 These words fully apply to the South Asian countries. 
The Soviet Union does not want South Asia as a seat of 
global conflict. It stands for replacing tension in South 
Asia by relations of good neighbourliness and mutual assistance 
in national development. Obseirvers believe that these problems 
were in the fore of issues discussed by the Dhaka meeting. 
Thus, the success of the summit fully met with the national 
134 interests to the U.S.S.R. and its Asian policy in general. 
Disarmament is a must for development. Regrettably, 
writes Kuritsyn, the South Asian region is being stuffed at 
rapid rates with ever more sophisticated and expensive weapons, 
including those that can carry nuclear warheads. South Asia 
accounts for 50 per cent of all people who live, according to 
the U.N. data, in "abject poverty", i.e., people whose annual 
135 income is less than 75 dollars. 
The arms build-up and other military preparations in 
South Asia did not make the situation safer there. If one 
of the neighbouring countries, clashing with one another, 
buys a new consignment of tanks, heavy guns or bombers, 
the other too considers it necessary to replenish its stocks. 
Such a race inevitably results in increasing mutual suspicion 
and distrust. 
133 V,Florin, "Who Opposes Regional Cooperation in South 
Asia", Issued by Information Department of the USSR 
Embassy in India, New Delhi, 20 Nov 1985 
134 Ibid. 
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This is to the benefit of only those whose policy is to 
draw dividends from seats of tension and conflicting situations, 
In case of South Asia these are the owners of foreign military 
bases and installations in the Indian Ocean and on its shores, 
who are thousands of kilometres away from this region, the 
owners of submarines with nuclear weapons on board, crusing 
not far from the coastal countries. There are those who 
intentionally whip up the arms race in the region, make a 
fortune on it and try to use it for strengthening their 
positions. 
The Soviet Union opposes such a development of events 
in South Asia. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbochev pointed out 
at the session of U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet held in late 1985: 
"to ensure that the Asian region is not a source of tension 
and an area of armed confrontation, the Soviet Union stands 
for broader political dialogue between all the states in the 
region in the interests of peace, good neighbourliness, mutual 
136 trust and cooperation," 
These words reflect in the best possible way the U.S.S.R's 
attitude towards the summit meeting of seven Asian states. 
The leaders of these South Asian States have repeatedly 
declared against the arms race. The joint efforts of South 
Asian countries in their striving to curb the arms race are 
also well known. Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, 
together with a group of other countries, sxobmitted to the 
U.N, a draft resolution on "the Prevention of the Arms Race 
in Outer Space", It coincides with the concrete programme of 
wide-scale international cooperation in peaceful exploration 
of outer space in conditions of its non-militarisation, 
submitted by the Soviet Union for the consideration of the 
137 
world community. 
136 Ibid, 
137 IbT3. 
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After the SAARC meeting held in Dhaka TASS submitted 
a report that it was the first summit of those countries, 
which in itself is a politically significant event. A new 
page in the history of the region was written by the desire, 
stated by the participants in the forum, to pool their 
efforts and to seek the replacement of mistrust and conflicts, 
that grim legacy of the colonial past, with mutual under-
138 
standing and cooperation. 
The positive results of the Dhaka meeting are reflected 
in full in the documents approved by it, the Declaration 
and Charter of the Association, The South Asian countries, 
which have an aggregate population of about one billion, or 
one-fifth of the world's have quite a few problems in common, 
which can be effectively resolved only by common efforts 
by the erstwhile difficulties, rooted in the colonial past, 
have lately been compounded by new ones, born of the predatory 
practices of international monopolies. These include growing 
foreign indebtedness and also trade protectionism, practices 
more and more often by the U.S.A.and its allies. 
The specific economic position of the Asian countries calls 
for a very careful approach to the choice of the mechanism of 
regional economic cooperation which would ensure equal and 
mutually beneficial participation for each member-country 
irrespective of its size and development standard. The 
Western attempts of economic integration based on the ungover-
nable market regulation, on the establishment of all sorts of 
common markets and so on are patently unacceptable for 
139 South Asian countries. 
Of special interest to the countries of South Asia in 
138 Vasily Kharkov, "Important Step in Regional Cooperation," 
TASS News Analyst, 10 Dec 1985 
139 A. Granovski, op.cit. 
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this connection, according to Granovski, is the experience 
of planned regional economic cooperation within the framework 
of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance,which is based 
on the interests of the member-countries which differ both 
in size and in the level of their development. The nucleus 
of this cooperation is production specialisation and coopera-
tion of partners on the basis of inter-governmental agreements 
in manufacturing modern industrial products which serve as a 
material foundation for technical progress. Opportunities 
for specialisation in the new high-technology industries which 
140 the South Asian countries have just started are extensive. 
The South Asian countries have adopted different strate-
gies of economic development. Being comparatively well placed, 
the Indian economy has grown faster, so has the Indian state 
structure and the bourgeoisie as compared with their counter-
parts in South Asia. The neighbouring state structures and 
141 the dominant classes do not seem to relish this development. 
The advance along the road to overcoming the obstacles 
to cooperation calls for persistence and patience from the 
partners as well as willingness to understand one another. 
Obstacles to regional cooperation stem not only from objective 
economic issues involving different standards of economic 
142 development but also from outside factors. One of the major 
obstacles, from the Soviet point of view, is the policy of 
American imperialism in the region. In its attempts to attain 
global supremacy the Reagan administration is stepping up its 
military presence in South Asia region and adjacent Indian 
143 Ocean. 
140 Ibid. 
141 S.D. Muni, "India and Regionalism in South Asia: A Poli-
tical perspective". International Studies, July 1978, 
p.489. " 
142 A. Granovski, op.cit. 
143 Ibid. 
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The U.S.A., says Granovski, is openly setting individual 
countries of the region against one another, trying to pose 
as a "disinterested defender" of small countries of the 
region from the alleged "Soviet threat". It is supporting 
and encouraging the destructive forces in certain countries 
of the region. The shipments of the American weaponry, 
including F-16 warplanes to Pakistan, the conversion of the 
island of Diego Garcia into a major naval base posing a 
direct threat to the countries of the Indian Ocean, the attempts 
to gain control over the instabilisation of the political 
situation in the region. They retard the efforts of the 
countries of South Asia to establish a climate of mutual 
trust and to promote constructive economic cooperation. Nor 
are the goals of regional cooperation promoted by the 
attempts of individual states to make the settlement of 
regional problems conditional on the prior settlement of 
144 bilateral differences on specific issues. 
Boris Chekhonin, TASS Political News Analyst, appreciated 
the steps taken by the leaders of the seven South Asian states. 
He says that "the decision on setting up a special group to 
study the problem of terrorism and its impact on security and 
political stability of the states in the region is highly 
urgent, the more so that terrorism has its concrete address 
in that region: acts of sabotage and politically motivated 
assassinations are plotted in Pakistan. It is exactly in the 
territory of that country that dozens of bases were set up 
to train terrorist bands and infiltrate them into India and 
Afghanistan, Who can guarantee that the geography of these 
incursions will not be extended, that Nepal, Bhutan and 
other member countries of the seven states whose governments 
pursue an independent and consequently, unsuitable to Washington 
144 Ibid. 
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policy, will not become the targets for terrorist provoca-
tions on the part of Pakistan?". According to Boris 
Chekhonin, it is not fortuitous that the U.S. assigned to 
Pakistan the role of the policeman in that region, the role 
which is incompatible with the status of non-aligned 
145 
country. 
145 Boris Chekhonin, TASS Political News Analyst, "On 
the Results of SAARC Conference", Issued by the 
Information Department of the USSR Embassy in India 
New Delhi, 10 Dec 1985 "v^ xa. 
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Chapter IV 
INDO-SOVIET RELATIONS : 1965-77 
An important element of the foreign policy of the Soviet 
Union is its relations with India with her great influence and 
traditional wisdom with specific political experience and huge 
economic potential. Even before 1947 India and the Soviet Union 
had friendly contacts and maintained commercial, scientific and 
cultural relations. The best minds in Russia and India showed 
traditional deep interest in each other's history and poli-
tical, ideological and philosophical outlooks. 
People in Russia followed with great attention and sympathy 
and sided with the national liberation struggle of the Indian 
people against the British colonialists for freedom and inde-
pendence. India received with great enthusiasm the views of 
the victorious Great October Socialist Revolution and followed 
compassionately the heroic struggle of the Soviet people against 
German fascism- and firmly believed in Soviet victory. 
In his radio message in Delhi on September 1, 1946,the first 
prime Minister of independent India and outstanding Asian states-
man Jawaharlal Nehru said welcoming the Soviet people: "They are 
our neighbours in Asia and inevitably we shall undertake many 
common tasks and have much to do with each other". The Soviet 
Union established diplomatic relations with India back in 
April 1947, i.e., before India officially became independent, 
A^^  The Early Phase 
When the British Raj in India was dissolved in 1947, and 
the sovereign states of India and Pakistan emerged, the 
Kremlin leaders, unlike their Czarist predecessors, paid 
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little attention to the subcontinent. Stalin and his ruling 
elite were preoccupied with East European affairs. Moreover, 
they harboured prejudice and misunderstanding about the great 
events during the liquidation of the British Empire in India. 
They dismissed the whole process of the peaceful transfer of 
power as "a set of new imperialist devices to retain British 
political,economic and strategic influence in South Asia... 
their dogmatic interpretation of major political events in 
strict accord with Marxist-Leninst theoryi blinded them to 
political realities and dynamics in Asia." 
Stalin contended that the ratio for bourgeoisie in colonial 
countries would split into the revolutionary group and the 
compromising group. In a colonial country such as India where 
capitalism was already more or less developed, the compromis-
ing bourgeoisie, according to Stalin, had come to an agreement 
2 
with imperialist powers. The founding of the Indian National 
Congress was itself a manifestation of anti-imperialist feeling 
among the Indian intelligentsia, which gradually percolated 
down to the Indian masses in the course of the Indian freedom 
movement. Although at the initial stage this protest was 
primarily against British rule in India, but after First World 
War imperialism started being regarded as an evil everywhere 
in the world. One of the deep impressions on Nehru's mind 
during his visit to Moscow at the end of 1927 was what he 
considered to be the complete absence of the racial prejudice 
in Soviet society and when he became the Prime Minister of the 
Interim Government of India in 1945, he declared that anti-
imperialism and anti-colonialism were the "kernal of our 
1 G.W. Choudhry, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Major 
Powers, Collier Macmillan Pub., New York, pp.7-8 
2 See Hugh Seton Watson, "Five Years of Cold War" in George 
W,Keeton and George Schwarzenberger, eds. The Year Book of 
World Affairs, as quoted in G.W.Chaudhury, op.cit., p.8 
3 J. Bandopadhyaya, Making of India's Foreign Policy, Allied 
Pub., New Delhi, 1980, p.32 
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foreign policy," and this policy v/as occasionally followed 
by Nehru's successive governments. India is opposed to any 
form of colonialism or imperialism and is wedded to the 
policy of uprooting domination of one country by another. 
Colonialism is economic exploitation of one people by 
another by political domination. The cornerstone of Soviet 
foreign policy was always to align herself with peoples 
fighting for the eradication of the consequences of colonia-
lism.'^  India's anti-imperialist and anti-racialist stand 
brings her slightly closer to the Soviet Union and a little 
far from western countries, as the Soviet Union also fights 
for the same principles and supports all those who have the 
same foreign policy orientations. 
Thus, India's anti-imperialist postures in international 
affairs have also some bearings in shaping Soviet policy 
towards India. Though not deeply involved in South Asia at 
the time of Indian independence, the Soviet Union, alone 
among the great powers, had a comprehensive theory to back up 
its policy towards the new countries of Asia. 
AS Vice-President of the Interim Government of India, 
Nehru declared at his first press conference on 7 September 
1946, that it would be the policy of his government to build 
up good relations with both the great powers — the Soviet 
Union and the United States. In his very first statement he 
outlined free India's non-aligned policy, maintaining that it 
4 Ibid., p.75 
5 Rasheedudin Khan, ed., India and the Soviet Union; Coope-
ration and Development, Allied Pub. New Delhi, 1975, 
p. xxiii 
6 S.R.Patel, Foreign Policy of India, Bombay, 1960, p.75, 
Also see S.K.Raman Pillai, Indian Foreign Policy, 
Meenakshi Prakashan, Meerut, 1969, pp. 172-191 
7 D.Cherkov, "The USSR and Developing Countries:Economic Re-
lations", International Affairs, Moscow, No.8, Aug 1972, 
p. 54 
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would try "to keep away from the power politics of groups 
aligned against one another which have led in the past to 
two world Wars and which may again lead to disaster on an 
even vaster scale, *• 
In December 1946 the Indian Science Congress, at the 
instance of Nehru, invited some Soviet scientists to visit 
India. The first Indian Ambassador to the Soviet Union 
was appointed on 25 June 1947. On Nehru's instructions 
the first step of sounding the Soviet Union about the 
establishment of diplomatic relations had been taken much 
earlier. V.K. Krishna Menon and K.P.S. Menon met the Soviet 
Foreign Minister, M.Meltov, in Paris on 28 September 1946 
9 
for the purpose. Meltov welcomed the idea. 
According to K.P.S, Menon, relations between India and 
the Soviet Union after independence may be divided into two 
phases — passive phase and active phase. The active phase, 
in his opinion, began in 1955. A period of transition may 
be marked frcwi 1953 to 1955, In fact, a slow change can be 
discerned towards the end of 1952 and early 1953 in the 
last days of Stalin. The establishment of diplomatic ties 
between India and the U.S.S.R. did not lead to an immediate 
development of close economic and cultural relations. There 
were many psychological barriers to be crossed. "Some 
Indians", wrote K.P.S. Menon, "still suffered from the fear 
of a jrelic of British days, that the U.S.S.R. was out to turn 
the world red by hook or crook, and many Russians thought 
that though India was nominally free,it was economically bound 
hand and foot to the chariot of western imperialism. 
Q The Statesman, Delhi, 8 Sept 1946 
9 Devendra Kaushik, Soviet Relations With India and Pakistan, 
Vikas, Delhi, 1971, p.27 
10 News and Views from the Soviet Union,New Delhi, No,3, 1961 
11 K.P.S. Menon, Lenin Through Indian Eyes, Delhi, 1970, 
pp.67-8; also see Devendra Kaushik, op.cit., p.28 
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The wanning of Indo-Soviet relations initiated a new 
era of cultural# economic/ military and diplcxnatic coopera-
tion. The Soviet Union always emphasizes the importance of 
cultural understanding in achieving closer relations with 
other countries and India, in the mid-1950s was no exception. 
Since 1955 there has been a regular annual exchange of 
delegations of scientists, artists, writers and others 
between India and the Soviet Union, In 1954, the U.S.S.R. 
organised the first festival of Indian films in Moscow, 
Until the mid-1950s India's economic relations with the 
Soviet Union were confined to trade, but this changed with the 
improvement of relations, Novf much emphasis was laid on 
Soviet help in capital construction and development of heavy 
industiry. In September 1954 the U,S,S.R. indicated its 
willingness to assist India in constructing a steel mill and 
in February 1955 an agreement was signed for the much 
pxiblicized steel plant in Bhilai. The steel works in Bhilai 
was the first major industrial enterprise to have been built 
with the assistance rendered by the U,S,S,R, and other member 
countries of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, India 
had received external help during its First Five Year Plan 
launched in 1951, from the west. During the Second Five Year 
Plan western aid continued to be much higher, but Soviet 
assistance was significant. Between November 1957 and 
February 1961 the U,S,S,R. extended credit to India totalling 
$ 670 million, Soviet aid in India's industrialization 
programme was even more extensive during the Third Five Year 
Plan, Most of the Soviet aid was utilised for industrial 
12 development, 
India obtained a large amount of economic assistance from 
12 G,W, Choudhury, op,cit,, p,22 
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both the U.S.S.R, and the western countries during the 
height of the cold war in the 1950s because of its special 
role as the leader of the 'third blocX'. Through the 1960s 
India and Egypt received more Soviet arms and military 
equipment than any other non-communist country. In the mid-
1950s, when Pakistan began to receive U.S. arms through various 
military pacts, a powerful section of the Indian public started 
to compaign in favour of soliciting Soviet military assistance. 
Since 1962 Moscow has become New Delhi's almost only source 
for the supply of sophisticated weapons. Peking took the 
view that Soviet military assistance to India was directed 
against it and alleged that the Russian 'revisionists' were 
colluding with Indian 'reactionaries', American 'imperialist* 
13 
and Japanese 'militarists' to encircle their country, Nehru, 
however was cautious in relying solely upon one super power 
for military assistance and although Soviet arms assistance 
had increased enormously, his policy in this respect is still 
followed. 
But the first break for Nehru's policy of befriending 
the communist neighbours was achieved in Beijing, rather than 
Moscow, The Korean War had broken out in 1950. Although 
Nehru initially supported the U.S, in condemning North Korea's 
aggression, an attitude which was widely criticized in India, 
he changed his stand, Nehru's objective became the evolving 
of a formula for peace, and he was soon to become a constant 
advocate of according China its rightful place in the United 
Nations and the world. 
A significant change in the Soviet attitude took place 
in 1952. The Soviets had previously not participated in U,N. 
debates on Kashmir, but in the January debate (1952) they 
attacked the U.S, arid Britain by charging them with seeking 
13 Grilal Jain, 'India-Soviet Treaty', IDSAJ. The Institute 
for Defence Studies and Analysis Journal, 2(1), July 1969, 
p. 37 
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to convert Kashmir into their colony, Nehru's initial reaction 
was one of embarrassment because he did not want the question 
to be involved in the cold war. In fact, he informed Washington 
and London that India had not sought Soviet support on 
14 Kashmir. 
The real change in the Soviet attitude came only after 
the death of Stalin in 1953, Nehru's first visit to the 
U.S.S.R, in June 1955 improved friendly relations between 
the people of India and the Soviet union, Nehru succeded 
in allaying Soviet doubts about India's foreign policy. He 
impressed the Soviet leaders with the policy of Panchsheel 
which coincided with the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence. 
On 18 November 1955, Marshall Bulganin and Khrushchev recipro-
cated the Indian Prime Minister's visit. In June 1956 
Vice-President Dr.Radhakrishnan, paid a 9 day goodwill visit 
to the Soviet Union. In his speeches during his tour 
Dr. Radhakrishnan made a point to commend the Soviet Union 
for taking steps for easing world tension and also for dissolv-
ing the Cominform, He referred to the remarkable libera-
lization in the Soviet Union since the days when he was 
ambassador in Moscow, he expressed the hope that the Soviet 
people would march steadily towards welfare state. 
In 1956, Nehru and his government's attitude towards 
Soviet atrocities in Hungary was mild compared to their 
severe condemnation of Anglo-French-Israeli action in Egypt, 
"The Hungarian crisis", as one commentator put it, "produced 
a much discussed illustration of the Indian leader's kindly 
treatment of Soviet misdeeds." In the U,N, General Assembly 
14 Sarvepalli Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru; A Bibliography, vol.1, 
Oxford University Press, Bombay, 1976, p.116 
15 The Hindu, Madras, 18 June 1956 
16 See Paul, F.Power, "Indian Foreign Policy : The Age of 
Nehru", Review of Politics, April 1964, p.274 
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India* alone among the non-communist countries, voted 
with the Soviet bloc against a resolution calling for free 
elections in Hungairy. Nehru, whose foreign policy was for 
the first time criticized inside his country for its "apparent 
dual standard of morality", tried to justify the Indian vote 
at the U.N. on the grounds that a U. N. supervised election 
in Hungary might create a bad precedent elsewhere. Kashmir 
was obviously his concern. He eventually responded to the 
criticism at home and abroad by modifying his stand. Later 
he told the Indian Parliament that the great majority of the 
Hungarian people wanted a change of government and that the 
Soviet forces which had suppressed their revolt should be 
withdrawn. In response, the Soviet government, pointedly 
reminded Nehru of India's many pressing domestic problems, 
particularly the Kashmir problem for which Soviet help was 
desired. Similarly when Nehru expressed concern in May 1958 
over the worsening Soviet-Yugoslav relations, premier 
Khxrushchev was reported to have told the Indian Ambassador 
that India should not interfere. The Soviet government also 
resented Nehru's late 1958 article "The Basic ;^proach", 
17 
which criticized all dogmatic Ideologies Including communism, 
Nehru reacted vigorously to the Anglo-French attack on 
Egypt condemning it in no uncertain terms, although he felt 
Nasser's original step was precipitate and had moved to try 
to resolve the dispute. After the ceasefire he took a hand 
in bringing about a speedy settlement and again activated 
18 his peripatetic foreign policy advisor, Krishna Menon." For 
Nehru the Anglo-French attack was a "flagrant violation of 
the U,N, charter" and a "clear and naked aggression". 
Perhaps stung by the western criticism and the sharp 
protest of the respected Indian leader Jayaprakash Narayan, 
17 G,W.Choudhury, op.clt., p.24 
18 Sarvepalli Gopal, Vol.11, op.clt., p. 277 
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Nehru publicly expressed his sympathy for Hungarian national 
forces on November 5/ 1956 and condemned the Soviet conduct. 
Hungary, however, took second place to Egypt in the Indian 
19 Foreign Office. 
Thus India's policies generally favoured Moscow during 
1954-62 and the Soviet dropped their neutrality on the 
Kashmir dispute and openly and unequivocally supported India. 
War between India, the befriending of which had enabled the 
U.S;S,R, to gain much influence in the third world, and China, 
fraternal member of the communist bloc, initially strained 
the Indo-Soviet relations that had developed so well during 
the preceding eight years. Khruschev described the border 
20 fighting as "an outright godsend for the imperialists", 
and, according to Pravda, he had good reason to despair about 
a conflict in which he did not have to favour one side over 
the other. 
Prior to the war, India had hoped that the U.S.S.R, would 
restrain China and in the event of a major armed conflict, 
remain neutral. This hope was not entirely without foundation: 
the Soviet Union did not want to lose the close friendship of 
India and make it look to the west for help. The U.S.S.R made 
its position clear in September 1959, three years before the 
outbreak of war, declaring for the first time that it took a 
neutral position in conflict between a communist and a non-
communist country. But when the war erupted in the midst of 
the Cxiban crisis, unity within the communist bloc against 
the westeim countries was vital and the Soviet Union felt 
compelled to show some fraternal leaning towards Peking. 
19 SxjOjimal Dutt, With Nehru in the Foreign Office, Minerva 
Associates, Calcutta, 1977, p. 177 
20 P ravda, 13 Dec and 25, 1963 
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During the period that followed not only did Sino-
Indian relations deteriorate, but the relations between 
India and Societ Union were strengthened considerably — 
from now onwards more Soviet leaders began to visit India 
and among those were Khrushechev, Brezhnev, Kosygin, Suslov, 
Kozhlov and Mikoyon. Indeed, Khrushchev preferred to be in 
India on the occasion of the lOth anniversary of the Sino-
Soviet Agreement of Friendship and Alliance of 1950, which 
incident, according to a leading expert of Chinese affairs, 
tended to add to Mao's irritation against Khrushchev and 
India.^^ 
(B) Phase-I ; 1965-71 
The first test of the strength of Nehru's foreign policy 
came immediately after his death. There were fears expressed 
that India would have moved away from non-alignment and the 
Soviet Union. But this did not happen and when Mrs,Gandhi 
took over as Prime Minister, all such fears were set at 
rest. But in early 1964 Lai Bahadur Shastri was eminently 
placed to succeed Nehru, At the initiative of the Government 
of the U.S,S,R. Prime Minister Shastri paid an official 
visit to the Soviet Union from May 12 to 19, 1965. He had 
meetings and talks with Brezhnev, and other leading statesmen 
of the Soviet Union. During these talks held in an 
atmosphere of friendship and mutual understanding, the two 
sides exchanged views on major international problems and 
discussed questions pertaining to the further development of 
Soviet-Indian relations and mutually profitable cooperation. 
The most significant development was Pakistani President 
21 Sisir Gupta, "India and the Soviet Union", Current 
History, March 1963, p.146; Also see J,A. Nalk, Soviet 
Policy towards India : From Stalin tp Brezhnev, Vikas 
Delhi, 1970, p.152 
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Ayxib Khan's visit to Moscow in April 1965. 
He made a considerable impression on the Soviet leader-
22 
ship. The Soviet leaders declared publicly that the 
Soviet-PaXistani detente did not involve any sacrifice of 
India's interests. Kosygin put it thus in his speech at the 
Kremlin reception for Shastri: "When the Soviet Union is 
striving to improve its relations with a third country this 
23 does not have to be at the cost of Soviet-Indian friendship," 
The Soviet policy of friendship to both India and Pakistan 
was put to severe tests during 1965, but it emerged successfully 
with added confidence and trust. When a crisis arouse over 
the Rann of Kutch in /^ril-May 1965 the Soviet Union appealed 
to India and Pakistan to resolve it through direct nego-
24 tiations. 
In order to resolve the problems between India and 
Pakistan and create conditions in which both would be joined 
to the Soviet Union in ties of friendship and in a benevolent 
relationship, Soviet premier Alexie Kosygin took the initiative 
in arranging a high level conference between India and 
Pakistan (in January 1966 after the Indo-Pak War) in which 
he himself actively participated. The conference, meeting 
at Tashkent attended by the Indian Prime Minister, Lai Bahadur 
Shastri and Pakistan President Ayub Khan with their senior 
aides grappled with the issues dividing the two countries 
and at crucial moments when deadlock threatened to stall 
further progress, Kosygin*s deft intervention saved it from 
failure and finally resulted in an Indo-Pak declaration and 
various other allied agreements. Moscow, according to 
22 T,N, Kaul, Diplomacy in Peace and War ; Recollections 
and Reflections, Vikas, New Delhi,1979, p.157 
23 Pravda, 16 May 1965 
24 Ibid., 9 May 1965 
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V.P.Dutt appeared to have scored an important diplomatic 
tri\amph and to have considerably advanced its objective of 
taking the entire subcontinent together with it into the 
25 international arena. 
All thiS/ however, did not mean that the conference 
proceeded smoothly. On the contrary, it ran a very compli-
cated course and its outcome was difficult to foresee right 
up to the closing day. If the conference succeeded, this 
was in a large measure due to the great pains taken by 
Premier Kosygin to bring the two sides closer. As M.S.Rajan 
wrote "... the Soviet prime Minister firmly stuck to the 
letter and spirit of the offer of good offices. He did not 
make at any stage any proposals or pressurise either of the 
leaders to accept the proposals of the other. Contrary to 
inspired and malicious press reports, there was no Soviet 
armtwisting of India or Pakistan. All that the Soviet prime 
Minister tried to do was to bring to bear on the two leaders 
his tremendous powers of persuasion to make them see each 
other's point of view in the interest of peace in the Indian 
stibcontinent. 
Shastri felt that the declaration had achieved "very 
tangible results'*, Kosygin expressed the hope that the 
declaration might become "the symbol of eternal friendship 
between India and Pakistan" and would also "strengthen 
friendship between Pakistan and the Soviet Union". He also 
said the declaration "lays down the real foundations for 
the creation of conditions of peace in this most important 
27 
area of Asia." 
25 V.p . Du t t , I n d i a ' s Fore ign P o l i c y , V ikas , D e l h i , 1984, 
p . 1 0 0 ; Also s e e Biraal P r a s a d , I n d o - S o v i e t R e l a t i o n s , 
1947-1972; A Doctimentary Study, New D e l n i , 1973, p .395 
26 M.S.Rajan, "The Taskent D e c l a r a t i o n : R e t r o s p e c t and P r o s -
p e c t / * I n t e r n a t i o n a l S t u d i e s , V o l . 8 , J u l y 1966-Apr i l 1967, 
p . 8 
27 S o v i e t Review, New D e l h i , In fo rma t ion Department of the 
USSR Embassy, 14 Jan 1966 
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Even while striking up a more balanced posture towards 
the two major countries of the subcontinent, Moscow made a 
point of reiterating its continuing interest in India. In 
September 1964, the Soviet Union gave India military credit 
for fortyfour MIG-21s, twenty helicopters and seventy PT-76 
tanks, among other items. More significantly, they made 
technical and financial arrangements for MIG production and 
28 
agreed to improve MIG capabilities for Indian requirements. 
India's decision on the major arms deal with Moscow was made 
29 
after repeated rebuffs from western sources. 
The Post-Tashkent Period t After Shastri's death immediately 
following the Tashkent accord, Mrs, Indira Gandhi took over 
the reins of power in India becoming the third Prime Minister 
of the Rep\jLblic. Her first official visit to Moscow in 
that capacity lasted four days — from 12 to 16 July, 1966. 
Her speeches in the Soviet capital reflected her devotion to 
safeguard peace, a legacy of her father — something that has 
found concrete manifestation in her deeds over the years. 
The joint communique at the end of her talks with the Soviet 
leaders reaffirmed their common goal of ensuring peace and 
highlighted the need to renounce the use of force in inter-
state relations. It urged an immediate end of the U.S. 
bombing of North Vietnam and abolition of military alliances. 
It also emphasised the need for consolidation of peace in 
Europe, solution of the human problem, elimination of 
Portugese colonialism in Africa and apartheid in South Africa 
and Rhodesia and realisation of nuclear disarmament. 
28 Wynfred Joshua and Stephen P.Gilbert, Arms for the Third 
World t Soviet Military and Diplomacy, Johns Hopkins 
Press, 1969, p,59 
29 See Lome J.Kavic, India's Quest for Security: Defence 
Policies, 1947-1965, University of California Press, 1967, 
pp. 105-6 
30 Sxamit Chakravarti, "Indo-Soviet Sxommits: An Assessment" in 
Vinod Bhatia, ed,, Indo-Soviet Relations; Problems and 
Prospects, Panchsheel Pub., New Delni, 1984, p.94 
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By the mid-sixties, western donors became increasingly 
critical of India's development strategy and took measures 
to change it through the lever of economic assistance. 
President Johnson has recorded that both India and Pakistan 
had used U.S. weapons/ leading to doubts the value of 
31 
military and economic aid, Mrs, Gandhi undertook a visit to 
the U.S. towards the end of March 1966, President Johnson 
32 told senators that they must help "this little lady". 
In January 1968, Kosygin had paid an important visit to 
New Delhi. His purpose was to give assurances of Soviet 
support to India against the background of the deepening 
political crisis in the country, the intensification of the 
Vietnam war and the intended British withdrawal from Asia 
by 1971.-^^ 
Svimmit meetings between the Indian and Soviet leaders 
have become a regular feature, each time providing a fresh 
impetus to the further consolidation of friendship and to 
the development of all round cooperation between the Soviet 
Union and India, Prom 8 to 18 of June 1968, the President, 
Dr. Zakir Husain paid a friendly visit to the U,S,S,R, The 
communique saidj "The U.S,S.R, and India are determined not 
only to maintain the relationship already established but 
also to develop these relationships in all spheres — political, 
economic, scientific, technical and cultural". 
When Alexie Kosygin, the Prime Minister of U.S.S.R. 
visited India in May 1969 to attend Zakir Husain's funeral. 
31 Lyndon Baines Johnson, The Vantage Point; perspectives 
of the Presidency. 1963-1969, Hopt, Rinehort and Winston, 
New York, 1971, p.225 
32 Uma Vasudev, Indira Gandhi, Vikas, New Delhi, 1974, p.359 
33 Bhabani Sen Gupta, "Moscow, Peking and the Indian Political 
Scene," Orbis, Summer 1968 
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he not only assured Moscow's support to India in her 
conflict with China but stated that India should become 
strong economically, politically and militarily. Moscow 
deemed to have reverted to Khrushchev's policy of building 
up India so that it could shoulder the responsibility of 
defending the subcontinent from what prime Minister Kosygin 
described as "the adventurist encroachments on the part of 
34 
outside forces which are out for a hegemony in Asia." 
Kosygin made a significant speech at the Red Fort in 
New Delhi on May 6, 1969. He said: •*The Soviet Union has 
always had complete understanding for the Indian people's 
peace-loving aspirations and their desire to live in peace 
with their neighbours, since without this, it is impossible 
to resolve big and crucial tasks in the area of economic and 
social progress."^^ In September 1969, the foreign minister 
of India, Dinesh Singh, paid an official visit to the U.S.S.R, 
He was received by the General Secretary of the CPSU, 
L.I.Brezhnev, Kosygin and he had talks with the Soviet 
foreign minister A.A. Grorayko. Indo-Soviet relations and 
other matters were discussed. 
Cultural ties between India and the Soviet Union are 
putting on firm foundation. The holding of joint symposia on 
problems of culture and art, the sharing of experience in 
choreography, music and musicology and exchange of visits of 
painters became regular. An Intergovernmental agreement on 
cultural, scientific and technical cooperation was signed 
between the two countries on February 12, I960. This laid 
the firm foundation for coordination at first in an annual 
and later from 1967, on a biennial basis, of the programmes 
34 Indian Express, New Delhi, May 8, 1969. Also see The 
Patriot, May 17, 1969 
35 Tass, Condensed text in the Current Digest of Soviet 
press, 21(9), 21 May 1969 
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of cultural exchanges. This cooperation has since grown 
in scale, and now embraces various aspects of social life, 
like education, all forms of art,literature, radio, films, 
TV, Sports, etc. 
The study of the Russian language is becoming more and 
more popular in India. Today Russian language is being 
taught at many of the Indian universities. By 1970, the 
Soviet Union had emerged as the second largest buyer of 
Indian goods; it was the main source for heavy industry 
and main supplier of sophisticated military equipment. In 
view of the heavy payments involved for economic assistance 
and arms, there was a negative aid flow, estimated at 28 
million for 1970-71."^^ 
Indo-Soviet relations improved further in 1970. The visit 
of president Giri to the U.S.S.R., in September 1970, took 
place in an atmosphere of sincerity, friendship and mutual 
understanding. In the communique it was noted that this 
visit and further strengthened relations between the U.S.S.R. 
and India for the good of both the countries. The Indian 
press gave a very glowing account of the meeting between 
Indira Gandhi and Kosygin in Moscow in October 1970. While 
discussing a host of important international problems, the 
identity of views of both the countries was noted. 
(C) The Indo-Soviet Treaty 
Mrs, Gandhi decided in December 1970 to seek early 
36 The Times of India, Delhi, 24 Nov 1987 
37 Robert H.Donaldson, "Soviet Policy in South Asia: Aspira-: 
tions and Limitations" in Roger E.Kanet and Donna Baiiry, 
eds., Soviet Economic and Political Relations with the 
Developing World, Praeger, New York, 1975, p.221 
38 E, Bragina, "India-1970", in Zafar Imam, ed., Societ View 
of India'1957-75, Kalyani Publishers, Delhi, 1§77, p.144 
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elections in the hope of changing the minority nature of 
her government. She probably figured that things would 
have been much worse a year later? prices of goods were 
sharply going up, unemployment was rising, there were 
demands for wage increases and the 1971 crop prospects did 
not seem too encouraging. She surprised her opponents and 
the world by winning a landslide victory, obtaining 359 
seats in the Lower House of 521, A slogan she used to 
39 telling effect was garibi hatao (banish poverty) . 
Events in Pakistan, meanwhile, had been taking an 
ominous turn. In later years president Ayxib Khan had given 
the army a back seat after appeasing it with pay increases 
and choice plots of land in the new capital of Islamabad, He 
ruled through civil servants and "basic democrats", who 
received money and privileges and provided the regime with 
40 
support in the villages. 
The December 1970 General Elections brought to surface 
serious and basic differences between the two wings of 
Pakistan. In the eastern wing the Awami League headed by 
Sheikh Mujibur Rehman achieved landslide victory. The Awami 
League, resplendent with victory/ once again raised the 
issue of complete autonomy. Mujib stood for the implementation 
of the six point programme which called for full autonomy 
for the provinces with the federal government looking after 
defence, foreign affairs, and subject to certain conditions, 
currency. The programme envisaged complete control of 
economic affairs including foreign trade ,and aid by the provinces, 
39 S.Nlhal Singh, The Yogi and the Bear i Story of Indo-
Soviet Relations, Allied ptiblishers. New Delhi, 1986,p.80 
40 Ibid., pp. 80-81 
41 Vijay Sen Budhraj, Soviet Russia and the Hindustan 
Subcontinent, Soraaiya Pxib., Bombay, 1973, p.'212 
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(i) The Bangla Desh Factor : All these demands aroused in 
West Pakistan a resentment against Mujib. The military rulers 
of Pakistan arrested the Awami Leaders including Shekih 
Mujib, let loose a reign of terror in March 1971 to suppress ' 
the popular movement in East Benal. As a result about three 
million Bengalis were massacred and ten million people were 
forced to leave their homes for India as refugees, India 
tried in vain to pursuade the international agencies and the 
U.S. to prevail on Pakistan to facilitate the return of the 
refugees. The situation created by the Bangladesh issue can 
be viewed as a major factor in the Indo-Soviet Treaty. 
Pakistan was encouraged by the U.S. and China in its 
attempt to crush the revolt in East Pakistan. In 1970, the 
U.S. supplied arms to Pakistan in violation of embargo. 
Henry Kissinger went to Peking and Nixon's visit to China was 
announced in July 1971. All these events made India panicky 
and it began to search for security. Thus the price of 
better relations between Washington and Peking was an improve-
42 
ment in relations between Moscow and New Delhi. 
Suspecting Washington-Peking-Rawalpindi collusion over 
the Bangladesh issue, India was forced to enter into a treaty 
agreement with the Soviet Union. This treaty marked a new 
phase in Indo-Soviet cooperation. It does not merely 
involve a commitment to peace, friendship and cooperation as 
the title suggests but to a limited yet significant extent 
it is a treaty of military cooperation. Foreign Minister 
Swaran Singh told Parliament on August 10, 1971 that the 
negotiations on the treaty had been going on for the previous 
43 two years and secret talks had taken place at various levels, 
Swaran Singh was in Moscow in June 1971 for important high 
42 Robert Jackson, South Asian Crisis, Vikas, New Delhi, 
1978, p.157 
43 The Statesman, Delhi, Aug 11, 1971 
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level talks, S.Nihal Singh says that discussions on the 
treaty were held in a desultory fashion from the second 
half of 1968, On the Indian side, the negotiations were 
largely conducted by foreign secretary T.N. Kaul and 
Ambassador D.p. Dhar* Indire Gandhi's trusted political 
aide. Indeed, it seems likely that Dhar's appointment to 
Moscow in the first place, in January 1969, was made by 
44 Mrs.Gandhi with an eye on the treaty, 
(ii) The China Factor : It would thus appear that the 
treaty was intially offered by the Soviet Union in the wake 
of China's Ninth Party Congress; the watershed marking the 
end of the cultural Revolution and the country's self imposed 
international isolation and perhaps around the time of the 
World Communist Parties Conference in Moscow in March/April 
1969. In the same year, the CPSU chief Leonid Brezhnev, for 
the first time had proposed Asian Collective Security which 
ever since has become an anathema for Peking. This was also 
the period of Sino-Societ clash at Ussuri river and a series 
of armed clashes on the Sinkiang-Kazakhstan border. After 
these clashes, Soviet premier Alxie Kosygin and Premier 
Chou-En-Lai had their dramatic meeting in August 1969 at the 
Peking airport and the Sino-Soviet border talks commenced in 
Peking. SALT discussions had begun in September 1969, between 
the two superpowers. Meanwhile China continued to make 
progress in the nuclear field. Its first hydrogen bomb was 
tested in June 1967, which was followed by two thermonuclear 
and one underground tests in 1969 and a series of test 
firing of MRBMs and a few IRBMS in 1968. Finally on 24 April 
1970, It entered the space age by orbiting a 173 kg satellite, 
thus demonstrating its capability to develop powerful boosters 
44 S. Nihal Singh, op.cit., p.67 
166 
for IRBMs/lCBMs, Since late 60s, the Soviet Union had 
established a nominal presence in the Indian Ocean that 
became the target of repeated attacks by Peking which in 
early 1970 announced its intention to build a powerful 
modem navy to counter the Soviet "gunboat diplomacy". Simul-
taneously the Soviet Union and China were engaged in winning 
over as many third world countries as possible the tussle 
being keen in Africa and West Asia. 
All these strategic developments are relevant to a 
correct appraisal of the Indo-Soviet Treaty and the motiva-
tions behind it, since they "served to emphasise that the 
international power game was being transformed from a two 
power adverse partnership... into a more complex (triangular) 
one", which according to K.Subrahmanyam, in view of standing 
Sino-Soviet conflict was likely to be more unfavourable to the 
46 Soviet Union. 
Keeping in view its security, Moscow decided to initiate 
steps to counter this game and the offer of the treaty to 
India appears to be one of these measures. The Soviet Union 
had started looking for a "balancer" and India by virtue of 
its geopolitcal importance locations, population, resources, 
armed potential* etc., and strained relations with China 
could serve the purpose. India, since early sixties, had 
been facing a possible combined threat from China and Pakistan 
and Was greatly concerned with the U.S. sophisticated 
military supplies to Pakistan, India was in need of Moscow's 
firm support. Thus, India had accepted Moscow's offer to 
sign this treaty and came close to Moscow, 
45 S.K. Ghosh, 'The Indo-Soviet Treaty and China*, The 
IPSA Journal, 5 (2), October, 1972,. p. 244 
46 K, Subrahmanyam, "The Indo-Soviet Treaty", Talk delivered 
at the Indian Council of World Affairs.on Sept 1971 
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Though the offer of the treaty had been made and the 
discussion regarding the treaty already had taken place 
between Moscow and New Delhi much before (in 1969) but it 
was officially signed when India's security was threatened 
by Pakistani military junta backed by China and the U.S.A. 
Thus, the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Coopera-
tion formalised Soviet political/ economic and military 
help, and served the cause of Indian security admirably. 
The first Chinese comment on the treaty came on September 
2, 1971 when a member of a visiting Chinese trade delegation, 
making a brief reference to the treaty, reportedly said in 
Georgetown (Guyana) that China "certainly does not regard the 
signing of the Indo-Soviet treaty as a friendly act so far 
as it is concerned". He also said that China was watching 
47 the "growing USSR-India collaboration against China." 
In a statement in the U.N. General Assembly on 26 November, 
1971, Vice Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua severely criticised 
the Soviet policy in the Indian subcontinent and said that 
the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty was, in fact "the basis 
of bare-faced armed aggression against Pakistan", This, he 
added, fully revealed the true features of the "foreign 
48 policy of peace" pursued by the Soviet leaders. 
Speaking in the Security Council on 10 August 1972, the 
Chinese chief delegate Huang Hua, said that the Soviet 
Social imperialism was continuing to play "a most insidious 
role in the development of the situation in the South Asian 
continent". The Indo-Soviet Treaty, he added, was "in essence, 
an aggressive pact of military aliance, whereby the Indian 
Government had "finally and openly dropped off its cloak of 
49 
nonalignment". 
47 The Hindu, 4 Sept 1971 
48 The Statesman, Delhi, 28 Nov 1971 
49 Ibid., 12''Tug 1972 
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Mrs,Gandhi's primary aim in taking up the Russians 
on their offer of a treaty was to break the new compact 
between Pakistan and the Soviet Union. Her domestic com-
pulsions had not become as urgent as they did after President 
50 Zakir Husain's death in early May, 1969. 
Mrs, Gandhi had written to Kosygin on July 10, 1968 on 
the dangers of giving arms to Pakistan, In his prompt 
reply Kosygin referred to the close Indo-Soviet relations, 
suggesting that even if Pakistan received arms it was in the 
larger interests of the region. After Tashkent, Kosygin had 
emerged as the dominant voice in shaping Soviet foreign 
policy, perhaps he also felt that he was responsible for 
forcing the Tashkent Declaration on Ayoib, thus weakening 
his position domestically. 
Thereafter, the re-establishment of amicable relations 
with India became the focal point of Soviet politics in the 
sxibcontinent. The Soviets thought that new gestures of 
friendliness towards New Delhi would remove all doubts 
created by Soviet arms supplies to Pakistan. In the pursuit 
of this policy the Soviets began to play up the danger of 
Pakistan's new aggression on Kashmir and assured New Delhi 
52 that Moscow regarded the state as an integral part of India. 
Simultaneously, the Soviet Union urged New Delhi to sign a 
treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation in return for 
Soviet promises of help to defend India's security against 
foreign 'aggression and for more economic and military assistance, 
Proceeding with some caution. New Delhi finally welfomed the 
53 
changed Soviet attitude. 
50 S. Nihal Singh, op.cit. 
51 Ibid. 
5 2 Literaturnaia Gazeta, 20 June 1970, as quoted in Hemen 
Roy, How Moscow Sees Kashmir, Jaico Pub.,Bombay, 1985,p.104 
5 3 Ibid. 
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Thus on August 9, 1971 the Soviet Union and India 
signed a treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation for 
a period of twnty years. The treaty bound both the Soviet 
Union and India to extend to each other full support in the 
event of an outside aggression, Swaran Singh stated in 
Indian Parliament that it "will provide a pattern for 
similar treaties between India and other countries in the 
54 
region. 
Article IX of the Treaty stipulated that in the event 
of either party being subjected tb an attack or threat 
thereof, the signatories would immediately enter into mutual 
consultations to take "appropriate effective measures", to 
ensure peace and security of their countries. Under this 
article if Pakistan, supported by China, threatened India with 
military damage in Kashmir, the Soviet Union was obliged to 
consult India and provide her with appropriate assistance to 
resist the aggression and ensure peace and security of 
India. Though the treaty did not specify military assistance 
in the event of armed aggression, the term "appropriate 
effective measures to ensure peace and security" could be 
implied to mean military peace and security. The statement by 
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko that "no one is any longer 
capable of basing the policy be it vis-a-vis the Soviet Union 
or vis-a-vis India without taking into account the treaty", 
seemed to provide Soviet military support to India in the 
event of an aggression. Boris Ponomarev indicated that .the 
treaty had guaranteed Soviet military support to India in the 
event of an aggression by her hostile neighbour. "In the 
event of an attack on one of our countries or the threat of 
such an attack", he explained, "the treaty provides for 
54 The Times of India, New Delhi, August 10, 1971 
55 Pravda, 14 Aug 1971, Also see New Times, Aug 1971 
170 
effective measures to be urgently taken by both contracting 
parties to guarantee peace and security. This commitment is 
aimed at serving the cause of defending peace and prevent 
56 
the unleashing of aggressive acts." Another Soviet spokes-
man emphasized that the treaty had guaranteed peace in South 
57 Asia against any potential aggressor. The treaty got 
adverse press criticism. Three leading newspapers of New 
Delhi pinpointed various aspects of the treaty in their 
lead editorials right after the event. The Times of India 
observed that the treaty represented "a departure from the 
policy of nonalignment as interpreted all these years." 
The Statesman held that the treaty gave "every sign of being 
hastily conceived." And The Hindustan Times argued that 
"in a situation of real crisis, Soviet support would have been 
forthcoming without a treaty." 
The Soviets achieved yet another objective. The treaty 
strengthened Indo-Soviet ties, made India more dependent on 
Soviet Russia and above all, abandon the policy of nonalighn-
ment. The Statesman described the treaty as "virtually a 
military arrangement". Though Article IV of the treaty stated 
that Moscow respected New Delhi's policy of non-alignment, 
"there is every evidence of alignment in a treaty almost dis-
62 tinguishable from a defence pact." 
Thus it became a controversial issue whether the Treaty 
amounts to an abandonment of India's policy of nonalignment. 
56 Ibid., 13 Aug 1971 
67 Ibid., 12 Aug 1971 
58 The Times of India, Editorial, New Delhi, lO Aug 1971 
59 The Statesman, Editorial, New Delhi, 10 Aug 1971 
60 "Was this Necessary", Editorial, The Hindustan Times, 
10 Aug 1971 " — 
61 The Statesman, 10 Aug 1971 
62 Ibid. 
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It appears a valid point of view, says V.M.Tarkunde that the 
policy of non-alignment would be compromised by this treaty. 
Formerly, there were pacts like NATO and SEATO and they were 
defence pacts which provided that if any party was attacked, 
the other party would give military aid and support to that 
party. That is the slight difference between this treaty 
and those pacts because in this one it is said that if one 
party is attacked, the other party shall enter into "mutual 
consultations" to take "appropriate" effective measures to 
63 
ensure peace and the security of that country. 
In Tarkunde's opinion, the difference is not very signi-
ficant. He says, formerly the world was divided into two 
blocs—the Russian and the American. And if one signed a 
treaty of mutual defence with Russia, it implied on anti-
American stance in foreign policy. The opposite would 
hold true about a treaty with America. That was the reason 
why even defence treaties were regarded as alignment because 
it implied alignment in a situation m which the world was 
bipolarised. Though the policy of non-alignment might not 
technically be continued by this treaty, whether the world 
is the same as it was about ten years ago. According to 
Tarkunde, the world is no longer bipolarised. There are at 
least three blocs and more are likely to emerge. Therefore, 
a defence treaty with one power does not necessarily imply 
enemity or some sort of non-alliance with another power. We 
are in a situation in which a treaty with Russia necessarily 
implies some sort of antagonism to America. But a treaty 
of common defence does not necessarily imply alignment when 
the world is not bipolarised and when there are several power 
blocs. This Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation 
63 V.M.Tarkunde, "angladesh was the Provocation", Paper 
presented in Seminar in New Delhi on 5 September 1971, 
in A.P.Jain, ed.. Shadow of the Bear ; The Indo-Soviet 
Treaty, New Delhi, 1971 
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between India and Russia, concludes Tarkunde, does not 
64 
necessarily imply antagonism or a stance against the U.S.A. 
The treaty got wide support in India. During the debate 
on it in Parliament only three MPs voted against it. Only 
the rightist parties expressed doubts on the need for the 
treaty. Thus The Hindustan Times wrote that the treaty "in 
a way breaks with the traditional Indian policy of non-
alignment, " 
Giving a rebuff to the rightists and defining the 
reality of Indian foreign policy. Prime Minister Indira 
Gandhi stated: "The cornerstone of our foreign policy continues 
to be nonalignment. This is a dynamic policy and means that 
the nation will not belong to any military pacts, India is 
prepared to support friendly relations with all countries and 
to respond to manifestations of friendship by any country. 
Precisely because of this the Indo-Soviet Treaty on Peace, 
Friendship and Cooperation was signed. This treaty in no way 
harms the policy of non-alignment and does in no way bar India 
from concluding similar treaties with any other nation." 
This treaty marked a turning point in India's foreign 
policy. It formalised the Indo-Soviet friendship and according 
to Gromyko, gave it a durable international legal basis. It 
assured India solid and secure support of the Soviet Union 
in case of any aggression against her. The latter too got in 
India a friend to counterbalance the growing Peking-Washington 
axis. The treaty attested to the. shared world view of India 
and the Soviet union. 
From 27 to 29 of September 1971 on the invitation of the 
64 Ibid. 
65 A. Medovoi, 'India 1971', in Zafar Imam, op.cit., p.153 
66 Ibid. 
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Soviet government Indira Gandhi paid a visit to the U.S.S.R. 
to develop further friendly Indo-Soviet relations. During 
the visit she had talks with the Soviet leaders over a large 
range of subjects of mutual interest. "In strengthening 
peace in Asia", said A.N. Kosygin, Prime Minister of the 
U.S.S.R., "the Soviet Union and India are strengthening 
67 
peace all over the world." 
AS a matter of fact, the Indo-Soviet relationship is not 
based on personalities or ideologies but on equality, national 
interest and common purpose. As long as the interests of the 
two countries converge the Indo-Soviet ties are continuing 
to expand. In both countries Indo-Soviet friendship has 
become a deep rooted popular tradition. 
(D) Phase-II ; 1972-77 
The friendly relations between India and the U.S.S.R, 
continued to grow in the spirit of the Treaty of Peace, Friend-
ship and Cooperation. The domestic situation of India was 
deteriorating fast. In a brief stopover in New Delhi on 
1 October 1971, Soviet President Podgorny said that Soviet 
people were closely watching the "difficult and dangerous 
situation in the Hindustan subcontinent." Intense Indo-Soviet 
consultations at various levels in conformity with the Treaty 
followed as the U.sl under Nixon took a tough stand trying to 
bend India in Pakistan's favour. 
The Indo-Pak war broke out on 3 December 1971, and ended 
with India unilaterally declaring ceasefire after the complete 
liberation of Bangladesh on 16 December. In the meantime. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Sumit Chakravarti, 'Indo-Soviet Summits : An Assessment, 
in Vinod Bhatia, ed., Indo-Soviet Relations;Problems 
and Prospects, Panchsheel Pub., New Delhi, 1984, p.96 
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political and diplomatic moves by the U.S.S.R. in India's 
support at the U.N. thwarted all Sino-US attempts to block 
Bangladesh's independence. Again it was Indo-Soviet coordi-
nation in accordance with the Treaty which failed the designs 
of the U.S. government in its despatch of a Seventh Fleet 
task force to the Bay of Bengal just on the eve of Bangladesh's 
freedom from the oppressive Yoke. 
Talks to C.L. Sulzberger of the New York Times shortly 
after the war, Mrs. Gandhi said, "we are unable to display 
70 gratitude in any tangible sense for anything." As for the 
United States, she assumed that Washington policy towards India 
71 
changed when U.S. policy towards China changed. Even earlier, 
on December 31, 1971, she emphasized the importance of friendly 
Indo-U.S. relations, taking into account the "new realities" 
72 
on the svibcontinent. 
The policy of the Indian government to ensure peaceful 
development of relations in the Asian subcontinent received 
the backing of the Soviet leaders. As stated by the General 
Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, L.J. Brezhnev 
in March 1972, establishment of secure peace and good neighbourly 
relations between India, Pakistan and Bangladesh would be '•a 
great contribution in improving the political atmosphere in 
73 Asia." In Brezhnev's report on the occasion of the 50th 
anniversary of the Soviet Union, it was stated: "Indo-Soviet 
friendship plays a very positive role in international life. 
69 Ibid. 
70 The New York Times, Feb 17, 1972 
71 The Indian Express, Delhi, Feb 18, 1972 
72 Quoted by Ashok Kapur, "Indo-Soviet Treaty and the Emerg-
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India is one of the largest nations on our planet. The Soviet 
Union and India have already acquired quite a lot of experience 
in fruitful cooperation. We believe that hence forward when 
these relations will grow in the spirit of friendship, peace 
and cooperation, our cooperation would deepen more. The 
strengthening of democratic, progressive and anti-imperialistic 
forces in India, as well as the policies of the Indian govern-
74 
ment led by Indira Gandhi, augur well for this objective." 
On the 15th August 1972, India observed the 25th anniversary 
of its national independence. Marking as it did, the silver 
jubilee of India's independence and 50th anniversary of the 
formation of the U.S.S.R., 1972 was a momentous year for both 
the countries. The gigantic third Asian International Trade 
Fair — Asia 72 — which was inaugurated by Prime Minister 
Indira Gandhi on 3 November provided an opportunity for the two 
states to present a panoramic view of their achievements. Trade 
deals at the U.S.S.R. Pavillion had been quick and sizeable. 
On the very first day of the fair, five contracts were signed 
between the Soviet Union and Indian trading firms. The Soviet 
organization "V/o Zapchasterport" undertook to import shirts 
manufactured by Indian firms like Wings, Liberty, Milton and 
excel. Contracts for imports from the Soviet Union of poly-
graphic machines, excavators and raining machinery had also 
been signed. Under a contract signed on 13 November 1972, the 
Soviet firm "V/o Techmastexport" undertook to supply the 
Indian Express a rotary printing machine of the volta type. 
According to the director of Soviet Pavillion, contracts 
worth Rs, 150 million had been concluded by 22 November 1972. 
"Indian industrialists", he said, "are interested in our 
machine tools, electronic equipment and agricultural machinery. 
I hope many more trade deals will be struck in the coming days."^^ 
74 Ibid. 
75 Sovietland, Nos. 23-29, issued by the Soviet News Agency/ 
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Indo-Sovlet Commission for Stronger tlest 
The proposal to set-up an Indo-Soviet Joint Commission 
to strengthen the ties between the two countries in the 
economic, scientific and technical fields was cleared at the 
highest level on 17 August 1972, The Union Planning Minister, 
D.p. Dhar, represented India on the Commission, The decision 
to have a jointCoromission was taken at the talks the Prime 
Minister Mrs.Indira Gandhi had with the Soviet prime Minister 
Kosygin in Moscow in September 1971, At that time the need 
to further strengthen the ties in various spheres was recog-
nized during the talks, A formal agreement for this purpose 
76 
was signed in Moscow on 19 September 1972, 
Mr. Y.T,Shah, Additional Secretary, Indian Ministry of 
Foreign Trade, after signing Indo-Soviet Trade Protocol on 
25 November 1972 at New Delhi said that the volume of trade 
between the two countries was growing at such a rate as to be 
worth of the cooperation between the two countries. He added 
"we are happy that the Soviet Union and India have now become 
77 " big partners in the economic and trade relations," 
The Soviets were now satisfied with India's attitude 
towards their country. They hoped to further strengthen 
the bonds of friendly cooperation to build a barrier against 
China. The Soviet commentators welcomed the Simla Agreement 
signed by India and Pakistan on 2 July, 1972, as "an important 
instnoment for the relaxation of tension in Asia and for 
peaceful coexistence," The Agreement to resolve the Kashmir 
issue through bilateral discussions without outside inter-
ference manifested "their sincere striving for normalization 
of relations and reservation of peace in the s\ib-continent,"' 
76 The Statesman, New Delhi, 20 Sept 1972 
77 The Times of India, 26 Nov 1972 
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The Simla Agreement had been "approved by all those^ who 
have at heart peace and stability in the area. It should 
become the cornerstone of peace and cooperation between India 
7ft 
and Pakistan." Izvestia said on 4 July 1972 that the 
summit meeting had shown that the path of peace and friendship 
was a realistic one for the countries of the subcontinent to 
79 follow. 
The Indo-Soviet joint commission which was set up in 
August 1972, began its first meeting in New Delhi on 9 February 
1973 with leaders of the teams from both the sides agreeing 
on the immense possibility of expanding economic cooperation 
and collaboration on a mutually beneficial basis. While India's 
emphasis was largely on trade expansion, the leader of the 
Soviet team, S.A. Skachkov, underlined Soviet capability to 
80 
assist India in developing key industries. 
The leader of the Indian team. Planning Minister D.p.Dhar, 
in his opening remarks spoke of the great scope for coopera-
tion in the field of production which he described as "a new 
and exciting field". "We are prepared", Mr. Dhar said, "to 
enter into long-term understanding with the Soviet Union." He 
pointed out that the recent expert level discussions between 
, 8 1 
the two sides had opened up new vistas of cooperation. 
The leader of the Soviet team expressed satisfaction on 
the points that the trade between the two countries has risen 
nearly six times in the last twelve years. He was also proud 
of the fact that there were 90 Soviet aided projects of which 
82 50 were in cooperation. 
78 Pravda, 6 July 1972 
79 Izvestia, 5 July 1972 
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(i) Brezhnev's Visit to India - Leonid Brezhnev visited New 
Delhi in November 1973. This visit was one of the most strik-
ing landmarks in Indo-Soviet relations next only to the 
historic visits to the U.S.S.R. by Nehru in June, 1955 and 
to India by Bulganin and Khruhshchev in November-December 
of that very year. Brezhnev used the visit to convey the 
intense Soviet feeling towards India — a feeling shorn of 
any trace of artificiality, "Friendship and cooperation 
with India"* he declared at the Red Fort grounds on 27 November 
1973, "is part and parcel of the foreign policy of the Soviet 
Union, We were with you in difficult and trying periods for 
India, We were with you when various external forces were 
trying to bring pressure on your country when it was uphold-
ing its vital interests. We shall be with you in the days of 
83 joy and in the days of trial." 
The talks which were held in an atmosphere of trust, 
friendship and mutual understanding, covered a wide range of 
svobjects concerning Indo-Soviet bilateral relations and 
perspectives of their future all-round development as well as 
topical international problems of common interest. Both sides 
noted with satisfaction the broad identity of views on the 
questions discussed and expressed their profound satisfaction 
at the successful development of relation of friendship and 
84 
cooperation between India and the Soviet Union in all fields. 
In course of an exchange of views on topical international 
problems the two sides expressed their satisfaction at the 
coincidence or proximity of the positions of India and the 
85 U,S,S.R. or major questions of the international situation. 
83 Sumit Chakravarti, op,cit., p,97 
84 R.K. Jain, Soviet-South Asian Relations, 1947-1978, 
vol. 1, Radiant pub.. New Delhi, 1978, p,400 
85 Ibid., p.401 
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Yet another issue of importance to India, which came 
up for discussion was the U.S. and Soviet naval presence 
in the Indian Ocean. India wanted the ocean to be declared 
a "zone of peace". The Soviet Union was in favour of 
reducing this naval presence on a reciprocal basis as a 
first step to declaring the Ocean a zone of peace. The joint 
statenvent nonetheless, was more positive than the earlier 
ones. It said: "the two sides reaffirm their readiness to 
take part together with all interested states on an equal 
basis, in the search for a favourable solution to the question 
Rfi 
of turning the Indian Ocean region into a zone of peace. 
The General Secretary of the Central Committee of the 
CPSU stressed that in the present world of today the growing 
desire of the majority of states for international detente 
and for the settlement of outstanding problems by negotiations 
is becoming ever more pronounced, positively appraising the 
important contribution made to the improvement of the general 
international situation ^ s a result of the Soviet-American 
summit talks, the Soviet Union considers that the agreements 
reached in the course of the talks will serve the cause of 
developing peaceful cooperation and improving the interna-
tional climate. It attached great significance to the 
conclusion of the Soviet-American Agreement on the Prevention 
of Nuclear War which not only meets the interests of the people 
of the U.S,S,R. and the U.S.A., but also serves the cause of 
strengthening universal peace. Indira Gandhi welcomed the 
detente between the u.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. as a step tov/ards 
relaxation of tensions in the world. On this connection, she 
highly appreciated the efforts of the general secretary of 
the central committee of the CPSU and expressed the hope that 
86 Trevor Drieberg, Harji Malik and D.K. Joshi, "Towards 
Closer Indo-Soviet Cooperation", New Delhi, 1974, in 
Vinod Bhatia, Indira Gandhi and Indo-Soviet Relations, 
Panchsheel Pub., New Delhi, 1987, p.66 
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this relaxation will also spread to other areas of the world 
and t>ring an end to the nuclear arms race which is a threat 
87 to mankind. 
The importance of Indo-Soviet relationship was empha-
sized by Brezhnev in his report to the 25th Congress of 
the Soviet Communist Party. He said, "We attach special 
importance to friendship with that great country. In the 
past five years, Soviet-Indian relations have risen to a new 
level. Our countries have concluded a Treaty of peace. 
Friendship and Cooperation. And even this short period has 
clearly shown the tremendous significance of our bilateral 
ties and its role as a stabilizing factor in South Asia and 
the continent as a whole." Close political and economic 
cooperation with the Republic of India, he said, was the 
constant policy of the Soviet Union. The Soviet people 
appreciate, and now, are in solidarity with India's peace 
loving foreign policy and the courageous efforts of her 
progressive forces to solve her difficult socio-economic 
problems. We wish the people and government of India 
88 
complete success in these efforts, he added. 
The delineation of the Sino-Indian border in Soviet maps 
had been a contentious issue between New Delhi and Moscow 
for years. The Soviets had been either evasive or vaguely 
sympathetic, but had refrained from expressing full support. 
Russians' nervousness over Indian moves for a rapproachment 
with China in the late sixties was both explicit and implicit. 
They now perhaps wanted to make a thaw in Sino-Indian relations 
89 
more difficult to achieve through their belated support. 
87 Ibid. 
6S Patriot, New Delhi, 18 March 1973 
89 Nihal Singh, The Yogi and the Bear : A Study of Indo-
Soviet Relations, Allied Pub,, New Delhi, 1985, p,l02 
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India exploded its first nuclear device on May 18 1974. 
The Indian Atomic Energy Commission announced that the 
explosion had been carried out more than 100 meters under-
ground. H.H, Sethna, the then Chairman of the Indian Atomic 
Energy Commission, reported that the yield of the plutoniura 
device exploded equals 10,000 to 15/000 tons of TNT. No 
radioactive fallout exceeding the safe limit has been 
registered. The aim of the experiment, he said was "to 
obtain information on the crater formation effect and on the 
possibility of blasting hard rock by means of the atom". The 
device has been designed exclusively by Indian scientists and 
90 built of Indian materials, Sethna said. 
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi who also held the post of 
Minister of Atomic Energy and Electronics, told a Delhi press 
conference that the explosion was part of the nuclear research 
programme, "We firmly stand for the use of nuclear energy for 
91 peaceful puirposes," she said. 
The explosion sent shock waves throughout the world and 
particularly in Pakistan. Pakistan believed itself to be 
threatened. It had all along been Pakistan's effort to 
convey to the world a justification for some kind of a parity 
between the two countries for the good of the world itself 
and to relate every Indian action to this yardstick. Reaction 
in Pakistan was predictably highly inflamed. The media carried 
alarming forebodings and sinister implications, Bhutto 
described the explosion in a statement on 19 May 1974 as a 
"fateful development", and said that Pakistan would never 
succumb to nuclear blackmail and would not accept Indian 
domination over the subcontinent. The explosion, he claimed, 
had put an end to the possibility of a no-war pact between 
92 India and Pakistan. 
90 R.K. Jain, op.cit., p.415 
91 Ibid. 
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Buutoo disclosed that he was having the matter raised 
in the forthcoming meeting of CENTO, that he was sending 
emissaries to China, France, Britain and Canada and that he 
himself would take up the matter with the Soviet leaders 
during his coming visit to Moscow. The Indian explosion no 
doubt, raised alarm bells in Islamabad, but part of the 
exercise of vigorous denunciation and cancellation of talks 
with India on normalizing relations was to prod the Americans 
to tilt further towards Pakistan and to redress the balance. 
Part of it was also for home consumption to stiffen the 
93 
morale. 
India's Minister of External Affairs, Sardar Swaran Singh, 
paid an official visit to Moscow from September 8 to 10, 1974, 
at the invitation of the Soviet Government. Swaran Singh was 
received by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee 
Leonid Brezhnev. Talks were held between the Members of the 
Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee and the Foreign 
Minister of the U.S.S.R. Gromyko and India's Minister of 
94 External Affairs Swaran Singh. 
The Soviet Defence Minister, Marshal A.A.Grechko, visited 
India on 27 February 1975. In his meeting with the Prime 
Minister of India, there was an exchange of views on some 
major international problems of interest to both the countries 
as well as on questions concerning further development of 
bilateral cooperation. He met the Minister of External Affairs, 
Y,B. Chavan and he also had several meetings and talks with 
Swaran Singh, Minister of Defence of India, The Soviet side 
positively assessed the progressive and anti-imperialistic 
direction of the non-aligned movement, of which India was 
one of the leaders, and expressed support for the aspirations 
93 V.P.Dutt, India's Foreign Policy, Vikas, New Delhi, 1987, 
p.212 
94 R,K. Jain, op.cit., p.423 
183 
of the non-aligned countries to promote the consolidation of 
world peace, security and cooperation. Both sides noted with 
satisfaction that the visit of the Soviet Defence Minister 
has significantly contributed to further strengthen the 
friendship and understanding between the peoples of India and 
95 the Soviet Union, 
(ii) Emergency in India and Soviet Support 
The political and economic situation in India had dete-
riorated rapidly during 1974 and early 1975 resulting finally 
in the proclamation of the emergency in June 1975. The left 
in India was split and while the CPM denounced, welcomed it in 
order to "stem the righwing tide" unleashed by many opposition 
parties, Moscow, too accepted this rationale of the need for 
emergency. Tass carried a long interview with the Congress 
president P.K, Baroah explaining the background of righwing 
offensive against which the Emergency was proclaimed and the 
need to boost the economy and improve the living conditions 
of different section of the people. 
From the declaration of the State of Emergency in India 
on June 26, 1975, until the electoral defeat of the Congress 
Party in March 1977, the Soviet posture towards the measures 
adopted by Mrs.Gandhi was one of unequivocal support. Pravda, 
in an article entitled "India: On the Road to Peace and 
Progress" maintained that "the emergency had been necessitated 
by the attempts of internal reaction aided by external 
forces to capitalize on the difficulties posed by the 1975 
economic crisis to create an atmosphere of pandemonium." 
Western press reports on the curtailment of civil liberties in 
India were discounted since "there were few who questioned 
the timeliness and expediency of the measures undertaken by 
97 the gove rnme nt." 
95 Ibid., p. 428 
96 Indian Express, 7 July 1975 
97 Pravda, 25 Jan 1976 
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In the economic realm, there was enthusiastic coverage 
of Mrs.Gandhi's Twenty Points Programme/ and the Soviet 
media were effusive in their praise for the beneficial impact 
that the emergency had on inflation, agricultural and 
industrial production, land reform and the extension of 
credit to the poor. In short the emergency was perceived 
as a means for attending to the "diverse and complex problems" 
encountered enroute to social and economic development. A 
Soviet political commentator concluded that it was for this 
reason that "the actions taken by the Indian government 
against internal and external reactionaries were responded to 
99 
with full understanding in the Soviet Union." 
During this period India's relations with the United 
States continued to be strained because of Washington's 
attitude on the Bangladesh issue and arms supply to Pakistan. 
However, the successful meeting of the Indo-US Joint Commission 
lifted to some extent the gloom cast by the second cancella-
tion of President Ford's visit to India. It was in this context 
that India's Foreign Secretary Kewal Singh visited Moscow in 
November 1975 for the annual consultations between the two 
countries. He carried a personal letter to Kosygin from 
Indira Gandhi. He had talks with Kosygin and Gromyko as 
also with Brezhnev. The Soviet leaders reiterated their 
support to the emergency at a time of growing world-wide 
criticism against it. They also expressed their admiration 
for the courageous way in which Indira Gandhi had dealt with 
a difficult situation and welcomed the socio-economic 
reform she had introduced. They equally stood by Indira 
Gandhi on the Bangladesh issue, and shared India's concern 
over the negative trends in that country. 
98 Ibid., 10 Feb 1976 
99 Y.Tsaplin, "The Sound Foundation of Indo-Soviet Ties, 
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Indira Gandhi indeed gone out of her way in early 
1976 to make some friendly gestures towards China. These 
were reciprocated by Peking, though there was no warmth in 
all these. However, on April 15, 1976 Foreign Minister 
Chavan announced that India was sending back its ambassador 
to Peking after 14 years. In September, the same year, the 
Chinese envoy took up his charge in New Delhi. 
Apparently Moscow was not unduly perturbed over this 
process of normalization in Sino-Indian relations, for at the 
25th Congress in February 1976, L.I.Brezhnev praised India 
and the leadership of Indira Gandhi in effusive language. 
Brezhnev reiterated Soviet appreciation of India's conti-
nuing commitment to progressive transformations in the face of 
heavy pressure from reactionary circles both at home and 
102 abroad. And his statement, "We attach special importance 
to friendship with India", must have been very reassuring to 
Indira Gandhi."'•^ "^  
Brezhnev concluded by saying with regard to the emergency 
imposed in India that "close political and economic cooperation 
with Republic of India is on steady course. Soviet people 
are sympathetic towards more than that, they feel solidarity 
with India's peace loving foreign policy and the courageous 
stxruggle of that country's progressive forces to solve the 
difficult Social and economic problems confronting it. We 
wish the people and government of India, complete success in 
their struggle. "-^ ^^  
Mr.Firyubin, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister visited India 
in February 1976. Moscow's main concern at that time was that 
101 Vinod Bhatia, Indira Gandhi and Indo-Soviet Relations, 
Panchsheel, New Delhi, 1987, p.77 
102 Ibid. 
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India should not open up a chasm in Indo-Soviet relations 
while trying to bridge the one between itself and China. 
There was undoubtedly no prospect for such developments in 
view of the abiding friendship between India and the Soviet 
Union and also because India continued to depend on Soviet 
arms even though it had sought aircraft from both France 
and Britain. And Moscow was also emerging as the most 
important source of assistance and raw materials at a time 
when India was under heavy economic strain. 
Mrs.Indira Gandhi had paid an official visit to the 
Soviet Union between 8 and 13 June 1976. Mr,Brezhnev, 
welcoming the Indian Prime Minister, said that experience had 
confirmed the foresight of the policy pursue by the Indian 
National Congress led by her — the policy aimed at industria-
lization, building of a self-sustained economy and the estab-
lishment of a strong public sector. This was the first time 
that the Soviet Party Chief had referred to the Congress Party 
in such laudatory terms. "Indeed it is due to this policy that 
India has become a powerful state which plays an important 
part in world politics", he maintained and added, "we highly 
value the constantly strengthening Soviet-Indian friendship 
and unity of the two great forces of today — the world of 
socialism and the countries that have liberated themselves 
from the colonial yoke and have embarked on the road of 
independent progressive development," The joint communique 
issued after the visit spoke of an atmosphere of "trust, 
friendship and mutual understanding." 
The Soviet expressed their "full understanding of the 
efforts of the government and the people of India aimed at 
solving the complicated socio-economic tasks facing the 
country" and high appreciation of the "peace loving foreign 
policy of India, its important positive role in the non-aligned 
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movement and its great contribution to the struggle for 
peace and against colonialism and racialism", the policy 
which had "won for India a well deserved and high prestige 
in the international arena. "•'•°^ ' Indira Gandhi visited Moscow 
with two main objectives. She wanted to assure her hosts 
that she would do nothing to damage Indo-Soviet ties while 
promoting normalisation of relations with China. And she 
wanted to raise the level of Indo-Soviet cooperation in view 
of the continuing oil crisis and adverse international economic 
development. 
The soviet Union and India expressed their unanimous 
opinion on the usefulness of the many faceted ties existing 
between them in the field of scientific and technical coopera-
tion including fundamental research, applied sciences and 
technology, medicine, agriculture and other fields. The two 
sides attach great importance to the practice of Soviet-
Indian political consultations which has proven its value. 
They decided to develop this practice making these consulta-
tions systematic and substantive and paying special attention 
to using them in assisting the implementation of agreed 
measures to strengthen peace, international security and coope-
107 
tation on the basis of equality between states. 
Following the split in the Indian National Congress in 
1969, Indira Gandhi successfully projected a radical image 
of herself. The Soviet Press and leaders sincerely believed 
that she represented the progressive forces in India, that 
her commitment to socialism was deep and firm, and that her 
opponents, who established the Janata Party eventually in 
1977, were all reactionaries representing pro-western, 
105 Asian Recorder, 1-7 July, pp. 13233-35 
106 Vinod Bhatia, Indira Gandhi and Indo-Soviet Relations, 
op.cit. 
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pro-monopoly, anti-communist, Hindu chauvinist elements in 
Indian Politics. When Indira Gandhi clamped Emergency rule 
on the country in June 1975, and when the government arrested 
most of those who formed the new cabinet in March 1977, Moscow 
strongly and consistently backed her. The political commen-
tator of pravda argued on 13 July 1975, that the "Right wing 
opposition" had been trying for some time to create "an 
atmosphere of chaos, anarchy and lawlessness in the country" 
and that the steps taken by the Government were timely and 
necessary.^°® Two other political commentators observed 
that "the intrigues" of the Indian "Right-wingers" had "forced 
Indira Gandhi's government to declare a state of emergency" 
109 
on 25 June 1975. 
The Soviet press repeatedly supported the Indian Govern-
ment's Emergency measures till the eve of the March 1977 
elections. For example. New Times wrote in January 1977 that 
these measure were necessitated by the attempts of the "Rightist 
parties backed by the imperialists... to topple the Gandhi 
Government and seize power in the summer of 1975. Another 
Soviet correspondent wrote two weeks later that the Emergency 
was proclaimed in view of the "reactionaries acting in con-
travention of the constitution and democratic norms and 
laws." •^'• 
The Congress Party, however, paid a heavy price in electoral 
terms for the imposition of the Emergency and for the excesses 
committed during June 1975 and December 1976. For the strength 
of the Congress in the Lok Sabha was reduced from 352 in 1971 
to 153 in 1977. Of the forty-nine Ministers of the Indira 
Gandhi Government who faced the electorate in March 1977, as 
many as thirty-four were defeated, including Indira Gandhi 
herself. 
108 Current Digest of the Soviet press, 6 Aug 1975, p.17 
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The Soviets were not prepared for the defeat of the 
Congress Party although Mrs.Gandhi's own reading of the 
situation was considerably less sanguine. At any rate, 
Moscow did not like the look or the policies of the Janata 
leaders. In the election campaign in February 1977, Morarji 
Desai» who would soon become Prime Minister, charged Mrs. 
Gahdhi's government with doing "whatever the Soviet Union 
does" and declared that if Janata came to power, the Indo-
Soviet treaty might "automatically go . 
Moscow received the news of the Congress Party's rout 
at the polls with deep embarrassment and, possibly some 
alarm. It, however, hastened to overcome the embarrassment 
of dealing with those they had been running down until the 
eve of the March 1977 elections, for within five weeks of 
the election results. Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko landed in 
New Delhi to mend Moscow's fences with the Janata Government. 
Pravada of 10 May 1977 described the Janata Government's 
decision to welcome the Soviet Foreign Minister "as a practical 
step affirming continuity of friendly policy of India towards 
113 the Soviet Union." 
A new government has been formed in India following the 
elections to the Lok Sabha in March 1977. Analyzing the 
poll results, the CPI central executive committee arrived at 
the conclusion that they were not a "verdict against the 
nationally accepted progressive policies of economic self-
reliance, strengthening of the public sector, radical socio-
economic reforms, secularism, anti-imperialist non-alignment, 
and friendship and cooperation with socialist countries." On 
March 2, 1977 Morarji Desai, veteran Indian politician and 
Chairman of the Janata Party, was elected leader of its 
112 The Indian Express, New Delhi, Feb 11, 1977 
113 Times of India, New Delhi, 12 May 1977 
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parliamentary group. He was sworn in as Prime Minister on 
the same day and began forming a new government. 
At his first press conference prime Minister Desai said 
his government's main task would be to eliminate poverty and 
unemployment. In foreign policy, he said India would follow 
a policy of genuine and complete nonalignment, India's 
relations with other countries would be good and cordial, 
115 provided they reciprocated, he said. 
Congratulating Mr.Desai on his appointment as Prime 
Minister, Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin expressed confidence 
that the traditional relations of friendship and all-round 
cooperation between the Soviet Union and India would continue 
to grow and develop in the interest of their peoples, peace 
and international security. 
114 A. Usvatov's Commentary on change of Government in 
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Chapter V 
INDO-SOVIET RELATIONS : 1977-82 
(A) Phase-I^ 1977-80 ; Relations During the Janata Regime 
After eleven turbulent and historic years in office, 
Indira Gandhi stepped down as the Prime Minister of India 
in March 1977 - not left the country in a shambles as the 
rout of the Congress in the election of the new Lok Sabha 
would suggest, but a country that had been cajoled, persuaded 
and whipped into shape on the way to achieving its full 
stature as an economically strong, socially forward looking 
and politically mature nation. 
A new party, the Janata Party, led by Morarji Desai 
assumed power in New Delhi at the end of March 1977. Atal 
Behari Vajpayee, a former Janasangh leader, took over as the 
new Minister of External Affairs. Prime Minister Morarji 
Desai and the Minister for External Affairs, Vajpayee took the 
earliest opportunity to declare their commitment to India's 
traditional policy of nonalignment. We can say that several 
specific characteristics or directions of the Janata government's 
foreign policy manifested themselves between April and June 
1977 namely "genuine" or "proper" nonalignment, first priority 
to better understanding and cooperation with immediate 
neighbours, pursuit of a policy of "beneficial bilaterialism" 
in general, renewed interest in the Commonwealth as a multi-
lateral association and its regional and bilateral benefits 
and opportunities, and a somewhat different articulation of 
India's nuclear policy. 
1 The Indian Express, New Delhi, 25 March 1977 
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Soon after assuming office as Prime Minister on 24 March 
1977, Morarji Desai had told a press conference that his 
government would follow a policy of "proper nonalignment". He 
also said that his government would not wish to have any 
"special" relations with any country. Obviously he had the 
Soviet Union in mind when he made this observation; for it is 
often asserted that the 20 year Treaty of Peace, Friendship 
and Cooperation between India and the Soviet Union signed in 
August 1971 had established "special" relations between the 
two countries. Commenting on this Treaty, the new Prime 
Minister said that if it meant that India should not have 
friendship with other countries, then it would have to change. 
2 
"At least we will not act upon it in that manner." 
Vajpayee, in a similar view, had declared on 7 April 1977, 
in his address at the meeting of the Coordinating Bureau of 
Non-Aligned countries in New Delhi India's resolve to follow 
the path of "genuine" nonalignment. Further, he made a speech 
in the Lok Sabha on 29 June 1977, in which he presented a full 
exposition of the Janata Government's nonalignment policy and 
its view of "proper" or "genuine" nonalignment. He said: 
"Non-alignment is not the policy of an individual or a party. 
This is based on National Consensus... The policy of non-
alignment is, in fact, a logical and essential extension of 
national dependence in the field of international affairs... We 
affiiTO this old tenet of policy because nonalignment recog-
nizes that in today's nuclear world war or its inevitability 
must be ruled out. We cherish our national independence, but 
reject the need to consign national defence to a committed or 
dependent military or ideological arrangement. Nonalignment 
frees a nation from the pressures to borrow foreign models or 
adopt other ideologies which may be alien to a nation's 
2 Asian Recorder, New Delhi, 23-29 April, 1977, p.13707 
ly^ 
3 
civilization or its ethos. 
These statements might have caused some alarm in Moscow 
but the Soviet Union needed India's friendship as much as 
India needed Soviet Union's. 
Within five weeks of the election results. Foreign 
Minister A.A. Gromyko landed in New Delhi, on 25 April, 1977. 
Two weeks prior to his visit, a shift in the Soviet attitude 
toward the Emergency and the new Indian government was dis-
cernible. The fate of the Congress was now seen as a conse-
quence of the "abuse of power", the "destruction of democratic 
norms", and the denial of the rights of the working class. 
Similarly, a statement on change in economic strategy by the 
new Minister for Industries, was reported without adverse 
5 
comment. 
The contents of the Soviet press in the week prior to 
Gromyko's visit indicated that the Kremlin had discussed the 
possibilities of the new leadership altering India's policy 
towards the U.S.S.R. There was a highly defensive attempt 
to dwell on the past benefits of Soviet support for India. 
Prominent Indians and major newspapers were quoted stressing 
the importance of Soviet-Indian ties, the value of Soviet 
economic and technical assistance and the significance of 
the 1971 Treaty of Friendship existing between the two 
nations. 
During his stay in Delhi, Mr. A.A.Gromyko was received 
by the Acting President of India, Shri B.D.Jatti and hold 
3 Foreign Affairs Record, June 1977, p.90 
4 Pravda, 10 April 1977 
5 Ibid., 21 April 1977 
6 Ibid., 17 April 1977, Also see The Hindustan Times, 
New Delhi, 25 April 1977 
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talKs with the Prime Minister Morarji Desai and the Minister 
of External Affairs Atal Bihari Vajpayee. This was the first 
high level exchange between the leaders of the new Government 
of India and the Soviet leadership. Pravda of 10 May, 1977 
described the Janata Government's decision to welcome the 
Soviet Foreign Minister "as a practical step affirming conti-
nuity of friendly policy of India towards the Soviet Union. 
From the Soviet point of view, it was a vital mission, 
and, after a long meeting with Desai, Gromyko felt suffi-
ciently reassured to declare that it would be absolutely 
"unnatural" to allow "anygaps" to develop in Indo-Soviet 
relations.® Vajpayee set the tone for Janata's policy towards 
the Soviet union by telling the Soviet Foreign Minister: "We 
appreciate the help the Soviet Union has given us to indus-
trialize our country and to make us self-reliant. We are 
also grateful for their consistent and principled support in 
our difficult times. We remember all this and we shall 
9 
continue to value our friendship with you." 
In the joint Indo-Soviet communique signed before 
A.A.Gromyko left for Moscow on 27 April, 1977, the two 
countries reaffirmed their faith in the spirit of the 1971 
Treaty and noted with "satisfaction" their "identical or 
close" position on many important world problems. At the 
luncheon held in honour of the visiting delegation, Atal 
Behari Vajpayee assured the Soviet Foreign Minister "that the 
bonds of friendship between our two countries are strong 
enough to survive the demands of divergent system, the fate 
of an individual or the fortunes of a political party". 
7 Cited in The Times of India, New Delhi, 12 May 1977 
8 The Hindustan Times, 27 April 1977 
9 The Times of India, New Delhi, 28 April 1977 
10 Soviet Review, 5 May 1977, p.14 
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At the close of Gromyko's trip, it was evident that the 
relationship had been reaffirmed. Three new agreements were 
signed involving a Soviet loan, a supplement to the bilateral 
trade plan for 1977, and Soviet technical assistance for the 
Srinagar-Tashkent Trans-Himalayan Tropo Scatter Telecommunica-
tions link. In addition a lengthy joint communique issued 
at the end of Gromyko's visit revealed several areas of 
agreement between the two sides. Desai and Vajpayee were 
officially invited to the U.S.S.R., the importance of 
recognizing the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace was mentioned. 
South Africa and Rhodesia were condemned; a settlement of 
the Middle East crisis was called for on the basis of a 
return by Israel of the Arab territories taken in 1967, and 
12 Vietnam's admission to the United Nations advocated. 
On 3 April, the 39th anniversary of the establishment of 
diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and India was 
extensively observed. On 8 April 1977, A.B. Vajpayee expressed 
the hope that traditional relations of friendship and all 
round cooperation between the Soviet Union and India would 
further develop. 
Despite all the greetings and platitudes which were 
exchanged when the Janata Government came to power the Soviet 
attitude began to quickly harden in their important dealings 
with India. This is clearly illustrated by the Soviet 
intransigence on the important question of Rupee-Rouble 
parity. The Russians sought to significantly hike the 
exchange rate of the Rouble which would result in India 
having to pay back much more for the aid received from Soviet 
Union.''•^ 
11 The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 28 April 1977 
^2 Pravda, 28 April 1977 
13 Arun Gandhi, The Morarji Papers; Fall of the Janata 
Government, Vision Books,Pvt. Ltd., Delhi, 1983 
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On June 30/ 1977 Morarji Desai wrote to India's Amba-
ssador in Moscow, l.K.Gujral, "... I appreciate the senti-
ments he (Brezhnev) expressed about me and the new Government 
of India. Nevertheless we have to remember that he and his 
colleagues were equally effusive about the past regime 
which, if I may say so, was probably more in line with the 
way of their thinking and ideology than with democratic 
tradition..." 
In November/ 1977, Gujral reported to Morarji Desai that 
the Communist Party of India was placed in a very high 
position in the 'communist fraternity'. Morarji replied to 
say that "he was not surprised at all because after all they 
were playing their game very faithfully and are receiving 
15 their reward." 
On 14 July/ 1977 Indo-Soviet relations figured in the 
Lok Sabha in the context of the Soviet plan for Asian security. 
Prime Minister Desai told the House, that so far as he was 
aware, the Soviet Union had not fully spelt out the contents 
and implications of the proposed security designed. He added 
that if the plan meant the formation of another bloc or 
alliance India would not be interested in it. He did not 
agree that there were no Soviet bases in the Indian Ocean. As 
he put it, the Soviet Union certainly had its "spheres of 
influence", there: "it is a race between the two powerful 
nations. It is from that we have to save Asia." 
The Prime Minister's statement on 14 July were the first 
overt indications of a new turn or attitude towards relations 
with the superpowers. In the past, India's official spokesmen 
had always expressed their explicit ignorance about any Soviet 
bases or military expansion in the Indian Ocean, 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Lok Sabha Debates, 4(29), 14 July 1977 
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Gromyko's visit to New Delhi was followed by the arrival 
of Desai and Vajpayee in Moscow on 21 October 1977. On the 
60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, 
in his speech on October 21, 1977 in Moscow, Mr.Desai called 
the October Revolution an epoch making event; in the history 
of the Soviet State and world history, that has inspired and 
17 
continues to inspire millions of people. 
In a speech made at the dinner given in his honour on 
the same day, the Indian Prime Minister indicated to his hosts 
that New Delhi was not considering any major change in its 
relationship with the Soviet Union. He noted that the 
differences in the political and economic systems of the tw© 
countries had not prevented close cooperation in a number of 
fields and pointedly referred to the Indo-Soviet Treaty as a 
high point in the relationship. 
Though he spoke of the recent political change in India 
as a revolution directed against the infringement of democratic 
rights, he immediately sought to reassure his hosts that the 
governmental change in New Delhi did not threaten the future of 
Indo-Soviet ties. He pointed out that the two countries were 
bound not by transitory issues such as ideology and personality 
but by their "national interests and vital common goals." 
Similarly, while emphasizing that India's basic commitment to 
nonalignment provided a flexible base for working toward 
friendly ties with all states, he added that established 
18 
friendship would not suffer in the process. "From a visit 
to London for a conference fixed a long time ago and a stop 
in Paris on the way back, the Soviet Union is the first country 
19 I am visiting as Prime Minister of India," said Desai. 
17 Y.Aleveyer, "A Major Factor of Peace and Stability", Inter-
national Affairs, Jan 1978, Moscow, p.88 
18 The Hindustan Times, 26 Oct 1978, Also see for full speech 
R.K.Jain, Soviet South Asian Relations 1947-78, Vol.1, 
Radiant Publishers, New Delhi, 1978, p.497 
19 The Hindustan Times, 26 Oct 1978 
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Apart from the joint communique signed on October 26, 
1977, and press reports on the talks, there is no detailed 
information available on the issues that were covered during 
the three rounds of negotiations that were held. Judging 
from the composition of the Desai's delegation, Indo-Soviet 
economic relations constituted a major area of discussion. 
A major dispute between India and the Soviet Union had 
erupted in the field of the Rupee-Rouble exchange rate. The 
Soviets argued that following price of the pound sterling 
to which the rupee was linked, justified a revision from 11.39 
Roubles to 100 Rupees to 8.66 Roubles to 100 Rupees in 1975. 
The Indians countered with the argument that the Rouble was 
arbitrarily set in terms of gold and was not stobject to 
market forces. The issue involved the payment of vast amounts 
by India in debt repayment and had led to prolonged haggling. 
While developments such as the decision to use U.S. aid 
for the projected expansion of the Bokaro Steel >5ill would 
suggest that New Delhi wished to avoid excessive dependence on 
the Soviet Union, the joint communique issued at the close of 
Desai's visit points to an expansion in the scope of Indo-
Soviet economic ties. The two sides were ready to cooperate 
in the development of alumina, non-ferrous metal, irrigation 
and agriculture in India, while the possibility of setting 
up joint industrial projects in third countries was also 
discussed. In addition, it was decided to continue Soviet 
assistance in the expansion of steel and coal production. 
During Desai's visit, judging from the attention given 
to the Indo-Soviet Treaty in Soviet media, it was clear that 
Moscow was eager to have New Delhi clearly reaffirm its 
commitment to this aspect of the Soviet-Indian relationship. 
While the Treaty was mentioned twice in the communique, the two 
I I I . II I 
20 The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 26 Oct 1978 
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sides resolved to strengthen their ties "in the spirit" of 
the document. This formulation was at variance with the Soviet 
tendency to refer to the Treaty as the "basis" of Indo-Soviet 
relations. 
The Indo-Soviet treaty emerged unscathed from the 
Desai visit, the Janata Prime Minister contenting himself 
with reiterating his view on his return to New Delhi that 
"there was no question of India having special relations 
22 
with any country." The Soviets however, did seem to be 
changing their formulations, but not their policy, on the 
Indian Ocean. During Desai's visit they expressed support 
"for the striving of the peoples of the area to make the 
ocean a zone of peace". The joint declaration also "urged 
the removal of all foreign military bases existing in the 
23 Indian Ocean and prevention and establishment of new ones." 
Morarji Desai had told the Parliament on 14 November 1977 
about his visit to the Soviet Union (October 21-26, 1977) that 
"when the Janata Government came to power, there were many who 
believed that Indo-Soviet relations would suffer as a conse-
quence of change of Government in India. This was not our 
expectation; the visit had indicated our faith that notwith-
standing differences in our social and political systems and 
approaches on some issues, our relationship has in no way 
suffered. On the contrary, on the principle of promoting 
beneficial bilateral relations, there are possibilities of 
healthy development in future." He further said that the 
Declaration signed by President Brezhnev and himself^ Indo-
Soviet relations have stood the test of time. It is a rela-
tionship which need in no way be feared by any nation as it is 
21 The Hindu, Madras, 25 Oct1978, Also see Pravda, 22 Oct 1977 
22 The Statesman, New Delhi, 29 Oct 1977 
23 Soviet Review, 24 Oct 1977, pp. 17-22 
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anchored in the principles of peaceful coexistence which have 
24 
universal applicability. 
Gromyko's talks in New Delhi had Desai's visit to the 
U.S.S.R. seem to indicate that neither side wanted to alter 
the existing structure of Soviet-Indian relations. Despite 
speculation to the contrary, there is evidence of disinclina-
tion on the part of Desai and Vajpayee to bring about a change 
in the prevailing relationship with the Soviet Union. The 
fact is that India has little to gain- by taking steps in 
this direction. For example, while the annulment of the 
Soviet-Indian treaty might be of value as a symbolic gesture 
as an indication of an impending change in India's foreign 
policy — it would not be worth much more. The treaty is not 
without a tacit significance for India's security concerns 
regarding China, and the recent indications of an upturn in 
Sino-Indian relations has not been substantial enough to make 
this aspect of the treaty unattractive to New Delhi. It is 
to be noted here that after a fifteen year interval, ambassa-
dorial links with China were reestablished in 1976. In 
addition, in 1977, China broke a similar fifteen year impasse 
in Sino-Indian trade by concluding an agreement with the Indian 
State Trading Corporation for the import of shellac and 
nonferrous metal. Indian trade agents also participated in 
25 the Canton Trade Fair in April 1977. 
The Janata Government hoped to insulate the Indo-Soviet 
relationship from its initiatives in other field in promoting 
better relations with the U.S., China and the neighbouring 
countries, the last being a matter of first priority. 
The Janata leadership continued to be aware of the security 
24 Foreign Affairs Record, Nov 1977, pp.243-4 
25 The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 20 May 1977 
26 Vajpayee's Statement in the Lok Sabha, 29 June 1977 
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27 problem along the Sino-Indian frontier. While India's 
military capability along the border had improved substantially 
since 1962, a reduced sense of sinophobia could well have 
the effect of making New Delhi feel less urgent about the 
need to enter into sxobstantive negotiations with Peking. At 
any rate any radical improvement in Sino-Indian relations 
would have brought to the foree certain major issues on which 
there existed a wide divergence of views. While the Chinese 
were perhaps be willing to settle the border dispute on the 
basis of the status quo, any agreement along these lines by 
the Janata Government would have complicated its political 
position at home. In addition, recent developments indicated 
that both countries viewed themselves as rivals for political 
28 influence in the smaller nation of South Asia. 
The Janata government's approach to neighbours was consi-
derable to scale down the country's power projection and meet 
them more than half way to resolve contentious issues — the 
"logic of good neighbourliness", as Vajpayee described the 
29 policy. 
Political observers point out that the Janata government 
would have liked India to play a bigger role in South Asia 
and in international politics. Again,"there was already 
talk in Janata Party circles about India staking its claim to 
permanent membership of the Security Council". If the Indo-
Soviet ties remained intact and if Sino-Soviet antagonism 
continued, the Kremlin would not have been averse to support-
ing India's reasonable, legitimate aspirations. 
27 Amrita Bazar Patrika, Calcutta, 25 Oct 1977 
28 Kedar Man Singh, Far Eastern Economic Review, 6 Jan 1978 
29 Atal Bihari Vajpayee, "India and the Changing International 
Order", in Misra, op.cit. 
30 "indo-US Relations: Structural Constraints", Economic and 
Political Weekly, 13(1), 7 Jan 1978, p.4 
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By early 1978, the Soviet leadership was disturbed by 
the discussions that the Indian Government was having with 
Western countries, president Carter, it seemed, wished to 
deal with India as the dominant regional power and would be 
mindful of its vital interests. Carter turned down the sale 
of A-7 aircraft to Pakistan, which pleased India, and corres-
ponded copiously with Desai. Carter had paid a visit to New 
Delhi in January 1978, 
Desai made other gestures to Pakistan, He adopted a 
line of diplomatic neutrality on Pakistan-Afghanistan 
differences and supported Islamabad for membership of the non-
aligned movement after it left CENTO in the wake of the Iranian 
Revolution. An agreement on Salal dam, initiated by Mrs.Gandhi's 
government, was signed in 1978. Vajpayee, during a visit to 
Kabul in September 1978, urged Afghanistan to remain non-
31 
aligned and promote trust in the region. 
Indian trade agents participated in the Guangzhau (Canton) 
trade fair in April 1977 and Chinese interest in promoting 
better relations with India was heightened by the change of 
government in New Delhi although Desai's meeting with the 
Dalai Lama in April 1977 provoked an official protest from 
Beijing for the record. China made friendly noises and 
signals came thick and fast from Beijing indicating a desire 
32 to improve relations. 
All through the years of the Janata regime, and even when 
Kosygin visited India in March 1979, the Russians seemed 
obsessed with China and the fear that they were attempting 
33 to get nearer to them. 
31 Walter K.Anderson, 'India in Asia: Walking on a Tightrope', 
Asian Survey, December 1.979 
32 Nihal Singh, 'Options in a Dangerous World', The Statesman, 
New Delhi, 9 Jan 1979 
33 Arun Gandhi, op.cit. 
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A balanced relationship was sought to be maintained with 
the superpowers on the basis o£ "genuine" nonalignment, bene-
ficial bilateralism and international cooperation during 
Janata government. A new chapter in India-US friendship 
was opened with President Carter's visit to India: although 
serious differences over the nuclear issue remained, relations 
between the two countries were restored to a new level of 
mutual confidence. Friendly ties with the Soviet Union were 
sought to be strengthened further by working for greater 
cooperation in the economic, scientific and technological 
sphere. In February 1978, the 4th session of the Indo-Soviet 
Joint Commission met in New Delhi, when a protocol was signed 
on long-term cooperation between the two countries. Arkhipov, 
who visited India for the meeting emphasised that Indo-Soviet 
cooperation between the two countries entered a new phase 
with prospects for wider and new areas of cooperation. 
The Soviet Deputy prime Minister Ivan Arkhipov arrived 
in India as the head of the Soviet delegation to attend the 
fourth session of the Indo-Soviet Joint Commission in February 
1978, Arkhopov described Indo-Soviet relations as very "close", 
and said that there were yet "greater prospects for further 
deepening of our friendship and in particular our cooperation 
35 in the field of economic activity." At the conclusion of 
the session, a long-term protocol was signed between the tw© 
countries for the expansion of economic trade, technical and 
scientific collaboration, an expansion which according to 
Vajpayee, reflected a new pattern of cooperation in industry. 
The major areas of cooperation envisaged for the next fifteen 
years were steel, non-ferrous metallurgy, heavy machine 
building, coal and petroleum, communication and transport. 
34 Vinod Bhatia, Indira Gandhi and Indo-Soviet Relations, 
35 National Herald, New Delhi, 26 Feb 1978 
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Seven sub-committees were set up to work out the details of 
cooperation the most important of these being the one charged 
with the task of preparing a long-term economic programme, 
36 including a trade plan. 
Besides agreeing to keep up its assistance for the 
ongoing projects^ the Soviet union offered to help in the 
setting up of a blast furnace at Visakhapatnam. It also 
undertook to set up an al^ amina plant with a capacity of 
6,000,000 tonnes to exploit the bauxite deposits in Andhra 
Pradesh. Both projects were to be financed in accordance 
with the "compensation" principle which meant in the present 
case that the Soviet Union would be paid back in kind for 
the technology and expertise that it supplied. At the end of 
his visit, Arkhipov observed that his country's economic 
relations with India were passing on to a "qualitative new 
phase" a phase marked by a search for new areas of cooperation, 
wider development of industrial coolaboration, exchange of 
technologies and experience on a broader basis, and coHa-
37 boration in third countries. 
In May 1978 India's Minister for Defence, Jagjivan Ram, 
visited the Soviet Union for a review of Indo-Soviet coopera-
tion in the field of defence. In the course of his visit 
he expressed the hope that India would receive Soviet support 
for the furtherance of its objective of speedy national self-
reliance. Marshal Ustinov, his Soviet counterpart, stated 
that the central objective of Indo-Soviet friendship, which 
he held up as an example of peaceful coexistence, was not 
confined to the two Governments but derived its strength 
38 from the people. Replying, India's Defence Minister 
specially mentioned the Indo-Soviet Treaty, and said that it 
36 The Statesman, New Delhi, 10 Mar 1978 
37 Indian Express, New Delhi 3 Mar 1978 
38 Hindustan Times, 24 May 1978 
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was not just a document between the two governments but a 
symbol of the sentiment of the two peoples for each other. 
The Treaty, he added, aimed at peace and friendship, non-
interference, respect for sovereignty and mutual aid in times 
39 
of necessity. 
In 1978, the Janata had to make decisions on arms pur-
chases. Intense lobbying was on by France and Britain to 
sell the Mirage and the Jaguar. It was in this context that 
Soviet Air Force Chief Kutakhov visited India in March 1978 
and offered an improved version of MIG-23 at concessional 
price and on better terms along with the promise to transfer 
its technology to India. In May, Defence Minister Jagjivan 
Ram visited Moscow for a review of Indo-Soviet cooperation in 
defence production. His main objective was to secure rapid 
40 transfer of Soviet weapon technology to India. when the Nam 
Palkiwala, India's Ambassador in U.S.A., wrote a letter to 
Morarji Desai on January 22, 1979, which showed that Soviet 
Union didii't want Morarji Desai to be Prime Minister of India. 
He wrote that the government of the Soviet Union had decided 
that they should work, as far as it lay in their power, to 
see that you (Morarji) cease to be the Prime Minister, and he 
added that some chosen persons in the Communist Party of India, 
who are pro-Soviet, had already received the message. The 
letter made public last week only confirm a conspiracy whose 
41 general contours have been known all along. 
Now it can be told that, from the very first month of the 
Janata Government a mystery meeting used to be held periodically, 
in the Guest House of a business house, in Faridabad. It was 
regularly attended by H.N. Bahuguna, Madhu Limaya, Nikhil 
39 Ibid., 27 May 1978 
40 Vinod Bhatia, Indira Gandhi and Indo-Soviet Relations, 
op.cit., pp. 90-91 
41 Dirty Russian Hand in Indian Politics, Organiser, 25 Sep 
1983 
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Chakravarti and the Russian Ambassador Vorosilov. A regular 
participant was Chandrasekhar. 
Russia got its bigest break in India in 1969, When 
Mrs Gandhi continued in office after the Congress split, with 
CPI support. A top Russian Politbureau member flew into 
Delhi at the time and persuaded CPI and CPI(M) to support 
Giri for Presidentship to save Mrs.Gandhi's office and 
protect Russian interests in Asia. It is significant that 
Limaye and his friends also backed Giri's candidature. Accord-
ing to Giri's friends, Russia made Rs.7 crores available to 
buy the so-called "Conscience" vote. It was during this period 
that the Treaty of friendship was signed, giving the world 
the impression that India was now part of the Russian camp. 
During the same period RAW entered into an arrangement with 
KGB transferring the services of some of its agents in the 
CPI(M) Politbureau to the Russian outfit. It was two of 
these gentlemen who played a crucial role in switching the 
42 
CPI(M) support from Morarji to Charan Singh. 
Although Limaye's link with Moscow became clear after 
Janata came to power, Bahuguna's links were clear from the 
start. When he was Chief Minister of U.P. Russia presented 
him an Ilyushin plane. The Soviet Ambassador lauded him as 
an up and coming "National leader" at a function in Lucknow 
early in 1975. Russia continued its support to 3ahuguna even 
in the 1977 elections as per litto Cohosh's letter to 
43 Dr. ultsiferov in Moscow. 
Vdjpayee had paid a visit to Moscow in September 1978. 
His main purpose was to appraise the Soviet leadership of 
the state of Sino-Indian relations and of India's new 
42 For details see Madhu Limaye, Problems of India's Foreign 
Policy, Delhi, 1984, Chapter 7 
43 Organiser, 12 July 1979 
207 
initiatives to nojnnalise relations with Peking. Vajpayee 
spoke of the high degree of trust and confidence between 
India and the U.S.S.R. and of the Janata government's efforts 
to improve relations with India's neighbours, including 
China. He assured the Soviet leadership that improvement o£ 
Sino-Indian relations would not be at the expense of Indo-
Soviet relations. However, divergence in perceptions had 
widened. Moscow had pointed out that the Karakoram Highway, 
built by China was a strategic one, which threatened China's 
neighbours, particularly India. Moscow wanted a reassurance 
from Vajpayee that the Janata government would do nothing 
at the expense of Indo-Soviet relations and friendship. At 
his luncheon in honour of Vajpayee, Gromyko did not mince words, 
He said: "The schemes of the forces that are hostile to world 
peace and international security in Asia should be rebuffed, 
and rebuffed decisively. It is necessary to unmask and 
frustrate their aggressive designs and expansionist procli-
44 
vities in time. However, Vajpayee did not respond to these 
strong sentiments though he praised the principled policies 
of the Soviet Union in contrast to China's wayward actions. 
Thus, Moscow failed to dissuade Vajpayee from his proposed 
visit to Peking, if that was Moscow's intention. In the end 
even Vajpayee had to postpone his visit to Peking since he 
fell ill.^^ 
Kosygin came to India in March 1979. He had spent six 
days in India and had a series of talks with Desai and 
Vajpayee. He was relentless in his attack on China, and 
called China's aggression on Vietnam criminal. He addressed 
the Indian Parliament and said that no peaceloving country 
could remain indifferent to such blatant actions. He warned 
^^ Pravda, 13 Sep 1978 
45 Vinod Bhatia, op.cit., p. 92;, also see Shashi Tharoor 
Reasons of State: Political Development and India's 
Foreign Policy Under Indira Gandhi, 1966-1977, New Delhi, 
1982, p.372 
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that China might choose to 'teach India a lesson' at some 
point in future. However, even though India was outraged 
by the Chinese action, the Janata government did not want 
to fully identify itself with the Soviet reaction. Desai 
merely said: "We have agreed even where we differ." It was 
clear that New Delhi was not ready to team up with Moscow 
against China. So in the final communique India v/ould only 
go to the extent of characterising the Chinese aggression as 
massive and armed attack, and to demand an immediate, uncon-
ditional and total withdrawal of Chinese troops from the 
territory of Vietnam. However, on the economic front, the 
Kosygin visit was memorable and an agreement was concluded on 
the controversial Rupee-Rouble exchange ratio. Kosygin 
offered 600,000 tonnes of additional crude for 1979. And 
although the Janata was more favourably disposed towards the 
West and to India's private sector, the visit of Kosygin led 
to the signing of a long-term agreement on trade, scientific 
and technical cooperation for a period of 15 years. It was 
the first long-term and comprehensive agreement between which 
led to an unprecedented expansion of cooperation between the 
two countries. The Soviet assistance already accounted for 
30 per cent of steel capacity, 70 per cent of oil extraction, 
30 per cent of oil refining capacity, 20 per cent of power 
generation and 80 per cent of matallurgical equipment. About 
76 major projects had been built in India or were being 
47 
constructed with Soviet cooperation. 
The Soviet Premier had separate meetings with the 
President Sar^va Reddy, the Deputy Prime Minister (Finance), 
Charan Singh and the Deputy Prime Minister (Defence) Jagjivan 
Ram, and the Minister of External Affairs, Atal Behari 
46 Overseas Hindustan Times, March 25 1979; and The New Times, 
No.13, 1979 
"^"7 Pravda, 10 March 1979, The New Times, No.12, 1979, Text of 
the agreement in Foreign Affairs Record, April 1977 
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Vajpayee. Among other subjects, Vajpayee talked of his visit 
to China. He informed Kosygin that he had told the Chinese 
leaders that if China normalised her relations with Moscow 
peacefully through bilateral negotiations, the forces of peace 
and stability would be strengthened and the whole world would 
stand to gain, 
India and the Soviet Union considered it necessary to 
exert further efforts in the interest of strengthening peace 
in the Asian continent, of developing cooperation among all 
Asian countries on the principles of sovereign equality and 
independence: non use of force, inviolability of frontiers, 
territorial integrity of states, non-interference in the 
internal affairs and other generally recognised principles of 
interstate relations. Acceptance of these principles in 
interstate relations, the communique said, would contribute 
to the transformation of Asia into a continent of durable 
peace and to strengthening of world peace. 
Besides the situation in South-East Asia, the two sides 
reviewed various other international issues,including the 
situation in West Asia, the freedom struggles in Southern 
Africa, disarmament, the need to increase the effectiveness 
of the United Nations to ensure lasting peace and restructur-
ing international economic relations on a democratic basis. 
The two sides noted that nonalignment is a positive factor 
in maintaining world peace, eliminating colonialism and 
racialism and ensuring equitable economic relations. They 
reiterated firm support to the conversion of the Indian Ocean 
into a zone of peace and regretted that Soviet-American talks 
on the subject had been suspended. India appreciated Soviet 
readiness to resume these talks. 
Expressing deep concern over the continuing serious 
threat to peace in West Asia, they pronounced themselves 
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in favour of a comprehensive and just settlement of the problem 
on the basis of the complete withdrawal of Israeli troops 
from all Arab territories occupied in 1967/ the recurring of 
the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine, includ-
ing their right to establish their own state as well as the 
ensuring for all states in the area the right to independent 
existence and development. 
On yet another international issue, there were differences 
between India and the Soviet Union, This was on the Heng 
Sararin regime which had been installed in Kampuchea with the 
Soviet support. Despite repeated requests from Kosygin, 
Vajpayee was reported to have told him that India would extend 
recognition to Kampuchea only when it was sure that the new 
48 
regime was in full control of the situation in that country. 
Yet as it turned out, the Janata government did "go a long way 
towards the Soviet position, refusing to link Vietnam's inva-
sion of Kampuchea with China's assault on Vietnam. In drawing 
the line between friendship and the Soviet policies, the Janata 
was careful not to antagonise Moscow while preserving its own 
49 independence. However, the difference between the two 
countries were very much evident. Vajpayee, as has been pointed 
out by an astute observer, was privately reported to have 
expressed his "vinhappiness over Kosygin's use of Indian 
podiums to denounce China and after the Russian Primier's 
departure, declared on television that what had been said in 
the joint communique was not as significant as what had been 
50 left out of it. Desai put it a little more succinctly, 
48 Pushpesh Pant, "Major Developments in India's Foreign 
Policy and Relations, Jan-June 1979, "International 
Studies, Vol,19, 1980, p.508 
4 9 Shashi Tharoor, Reasons of State; Political Development 
and India's Foreign Policy Under Indira Gandhi 1966-1977, 
New Delhi, 1978, p.371 
50 Ibid., p.374 
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While Kosygin/ before his departure, told reporters that both 
countries agreed on all subjects, Desai quipped that they 
51 had agreed even where they differed. 
During Kosygin's visit in 1979, several protocols were 
signed between India and the Soviet Union. These included 
protocols for supply of 600,000 tonnes of Soviet crude in 
exchange for Indian rice, supply of agricultural machines and 
motor vehicles as gift to Suratgarh State Farm, agreement 
on cooperation in medical science and public health and a 
52 
protocol on cultural exchanges. Another long term agree-
ment was signed on cooperation in economic, trade, techno-
logical and scientific fields which would run for ten to 
fifteen years covering major proposals like Visakhapatnam 
Steel Plant, East Coast aluminium project,Msthura Refinery, 
Singrauli and Raniganj coalfields, Pamgarh washery and 
Malanjkhan copper project and also providing for Indian 
experts to visit Soviet Union to familiarise themselvs with 
the Soviet development in inland fisheries, pulp and paper, 
53 
and food industry. 
Political dialogue between India and the Soviet Union 
continued uninterrupted in the next years. The Indian Prime 
Minister visited the Soviet Union on 11 June 1979 and received 
a flattering welcome. Cooperation between the Soviet Union 
and India, linked by traditional friendship, was strengthen-
ing with every passing year and this served the vital 
interests of the peoples of the two countries, said Brezhnev, 
General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and the 
President of the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet in 
his dinner speech in the Kremlin in honour of the visiting 
54 Prime Minister of India. 
51 Pushpesh Pant, op.cit., p.508 
52 Asian Recorder, 25(15), 1079, p.14832 
53 Ibid. 
54 Pravda, and The Times of India, New Delhi, 12 June 1979; 
Also see New Times, No.25, 1979 
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It has been considered necessary to draw extensively 
on this communique as it amply illustrates the close corres-
pondence of views on a wide range of issues and brings out 
the community identity of strategic contexts between the two 
countries. It shows that in this case the cordiality in 
bilateral relations is more a function of coinciding national 
interests rather than a rapport between individual persona-
lities or any ideological affinity. 
Touching upon the situation in Asia/ Leonid Brezhnev 
said that "China's recent aggression against Vietnam, the 
repeated threats of taking up arms again to teach somebody 
a lesson, all this extremely complicates the situation, and 
creates considerable dangers for Asian countries. 
Morarji Desai was received on his arrival in Moscow by 
President Brezhnev, Primer Kosygin and other Soviet leaders. 
Speaking at a banquet held in his honour in Moscow, Desai said: 
"In India the Soviet Union has a steadfast friend whose 
policies are not guided by or founded upon the shifting sands 
of transient considerations and temporary advantages, but are 
based upon the bedrock of warroth, goodwill and recognition 
of mutual interests." The Minister of External Affairs, Atal 
Behari Vajpayee who accompanied the Prime Minister on the 
tour, described as a "Landmark" the agreements reached during 
Desai*s visit to the Soviet Union. 
In the Soviet Union, Morarji Desai visited Tashkent, 
Moscow and Leningrad, At Moscow, Desai had talks with Brezhnev 
and Premier Kosygin. The joint communique issued at the end 
of the visit stated that the Indo-Soviet talks showed the 
"coincidence or similarity of views of India and the Soviet 
Union on key international problems". This would serve the 
55 Ibid. 
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cause of "further widening the many sided cooperation between 
India and the Soviet Union," 
The communique cited the Indo-Soviet long-term programme 
of economic# trade, scientific and technological cooperation, 
the agreement on cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy, the joint commission meetings, the launching of the 
56 Bhaskara Satellite and the agreement on the Visakhapatnam 
steel plant on "new manifestation of the determination of the 
57 
two sides to expand their economic and other cooperation." 
During his wide ranging talks with the Soviet leaders, 
Desai explained India's position regarding various issues, 
especially those on which India and the Soviet Union had 
differences. On Kampuchea, the differences persisted and 
both countries reiterated their positions. Again, while 
India and the Soviet Union agreed that the Camp David agreement 
between Egypt and Israel signed through the mediation of the 
U.S. could not lead to a comprehensive settlement of the 
Palestine problem, India did not express itself in favour 
of the move to expel Egypt from the non-aligned movement for 
58 being a party to the agreement. 
However, the subject on which intense debates took place 
between the two leaders was on the development in Afghanistan, 
India's next door neighbour, where the Soviet Union had 
installed a pro-Moscow regime. The changed environment at 
India's doorstep was causing considerable concern to India 
not only because of the Soviet role there but also because of 
Pakistan using this as a proxy to get sophisticated military 
hardware from the U.S. Desai was forthright in his criticism 
59 
of the developments in Afghanistan. In the joint communique. 
56 Indian Express, New Delhi, 8 June 1979 
57 The Hindu, Madras, 12 June 1979 
58 Indian Express, New Delhi, 13 June 1979 
59 Ibid. 
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while referring to Afghanistan, both countries expressed 
themselves "firmly in favour of the aspirations" of the Afghan 
people for the preservation of their national independence and 
declared their opposition to "any interference by outside 
forces" in the internal affairs of that country.. Desai, 
however, reportedly advised Brezhnev that the government in 
Kabul should try to acquire credibility among the Afghan 
people rather than blame Pakistan's interference for its 
troubles. On his return to New Delhi, Desai even went to 
the extent of offering his good offices to mediate between 
62 Afghanistan and Pakistan to solve the situation there, 
A host of agreements were signed between India and the 
Soviet Union. Protocols on long-term programms of cooperation 
were signed in October and December. On 1st December 1978, 
India and the Soviet Union signed in New Delhi a protocol 
envisaging cooperation in several new fields including 
agriculture, animal husbandry, light engineering and new areas 
63 
of science and technology for the next ten to fifteen years. 
While extending Soviet cooperation in the development of small 
sector in India and also in the methodology of planning, it 
also facilitated joint research projects and joint industrial 
64 
ventures in third countries. Yet another protocol signed in 
New Delhi on 23 December 1978 envisaged a total turnover of 
Rs. 1,200 crores, an increase of tv/enty per cent in Indian 
65 Soviet trade during 1979, It provided the Soviet Union an 
opportunity for the first time for the export of 300,000 
60 Foreign Affairs Record, 25(6), June 1979, p.123 
61 Timothy George and others. Security in Southern Asia; 
India and the Great Powers, Hamisphere, 1984, p,163 
62 Ibid, 
63 Asian Recorder, 25(2), 1979, p.14686 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid., 25(4), 1979, p. 14709 
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tonnes of cement, 57,000 tonnes of wood pulp as also ferti-
lizers supply which was 40,000 tonnes more than the previous 
year; it also provided for the Soviet Union buying new 
items like petrol dispensing equipment, pneumatic tools and 
tool kits, steam boilers, heating equipment, printing machinery, 
incinerators and shoe uppers. It was clear that there were 
practically very few fields to which Indo-Soviet cooperation 
did not extend. 
However, the most significant development during this 
period was the signing of a protocol on 25 November 1978 
which fixed an exchange rate of Rs.lO to one Roxible for the 
settlement of all existing and future credit agreements and 
commercial transactions designated in Roubles between India 
67 
and the Soviet Union. India, which had been trying for a 
reasonable Rupee-Rouble exchange rate for quite some time had 
reasons to feel happy about the new agreement. This was very 
much evident in the Annual Report of the Ministry of External 
Affairs for 1978-79 which commented on the agreement thus: 
"India regards the new exchange rate as a reasonable read-
justment between the two countries taking into account the 
adjustment between the ruppe and other currencies. The 
protocol also contains an agreed built in mechanism for 
future adjustments in the exchange rate. The Soviet Union 
has provided an interest free 45 years deferred payment 
facility to meet additional liabilities arising from the 
application of the new rate of exchange in respect of supplies 
made and services rendered upto the date of protocol under 
the existing credits. The protocol is expected to smoothen 
the flow of trade and further strengthen the economic coopera-
6ft 
tion between the two countries," 
66 Ibid, 
67 The Hindu, Madras, 26 Nov 1978 
68 Government of India, Reports, Ministry of External Affairs, 
1978-79 — ^ 
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It was pointed out that the agreement was, in the long 
term, self balancing with imports and exports equalling each 
other, thus needing no external resources to balance it. 
Also it was eirphasised that the trade between the two countries 
being planned, the nature and substance of it was reviewed 
regularly and adjusted to the changing ne^ eds of the economies 
of the trading partners. However, critics of the agreement 
maintained that the compulsions in rupee trade on the 
partners to balance their two way transactions could naturally 
lead the stronger partner like the Soviet Union to charge 
70 higher prices for its exports and lower prices for imports. 
(B) Phase-II, 1980-82 : Relations During Indira Gandhi's 
Second Term 
After being in the political wilderness for nearly three 
years, Indira Gandhi returned to power following the mid-term 
poll to the Lok Sabha, the Lower House of India's Parliament, 
in January 1980. She took over as Prime Minister on 14 January 
1980 and appointed P.V. Narasimha Rao as her Minister of 
Extenal Affairs. 
Indira Gandhi was no stranger to the domain of government 
and foreign policy. She had been Prime Minister earlier for 
eleven years (1966-67) and had been associated with the 
formulation and implementation of foreign policy at the 
highest level, both in times of peace and war; and her 
approach to the various issues and aspects of foreign policy 
and relations was widely known, 
Indo-Soviet relations survived a change of government in 
69 M.A.I^afarshah, India and the Super Powers; India's Poli-
tical Relations With the Super Powers in the 1970s, New 
Delhi, 1980, p.143 
70 Ibid., p.146 
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India and four leadership fatalities, those of Brezhnev/ 
Andropov, Chernenko and Indira Gandhi. The durability of 
Indo-Soviet ties was manifest when the Janata Government 
came into power in 1977. The Janata leaders had talked about 
"genuine non-alignment", given the impression that they 
intended to distance India from the Soviet Union, but in 
effect Morarji Desai signed significant economic agreements 
with Moscow which were not exactly an indication of moving 
away. 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at the onset of the 
1980s is the first time the Soviet had conducted a full-
scale invasion of a country outside Eastern Europe, Although 
Afghanistan borders the U.S.S.R. it is a third world Muslim 
country. It also has considerable geostrategic importance. 
The Afghanistan issue created some differences of opinion. 
India was not in favour of the presence of foreign troops and 
stood for an overall political settlement that would ensure 
withdrawal of Soviet troops as well as cessation of inter-
ference from across Pakistan's frontiers in the shape of 
material assistance to rebel elements. The Soviets sought 
to justify their massive military incursion into Afghanistan 
in December 1979 on the round that they had been "invited" 
by the then Afghan President, Hafizullah Amin. However, it is 
well known that Amin was far from being a friend of the 
Soviet Union. Indeed he was a foe or, at any rate, whom the 
Soviet Union regarded as a thorn,as it were, in its side. An un-
mistakable proof of this fact is provided by Amin's physical 
elimination, soon after the Soviet military take-over of 
Kabul, and the establishment of a pro-Soviet regime headed 
by Babrak Karmal. 
Naturally the then Government of India headed by Charan 
Singh did not accept the manifestly untenable Soviet version. 
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The Indian press had also rejected the "Invitation" story. The 
veteran journalist, Girilal Jain wrote in a signed article: "It 
was sheer chicanery on the part of the Kremlin that it had 
71 
arrived at the request of Kabul." The first official intima-
tion India had of the Soviet invasion was from the Soviet 
Ambassador Yuri Varontsov knocking on foreign secretary 
72 R.D. Sathe's door around midnight on December 26. 
By contrast, Indira Gandhi, who was then on the threshold 
of a new term of office, tended to indulge in a balancing 
exercise by blaming the Afghan developments equally, as it 
were, between the United States and the Soviet Union. In an 
interview to a French correspondent, she did say that she saw 
the developments in Afghanistan as a danger to India, but she 
has hastened to accuse the U.S.A. of being "responsible for 
destabilization of the region.../ the past should not be 
forgotten." Moreover, even before she took over as Prime 
Minister which was on 14 January 1980, the Minister of 
External Affairs in New Delhi had reportedly got in touch 
with her, and on 11 January 1980 — in tune with her equivocal 
line — a spokesman of the Ministry said in New Delhi that 
the situation in Afghanistan "cannot be looked upon in isolation 
from bases and military linkages in Asia" and added that "a 
discussion fat the UN] at this stage will really highten cold 
74 
war tension." In the same view India's permanent Represen-
tative at the UN Brajesh Mishra, intervening in the General 
Assembly debate on the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan 
expressed the view that "a discussion in the General Assembly 
of the question... did not help in restoring peace in the 
71 The Times of India, New Delhi, 1 Jan 1980 
72 Bhabani Sen Gupta, The Afghan Syndrome; How to Live With 
Soviet Power, New Delhi, Vikas, 1982, p.13 
73 The Times of India, New Delhi, 1 Jan 1980 
74 Ibid.,12 Jan 1980 
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region."''^ At a time when the Soviet troops, as The Times 
of India editorially put it, had already forced their will 
on Afghanistan in utter contempt of international law. 
When a resolution sponsored by twentytwo nonaligned 
countries demanding the "immediate, unconditional, and total 
withdrawal" of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan was put to 
vote on 15 January 1980, India chose to abstain, while an 
overwhelming majority of the nonaligned states lined up 
behind the 104-strong affirmative vote. 
The speech of Indian delegate, Brajesh Mishra, as it was 
delivered, stunned the world. While opposing the presence of 
foreign troops and bases in any country, he said that the 
Soviet Union had assured India that it would withdraw its 
troops from Afghanistan when Kabul asked it to do so. "We 
have no reason to doubt the assurances, particularly from a 
friendly country like the Soviet Union with whom we have 
77 
close ties." 
Mrs,Gandhi attempted to bring back some semblance of 
balance to the Indian position. At a press conference on 
January 16, 1980 she disapproved interference by any foreign 
power in the affairs of another country and said that the 
Soviet presence in Afghanistan had increased tension and moved 
78 danger closer to the Indian border. Mrs.Gandhi went a step 
further by assuring Parliament on January 30 that India would 
made "every effort to ensure speedy withdrawal of Russian 
79 troops from Afghanistan" 
75 Indian and Foreign Review, New Delhi, 15 Jan 1980 
76 The Times of India, New Delhi, 1 Jan 1980 
77 Quoted in Kuldip Nayar, Report on Afghanistan, Allied, New 
Delhi, p.59. 
78 The Indian Express, New Delhi, 17 Jan 1980 
79 Bimal Prasad, "India & the Afghan Crisis, in K.p.Misra, 
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Despite these differences, Indo-Soviet relations con-
tinued to have all-round development. On 27 May,1980 UNI 
reported that the Soviet Union would supply India military 
hardware worth Rs. 1,300 crores under an agreement which was 
considered to be the biggest so far between the two countries. 
The Soviet Union undertook to advance long-term credit for 
these purchases under the most favourable terms, repayable 
over a period of 17 years and carrying an interest rate of 
2.5 per cent per annum. The items covered were petga class 
missile-equipped patrol boats, air-to-air and surface-to-
surface missile rockets and anti-tank weapons and defence 
equipment. This was part of the defence agreements worth 
80 
Rs. 2,500 trores concluded with various countries. Subse-
quently an official spokesman clarified that western reports 
about a 1,5 billion was a "wrong projection". He denied that 
the arms deal was an indirect way of carrying favour v/ith 
the Soviet Union. He added: "there was no uproar in the 
western media over the Jaguar deal with Britain last year 
81 
which is double in value." 
Another major step in the further expansion and consoli-
dation of friendly Soviet Indian-relations was the meeting 
between Leonid Brezhnev and Indira Gandhi in Belgrade on 
May 8, 1980, which took place in an atmosphere of mutual 
understanding. In the course of the meeting, the two sides 
exchanged views on a nuniber of questions pertaining to 
Soviet-Indian cooperation in various spheres, and agreed 
that expanding the sphere of mutually advantageous coopera-
tion met the interests of the peoples of the Soviet Union 
and India, During discussions on major international 
problems the two sides noted that the positions adopted by 
80 The Statesman, New Delhi, 28 May 1980 
81 Eric Gonsalves, then Secretary in the Indian External 
Affairs Ministry at a press Conference at Kuwait, The 
Times of India, New Delhi, 21 June 1980 
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the Soviet Union and India on the main questions concerning 
the strengthening of detente and peace were identical* and 
that cooperation between them helped to promote stability and 
82 good neighbourliness in Asia and throughout the world. 
On the invitation of the government of the U.S.S.R., the 
Indian Minister of External Affairs, Narasimha Rao, paid an 
official visit to the Soviet Union on June 3-7, 1980. During 
his visit, Narasimha Rao had talks with Anderi Gromyko. The 
two sides discussed the development of bilateral relations 
and also a wide range of international issues of common 
interest. They were pleased to note that relations between 
the U.S.S.R. and India serve the interests of peace and 
stability in Asia and throughout the world. They also examined 
questions related to fulfilment of long term agreements in the 
main sphere of Soviet-Indian cooeration. Having exchanged 
views on the major international issues, the two sides remarked 
on the closeness of the positions of the U.S.S.R. and India 
regarding the issues under discussion. The Soviet Union and 
India expressed their conviction that the process of detente 
should be extended to all regions of the world and also their 
firm intent to continue their support for an end to the arms 
race and for the struggle against imperialism, racism and all 
forms of domination. The results of the visit by Narasimha 
Rao to the Soviet Union constituted a new and positive con-
tribution to the development of mutual understanding and 
83 friendship between the U.S.S.R. and India. 
The president of India, Neelam Sanjeeva Reddy, visited 
the U.S.S.R. between September 29 and October 7, 1980. During 
82 A.A,Gromyko and B.N. Ponamarev, ed., Soviet Foreign Policy, 
Vol.11, 1975-80, Progress Pvib., Moscow, 1981, p. 624. 
®2 Pravda, June 8,1980 quoted in Gromyko and Ponamarev, ed., 
op.clt. 
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his talks with Leonid Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders, there 
was an exchange of views on the main question concerning Soviet-
Indian relations, based on the firm foundation of the 1971 
Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation, In their dis-
cussions on urgent international problems, the two sides paid 
particular attention to the strengthening of peace and 
international security, to the struggle against imperialism, 
colonialism and racism. The Soviet Union, declared Leonid 
Brezhnev, was making consistent and resolute efforts to 
preserve and stimulate detente, to secure a concrete shift 
from armament to disarmament; and to achieve a just political 
settlement of conflict situations, including those in such a 
"sensitive" region as the Near and Middle East. The two sides 
made a detailed analysis of the situation in Asia, where the 
intensification of activity by aggressive forces has escalated 
tension. The president of India described the traditional 
friendship between India and the U.S.S.R. as an example of 
firuitful and mutually beneficial cooperation answering the 
fundamental interest of both the Indian and Soviet peoples 
and also the interests of universal peace.^^ 
An important landmark in the field of India's relations 
with the Soviet Union during this period was the 3-day state 
visit by L.I.Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and 
Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of U.S.S.R. 
The brief visit, which began on 8 December 1980 was consi-
dered to be more than a routine diplomatic exercise. It was 
indeed a crucial one because of the prevailing situation in 
the region. India viewed with apprehension the tension and 
conflicts grov/ing in the region, the increase in the presence 
of the great powers, and the changing security environment 
caused by the rapid militarization of the Indian Ocean. 
84 Pravda , Oct 1, 1980, in Gromyko, o p . c i t . , pp .242-5 
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Brezhnev was accompanied by a high power delegation, 
comprising some of his senior colleagues, including the 
foreign minister Andrei Gromyko. During his stay Brezhnev 
held wide-ranging discussions with prime Minister Indira 
Gandhi both on bilateral matters and on the prevailing 
international situation. The President of India, N.Sanjiva 
Reddy, reiterated India's stance on development in the region. 
Speaking at a banquet given in honour of Brezhnev, he stated 
that "we in India remain opposed to any form of intervention, 
covert or overt, by outside forces in the internal affairs 
of the region". He reaffirmed India's firm conviction that 
durable peace can be restored through negotiated political 
solution having full respect to the independence, soveregnty, 
integrity and nonaligned status of the countries of the 
region." 
president Brezhnev's visit to Delhi in December 1980 
promoted the relationship further in a variety of directions. 
Although the Indian side reiterated its position on the issue 
of Afghanistan, the joint declaration issued at the end of 
the visit made no reference to the presence of Soviet troops 
in Kabul. Apparently, the two leaders did not want their 
different perceptions to be reflected in the joint declara-
tion which expressed serious concern over Jthe hotbeds of 
tension in South-West Asia and reaffirmed their conviction 
in a comprehensive political settlement respecting the 
independence, soverignty, territorial integrity and non-
aligned status of the countries of the region. They asked for 
termination of the armed conflicts in the region and the 
exercise of restraint and promotion of cooperation. 
prior to President Brezhnev's visit to New Delhi, President 
85 Foreign Affairs Record, Dec 1980 
86 The Times of India, New Delhi, 25 Sept 1981 
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Sanjeeva Reddy went to Moscow in October 1980. President 
Reddy's visit to Moscow was interesting in a number of ways. 
While the Reddy-Brezhnev talks covered a wide area and found 
considerable coincidence of views on lessening tensions in 
87 the troubled spots of the world, there was also the 
extraordinary incident of President Brezhnev keeping away 
from a dinner hosted by the Indian President in Moscow. 
Speculation was rife at the time that the Soviet Union 
was expressing annoyance over India's stand over some of the 
issues like Afghanistan, but subsequently the official 
explanation given by Moscov; was that President Brezhnev had 
to keep away because of the death of the wife of the senior-
most member of the Politburo of the Soviet Comrriunist Party, 
Mr. Nikolai Tikhonov on the same day and that it was because 
of mere protocol. 
During his 1980 visit Brezhnev said: "Friendship and 
cooperation with India is part and parcel of the foreign 
policy of the Soviet Union. We were with you when India was 
under the yoke of colonialism. Vie were with you when India's 
new statehood was emerging. We were with you in the difficult 
and trying periods for India. We were with you when various 
external forces were trying to bring pressure on your country 
when it was upholding its vital interests. We shall be 
88 
with you in the days of joy and in the days of trial." 
During the visit it was rightly emphasised that the 
experience of Soviet-Indian relations over the quarter 
century of the existence of independent India was of funda-
mental importance. It convincingly demonstrated how close 
multi-faceted ties can unite states with different social 
87 See Joint Communique, Ibid., 2 Oct 1980 
88 Oleg Kitsenko, the Road of Friendship, Soviet Indian 
Cooperation Series, Sovie Land Booklets, 1980, pp.19-20 
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systems when their policies promote the fight for peace, 
security of nations, and are against aggression, all forms 
of colonialism, when relations among the states concerned 
are founded on respect for one another's sovereignty, non-
interference in one another's internal affairs, and extensive 
development of economic and other cooperation based on 
equality and mutual benefit. 
The Soviet Union continued to develop the relations with 
other countries in South and South-East Asia, with Nepal, 
Srilanka, Burma, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia 
and Phillipines. The peaceful initiatives of the Soviet Union 
met with understanding on the part of the governments and the 
public of these countries. The important and urgent proposal 
put before the Thirty-Fourth session of the UN General Assembly 
by the Soviet Union on the inadmissibility of a policy of 
hegemonism in international relations brought a favourable 
response from the countries of Asia. Representatives of the 
Asian countries stressed that the issue was raised at an 
appropriate moment, pointing out that a hegemonic policy was a 
direct threat to international peace and security, and that 
this question bore on the fundamental principles of the United 
Nations. Charter and also the principles and aims of the non-
aligned movement. 
On 10 December 1980, the Soviet Union and India issued 
a joint declaration in which they called for the elimination 
of all foreign military and naval bases in the region of the 
Indian Ocean, and for the prohibition of the establishment of 
new bases. They also strongly condemned any attempts to 
increasethe foreign military presence in the Indian Ocean for 
whatever reason, and expressed their support for the just 
demand of Mauritius that the Chagos Archipelago including the 
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89 island of Diego Garcia, be returned to it. "The Soviet 
Union is a staunch champion of the idea that the Indian Ocean 
be turned into a zone of peace", declared Leonid Brezhnev. "We 
believe that the Indian Ocean has been and remains the sphere 
of vital interests of the states located on its shores, but 
90 
not of any other states." 
The expansion of economic relations kept apace with the 
development of other relationship. The Indo-USSR Joint Commission 
ending its 6th session in New Delhi on 23 January 1981, had 
agreed on specific areas of cooperation and a protocol was 
signed on the basis envisaged between Mrs.Indira Gandhi and 
President Brezhnev in September 1980. A Soviet aid of Rs.527 
crores during the Sixth Plan was agreed upon. The areas 
indentified for this aid included such major units as an 
Aluminium complex in Andhra Pradesh, a four-million tonne Coal 
complex, a 1,000 MW integrated thermal power plant at Singrauli, 
oil exploration and the Visakhapatnam Steel Plant. The 
Protocol was signed by P.V.Narasimha Rao and Ivan Arkhipov, 
First Deputy Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers. The 
Commission indicated that substantial progress had been 
achieved in the implementation of working programmes of coopera-
tion in important fields like ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, 
coal industry, oil, machine building, power and irrigation. •^'• 
Trade had also expanded very substantially between the 
two countries. There had been a threefold increase during 
1976-81. According to the statistics released from Moscow, 
the turnover which was 647 million Roubles in 1976, had touched 
2,398.9 million Roubles in 1981. (One rouble equalled rupees 
9lA twelve at the time). 
^^ Pravda, 12 Dec. 1980, in Gromyko, op.cit., p.626 
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The Soviet Union became the leading trade partner of 
the country, imported goods worth 1,333.8 million Roubles 
in 1981 as against the exports worth 1,084.1 million Roubles 
to India during the same period. Indeed of India's total 
exports of Rs. 6,709 crores in 1980-81 the Soviet Union 
accounted for goods worth Rs. 1,167 crores that is, about 
92 17 per cent. 
Another example of such close cooperation as exists 
between India and the Soviet Union with their different 
social, economic, and political systems was Mrs.Gandhi's 
week-long goodwill visit to the Soviet Union beginning from 
September 20, 1982, comes in the spirit of the understanding. 
The Indian Ministers of Irrigation and External Affairs preceded 
her arrival in Moscow for consultations with their Soviet 
counterparts on various issues of mutual interest. 
Reviewing the progress of cooperation after Brezhnev's 
visit to India in 1980, V,I,Litvinenko, Deputy Chairman of the 
Soviet State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations, in an 
article mentioned the inauguration of the troposcatter link 
between the two countries in November 1981, the beginning of 
construction of the Visakhapatnam Steel Plant, the completion 
of the construction of the Mathura Oil Refinery, Korba 
alluminium plant and the preparation of the 1981-1990 techno-
economic plan for oil development, the beginning of the work 
on the Singrauli coal and power complex construction, prepara-
tion of the technical documentation for the construction of a 
factory for production of prefabricated ferro-concrete 
structures for irrigation projects and the study for controlled 
explosion techniques in building of the 50 meter high Birarikhad 
93 dam in Himachal Pradesh. 
92 The Hindustan Times, 31 Sept.1982 
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With such close and friendly relations between the two 
countries, India's efforts to diversify its sources of arms 
supply and to strengthen its economic relations with the 
West have been cited in sections of the Western press as 
irritants in Indo-Soviet relations. India's attempts to 
improve its relations with China and Pakistan during 1982 
had also been treated in the 'Western media as issues causing 
dissatisfaction to the Soviet Union. None of these develop-
ments however has in fact retreated relations between the two 
countries. Mrs,Gandhi's visit to the Soviet Union v;as not 
meant to clear any misunderst—anding or to resolve pending 
issues but to strengthen the existing close friendly relations 
and further expand the economic cooperation between the two 
countries. 
This visit was in contrast to her well-piiblished visit 
to the United States in July which first appeared as very 
successful but later raised certain doubts about the nature 
of the final outcome. Asked about the difference between 
her visit to the U.S. and the one to the Soviet Union, 
Mrs.Gandhi said the two were entirely different. One common 
thing was that they were goodwill visits. She said the Soviet 
Union stood by India in its moments of need: "Today, we seek 
friendship with all countries", she said. Her visit to the 
U.S. was intended to promote friendship with that country in 
the aftermath of the U.S.decision to transfer arms to 
Pakistan. 
The Indo-Soviet joint declaration marking Mrs.Gandhi's 
visit affirmed the strong opposition of the two countries to 
outside interference in the internal affairs of the countries 
of South-West Asia. VUthout mentioning Afghanistan, the two 
countries expressed their conviction that the problems of 
the region demanded peaceful political solutions paying full 
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respect to the independence, sovereignty, territorial inte-
grity and nonaligned status of the countries of the region. 
The declaration called upon the countries of South-West Asia 
to expeditiously terminate the armed conflict, to exercise 
restraint and cooperation constructively for reducing tensions 
and restoring peace. Both sides were confident that negotia-
ted political solutions alone could guarantee a durable 
settlement of the existing problems of the region. Mrs.Gandhi 
Said in a press conference in Moscow that the Afghanistan 
question should be viewed in its "totality" — the presence 
of Soviet troops as v/ell as supply of weapons to insurgents 
from outside, which also was "interference". 
The centrepiece of the joint declaration were the proposals 
on disarmament, India secured Soviet endorsement to its 
proposals for immediate suspension of nuclear weapons tested and 
convention on non-use of these weapons. For its part India 
welcomed the Soviet declaration not to be the first to use 
nuclear weapons and agreed with the Soviet Union that adoption 
of similar obligations by other nuclear weapons states would 
contribute to the achievement of complete ban on the threat or 
use of nuclear weapons. 
Apart from issues related to South-West Asia and nuclear 
disarmament, the joint declaration also dealt with the need to 
restore detente between the two superpowers, find political 
solutions to conflicts in Viest Asia, South-East and elsewhere, 
convert the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace, implementation 
of U.N. decisions on decolonisation and complete elimination of 
racism and apartheid in South Africa. 
During the course of talks, both the leaders referred to 
certain specific issues and among them two merit attention. 
First, Pakistan's offer of a non-aggression treaty with India . 
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The Soviet Union has never looked at this offer as positive 
and Brezhnev was reported to have told Mrs,Gandhi that the 
Pakistan's proposal was a cover for induction of American 
weapons. Another was Mrs.Gandhi's reference to the role of 
the leftist parties in India. There had been much criticism 
in India that this was unjustified as it related to internal 
affairs of the country. Mrs.Gandhi had explained that the 
subject figured when she gave a bird's eye view of the 
political and economic situation in India. Similarly, Brezhnev 
suirveyed the Soviet situation. 
The highlight of Mrs.Gandhi's visit to Moscow however 
was the Soviet offer to set up a 1000 MW nuclear pov/er station 
in India. Mrs.Gandhi had suggested on the first day of her 
visit further expansion of Soviet collaboration in nuclear 
energy among several major areas in which India needed help 
at this stage. But the Soviet offer, which was first made in 
1979 by the then Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin, during his 
official visit to India, was considered by the Janata govern-
ment which did not find it feasible. India had evolved a 
Specific design of nuclear power plants suited to the local 
conditions and has achieved a great degree of self reliance. 
Secondly, India has had frustrating experience of dependence on 
external nuclear fuel supply for the Tarapur Plant. 
In sum, Mrs.Gandhi's visit to the Soviet Union was 
successful. Her visit had created an atmosphere conducive 
to further development of economic, diplomatic, defence and 
nuclear relations between the two countries. 
Much of Indian attention was concentrated in the early 
months of 1983 on the Nonaligned Summit whose venue had been 
moved at the last minute from Baghdad at war with Iran, to 
New Delhi. Most members of the movement were pressing for an 
early summit, despite Baghdad's untenability, to praise Cuba 
231 
out of the Chairmanship, and India was happy to fill the 
breach. India had made a major contribution to the found-
ing of the movement, but had not hosted a summit before. 
The Soviets took keen interest in preparations for the 
sxammit, principally with a view to limiting the damage caused 
by their action in Afghanistan. Early in 1983, Leonid 
Zhegalov sounded the Soviet note in New Times. He said: "Indian 
politicians and diplomats are now taking an active part in 
drafting resolutions for the coming forum and consulting with 
representatives of other nonaligned countries on a wide range 
of questions. Some topics, like the so-called Afghan and 
Kampuchean questions, are tossed in from outside the movement 
to divert the conference from the discussion of truly burning 
issues, issues of paramount importance for the cause of peace and 
the developing countries. Delhi's stand on these questions 
94 is unambiguous." 
The Soviets were banking on India to guide the summit 
through the shoals of Afghanistan and Kampuchea, a goal which 
coincided with New Delhi's objectives of bringing the summit 
to a successful conclusion. India's strategy was to emphasize 
issues of war and peace and economic development and give a 
global perspective to problems, instead of getting bogged 
down in regional issues. But there were no illusions about 
95 the contentious nature of the Afghan and Kampuchea problems. 
G.L. Bondavesky, who arrived in Delhi at the end of a 
Soviet team to observe the summit declared: "The Seventh summit 
will be the most crucial in the history of the movement. You 
now have the right lady at the right place and the right time." 
94 India Today, New Delhi, 31 Mar 1983 
95 Nihal Singh, The Yogi And The Bear; A Study of Indo-Soviet 
Relations, Allied Pub, New Delhi, 1985, p.199 
96 Quoted in India Today, New Delhi, 31 Mar 1983 
232 
In July 1983, the Soviets made a gesture to Mrs.Gandhi 
by inviting her son Rajiv Gandhi who had entered politics. 
Rajiv met almost everyone of note, including Ustinov, Gromyko, 
Arkhipov, Kuznetsov, Ponomora and Foreign Trade Minister 
Potolichev. perhaps this was a Soviet way of pleasing Mrs.Gandhi. 
Immediately after Rajiv's return from Moscow, the pro-communist 
as distinguished from the CPI, press began lavishing praise 
on him. 
There was no denying that despite multifarious develop-
ment of the economic relationship, there were serious problems 
bedevilling trade between the two countries. The most serious 
problem was the huge balance in favour of India in its trade, 
particularly in the last three years. Indian exports to the 
Soviet Union far outstripped the Indian purchases from the 
Soviet Union. The turnover in Indo-Soviet trade increased 
eight and-one-half times between 1970-71 and 1981-82, showing 
97 
sharp fluctuations and a dramatic increase from 1979 to 196 2. 
Between 1980-83 India has been piling up a large surplus in 
its rupee holding as the trade with the Soviet Union is on 
the rupee trade pattern. According to the official figures, 
India's surplus had gone up from Rs. 212 crores in 1980-81 
98 
to Rs. 2,353 crores by the beginning of 1984. 
This compelled the Soviet Union to reduce its purchases 
from India and led to the Soviet refusal to import Indian 
cashew in 1982-83 creating a serious problem for 200,000 workers 
in 120 cashew factories in Kerala. 
The revised budget estimates for 1982-83 provided for 
Rs.12,800 million in "technical credits" to meet "temporary 
97 Jayashankar, "India's Trade with the Soviet Block: Growing 
Dependency and Commodity Inconvertibility", Problem of 
Nonalignment, New Delhi, June-Aug 1983 
98 The Times of India, Editorial, New Delhi, 9 May 1983 
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imbalance" in India's rupee payment trade, largely with the 
Soviet Union. In the Soviet view this imbalance in India's 
favour was far from temporary. According to one estimate, 
99 India's trade surplus in 1982 was Rs.6,680 million. 
The Soviet agreement to sell India more oil was, in 
effect, a reluctant and short term effort to maintain the 
level of trade. The Soviets were sufficiently alarmed over 
the long-term trend to fire a warning shot across the bow. 
In 1983, they suddenly withdrew from Indian markets and 
temporarily suspended shipment of goods. India's dependence 
on Soviet and East European markets in certain areas had been 
considerable. In percentage terms, the rupee trade area 
accounted for 96.8 of exports in knitwear, 83 in cosmetics, 
detergents and toiletries, 76 in mica, 69 in pepper, 65 in 
cashews, 45 in coffee, 42 in drugs and pharmaceuticals, 
41.6 in tobacco and 2 3 in textiles. 
Indian officials warned the Soviet Union that their 
abrupt withdrawal from the market would have political reper-
cussions. Large parts of the country were dependent upon 
Soviet trade. Punjab in hosiery, Kerala in cashews, U.P. in 
showe uppers, Andhra in tobacco, apart from several enter-
prises set up specifically to cater to the Soviet demand. To 
Indian exporters, the government sent out a message that they 
should diversify their markets. 
During Mrs.Gandhi's visit to Moscow in September 1982, 
the trade issue was discussed and the six-day visit to New Delhi 
of Arkhipov in May 1983 was a follow-up to the Moscow talks. 
Arkhipov signed a credit agreement of $140 million for the 
second stage of the Visakhapatnam Steel Plant. He also brought 
offers of two nuclear power plants of 440 megawatts each. 
99 Jayashankar, op.cit. 
100 Ibid. 
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four more thermal power stations of 200 MW each and new oil 
.. , 101 
refineries. 
The trade quarrel was however patched up during 198 3 by 
India promising to try harder to import Soviet machinery and 
the Soviets beginning a determined effort to interest the 
102 Indian private sector in Soviet industrial products. 
On 15 November 1982 President Brezhnev died and 
Mrs.Gandhi flew to Moscow for the funeral. On 9 February 
1984 Soviet President Andropov died. Mrs.Gandhi again 
went for the funeral and had a special session with his 
successor, Chernenko. Indira Gandhi's assassination on 
31 October 1984 was deeply mourned in the Soviet Union. 
She was genuinely held in high regard by the Soviet people, 
and as a world leader who was friendly to the Soviet Union, 
her passing away caused concern and anxiety in Moscow. 
Mr.Rajiv Gandhi's coming to power was welcomed. In its 
message of greetings to Rajiv Gandhi, the U.S.S.R. Council 
of Ministers had said: "The people and the leadership of the 
Soviet Union attach great importance to strengthening and 
deepening traditional relations of friendship and coopera-
tion with India. You may be rest assured of the Soviet 
Union's readiness to extend assistance to India in further 
consolidating its economy, and in enhancing its interna-
tional prestige. "•^ °'^  
These assurances were reaffirmed during the meeting 
by Nikolai Tikhonov, Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of 
Ministers, had with Rajiv Gandhi on November 2, 1984. The 
101 The Qversease Times, 20 May, 1983. 
102 For details see The Times of India, New Delhi, 
11 Jan 1983 
103 The Times of India, New Delhi, 14 Nov 1984 
235 
Indian Prime Minister expressed profound gratitude for the 
kind wishes offered to him by the Soviet leadership and the 
deep sympathy expressed by the Soviet people. He had 
pointed out that India valued high its friendly relations 
with the Soviet Union and that these enjoyed the broad 
support of the political forces of the count and the Indian 
people in general. Proceeding from this fact, he had assured 
the Soviet delegation led by Nikolai Tikhenov, that much 
attention will be devoted to the further deepening of 
cooperation with the Soviet Union in keeping with the 
independent and peaceful foreign policy of the country, 
shaped under the guidance of Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira 
Gandhi.-^^^ 
104 Ibid. 
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Chapter VI 
ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL RELATIONS 
(A) Economic Relations 
Indo-Soviet relations are characterised by mutual respect 
and trust between the leaders and people of the two countries 
and by diverse spheres and forms of bilateral cooperation. 
These words, taken from the joint Soviet-Indian Declaration 
signed in 1982, reflect in brief the essence of relations 
between the two countries. 
Independent India's advance to economic progress in 
inseparably linked with Soviet-India cooperation. The relations 
between the two countries are a good example of peaceful 
coexistence between states with different social systems. They 
are based on the principles of mutual benefit, complete equality, 
trust and non-interference in each others affairs. These very 
principles underly the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Coopera-
tion between the Soviet Union and India, signed in 1971. 
Indo-Soviet relations currently embrace practically all 
major spheres of the two countries* economies; the heavy 
industry and geological prospecting, irrigation and the coal 
industry, machine building, space research and state planning. 
Tens of major enterprises of ferrous and non-ferrous meta-
llurgy, machine building, oil, coal, medicine and other 
branches of industries as well as power and agriculture have 
been built in India with Soviet assistance during the short 
period. They first of all, are steel plants at Ranchi and 
Durgapur, aluminixim plant at Korba, oil refineries at Barauni, 
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Koyali and Mathura# a number of coal enterprises, petroleum 
industry/ power stations, instrximentation plant at Kota, 
pharmaceutical plants at Rishikesh/ Hyderabad and Madras 
agricultural farms, higher middle education establishments 
and other important projects. 
An important role in the development of mutually beneficial 
cooperation between the two countries belongs to trade. Statis-
tics indicate that the provisions of the joint Soviet-Indian 
declaration signed in November 1973, dealing with the increase 
of mutual trade 1,5 to 2 times by 1980, was successfully 
brought into effect. Indeed, the volume of trade in 1980 
exceeded 1,7 billion roubles, having increased 2.5 times since 
1975.^ 
The Soviet Union has long ceased to be a buyer of tradi-
tional Indian export commodities. Along with stepping up the 
import of traditional items, the U.S.S.R. is increasingly 
importing Indian industrial or the so called engineering 
products. 
Starting from the 70s, the Soviet Union, meeting the 
requests of the Indian side, appreciably increased the exports 
to India of many commodities and industrial articles: oil 
products, fertilisers, asbestos, metals, newsprint and so on. 
Prom 1977 the U.S.S.R. started exporting crude oil to India to 
meet the increased demand of the country's industry for this 
commodity. Machines and equipment hold important place in 
the structure of Soviet exports to India, too. 
Trade is an important and most dynamically developing 
1 V.I.Litvinenko, Economic Counsellor of the U.S.S.R, 
Embassy in India, The Times of India, New Delhi, 13 April 
1987 
2 y.pitovranov. President of the Presidixom of the USSR 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, The Times of India, 
New Delhi, 18 Nov 1984 
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sector of the bilateral Soviet-Indian trade relations. It has 
been developing on a long-term and balanced rupee payment basis. 
Such a system of trade has been in existence between the tv/o 
countries for over 30 years. It has been tested by time and 
has proved its vitality and utility. 
Before 1955, when the first economic agreement was signed, 
India imported little from the Soviet Union. The trade was 
almost stagnant. After the 1955 agreement, with growing 
Soviet exports to India of plants and machinery, Indian 
exports to the Soviet Union continued to rise till the early 
70s. With the growing development of its economy, India's 
demand for plants and machines began to decline, and its need 
for raw materials began to rise. 
After two decades India's exports to the U.S.S.R. increased 
to Rs.2,858 million and imports to Rs.2,547 million in 1973-74. 
In the next year there was a steep rise in both exports to 
and imports from the U.S.S.R. and it became India's most 
3 
important trade partner. 
The overall Soviet foreign trade grew from 6.4 billion 
dollars in 1955 to about 20 billion dollars in 1958, In 
commodity composition of the foreign trade, constunption goods 
increased from 25 per cent of the total imports in 1955 to 
34 per cent in 1968.* 
During the 1960s agricultural products began to yield 
place to manufacture, especially to engineering industry in 
the composition of India's exports to the Soviet Union. The 
3 R.H, Patel, "Emerging Possibilities in India's Bilateral 
Trade", Economic and political Weekly, 5 march, 1977 
4 M. Sebastian Stanislaus, Soviet Economic Aid to India, 
New Delhi, 1975, p.169 
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manufactured exports were made up to clothing^ chemicals, 
footwear, dyeing and tanning materials, pharmaceutical 
products, iron and steel and engineering goods. In the 
second half of the the sixties the exports of engineering 
goods to the Soviet Union showed an increasing trend. The 
value of the engineering exports stood at Rs,97 lakhs in 
1968-89, However, these exports amounted to only one per cent 
of the total Indian engineering exports in 1968-69. Export 
of other commodities like clothing and iron and steel also 
showed an upward trend in the late sixties. 
It is also necessary to mention here that by the end of 
1960s the Soviet Union constituted a significant market for 
many Indian exports. For instance, the Soviet Union accounted 
for 64 % of India's total export of fruit juices, 60 % of 
batteries, 59 % of woolen hosiery, 55 % of men's shirts and 
52 % of leather footwear. 
Therefore, from the early seventies, the U,S.S.R, stepped 
up the supply of raw materials to India which rose to about 
85 %, It was realised then that further growth of Indo-
Soviet trade would depend on India buying more machines, 
equipment and technology from the Soviet Union, 
Geared to India's planned development, Indo-Soviet trade 
has played a major role in the industrialisation of India. 
About 70 major projects in the core sector of the Indian 
economy — steel, heavy machines, oil, power, coal and others -
have been built in India through Soviet assistance. This has 
not only placed India among the industrial countries of the 
World but also advanced its economic independence and self 
reliance today. India holds the leading place among the deve-
loping countries with whom the Soviet Union maintains trade 
relations,*' 
5 The Times of India, New Delhi, 18 Nov 1984 
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For more than 30 years now trade between the two countries 
has been built on the basis of long-term agreement signed for 
five year periods. Today, it is based on a trade agreement 
for 1986-1990. Every year the two countries sign protocols 
on trade turnover specifying the list and volxime of mutual 
goods deliveries with due regard for each side's requirements 
and capabilities. The planned character of trade enables 
the U,S,S.R, and India to make appropriate provisions in their 
respective long term and current plans of economic development 
for the planned mutual goods deliveries under long-term 
agreements and yearly protocols. 
In the subsequent period, having made substantial progress 
in the development of national machine building, India started 
gradually reducing the import of many types of machines and 
equipment. In the period between 1981 and 1985 the share of 
machines and equipment in the general volume of Soviet exports 
to India averaged 15 per cent. Today, the U,S,S,R. exports 
aircraft, trucks, mining, geological prospecting, oil drill-
ing, metallurgical, power and other equipment to India. 
India's exports to the u,S,S,R. include a wide range of 
goods which are not produced in U,S,S,R, for climatic reasons 
such as coffee, castor oil, black pepper, jute, etc, or whose 
home production does not meet the existing demand (hides and 
skins, tea, mica, cotton fabrics, shoe uppers, etc.), 
The share of the U,S,S.R. in the general volume of 
Indian exports is growing all the time and stood at about 15 
per cent in 1984, while in the export of individual commodi-
ties it is actually much higher, viz,, coffee-37 %, tea-28 %, 
black pepper and other species-25 %, tobacco-40 % and jute 
articles-65 %J 
6 A.P,Filatov, ••Firuitful Soviet-Indian Trade Cooperation", The 
Times of India Supplement, New Delhi, 14 Nov 1986 
7 Ibid. 
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The growth in the volume of import from India is 
accompanied by changes in its cororoodity structure. In 
particular, the share of agricultural products (tea, coffee^ 
spices, groundnuts) is declining, although in absolute 
figures their imports to the U.S.S.R. continues to grow, while 
the share of finished articles (engineering products, clothes, 
cotton fabrics, shoes upper, etc.) is going up the shares of 
finished articles in the general Soviet import of Indian goods 
surpassed 60 per cent in 1985, with engineering products 
accounting for 12 per cent of that total. 
A new trade agreement, an agreement on mutual supplies 
of goods during 1986-1990 as well as a protocol on the supplies 
of machinery and equipment in India during 1986-1990 (under 
a commercial credit for 10 years at four per cent interest) 
were signed in furtherance of the agreements and accords 
concluded between the two countries. These documents will 
serve as the basis for the broadening of Soviet-Indian trade 
during the. entire current five-year plan period. They define 
the main principles and the consignment of goods of mutual 
deliveries." 
The creation of an Indo-Soviet Joint Commission in 1972 was 
also a significant step in the promotion of trade and economic 
cooperation. An equally important step was the agreement 
between the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and 
Industry and the Soviet Chamber of Commerce and Industry in 
1979, The contacts between the \MQ chambers have grown from 
1979 so that today not only regular exchanges of business 
delegations take place bttt also seminars and meetings are 
conducted in order to explore further possibilities for trade 
exchange. The agreement notably provides for the exchange of 
8 Ibid. 
9 I.Semenov, Trade Representative of the USSR in India, The 
Times of India. New Delhi, 9 Aug 1986 
lb The Times of India. New Delhi, 18 Nov 1984 
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information on issues of mutual interest, for the organisation 
of various syraposiums and seminars, for assistance in staging 
exhibitions in both countries, for the exchange of delegations 
of representatives of business circles and so on. 
Under that agreement, the U.S.S.R. Chamber of Commerce 
has worked out business programmes and organised visits to 
Soviet foreign trade organisations, niinisteries and agencies 
for more than 20 delegations from India. In i^ril 1982, in 
accordance with the agreement there was a seminar on "How to 
Trade with the USSR" in India, which was attended by a delega-
tion of the Soviet Chamber of Commerce and Industry and by 
about 250 representatives of Indian firms and organisations,^2 
In the period between 1977 and 1982 over 70 Indian firms 
have taken part in various international and specialised 
exhibitions organised in the U.S.S.R. with the assistance of 
the U.S.S.R. Chamber of Commerce and Industry. The 1978 
National Exhibition of India in Moscow was a big success. About 
400 Indian firms and organisations took part in the exhibition 
which was attended by 1.5 million visitors. Even bigger 
exhibition was staged in the Soviet Union in 1984. 
The export of goods to the U.S.S.R. is of special ixnpor-
tance for India since in conditions of perpetual instability 
of the world capitalist economy and because of the various 
restrictions and barriers raised by the Western nations in the 
way of exports from developing countries, Indian goods are 
running into mounting competition on the world market and 
therefore their share in world trade is declining, 
India's share has decreased in the global export of tea 
11 Y.Pitovranov, president of the presidium of the USSR Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry, The Tiroes of India, 18 Nov 1984 
12 Ibid. 
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from 27 to 16 per cent, of cotton fabrics from 5 to 1.7 and 
of coffee from 2 to 0.9 per cent. In these conditions the 
Soviet union remains a large and secure market for Indian 
goods. Moreover, stable purchases by the Soviet Union of 
certain Indian goods have led to the establishment and inten-
sive development of corresponding industries in India such as 
the production of knit wear clothing and shoe uppers. 
The results of Soviet-Indian trade cooperation and the 
permanent drive of these two countries for its further 
expansion and advancement show how much can be accomplished by 
states with different socio-economic systems if their relations 
are built on the principles of equality, mutual benefit and 
respect for each other's interest. Good prospects for the 
further consolidation of trade contract were opened after the 
signing of a trade agreement between the U.S.S.R. and India 
for 1981-85, providing for a further growth of mutual trade 
by about 100 per cent. In 1982, trade turnover between the 
two countries totalled as much as 2,5 billion Roubles. 
At the end of sixth five-year trade agreement (1981-85), 
Soviet-Indian trade touched the 178 billion Rupee mark, which 
was 2,5 times more than the trade turnover during 1976-1980. 
In 1985 trade turnover between India and Soviet Union exceeded 
Rs,44 billion for the first time.^^ 
The most favourable possibilities for production coope-
ration between Soviet Foreign Trade organisations and Indian 
public organisations and private firms exist in such fields 
as power, electronics, coitqputers, machine tools, transport, 
13 A.P. Filatov, op.cit. 
14 Y. Pitovranov, President of the Presiditun of the USSR 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, The Tiroes of India, 
14 Nov 1984 
15 I. Semenov, op.cit. 
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production of transport means (trucks, cars, electric loco-
motives) ,power and mining equipment. The visit of a delega-
tion of the Indian Association of Engineering Industry to the 
U.S.S.R. (in May 1985) and of a delegation of the U.S.S.R. 
State PlcUining Committee to India (in October 1985) laid the 
foundations for this work. These visits revealed to both sides 
a number of interesting fields of passible cooperation. The 
results of these visits were concretised later at the session 
of the working group of production cooperation and machine 
building, held in January 1986. 
The Fourth Session of the working group on electronics, 
which concluded in Delhi, was a concrete and JLroportant step 
in this direction. A working programme of cooperation in the 
field of electronics for 1986-1990 elaborated a long-term 
programme of cooperation in computer technology and electronics 
till the year 2000. Such programmes are being worked out for 
other branches as well, as envisaged by the Agreement of Basic 
Directions of Economic, Trade and Scientific Technical Coopera-
tion till 2000, signed on May 22, 1985. 
Considerable work is being done in the field of Soviet-
Indian trade. After registering constant growth in the commodity 
turnover during all these years, in 1986, following the steep 
decline in the prices of oil and petroleum products in the 
world market, the commodity turnover also declined. However, 
as a result of the efforts made by the two sides, in 1987, it 
became possible to stabilise lateral trade and ensure its 
growth. For this, new commodities such as plastics, ammonia, 
cellulose, raw materials, non-ferrous metals and methanol, etc., 
were added to the Soviet-Indian trade as new additional 
possibilities were explored for increasing the supplies to 
India of a number of important goods. 
16 Gennadi Scherbakbv, Trade Representative of the USSR in 
India, The Tiroes of India. New Delhi, 18 Nov 1988 
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The two countries are also considering possibilities of 
utilisation of such forms of cooperation with India's public 
sector and private firms as participation in the construction 
of joint projects in the U.S.S.R, by Indian firms, conclusion 
of long-terrp.contracts between Soviet organisations and 
Indian private and public sector firms which export Soviet 
goods and import Indian goods, organisations of counter 
deliveries and barter deals« widening of the exchange of 
visits of delegations of industrial and trade circles of the 
two countries, development of cooperation between Soviet and 
Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, associations and 
amalgamations, organisation of exhibitions, seminars and 
syznposiiuns, participation of Soviet organisations and Indian 
firms in fairs and exhibitions to be held in the U.S.S.R, and 
India. 
Of late, substantial progress has been made in this 
direction as a result of the holding of a number of exhibi-
tions and seminars and mutual visits of delegations. A major 
specialised exhibition of Soviet machinery, equipment and 
technology in Bombay and exhibition of fifteen Soviet foreign 
trade organisations held earlier in Calcutta^ Bangalore and 
Pune, were a great success. The seminar on "Indo-Soviet 
Trade and Economic Relations" held in Delhi on January 2-3, 
1986, at the India International Centre with the active 
participation of a n\amber of Union Ministries of India, lead-
ing State Corporations, associations and federations of 
private sector firms was extremely interesting and useful. 
Undoubtedly, such seminars should be held more frequently. 
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INDIA'S TRia)E WITH U . S . S . R . 
Year 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
Source: 
E3q)orts 
1,589 
1,700 
1,400 
1,704 
2,200 
2,100 
1,950 
The Times of Ind ia , 
(Rs. 
New 
in crores) 
Imports 
1,222 
1,151 
1,700 
2,060 
2,200 
1,500 
1,850 
De lh i , 
25 Nov 1986 
Major Projects 
Indo-Soviet Cooperation in Steel Making - The signing of the 
historic agreement on 2 February 1955, on the construction 
of Bhilai Steel plant, marked the beginning of this fruitful 
and highly beneficial cooperation. 
The share of Soviet-assisted iron and steel plants is 
nearly one-third high in the aggregate national steel output. 
In Bhilai the steel plate rolling mill 3600 assembled of 
equipment manufactured by the Soviet Novakramatorsk and 
Indian Ranchi Heavy Machine-Building plants has been steadily 
advancing to its design capacity. The Bhilai plant started 
up three continuous steel casting machines which are to supply 
the rolling mill 3600 with slabs and a blooming installation. 
Equipment for these plants was manufactured by the Soviet 
South-Ural and Indian Ranchi Machine Building plants. 
The Bhilai Steel Plant managed by the Steel Authority of 
17 V. Kolpakov, Minister of Iron and Steel Industry, USSR, 
The Statesman, New Delhi, 10 Aug 1986 
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India Limited contributes more than 30 per cent of the total 
production of steel in the country. Since the beginning of 
operation in 1959 and by the end of 1975-76, the plant with 
the capacity utilisation of about 94 per cent has registered 
cxomulative production of 25 million tonnes of ingot steel and 
that of 20 million tonnes in 1962-63 and was subsequently 
expanded to 2,5 million tonnes in 1967. The plant is under 
18 process of expansion. 
In 1974-75 the profit-wise performance of Bhilai was 
extremely impressive. Out of the total profit of Rs,400 
million made by the Hindustan Steel Limited, Bhilai contri-
buted Rs,360 million, A sxibstantial amount of Bhilai's 
production is exported to more than 40 countries thereby 
earning a considerable amount of foreign exchange. Till March 
1976, it had exported 4,4 million tonnes of steel worth 
Rs,248 crores,^^ 
India is infact the largest recipient of Soviet aid among 
the developing countries. Starting with the constmaction of 
the Bhilai plant, the Soviet Union has assisted India setting 
up about 70 more enterprises. By 30 April 1977 the total 
Soviet credit facilities to India has reached Rs.1,920 crores. 
The Soviet Union has so far provided long-teinnn credits of 
20 Rs.1,237 crores. 
These long-term credits have helped India to emerge as 
one of the industrial states on the world map. Today Soviet 
aided projects in India account for 85 % of heavy engineering 
goods, 60 % of turbo-generators and heavy electrical equip-
ments, 31 % of steel, 20 % of electric power, 70 % of oil 
18 R.K.Sharma, Indo-Soviet Relations; Economic Analysis, 
New Delhi, 1980, p.37 
^^ The Patriot, New Delhi, 26 May 1975 
20 R.K. Sharma, op.cit. 
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products and 16% of iron ore. 
At the moment, the work to expand the plant's capacity 
to 4 million tonnes of steel a year is nearing completion. 
Already built is a converter shop with a capacity of 1.5 million 
tonnes of steel a year with continuous pouring stabbing and 
blooming mills, and a high capacity thick steel rolling mill 
3600; these production facilities were designed by the Indian 
company MECON with the participation of a number of Soviet 
agencies at the initial stage of designing. A seventh blast 
furnace with a volume of 2,000 cxim. and a ninth cokeoven battery 
22 
are under construction at Bhilai now under MECON's designs. 
Another big step in Soviet-India metallurgical cooperation 
was the construction of the steel Mill of Bokaro. The first 
stage of the plant with a capacity of 1.7 million tonnes of 
steel per annum was completed in early 1978. At the moment 
workers and engineers are completing the expansion of the plant 
23 to a capacity of 4 million tonnes a year. 
Meanwhile, Bokaro has emerged as the biggest supplier of 
pig iron to the foundries of the country thereby meeting 45% 
of the demand. In June 1977, it completed despatch of one 
million tonnes of pig iron valued at over Rs.380 million of which 
660,000 tonnes were sold at the home market and 334,000 tonnes 
were exported to the Soviet Union and Japan, earning Rs.llO 
24 
million in foreign exchange. 
In 1979 the U.S.S.R. and India signed an agreement on 
cooperation with the construction of a new Steel Mill at 
21 Subrata Banerjee, "Indo-Soviet Economic Cooperation 
and Struggle Against Neo-Colonalism", Amity, 9(2-3). 
22 I.Kazanets, Minister of Ferrous Metallurgy of the USSR, 
The Times of India, New Delhi 14 Nov 1984 
23 Ibid. 
24 R.K.Sharma, op.cit. 
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Visakhapatnam with a capacity of 3.2 million tonnes of steel 
a year with the first stage production facilities having a 
capacity of 1.1 million tonnes of steel per anniom. The plant 
is designed with due regard for the latest advances in ferrous 
metallurgy. It will have blast furnaces with a unit vol\irae 
of 3,200 cub.ra and coke batteries with an oven volume of 
41.6 cub.m, a converter shop where all steel will be cast by 
6 steam continuous pouring machines and a rolling shop with 
25 
advanced high productive rolling mills. 
These days Soviet design agencies are completing a cost 
and feasibility study for modernising and expanding India's 
oldest TISCO Steel Mill at Bumpur. The accon^lishment of 
the measures provided for by the study with help raise the 
plant's output, upgrade its efficiency, introduce new tech-
nologies and equipment and thereby expand the range of finished 
products, upgrade their quality and improve working conditions 
at the plant. 
To provide India with qualified national metallurgical 
design personnel, the U.S.S.R. renders it technical assistance 
in strengthening the country's research and design instutitions. 
Oil - Soviet and Indian oil producers have been cooperating 
for more than three decades now. The seismic sea survey 
undertaken with the aid of Soviet seismic ship lasted from 
1964 to 1966. Nearly 124,000 square kms of shelf area is 
extremely promising according to the provisional estimates. 
The Soviet Union has made the most valuable contribution 
in the field of necessary skills for Indian oil industry. Nearly 
1,500 oil experts have visited India to assist the ONGC and 
25 I. Kazanets, op.cit. 
26 See for details, V.B.Singh, Indo-Soviet Relations 1947-77, 
New Delhi, 1978, p.38 
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more than 400 oil engineers and workers have received train-
ing in the U.S.S.R. and 500 other Indian oil specialists 
27 have been trained directly at the work sites. 
The Soviet union has not only helped in the field of 
prospecting^drilling and production of crude oil but also in 
the public sector at Barauni, Koyali and Mathura. The Barauni 
refinery started production in 1964 for which the agreement 
was signed in September 1959. The capacity of this refinery 
was expanded from two million tonnes to three million tonnes 
in November 1967. The two million tonnes annual capacity at 
Koyali was also built with Soviet assistance. It was 
commissioned in 1965 and its capacity was expanded to three 
million tonnes in September 1967. 
Soviet oil producers are glad that India is an oil pro-
ducing nation, with annual production estimated at 30 million 
tonnes. It has launched offshore production on the Bombay 
shelf, in addition to onshore facilities in the States of 
Gujarat and Assam where Indian specialists for the first time 
discovered oil deposits and began to develop oil fields with 
28 the help of their Soviet colleagues. 
Cooperation between Soviet and Indian producers has now 
entered a new stage. Earlier, seismological prospecting 
conducted with the help of Soviet specialists in some areas of 
different oil and gas bearing basins was not tied up in a 
single programme. In line with inter-governmental agree-
ments of 22 May 1985 and 27 November 1986, Soviet organisa-
tions at the present time fulfil all geological and pros-
pecting operations on a contract basis in a comprehensive 
programme within the boundaries of agreed-upon onshore 
27 D.D.Narula, "Indo-Soviet Economic Cooperation and 
Struggle for National Self-Reliance", Amity, 9(2-3), 
Peb-March 1980, p.24 
28 V,Dinlcov, Minister for the Soviet Oil Industry, The 
Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 23 Nov 1987 
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districts of India. These include geophysical research/ 
data process and interpretation, the drilling of exploration 
wells, evaluation of recoverable oil reserves, project 
design and development of a feasibility report on a contract 
for geological prospecting in West Bengal, now under the 
consilopment of new fields. These works are to be carried 
out and paid for by Soviet organisations in Cauvery, North 
29 Cambay and West Bengal basins. 
Coal - Soviet assistance in coal industry has been equally 
vital. There were four projects in 1974 (increased to 12 in 
1987), in the coal industry built with Soviet assistance — the 
Banki project with an annual capacity of 0.6 million tonnes, 
Suralchachar project with 1.1 million tonnes, coal quarry in 
Manikpur with 1.0 million tonnes of coal and coal washery at 
Kathara with a capacity to process 3 million tonnes of raw 
coal per year. In 1975-76 these enterprises made a profit 
of about Rs.lOO lakhs. Apart from so many other valuable 
technical assistance in the development of Indian coal 
industry, the Soviet Union has assisted India also in the 
Mining and Allied Machinery Plant at Durgapur with a capacity 
of over 45,000 tonnes of mining equipment annually. In 
1975-76 it earned a net profit of Rs,70 lakhs. 
Over the 30 years of Soviet-Indian cooperation in coal-
mining, quite a nxomber of coal mining and processing facilities 
have been started up in India, including the above mentioned 
Surakachar and Banki manies, and the Ramgarh, Manil^ur and 
Jayant open cast mines and Kathara benefication plant. This 
led to a considerable increase in the national coal output in 
29 * Ibid, 
30 V. Gordopolov, "Soviet-Indian Cooperation in Coal Indus-
try," Soviet Review, 11(15), 28 March 1974, pp.20-21 
31 Gryaznov, E,, "India Fully Equipped to Meet Coal Target", 
Soviet Review, 11(5), 31 Jan 1974, pp.32-33. 
253 
India, which has grown to something like 170 million tonnes 
of coal a year. Indian authorities are planning to raise 
coal production to 400 million tonnes by the year 2000. Soviet 
assisted projects will account for a quarter of the annual 
32 
national output of coal. 
In keeping with these accords, the Ministry of Coal 
Industry of the U.S.S.R, and the Ministry of Steel and Mines 
of the Government of India developed and signed a programme 
for cooperation in coal production for up to the year 2000. 
Soviet design institution have already developed projects 
for the Mukunda open cast mine with a capacity of 12 million 
tonnes of coal a year, Nigahi open-cast mine with a capacity 
of 14 million tonnes of coala year and the Jhanjra mine (2.8 
million tonnes) among others. Three more designs are underway 
for the Moher, Kxanari and Khaida open-cast mines with an 
aggregate capacity of 30 million tonnes of coal a year. Another 
five designs for the Sitanala, Kapuriya, Mahal, Karhauri and 
Parbatpur mines with an aggregate capacity of nine million 
tonnes of coal a yearwill be completed in the very near 
33 future, 
Soviet organisations elaborated a master plan for the 
development of the Godavari coal deposit in the southern part 
of India, which provides for the construction If 12 conven-
tional and five open-cast pits with an aggregate capacity of 
24 million tonnes of coal a year. A possibility is being 
considered for building fuel-energy conqplexes at the Mukunda 
open-cast mine in Bihar and the Neiveli-111 open cast mine in 
Tamil Nadu.^^ 
a2 M.Schadov, Minister of Coal Industry, The Hindustan Tiroes, 
New Delhi, 23 Nov 1987 
'33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
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The Soviet Union gives expert and technical assistance 
in driving three shafts at the Jhanjra mine and developing 
steep coal beds at the Tipong mine. The Soviet Union began 
shipping of equipment for the Khadiya* Mukunda and Jhanjra 
mines. 
Power Industry - Since 1957 the leading design and head 
building, assembly and adjustment organisations of the Ministry 
of Electric Power Development and Electrification of the 
U.S.S.R. have, together with Indian specialists, been actively 
involved in the designing and building of 16 power plants, 
including factory-attached, having a total capacity of 345 
million kilowatts. It is to be said here that the initial 
period of cooperation laid a good and healthy foundation for 
mutual understanding and confidence between the two countries. 
In 1968-69 the HarduaganJ, Korba, Obra and other fuel-
burning and hydraulic power plants were completed and put to 
use. One of India's largest electricity generating facilities 
36 
at Neyveli stands apart among thermal power stations. 
The Heavy Electrical Equipment Plant at Hardwar, also set 
up with Soviet assistance, was an iir^ortant landmark in the 
development of our power industry. Presently it is meeting more th^ 
56 % of the demand for large power generators and a substantial 
part of the demand for large size industrial motors. This is 
a technologically advanced plant which produced turbines with 
a capacity of 200,000 kilowatts. Not a single developing 
37 
country except India is manufacturing such machines. 
Agreement on economic and technical cooperation between 
35 Ibid. 
36 Anatoli Mayorets, Minister of Power Industry and Electri-
fication of USSR, The Statesman, New Delhi, 10 Aug 1986 
37 Soviet Review, 13(39), 26 Aug 1976, p,36 
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the Soviet Union and India, signed on December 10# 1980, 
marked a new phase in the development of bilateral coopera-
tion. Under it, the Soviet and Indian organisations signed 
in 1982 contracts on giving India assistance in building the 
first stage of the Vindhyachal Thermal Power Plant, consist-
38 ing of six power units of 210 megawatts each. 
Equipment and materials supples for the Vindhyachal 
project began in late 1984, As of now 4 boiler units, 2 
turbines, 2 generators and part of the generators and part 
of the general and auxiliary equipment have been shipped; 
most of the equipment has been supplied for the first power 
unit, due for commissioning in June 1987. Together with 
their Indian colleagues a group of Soviet specialists are 
conducting building inspecting and contract supervision of 
39 
equipment. 
Simultaneously the Soviet Union and India are building 
the 570 km Vindhyachal-Jabalpur-Itarsi power-transfer line 
of 400 kilowatts. The detail contractor design of the line 
has been handed over to the customer. Metalwork pylons, wires, 
insulators and equipment for the line are being supplied. At 
the Soviet-Indian sximmit in 1982 the agreement in principle 
was reached on giving India assistance in the building of 
industrial projects, including a thermal power plant of 1,000 
megawatts. The Soviet organisations discussed India's 
feasibility study on Kahalgaon fuel burning plant (4 power 
units of 210 megawatts each) in Bihar and issued in October, 
40 1983, the assistance proposals. 
The bilateral scientific and technical cooperation in the 
use of low-calorie fuels and solar energy holds an important 
place. An in^etus to it was given by the signing of the 
38 Anatoli Mayorets, op,cit. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid, 
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long-term programme of economic, trade, scientific and 
technical cooperation between the U.S.S.R. and the Republic 
of India in 1979. 
Space - Soviet-Indian cooperation in space studies dates back 
more than 20 years. Since late 1963, meteorological rockets 
with a ceiling of up to 100 kilometers have been blasting off 
an international launching pad in the vicinity of the fisher-
man's townlet of Thumba, a suburb of the city of Trivandrum. 
The joint Soviet-Indian space flight marked the beginning 
of a new and important stage in the Indian national space 
programme. India was the fourteenth country of the 150 odd 
U.N. members to send a man into space. April 19, 1975, June 
17, 1979 and November 20, 1981 were important milestones along 
the road of Soviet-Indian cooperation in space development. 
These were the days of launching the Indian satellites of 
Aryabhata, Bhaskara-1 and Bhaskara-2 from the Soviet Kapustin 
Yar Cosmodrome. Soviet specialists consulted their Indian 
counterparts at all stages of the development and manufacture 
of satellites and their preparation for launching, Soviet 
industry supplies a number of on board systems and units 
• 
including the altitude control and stabilisation system, solar 
and chemical cells, computers and thermal insulation. The 
Soviet Medvezhile Ozera tracking station was actively involved 
in their flight programmes. These launchings confirmed what 
Dr. Vikram Sarabhai, first Chairman of the Indian National 
Committee for Space Research, once said that "if we need help 
in space technology we shall ask the Societ Union. We need not 
only a satellite, but also the knowhow in building it, the 
knowhow in space technology, and only the Russians can give us 
such help."*^ 
41 V.Kozynev, Vice Chairman of the Intercosmos Council under 
the USSR Academy of Sciences, The Times of India, New 
Delhi, 9 Aug 1986 
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In 1961, when Yuri Gagarin, the first space hero of 
the world came to India, he spoke of the time when Soviet 
and Indian cosmonauts would together explore the universe, 
India was greatful to him for his kind thoght but attached 
no more importance to it because it did not have, then, even 
42 a space programme, 
India's Space programme took shape when the U.S.S.R, 
launched the world's first Earth Satellite in 1957, India 
established an optical tracking station at the Nainital Obser-
vatory (U.P.) to watch it. In 1958 the Tata Institute of 
Fundamental Research, Bombay, began .launching constant altitude 
plastic balloons to collect data on high altitude conditions. 
In 1961 space research was brought under the Department of 
Atomic Energy, In 1962 the Indian Council for Space Research 
was formed, A decision was soon taken to open a sounding 
rocket launching site to carry out systematic launchings. In 
1969 the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) was formed. 
In 1982 India and the U.S.S,R. concluded an agreement to 
launch the fourth Indian satellite by a Soviet carrier. The 
•IRSIA' satellite meant for the eairth's natxxral resources 
research was lavmched into space from the Bayconur spaceport 
on March 17, 1980. 
On 3 i^ril, 1984, the Soviet Union launched the Soyuz 
T-11 Spaceship with an international crew of two Soviets and 
one Indian Cosmonaut, Rakesh Sharma. The joint Soviet~Indian 
space flight marked the beginning of a new and important 
stage in the Indian national space programme, 
Soviet and Indian scientists continued their research 
into gamma astronomy using balloon-carried telescopes. These 
42 Brojendra Nath Banerjee, peace,^Friendship and Coopera-
tion, B,R.Publishing Corporation, Delhi, 1987, p,4 
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air balloons start from a special ground in the vicinity of the 
Indian city of Hyderabad which lies on the geomagnetic equator. 
Soviet scientists recommended to consider the possibility of 
43 installing jointly. 
Agriculture - The industrial sector has claimed nearly 99 % of 
total aid from the U.S.S.R. to India. This, because firstly, 
in the Soviet development strategy agriculture was given a 
minimal role. Between 1921 and 1950 agriculture received a 
share of only 8 ?4 of the total investment, while industry 
drew as much as 70 % of the total. Secondly, the Soviet Union 
Was convinced that a scientific development of agriculture in 
India was possible only through socialisation measures, because 
collectivisation of land would facilitate mechanisation of 
agriculture. In the view of Soviet Union therefore, agri-
cultural growth would only be a function of land reforms. 
It is not surprising in this context that the little 
Soviet aid that India got for agriculture has flowed largely 
to state farms. 
The Soviet Union has offered a gift of machinery and 
equipment constituting a composite unit for a farm of about 
30,000 acres at Suratgarh, Rajasthan, This led to the estab-
lishment of the centralised mechanised farm, and it is the 
first and the largest of its kind in the country and is noted 
for production of imporoved seeds. The farm stretches over an 
area of 30,331 acres of which 27,300 acres are devoted to 
agricultural operations which yield good crops despite water 
shortage. The Suratgarh farm constitutes the core of India's 
seed growing farms. The organisational principles for large 
state farms evolved at Suratgarh are now utilised to set up 
43 V,Kozyrev, op,cit. 
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state livestock breeding farms. Machine operators trained in 
the farm now work in the fields in nearly all the Indian 
states. 
This followed by the setting up of yet another farm in 
1964 at Jetsar, Rajasthan, with the help of machinery purchased 
from the Soviet Government. The completion of a number of 
irrigation projects in the Third Plan period opened up large 
areas of wasteland. Here was an opportunity to set up more 
large-sized mechanised farms, and the Soviet Government 
agreed to gift machinery for five state seed farms, of these 
four farms at Hirakud (Orissa)« Hissar (Haryana), Jullunder 
(Punjab) and Raichur (Kamataka) have already been set up. 
The five year (1971-76) inter-governmental agreement on 
scientific and technical cooperation in agriculture had been 
extended for the next five years. 
On 19 July 1973, the Union Minister of State for Agri-
culture, A.P.Shinde, inaugurated at New Delhi a photo exhibi-
tion "The Agriculture of the USSR", at the House of Soviet 
Culture. Speaking about the Indo-Soviet collaboration in 
agricultural research and development which has grown over 
the years, Mr.Shinde saidj "We now have a number of state 
farms operated with Soviet machinery. We also have extensive 
programmes of sheep Improvement based upon Russian marine". 
He added that he was grateful for the possibility that India 
might also be able to intensify its sheep improvement programme 
for the desert areas of Rajasthan and Gujarat by using the 
44 famous Karakul sheep. 
The Soviet Union has offered to supply India, on a loan 
basis, two million tonnes of food grains including certain 
quantity of rice, giving one more magnificent proof of its 
44 News and Views from the Soviet Union, A press release 
issued by the Inforniation Department of the USSR Embassy 
in New Delhi on 29 July, 1973, XXXII (168), pp.4-5 
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sincere friendship with this country. The offer was conveyed 
personally by Soviet Communist Party General Secretary, Leonid 
Brezhnev, in a special message to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi 
on 25 September 1973, In his letter to Mrs.Gandhi, Mr,Brezhnev 
said: "Taking into account Indi's'food difficulties caused 
by unfavourable weather conditions and being guided by 
aspirations to develop friendly Soviet-Indian relations, the 
Soviet Government is willing to supply India two million tonnes 
of foodgrains including a certain amount of rice, on a loan 
basis," The despatch of the food grains can be started 
45 immediately Mr.Brezhnev informed Mrs,Gandhi, 
Food Secretary G.C.L.Juneja, who announced India's accept-
ance of the Soviet offer at a press conference on 28 September 
1973 saidx "The charming feature of the offer is that it was 
made by our friend , the Soviet Union entirely on their own 
initiatives.'*^ 
It is necessary to note that in 1971 and early 1972 the 
food situation deteriorated because India had to feed over 10 
million refugees from East Pakistan. Again, floods in Uttar 
Pradesh, West Bengal and Bihar destroyed about 2 million 
tonnes of foodgrains, AS India was unable to be independent 
of food imports, the supply from U,S,S,R. was welcomed. 
In 1979 a protocol was signed by Dr.D.P.Gautam, Director 
General of the Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR) , 
and A.A.Geltehov, Soviet Deputy Minister of Agriculture, which 
took into account the provisions of the long-terra programmes 
of cooperation signed in March 1979 when the Soviet Premier 
had visited India. 
45 Patriot, New Delhi, 29 Sept 1973 
4 6 Ibid. 
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Science and Technology - The first agreement on cultural, 
scientific and technological cooperation was signed in 1960. 
It opened the way from contacts between individuals or groups 
of scientists, to relations between scientific organisations. 
It has also helped India to advance its scientific education. 
And the two countries have been cooperating in fundamental 
research in a nianber of fields — agriculture, power genera-
tion, solar energy, atomic power, space programme, and several 
others* 
Bilateral technological cooperation has come a long way. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, the Soviet Academy of Sciences and 
its branches and the Indian organisations conducted joint 
research into geology, geophysics, cybernetics, crystallo-
graphy, magnetohydrodynamics (MHD) generators, petrochemistry, 
engineering, ferrous metallurgy and other spheres. The results 
of much of this research were later introduced into metallurgy, 
oil and gas industry, power industry, engineering and other 
industries. 
In 1980-87, Soviet-Indian scientific cooperation was 
governed by an agreement between the U.S.S.R. State Committee 
for Science and Technology and the Indian Department of Science 
and Research. The document highlighted the development of 
alternate energy sources and new power generating technologies. 
Both countries are keen about computer development. Apart 
from setting up a Faculty for Computer Studies at the Institute 
of Science, Bangalore, the U.S.S.R. has been cooperating with 
India in the computer field for a number of years. The U.S.S.R. 
is already producing super computers of 100 million operations 
47 per second. 
The' Soviet Academic of Sciences and the Indian National 
47 Shankar Narain, "New Horizons in Science and Technology", 
The Times of India, 13 April 1987 
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Science Academy will continue their cooperation in funda-
mental research, particularly in earth sciences, physics, 
mathematics, chemistry, biology, etc. Further development of 
the computer and electronic revolution depends on production 
of new materials. The two countries are doing joint research 
in a number of fields to achieve this target. The Soviet 
Union itself has set the target of eliminating man's presence 
in the technological processes and production of high purity 
substances. 
Radiation technology and synchrotron radiation are new 
technologies with immense Industrial application potential. 
The U.S.S.R, has supplied an accelerator to the Bhabha Atomic 
Research Centre (BARC). Among its uses, are may be mentioned. 
It can disinfect food grains at 200 tonnes per hour and is much 
48 
cheaper compared to chemical methods and improves storing. 
India and the U.S.S.R. have been closely working on the 
problems of desertification and environmental problems. The 
two countries are particularly interested in three areas: 
fixing of moving sands, problem of desalination and fertility. 
During the 10th session of the Inter-governmental Soviet-
Indian Commission on Economic and Scientific-Technical Coopera-
tion (Delhi 28-29 April 1986) an agreement was reached on 
widening production cooperation on long-term basis, A protocol 
on cooperation by the production of a wide range of products of 
machine-building was signed in January 1987 in Delhi. A 
programme in the field of production upto the year 2000 has 
49 been prepared, 
48 Ibid. 
49 V.I, LltvinenJco, Economic Counsellor of the USSR Embassy 
in India, The Times of India, New Delhi, 13 April 1987 
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The Comprehensive Long-term Programme of Scientific 
and Technical Cooperation between the U.S.S.R. and India* 
signed by Mikhail Gorbachev and Rajiv Gandhi in Moscow on 
July 3, 1987, marked a major step along this road. The 
activities envisaged by the programme from three groups. 
The first of them conqprises joint works in the priority 
fields of science and technology with the aim of putting the 
results to use in the economics of the U.S.S.R. and India 
in the immediate future. They are research exercises in the 
sphere of biotechnology and immunology, including develop-
ment of medicines, materials technology, laser and space 
technology, development and use (including industrial uses) 
of powerful electron accelerations, technology for survey-
ing for underground water, computer technology and electro-
nics, and development and use of catalysts. The prospects 
of dynamic economic and social development of the two 
countries are now determined by their scientific potential 
in the sphere of pure science. That is why the next group 
of the projects envisaged by the Comprehensive programme 
deals with the most important research work in fundamental 
sciences — mathematics, mechanics, physics, astironomy and 
sciences concerning the earth, biology, chemistry and 
ecology. 
And, lastly, the third group of the areas for long-term 
development of cooperation, such as non-traditional (includ-
ing renewable) energy sources, long distance transfer of 
51 power, machine-building and instrument making. 
During the drafting of the Comprehensive programme 
priority was given to the research projects in which the 
scientific and technical interests of the Societ and Indian 
scientists were manifested most graphically. 
50 The Tiroes of India, New Delhi, 4 July 1987 
51 Ibid., 19 Nov 1988 
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The Soviet and Indian scientists pay particular atten-
tion to research and developinent in the field of electronic 
materials and hyperpure sxibstances necessary for carrying 
out work relating to high temperature super conductivity. 
The first meeting of the Joint Council held in New Delhi on 
March 30-31, 1988 showed such a scheme for directing the 
programme and assuring its fulfilment is effective. 
In the sphere of materials technology and development of 
new structural materials the scientists of the two countries 
have focused on the development and treatment of corr^ josite 
and superstroiig materials, the application of diamond coat-
ings, the development of articles by a super plastic moulding 
method, and on the treatment of materials in space. These 
works are being carried out successfully particularly in the 
field of production of friction materials and articles made 
of Indian iron ore — "blue dust". To conduct research in 
this area, the two sides have recognised it expedient to es-
tablish a joint Soviet-Indian centre for materials technology. 
The scientific-technical and organisational aspects of such a 
52 
centre are now being considered. 
Power metallurgy figures prominently among the fields of 
scientific-technical cooperation in which the results are not 
bad. The preparations for signing a general agreement on 
building a joint Soviet-Indian centre for dust metullurgy on 
Indian territory are nearing completion. Development of pro-
duction processes and equipment for turning Indian iron ore 
(•blue dust') into iron powder and of titanixim filtersi and 
hydrodynamic compaction of powders by an explosion are to 
be the main directions in the work of this centre. All this 
means that the activity of the centre will be aimed at 
satisfying the needs of the two countries economies in the 
most up-to-date materials. 
52 Ibid. 
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The project to set up an anti-poliorayelitis vaccine 
production unit in India, based on Soviet technology and 
with an annual capacity of 100 million doses is also at 
the organisational stage. An agreement on this was signed 
in Moscow on September 19, 1988. 
The projects in the field of development and synthesis 
of new catalysts and creation of new production processes 
on their basis are much closer to technical reality. The 
Joint Soviet-Indian Council for implementing and coordina-
ting the Comprehensive Long-term Programme of Scientific and 
Technical Cooperation instructed the respective organisa-
tions in both countries to prepare urgent proposals on 
establishing a joint Soviet-Indian enterprise for the indus-
trial production of new catalysts and new catalytic technologies, 
developed within the framework of Soviet-Indian Cooperation 
and the national programme, and for the sale of them in 
India, the Soviet Union and third countries. 
Soviet-Indian Cooperation in the priority fields of science 
and technology is carried out on a priority basis and is 
clearly aimed at accomplishing the most important economic 
tasks facing the two countries. 
(B) Cultural Relations 
Cultural ties between the two countries were put on a 
firm foundation after India became independent. Together with 
traditional exchanges such as of artists and exhibitions of 
pictorial and applied art, contacts were established between 
libraries and museums. The holding of joint symposia on 
problems of culture and art, the sharing of experience in 
choreography, music and musicology, and exchange of visits of 
painters became regular. 
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In the beginning of the 20th century the Russian people 
were alrea<^ reading such classics as 'Panchatantra* * 'Bhagavad 
Gita' and the • Shakuntalarn', translated into Russian. The 
Russian painter Vereshchagin^ who visited India twice, left 
memorable paintings, particularly on the cruelty of the 
British rule in India. 
An inter-governraental agreement on cultural, scientific 
and technical cooperation was signed between the two countries 
on February 12, 1960. This laid the firm foundation for coor-
dination, at first in an annual, and later from 1967, on a 
biennial basis, of the programmes of cultural exchange. This 
cooperation has since grown in scale, and now embraces various 
aspects of social life like education, all forms of art, 
literature, radio, films, T.V., sports, etc, India and the 
Soviet Union signed the latest cultural agreement for the 
year 1985-1986 at New Delhi in February 1985. 
Many Soviet theatres have productions based on Indian 
svibjects and plays by Indian authors in their repertoires. 
The 'Ramayana', for instance, has been running at the Central 
Children's Theatre in Moscow for almost 24 yeairs, Societ 
spectators know and love *The Wiite Lotus' produced after a 
drama by Shudraka, 'Sohni Mahival* by Balwant Gargi, the 
musical 'The Big Wave of the Ganges', the ballets 'Chitra* 
and 'The Love Charm*• Not long ago the Moscow Stanislavsky and 
Nemorovich-Danchenko musical theatre had a premiere of the" 
ballet 'Shakuntala', music for which was written by Soviet 
con^oser Sergei Balasanyan, Indian theatres stage plays by 
Russian authors: Gogol, Chekhov, Gorky, Simonov, and Sofronov. 
Films - Cooperation in cinematography began actually in the 
forties. Soviet films by famous directors like Eisenstein, 
Pudovkin and Dovzhenko made a significant impact on Indian 
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viewers and film producers, particularly on directors like 
K.A.Abbas, Satyajit Ray, Mrinal Sen and others. 
In 1954 the U.S.S.R. organised the first festival of. 
Indian films in Moscow, AS a result, names like Raj Kapoor 
and Nargis became highly popular in the Soviet Union. 
This formed a new form of Soviet-Indian cinematographic 
cooperation. The first such film titled "A Journey Beyond 
the Three Seas" (or Pardesi) was produced on the visit of the 
Russian seafarer Afanasy Nikitin. Then followed a number of 
other co-productions — 'Rikki Tikki Tavi', 'The Black 
Mountain*, * Sunrise on the Ganges', and 'Ali Baba and Forty 
Thieves' of late, a documentary on Jawaharlal Nehru directed 
by A. Aldokhln and Shyam Senegal has been released, as also a 
feature film 'Sohni Mahival*. 
As Indo-Soviet Cultural Agreement was signed in 1976, 
this was announced by the Minister of Information and Broad-
casting Mr.L.K.Advani, who led an Indian delegation to the 
International Film Festival which began in Moscow on 7 July 
1976, The Indian entry, 'Mrigaya* or the Royal Hunt, a film 
directed by Mrinal Sen Was widely acclaimed at the festival. 
A 20-day Festival of Indian Art and Culture was held in 
the Soviet Union in September 1977, A festival in which eminent 
musicians and dancers from India participated, was inaugurated 
at the Bolshoi Theatre by the Union Education Minister 
Dr. P.C.Chunder on 15 September 1977.^ A Film Festival and 
three exhibitions — miniatures, handicrafts and photographs -— 
were also held. The U.S.S.R. held a Festival of Soviet Art and 
Culture in India in November-December 1977. These festivals 
were being held under the Indo-Soviet Cultural Exchange Progra-
mme, 
53 Indian Foreign Review,. 15 Sept 1977 
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The Minister of Information and Broadcasting, Vasant 
Sathe, said on 25 May 1980 that there were great possibilities 
of cooperation between India and the Soviet Union in the 
filds of Cinematography and radio, television. On his return 
from Tashkent, where he represented India as leader of the 
Indian delegation to the Sixth Tashkent International Film 
Festival, he said that India could cooperate in the field 
of children's films with the Soviet Union which had made 
great advance in the field. He added that during his visit, 
he had very useful and fruitful discussions with the Soviet 
Minister for Cinematography, Ermash and the Chief of the 
Soviet Radio and Television, Sathe further said that the 
Indian films "sparsh" and "Ek bar phir" entered in the 
festival, had been very well received. The Joint Indo-Soviet 
production 'Alibaba Aud Chalis Chor' had already become very 
54 popular with the viewers. 
Festivals - The festivals of the U.S.S.R, in India and the 
Festivals of India in the U.S.S.R, in 1987-88 played an 
important role in the cause of strengthening friendship and 
mutual understanding between the two countries and peoples. 
The festivals of the U.S,S.R, dedicated to the 70th anniversary 
of the Great October Socialist Revolution, opened on 21 Novem-
ber 1987, This was coincided with the time when the Festival 
of India in the U.S,S.R. was in full swing, which was dedi-
cated to the 40th anniversary of India's independence. The 
festivals are an expression of deep respect of the peoples 
of both the countries for each other's history and culture, 
their adherence to the ideals of freedom and justice. Equally 
important is the fact that the holding of the festivals was 
possible only due to very good relations which shaped between 
54 Ibid,, 13 Sept 1977 
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the leadership of the two countries, whose bright manifes-
tation was the exchange of official friendly visit of Mikhail 
Gorbachev to India and Rajiv Gandhi's visit to the U.S.S.R, 
Suffice it to recall that nearly 3,500 Indian representa-
tives, including performers, public figures, young leaders, 
scientists and sportsmen have visited the Soviet Union as 
part of the Festival programme. Nearly 150 Indian troupes 
performed in 140 Soviet cities. Some 2,000 artists parti-
cipated. 
Exhibitions held as part of the Festivals had become 
crucial to cultural exchanges between India and the Soviet 
Union. It was a serious scientific effort prepared jointly 
by Soviet and Indian organisations, including the Soviet 
Academy of Sciences, the Chief Administrator of Archives 
under the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, the Ministry of 
Culture of the U.S.S.R,, the Soviet Foreign Ministry and the 
National Archives of India. 
Slimming up the results of the Festivals, the Chairman 
of the U.S.S.R. Organising Committee of Soviet-Indian Festi-
val, Zakharov, said in conclusion: "We can say that both 
have written down a vivid page in the history of Soviet-Indian 
cultural relations. Any such festival is an example showing 
the whole world the fruits of new thinking and new political 
approaches in international affairs." Zakharov described 
the festival as the diplomacy of the masses. He said that 
"everything thought by us was an endless field for the meeting 
of millions of citizens of the two countries in the name of 
peace, friendship and mutual prosperity.^^ 
55 A.Pozin, The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 2 Nov 1988 
5 6 Vasili Zakharov, USSR Minister of Culture and Chairman 
of the USSR Organising Committee of Soviet Indian Festi-
val, The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 21 Nov 1987 
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Education - Indo-Soviet cooperation in education began in 
1956 with the signing of UNESCO protocol on the establish-
ment of the Indian Institute of Technology in Bombay with 
Soviet assistance. Starting with 100 students in 1958, the 
Bombay IIT was the first institute in the country to have 
introduced a five year academic course for students, as well 
as a two-year postgraduate course, 
Indo-Soviet cooperation in the field of education covers 
the granting of scholarships to students, promotion of higher 
scientific education in India, production of Soviet text-
books in India, establishment of direct relations between 
Soviet and Indian educational establishments, promotion of the 
study of Russian language in India, and others. The U.S.S,R. 
has taken part in organizing four autonomous departments at 
large Indian universities devoted to aeronautics, metallurgy, 
geophysics and automatics and computers. Specialized tech-
nical training schools were set up with Soviet assistance in 
the cities of Baroda, Bhilai, Hyderabad, Ranchi and Bhopal 
to produce middle-level technicians. 
An Indo-Soviet Joint Commission has been set up for 
cooperation in the field of social sciences, A centre for 
Russian studies was opened at Jawaharlal Nehina University 
in 1965. 
The study of Russian language is becoming more and more 
popular in India, Today Russian language is being taught at 
most of the Indian universities. 
Cooperation in Book publishing - A major field of Soviet 
assistance at present in the field of education is in provid-
ing inexpensive and good textbooks to university students. 
Already over 450 Soviet textbooks have been adopted for Indian 
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languages. An Indo-Soviet Textbook Board has been set up 
for this purpose and it meets yearly in order to select 
books and arrange for their publication. The books are 
produced at low cost for students. 
Publication of Soviet classics and modern work in Indian 
languages is another major activity in the educational field. 
Soviet publishing housea are bringing out translations in 
almost all the major Indian languages, thus helping students 
and readers to acquaint themselves with the rich literary 
traditions of the Soviet people, Russian and Soviet classics 
occupy a prominent place in the literature now made available 
in India. 
At the same time, Indian classics and modern works are 
being translated into the Russian language, Tagore, Gandhi, 
Nehru, Prem Chand, Mulk Raj Anand, Sardar Jaffri and others 
are well known names today among the Soviet readers, Tagore's 
"The Gardener** and "Gitanjali" were p\iblished as early as the 
1920s in the Soviet Union, The overall editions of Indian 
books published in the languages of the peoples of the U,S.S,R, 
has already topped the 30 million copies mark. 
Societ copyright agency VAAP has been cooperating with 
several Indian p\iblishers such as Federation of Indian Pub-
lishers, The National Book Trust, Oxford press, Ajanta 
57 Books, Arnold Heinemann, Vikas, Sterling, etc. 
Thus, academic exchange became a regular feature of Indo-
Soviet cooperation. It takes place under the Cultural Agree-
ment signed by the two countries. As a follow-up of the 
Cultural Agreement, Joint Committees of the representatives 
of the two governments have been regularly jceviewing and 
57 Nikolai Chetverikov, Chairman, VAAP Board, The Times of 
India, New Delhi, 24 Nov 1987 
272 
drawing up cultural exchange programmes as means of imple-
mentation of the Cultural Agreement. So far 10 annual and 
58 
7 biannual programmes have been successfully implemented. 
A large niunber of students/trainees from India are visit-
ing U.S.S.R. for studies. A survey has indicated that in 
1985-86/ about 329 persons from India were studying in the 
U.S.S.R. Out of it 326 were trainees. The number of U.S.S.R. 
students studying in the Indian universities is, however, 
very negligible. In 1985-86 one student from the U.S.S.R. was 
in undergraduate courses and one was in postgraduate course. 
Cooperation in the field of sports is now gaining momen-
tum. The Soviet Union provides sports coaches to India and 
teams have been exchanged in vollyball, football, and other 
Sports fields. Since 1983 the sports exchange is being imple-
mented under the Soviet-Indian Sports protocol which provides 
good opportunities for expanding the scope of cooperation of 
great importance in promoting sports relations, A protocol 
was signed in December 1985 for the construction of a large 
sports complex in Bangalore with Soviet assistance. 
58 Anil Bordia, Secretary, Department of Education, The 
Hindustan Tiroes, New Delhi, 18 Nov 1988 
59 Ibid. 
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MAJOR SOVIET-INDIAN PROJECTS AND ASSISTANCE 
(Industrial, Agricultural, Scientific, Educational) 
FERROUS METALLURGY 
- Bhilai Steel Plant (with raw material facilities) 
- Bokaro Steel plant 
- Vizag Steel Plant 
- Metallurgical & Engineering Consultants Ltd, (MECON), 
- Ranch! R & D Centre for steel research, Ranchi. 
NON-FERROUS METALLURGY 
- Aluminium Plant, Korba 
- Bauxite and Alumina Plant project, 
- Andhra R & D Centre for nonferrous metallurgy, Korba. 
HEAVY ENGINEERING 
- Heavy Machine Building Plant, Ranchi. 
- Heavy Electrical Equipment Plant, Hardwar. 
- Mining and Allied Machinery plant, Durgapur. 
- Training:Institute for Designing Metallurgical Equipment, 
Ranchi. 
OIL INDUSTRY 
- Drilling and Exploration (Gujarat, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal, 
Assam, Himachal Pradesh, etc. and offshore exploration 
along the costs of India) . 
- Barauni Refinery, Bihar. 
- Koyali Refinery, Gujarat, 
- Mathura Refinery, U.P, 
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Training;- Hind Oil Designing Institute, Baroda. 
- Research and Training Institute, Dehra Dun. 
- Drilling Technology Research Institute, 
Dehra Dun. 
- Institute for Reservoir Development, Ahmedabad. 
COAL INDUSTRY 
- Surlchachar Coal Mine 
- Bank Coal Mine 
- Manikpur Coal Mine 
- Kathara Coal Washery 
- Nigahi Opencast Mines 
- Jayant opencast Mine 
- Mukunda Coal Mine 
- Jhanjra Coal Mine 
Raniganj Coal Mine 
- Tipong Coal Mine 
- K\imari Coal Mine 
- Sitanaia Coal Mine 
- Assistance to Singareni Colliery Co (Andhra) , 
- Development and Modernisation of Coal Washeries. 
- Central Mechanical Workshop, Singrauli, for repair and 
production of mining equipment and materials. 
Training - Coal Preparation and Engineering Institute, 
Ranchi. 
- Assistance for Coal gasification in Rajasthan, 
POWER INDUSTRY 
- Neyveli Thermal Plant, Tamil Nadu. 
- Korba Thermal Plant, Madhya Pradesh. 
- Obra Thermal Plant, Uttar Pradesh. 
- Patratu Thermal Plant, Bihar. 
- Harduaganj Thermal plant, Uttar Pradesh. 
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- Bhakra Hydropower Station, Punjab, 
- Mettur Hydropower Station, Tamil Nadu. 
- Balimela Hydropower Station, Orissa. 
- Lower Sileru Hydropower Station, Andhra, 
- Hirakud Hydropower Station, Karnataka. 
- Linganayaki Hydropower Station, Karnataka, 
- Vindhyachal Thermal Power Station, Singrauli, 
- Kahalgaon Thermal Power Station, Bihar. 
- Bakireshwar Thermal Plant, West Bengal. 
- Tehri Hydropower Plant, Uttar Pradesh, 
MEDICAL INDUSTRY 
- Anti-Biotic Plant, Rishikesh. 
- Synthetic Drugs plant, Hyderabad. 
Surgical Instruments Plant, Madras. 
PUBLIC HEALTH 
Cooperation in combating mass infectious diseases like 
malaria, smallpox, cholera, etc.; in Ophthalmology; in 
preparation of vaccines and blood preparations and others. 
TRANSPORT & COMMUNICATION 
- Calcutta Metro system. 
- Troposcatter telecommunication link between Moscow 
and Delhi. 
INSTRUMENTATION & AUTOMATION 
- Prescision Instrument Plant, Kotah. 
- Optical Glass Factory, Durgapur. 
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AGRICULTURE 
- State seed farms (in all six) . 
- Animal Husbandry : Assistance for Merino, Karakul 
Sheep and other fur animal development. 
- Plant Development: Sunflower, beetroot. 
- Canning Factory. 
- Assistance for production of specialised cans and 
packaging material. 
- Tractor Plant, Loni, U.P. 
- Training : Workshop for training middle level farm hands, 
Factory for production of lining materials 
for irrigational canals. 
- Assistance for Dam building. 
SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY 
- Scientific Corporation in the development. 
- MHD power generation. 
- protectiion of metals from corrosion. 
- powdermetallurgy, 
- Standardisation and metrology. 
- Construction materials. 
- meteorology. 
Lasers. 
- B iotechnology. 
- The physics of high temperatures and pressures. 
- Catalysis. 
- Electrical metallurgy. 
- Oceanography. 
- Science information (in all 112 subjects) 
- Solar Energy Development. 
Space Research and Development, 
- Nuclear energy. 
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EDUCATION 
- The Indian Institute of Technology/ Bombay. 
- Autonoraovis faculties for ; 
- Aircraft Designing (Bombay). 
- Metallurgy (West Bengal). 
- Geophysics (Hyderabad). 
- Automation and Computer (Bangalore) 
and a number of technical schools for promoting scientific 
education. 
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CONCLUSION 
The perspectives of South Asian States on the external 
environment since the withdrawal of the British from the 
subcontinent have varied widely over time^ but there has been 
a considerable degree of consistency in their respective 
responses to the involvement of outside powers in the sub-
continent. While this has been determined primarily by the 
specific circumstances surrounding both regional and extra-
regional developments, there is also a wide variety of 
historical and cultural traditions that continue to influence 
policies and attitudes on foreign policy and security issues 
in the politics in South Asia, 
To cultivate India as the major South Asian nation which 
steered clear of any alliance with the U.S. was the leitmotif 
of Soviet South Asian policy in the 1950s. Another important 
strand joined this one in the 1960s, viz., India as a counter-
weight to Maoist China which increasingly challenged the 
ideological authority of post-Stalin Soviet leadership. In 
1960 Moscow withdrew all aid from China. In October that 
year it concluded an agreement with India in the latter's 
purchase of various types of Soviet aircraft. This was 
followed by further ordecs in 1961 and 1962. In August 1962, 
or the eve of the Sino-Indian border clash, Moscow concluded 
an agreement to grant license to India to produce MIG-21 jet 
fighters. This may have been the first such licensing outside 
the U.S.S.R, including the Soviet bloc. The military dimension 
of Indo-Soviet relations developed significantly enough against 
the background of a major incident on the 2,500 mile Sino-Indian 
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border leading to loss of lives in October 1959 and mounting 
border tension between the two most populous nations of the 
world. 
The post-Khurshchev Soviet leadership, consisting of the 
trivimvirate of Brezhnev, Kosygin and Podgorny was more 
restrained in its policy towards the South Asian subcontinent. 
The Indo-Pak war of 1965 led to Moscow's mediatory role early 
next year in Tashkent. The sxumiit between president Ayub 
and Premier Shastri in that Soviet city revealed two interest-
ing features. First, Moscow had become an important factor 
in South Asia, Second, Kremlin's new leaders were taking a 
more balanced stance on the Indo-Pak dispute, an important 
reason for which was the growing Sino-Pak link. Indeed 
Moscow even extended limited arms aid to Pakistan in the late 
1960s, to neutralize Chinese influence there, thereby running 
into Indian indignation. 
The 1962 debacle awakened India to the new realities. The 
America of Dulles was unwilling to accept the genuineness of 
non-alignment and described it as dishonest. In the context 
of South Asia, Pakistan was the focal point, being an ally. 
Inevitably, India did not get American sympathy or support, 
even though the U.S.A. and U.K. did not approve China and had 
kept it out of the U.N. 
Moscow's growing role in South Asia was exemplified by its 
successful mediation in the 1965 war and its atterrpt to build 
up its influence with Pakistan by offering arms aid to it in 
1968, The Soviet Union tried to mediate in the 1971 war between 
India and Pakistan, but its offer was turned down by India, 
which preferred to negotiate bilaterally. Moscow hoped that 
the Treaty of Friendship concluded with Mrs.Gandhi's govern-
ment would be the precursor to India's acceptance of the 
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Brezhnev Doctrine. But the doctrine still remains a dis-
embodied spirit. While Soviet interests have undoubtedly 
prospered in the area# they have not reached a point where 
the Soviets can hope to play a pre-eminent role in the 
policies of India or of the other countries of South Asia. 
The Soviet Union chose its options with skill, taking 
full advantage of the opportunities which offered. When the 
U.S.A. began to arm Pakistan, Soviet militaxry assistance to 
India became readily available. Soviet political support 
over Kashmir helped to neutralise American backing of Pakistan, 
while the United States looked askance at India's socialistic 
five year plans with their emphasis on industry, the Soviets 
welcomed the planning process and helped in the building up 
of heavy industry. The rupee trade agreement provided new 
export markets for India's developing skills and an outlet 
for its industrial products. In the war with China and the 
recurrent clashes with Pakistan, Soviet military and political 
support Was invariably extended to India. The Soviet image 
in Indian eyes was therefore that of a loyal and steadfast 
friend, whose support can be counted upon in good times as 
in bad. 
But while there was this spectacle of competition and 
sometimes of confrontation between the super powers in India 
and South Asia, their basic aims were not so divergent after 
all; they were common, complementary or compatible. But 
they were also competitive. American strategic interests 
were not directly involved in the Indian Ocean area except 
to the extent of safeguarding vital oil supplies from the 
Gulf and West Asian states. Soviet strategic interests were 
also largely limited to keeping the lines of communication 
open with its Eastern provinces and blocking their attempts 
to build up anti-Soviet groupings in the area. India's 
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insistence on keeping the Indian Ocean area a zone of peace, 
free from great power rivalries, affects both superpowers 
equally. 
Supeirpower rivalry in the Indian Ocean is a threat not 
only to India but other countries of the region. It is of 
the utmost in^ortance to them that superpower military 
presence should be gradually reduced and eliminated from 
there. For this purpose, India and other littoral countries 
are demanding that the Indian Ocean be declared a zone of 
peace. 
The Soviet Union is in favour of turning the Indian 
Ocean into a peace zone, as was proposed by the nonaligned 
states. It is also for the withdrawal from this region of 
all the naval fleets not belonging to the coastal states. 
The Soviet Union considers it necessary to hold an interna-
tional conference to discuss the question of turning the 
Indian Ocean into a zone of peace and expresses its readiness 
to resume the talks suspended by the United States on a 
limitation and then reduction of military activity in the 
Indian Ocean. The u.S.S.R. resolutely called for convening 
an international conference on the Indian Ocean in the 
first half of 1986, in accordance with the U.N. Special 
Committee's decision. Gorbachev had put new proposals for 
enhanced military and political stability in -the Indian Ocean 
in his speech in the Indian Parliament during his visit to 
New Delhi in November 1986. 
One of the most important Soviet foreign policy lines 
is the struggle for peace and security in the Asian continent-
the Soviet Union builds its relations with the countries of 
Asia on the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence of 
states with different social systems. The Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union has always considered the struggle to 
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reduce threat of war and.curb the arms race a major foreign 
policy task of the Soviet Union, At the 26th Party Congress 
in February 1981, it put forward a series of new construc-
tive proposals of a political and military character, some 
of which directly concerned various Asian regions from the 
Near to the Far East. 
However, it is Soviet intervention in Afghanistan that 
has introduced a strong role of divergence in Indo-Soviet 
relations, and altered India's strategic perspectives of the 
region in a radical manner. The geographical distance between 
India and the Soviet Union was an essential element of friendly 
Indo-Soviet relations, Nonaligned Afghanistan was a buffer 
between the two countries, India was not exposed to pressures 
or interferences from this quarter except from Pakistan. 
Soviet troops could .not pose an immediate threat to India, 
but it was deciisively important for India to seek a solution 
to the Afghan problem so as to enable Soviet troops, to 
withdraw and restore Afghanistan's nonaligned status. 
The emerging Afghanistan-Pakistan scenario heralds 
dangerous portents for India. One such consequence is that 
Pakistan has been receiving massive quantities of arms from 
the U.S.A. on the pretext of the Soviet threat; whether or 
not Pakistan will be able to take on a superpower is a 
different question. But it has been the Indian experience 
that whenever Pakistan has received huge quantities of arms 
for other purpose, these have, in fact, been used against 
India. 
Superpower confrontation on India's border would be 
extremely disastrous for India, On the other hand, the last 
decade witnessed an equally significant development in South 
Asia. India emerged as a regional power after the birth of 
Bangladesh. Consequently India's strategic perceptions underwent 
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a change, a truncated Pakistan was no longer a serious 
threat. India's military capability alongwith her rapid 
economic development could safeguard her western frontier. 
At the same time^ the threat from China had lost its intensity. 
China was too preoccupied with the Soviet threat in the north. 
The defeat and withdrawal of American Power from Vietnam and 
the Soviet Union exacerbated the situation from the Chinese 
point of view. 
For Mrs.Indira Gandhi, the Moscow visit of October 1982 
had restored the balance of power in the South Asian region. 
Whatever clouds had fallen on the relationship as a result 
of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan had passed.Mrs.Gandhi 
did tell Brezhnev that India would like him to pull out his 
troops from Afghanistan. 
If one analyses the developments in Afghanistan after 
the total withdrawal of Soviet troops (February 1989) an 
impression is created that the Kremlin does not have a long-
term Afghan policy, Gorbachev's leadership seems to be on 
trial in Afghanistan, and if he fails to pass the test, the 
interests of both the Soviet Union and India will be compro-
mised* The Soviet Union is seriously disturbed by the con-
tinuing U.S.-Pakistan support for the Mujahideen and their 
consequent refusal to accept anything less than Kabul 
government's surrender. But Soviet Union does not seem to be 
thinking in terms of replacing president Najibullah with some 
one who, in its view, may be more acceptable to Mujahideen 
as an interlocutor for a possible rapproachement. 
It is of utmost importance for Soviet Union and India 
to realise that in the context of US-Pakistan-Iran designs 
for installing a fundamentalist regime in Afghanistan, new 
schemes dangerous for both the countries are in preparation 
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which Moscow and New Delhi will be ill-advised to ignore. 
By any reckoning developments in Afghanistan would have a 
critical bearing on the security of both the Soviet Union 
and India. 
The Soviet Union has developed its relations with the 
other South Asian countries. In April 1980 Moscow had 
signed a scientific and cultural agreement with Maldives, a 
nation of over 1,000 coral islands with a Muslim population, 
Nepal too has been successful in receiving Soviet aid. The 
Soviet Union helped in the construction of some projects 
in Nepal. However, the Soviet union has not shown any involved 
interest in Nepalese affairs except its concern for the 
increasing influence of China in Nepal. It appears that the 
Soviets are inclined to view with favour any government in 
Nepal which could maintain internal stability and status quo 
in the country. 
Soviet Union adopted a differing posture on the Bangladesh 
crisis than India. When the crisis erupted in March 1971, the 
Soviet approach to the problem was merely to counsel President 
Yahya Khan to end brutalities in East Pakistan and negotiate 
with its leaders. This approach persisted even after the 
Indo-Soviet treaty was signed, while the Indian stand was 
that conditions must be created in East Pakistan for the 
return of the refugees in honour and safety. 
More importantly, the Soviet Union did not visualise 
the prospect of an independent Bangladesh till the very end. 
Given the emerging Sino-Pak-American axis, war in the western 
sector with the backing of China and the U.S.A. close to the 
Soviet border was viewed as a security hazard for the Soviet 
Union. That is why the Soviet Union was keen for a political 
settlement of the Bangladesh crisis within the framework of 
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Pakistan. However* when full scale war between India and 
Pakistan broke out in Decernber 1971, the Soviet Union 
supported India. Its firm diplomatic support in the United 
Nations was valuable and enabled India to liberate Bangladesh. 
II 
The Soviet-Indian relations serve as an example of multi-
faceted cooperation between states with different social 
systems. This friendship dates many decades back but only 
after India won independence was the striving for friendship 
translated into reality, 
Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi, outstanding Indian 
leaders, spent much time and effort to consolidate Soviet 
Indian friendship and cooperation. Jawaharlal Nehru proposed 
establishing diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union even 
before India won independence. Pour months before the 
proclamation of independence he wrote that cooperation 
between the two countries would benefit both nations and 
contribute to peace and pirogress world over. His active 
work resulted in fundamental bilateral agreements opening the 
way to broad-based fruitful cooperation in economy, trade, 
science and culture, Nehru's historical perception was 
indeed prophetic. He clearly saw the advantage of sending 
his very first diplomatic mission to Moscow to symbolize a 
major turn in Indian history. 
Nehru placed an even greater premixira on more cooperative 
relations with the U.S.S.R. and the West, His diplomacy in 
this era proved successful, for both powers were interested 
albeit for different reasons in Indian political stability 
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and economic development. Each provided India with material 
assistance without pressing for a change in her basic inter-
national relations. In retrospect Nehru's policy has been 
vindicated with regard to Russia but it did not succeed in 
the case of China, As the years passed, Nehru learned 
sometimes in a painful way, of limitations on his power to 
influence international events. 
Khruschev*s visit to India in November 1955 was a turn-
ing point in Indo-Soviet relations which from that modest 
beginning had assumed a multi-dimentional character by the 
end of the sixties, A marked feature of these wide ranging 
relations was the cordiality and warmth. It is obvious that 
the development of close and friendly relations between the 
two countries belonging to opposite social systems must have 
been motivated by their vital interests. 
The first major area where Indo-Soviet interests con-
verged was Pakistan, On the Indian side Pakistan wholly 
dominated the Indian strategic perception since independence. 
The trauma of partition coupled with a territorial dispute 
over Kashmir soured Indo-Pakistani relations from the very 
beginning. 
The Soviet Union also shared India's strategic pers-
pective on China. Sino-Soviet relations worsened even further 
when China laid claims to Soviet territory. On this issue 
the two socialist countries fought a border war in the Par 
Eastern region in March 1969, Convergence of strategic 
interests on China provided an additional incentive to 
friendly Indo-Soviet relations, l^o decades ago the security 
needs of India determined the level of Indo-Soviet relations. 
Today, the Indo-Soviet political relations determine the 
Indian security position. 
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All of this shows that if Indo-Soviet relations were 
close and friendly, it was largely because of the conver-
gence of their national interests, issues, which had a 
vital bearing on India's security considerations also impinged 
on Soviet strategic perceptions. In the process, India 
received valuable support on some of its major foreign 
policy issues and came to occupy a pivotal place in Soviet 
security considerations. The Dullesian strategy of contain-
ing communist and the rift with China aroused Soviet fears 
of encirclement which would have been cortqplete but for 
India which had kept out of these alignments. Thus the 
Soviet Union developed a vital stake in India's nonalignment, 
India's nonalignment was the minimum requirement of 
Soviet security interests. That is why the Soviet Union 
publicly castigated China for provoking a war with India 
which was bound to throw the latter into Western arms. 
Fortunately for the Soviet Union, western interest in India 
waned after the escalation of the American conflict in 
Vietnam, This also explains Soviet eagerness to cooperate 
with India on the economic level. Had Western aid started 
flowing into India, it is likely that India would have 
acquired a state of dependence at some point. However, from 
the late fifties onwards the Soviet Union was the sole supplier 
of Indian weaponry and military hardware. Military and economic 
dependence on the Soviet Union throughout the late fifties and 
sixties contributed in strengthening Indo-Soviet relations 
which by the late sixties, had acquired a wide ranging 
character, and were close. 
The Soviet-Indian security link continued to develop. 
In February 1975 a top level Soviet military delegation 
consisting of Defence Minister Grechko and the Air and Naval 
Chiefs visited India. The visit came against the background 
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of Chinese arming of Pakistani forces (including two new 
Pak divisions) and the reported move by the U.S. to resume 
military supplies to Islamabad, The result of the high 
level Indo-Soviet military consultations was an agreement 
to expand defence production in India with Soviet aid. This 
would include production of an improved version of the MIG-21. 
The Indian Navy also stood to benefit. In April that year an 
agreement provided for delivery to India of 8 Nanuchka 
missile patrol ships. The Soviet team was reportedly impressed 
by India's defence industry and Marshal Grechko declared that 
a strong India was vital for peace in the subcontinent. 
Developing with each passing year, these relations 
reached maturity and found expression in the Treaty of 
peace. Friendship and Cooperation signed on August 9, 1971, 
which proved its worth for bilateral relations and for peace 
in Asia. Stimmit contacts and meetings between Soviet and 
Indian leaders were particularly important for strengthening 
bilateral relations. 
In November 1973 Brezhnev paid a visit to India, the 
first Asian State to be so honoured by the CPSU General 
Secretary, Besides signing a 15-year trade and economic 
agreement, hO.told India* s Parliament that there was need for 
a "thorough and comprehensive" discussion of the concept of 
Asian collective security. The absence of any specific 
reference to that concept in the Joint Declaration, however, 
reflected New Delhi's steady reluctance to accept what had 
come to be widely suspected as Soviet strategy for isolating 
China. 
Brezhnev and his colleagues apparently did not show any 
strong reservations about Delhi's efforts to normalize 
relations with Beijing. The Soviet stake in cultivating India 
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for strategic reasons was remarkably evident that year when 
Moscow granted a wheat loan to India despite its own shortages 
in food grains. The stake was again seen the following year. 
Barely a month after India's nuclear explosion at pokharan, 
a pravda article on India's foreign policy was all praise 
for New Delhi while being critical of Beijing. But there was 
no mention of the nuclear test despite the fact that Moscow 
happened to be a most conservative co-sponsor of nuclear 
nonproliferation. When External Affairs Minister Swaran 
Singh paid, a visit to Moscow in September that year, Brezhnev 
reiterated firm and consistent Soviet support for Mrs.Gandhi's 
government. Moscow lived up to its words by supporting the 
emergency rule in India which was clamped down the following 
year. 
Mrs.Gandhi visited Moscow in June 1976. The 25th CPSU 
Congress had concluded with Brezhnev making warm references 
to India in mid-April, The Sino-Indian decision to exchange 
Ambassadors had been made public. The rosy picture was 
tarnished somewhat by Bhutto's statement that the Chinese 
were helping Pakistan troops construct a road connecting 
Skardu (which had an air base) in the North-Western Frontier 
Province with the Karakoram highway, and by premier Hua's 
reiteration to him of Chinese support for the Pakistan stand 
on Kashmir the same month. In Moscow, the Indian and the 
Soviet leaders reiterated familiar views like the Indian 
Ocean should be treated as a zone of peace, with the Soviet 
side deriving obvious satisfaction at the pin-pointing 
of U.S. presence in Diego Garcia by both sides. But China 
was not mentioned, reflecting India's strong desire to 
preseirve and develop the recent movement in Sino-Indian 
relations. 
N.Shurigin's article in Pravda on June 13, quoted in 
The Hindustan Times^14 June 1974 
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Ruring 1970-80, India's relations with the Soviet Union 
has been fashioned on the anvil of choice. The inevitable 
necessity to choose imparted to Indo-Soviet relationship an 
in-depth strategic dimension in 1971, India had to choose to 
intervene in the Bangladesh liberation struggle with force; 
the choice was picked up from among several options. Once 
the decision was made, it was necessary to forge close 
cooperation with one great power to neutralise the resistance 
put up by Pakistan and its international allies to the 
implementation of the Indian decision. The Indo-Soviet 
Treaty of Peace and Friendship was born out of the necessity 
of choice. The necessity was nationally shared; hence the 
support the treaty received in 1971 even from quarters that 
were cool towards the U.S,S,R. 
Leonid Brezhnev had paid an official visit to New Delhi 
in December 1980, This visit had proved very significant. 
In September 1978, External Affairs Minister Vajpayee went 
to the U.S.S.R. 
The long-standing personal friendship between Brezhnev 
and Mrs,Gandhi had steered the relationship through the 
1960s and 1970s, in directions desired by both, Brezhnev's 
death (15 November 1982) could mean a vacuum. But Yuri 
Andropov, Brezhnev's successor took immediate care to fill 
the gap created by Brezhnev's death, A series of changes in 
international politics, resulting in a sharp aggravation in 
the US-Soviet confrontation, raised a number of issues which 
Andr-opov and Mrs,Gandhi had no occasion to sit down together 
to discuss to mutual satisfaction. Then early February 1984, 
Andropov died. His successor, Konstantin Chernenko, assured 
the Prime Minister at a brief cordial meeting in the Kremlin 
that there would be "no change" in the Soviet Union's policies 
2 Bhabani Sen Gupta, "The Necessity of Choice", Seminar, 
Feb 1980, p,35 
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towards India. The meeting was too short for a compre-
hensive exchange of views. The Soviet leadership there-
fore decided to send Politburo member Demitri Ustinov to 
India fully authorised to conduct summit level political 
talks covering the entire field of international and 
regional issues. 
The Ustinov visit was one of the important landmarks 
in the 34 year old Indo-Soviet friendship. In political 
and strategic importance it is comparable to the India 
visits of Khurshchev and Brezhnev, The Ustinov visit had 
indeed two dimensions. First, Ustinov represented the 
collective CPSU Politburo leadership whose brief he was 
carrying. Secondly, as defence minister of the U.S.S.R,, 
he was in a position to lend a strategic aspect to the 
political understanding distilled frc»n his conversations 
with Mrs.Gandhi and her senior cabinet colleagues. To be 
sure, the Ustinov-Mrs,Gandhi talks were almost entirely 
political. However, at several points in the conversations, 
Ustinov assured the Prime Minister of "complete" and "un-
equivocal" Soviet support and backing if India were in 
trouble. A nioraber of times, Ustinov mentioned the Indo-
Soviet Treaty of 1971 to reiterate Soviet support to India 
4 
in any contingency that may arise. 
Another augmenting factor of Indo-Soviet relations was 
the economic cooperation between the two countries," The 
Soviet Union supported the stress laid on heavy industry in 
the Indian economic strategy for development. India's first 
major project in the ptiblic sector was the Bhilai Steel 
Plant in 1954. It also assisted India's Second Five Year 
Plan and was willing to accept rupee payment. This helped 
3 Bhabani Sen Gupta, India Today, 31 Aug 1984 
4 Ibid. 
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India in conseirving her limited foreign exchange and gave 
a big push to Indo-Soviet trade, providing the Soviet 
Union with a market for its industrial goods at a time 
when it was unable to compete in the world market due to 
poor quality. Over the years, economic cooperation between 
the two countries has grown vastly, Soviet aid and trade 
continue to play an important role in India's economic 
development. 
In the fifties and sixties, economic links with the 
Soviet Union had acquired a prominent place in India's 
foreign economic relations. Both the depth and range of 
these links were quite remarkable. All significant sectors 
of the Indian economy such as steel, oil, machine building, 
power, pharroaceuticals, etc, received substantial and 
crucial assistance from the Soviet Union, The rate of 
growth of Indo-Soviet trade during the seventies slowed 
down considerably as compared to the growth in the first 
phase as well as in relation to the growth of India's trade 
with some other regions such as ECM, ESCAP, Latin America 
and OPEC countries and also there was no dramatic change in 
the composition of India's exports to the Soviet Union 
during the seventies. 
Undoubtedly, Soviet Union has helped India to play a 
crucial role in attaining a large measure of self suffi-
ciency, Indo-Soviet economic relations can be projected 
to the third world as a classic example of economic relations 
between an industrially advanced socialist country and a 
developing country. 
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III 
Meetings between Soviet and Indian leaders are always 
marked by warmth and cordiality, and deep tirust and mutual 
understanding. They have a beneficial effect on the develop-
ment of relations between these two countries. Years and 
decades pass, but the relations of friendship and cooperation 
between the U.S.S.R. and India continue developing on the 
ascending line. This is happening because these relations 
are built on a basic of equality and mutual respect, on 
coincidence or similarity in the positions of the two 
countries on the cardinal problems of recent times. 
The state of Indo-Soviet relations is symbolised by the 
fact that India is the first Asian country that Gorbachev 
has chosen for a stage visit after assuming the leadership 
of the Soviet Union even as the U.S.S.R.was the first foreign 
country that Rajiv Gandhi visited as India's Prime Minister. 
This "respectful closeness, a sort of kinship", is a new phe-
nomenon reflecting the new heights of Indo-Soviet coopera-
tion and friendship. Rajiv Gandhi and Mikhail Gorbachev 
are building a glorious edifice on the sure and firm founda-
tions laid by Nehru, Khurshchev, Indira Gandhi and Brezhnev, 
Rajiv's Moscow visit in May 1985 took place along some-
what predictable lines. Two agreements, negotiated earlier, 
were signed in Moscow. The more significant of the two was 
a 15-year economic and commercial agreement on the pattern 
of the one signed by Mrs.Gandhi setting out cooperation 
between the two countries till the year 2000. True to the 
long-range Soviet policy of sponsoring a Moscow supervised 
Asian Security System, Gorbachev pointedly referred to "cons-
tructive initiatives... to ensure certain aspects of the 
security of the Asian continent and some of its regions". 
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suggesting a comprehensive approach to these problems. 
Rajiv Gandhi was noncommital and told a press conference in 
Moscow that the issue was discussed but no specific proposals 
came up. India had signed with the Soviet Union a protocol 
on cooperation in the power sector on 27 December 1985. The 
working programme of cooperation between India and the 
Soviet Union for 1986-90 is directed towards increasing power 
generation and reliability. The programme is to be carried 
out by way of joint execution of power projects, both thermal 
and hydel and modernisation of existing ones. 
The Soviet Union is assisting India in the construction 
of the first phase of Vindhyachal Super Thermal Power Station 
in Madhya Pradesh consisting of six units. Soviet assistance 
is also available in the construction of the Kahalgon Super 
Thermal Power Station in Bihar consisting of four units. 
Mr.Gorbachev described the visit of Mr.Gandhi to the 
Soviet Union as "a big event in the life of our two states". 
He further said that the personal relationship he and the 
prime Minister Mr.Rajiv Gandhi have already established 
would strengthen the personal contacts and friendship between 
the two countries. 
During the speech at the Kremlin dinner in honour of 
prime Minister Rajiv Gandh on May 21, 1985, Mr.Gorbachev 
said that "a special place is held by the Soviet Union and 
India's concurrent efforts to remove thp threat of war and 
end the airms race. No one can ignore the fact that friend-
ship and cooperation between our two countries are playing 
a more and more important and beneficial role in the entire 
system of international relations. By force of example, 
these relations are helping assert the principles of peaceful 
5 The Statesman, New Delhi, 1 June 1985 
6 The Times of India, New Delhi, 22 May 1985 
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coexistence and work for stronger peace and security of all 
the peoples. These aims are well served by our Treaty of 
7 
Peace, Friendship and Cooperation. 
Several positive steps have been taken by the leaders 
of both the countries to improve relations. Gorbachev's 
visit of November 1986 is remarkable in this direction. He 
had paid an official friendly visit to India. In his welcome 
speech at the Delhi airport Mr.Rajiv Gandhi said that Mikhail 
Gorbachev relentlessly works for peace and disarmament, "His 
bold peace initiatives, particularly those which he put 
forward at Raykjavik, reflecting the sincere and consistent 
foreign policy course of the Soviet Union, have won universal 
approbation. Hence, it was with great warmth and pride that 
India welcomed this honoured guest". Rajiv Gandhi noted 
that Indo-Soviet relations had gained depth and maturity with 
the passage of time and that those relations had remained firm 
and steady through the twists and turns of international 
politics. 
The visit of Mr.Gorbachev to India was a great and 
significant event not only from the point of view of this 
country but also for the cause of world peace. The high level 
of Soviet-Indian relations enabled the sides to produce a 
truly historic document. On 27 November 1986, Gorbachev and 
Rajiv Gandhi signed the historical Delhi Declaration on the 
principles for a nuclear weapons free and nonviolent world. 
This improtant document sets forth 10 principles to build a 
world free from nuclear weapons and violence, "Peaceful 
coexistence", says one of the ten points of the Declaration, 
"must become the universal norm of international relations 
Mikhail Gorbachev, Selected Speeches and Articles, 
Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1987, p.77 
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so that in our nuclear age confrontation is replaced by 
cooperation* and conflict situations are resolved through 
political and not military means". 
On the same day, an agreement on economic and technical 
cooperation was signed by Vladimir Komentsev, Deputy Chairman 
of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, and Mr.N.D.Tiwari, 
India's Minister of External Affairs, A protocol on the 
festivals of the U.S.S.R. in India and of India in the 
U.S.S.R. to be held in 1987-88 to commemorate the 70th 
anniversary of India's independence was signed by Eduard 
Shevardnadze, Foreign Minister of U.S.S.R. and P.V.Narasimha 
Rao/ India's Minister for Human Resource Development. 
It would be relevant, in fact necessary to make the 
point that the Delhi Declaration is the result essentially 
of India's initiative if only to dispel the impression that 
it is part of the Soviet "peace offensive", India has been 
wanting such a declaration to be endorsed by the U.N. General 
/assembly and must regard the Soviet acceptance as a signi-
ficant gain. The Soviet side has, of course,,made a vital 
contribution to the formulation of the declaration and the 
ten principles accompanying it. But again it is early to 
see that the principles embody the same spirit which has 
informed India's approach to human relations. Witness 
the references to non-violence as the desirable "basis of 
community life", recognition of human life as "supreme" and 
creation of conditions for "the individual's harmonious 
development". Mr. V.N.Rykov, Soviet Ambassador to India had 
said that Gorbachev's visit to India in November 1986 opened 
new vistas for broadening of bilateral cooperation and inter-
action on the key issues of the day averting nuclear threat 
g 
and developing new equal international relations. 
8 The Times of India, New Delhi, April 13, 1987 
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The extensive exchange of views between Gorbachev and 
Rajiv Gandhi on issues of bilateral relations, international 
problems and the agreements, signed during the visit gave 
Soviet-Indian relations a new powerful thirust and filled them 
with more concrete contents. 
One of the provisions of the Delhi Declaration is about 
outer space. Near earth space surrounds the whole of mankind, 
and so it cannot be immaterial to anyone how this environ-
ment is used. Both the Soviet Union and India favour keeping 
space peaceful. In advancing a programme for "star peace", the 
Soviet Union considers it necessary to enable every developed 
or developing country wishing to join in the exploration and 
utilisation of outer space to do so on the basis of broad 
9 
international cooperation. 
The Festival of India in the U,S,S,R. and the Soviet 
Festival in India have helped the peoples of both the 
countries to enrich their knowledge about each other's countiry. 
The level of interaction between the two peoples has been the 
highest form. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi went to Moscow 
in July 1987 to inaugurate the Festival of India in the 
Kremlin, The Soviet prime Minister Mr.Nikolai Ryzhkov had 
come to Delhi to inaugurate the U.S,S,R, Festival in India 
on 24th November 1987. The holding of the Festival was 
possible only due to the high levelof relations which shaped 
between the leadership of the two countries, whose bright 
manifestation was the exchange of official friendly visit of 
Gorbachev, to India and Rajiv Gandhi's visit to the u,S,S.R, 
Mr.Gorbachev had paid another visit to India on 18 November 
1988. This time he came to receive the Indira Gandhi Inter-
national Peace Award and to attend the closing of Soviet 
9 Yuri Tomilin, "For a Nuclear Weapon-Free and Non-
violent World", International Affairs, March 1987, p.9, 
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Festival in India. He had received the Indira Gandhi Award 
for Outstanding Contribution to peace. Disarmament and 
Development. On this occasion he said that "Soviet-Indian 
friendship rests on a fiirm foundation and has nothing to do 
with any transient consideration or schemes." This visit of 
Gorbachev is not only a step towards peace but also a step in 
further deepening a time tested friendship. 
The Soviet Union, and India hold similar views on the 
comprehensive system of international security. Proof of 
this is the coincidence of the Soviet initiatives advanced on 
the January 15, 1986, statement of Mikhail Gorbachev and 
documents of the 27th Party Congress, and of the proposals 
elaborated by Rajiv Gandhi ifi his action plan for ushering 
in a nuclear weapon free and nonviolent world order tabled 
at the Third General Assembly Session on Disarmament. In 
the coalition for peace Soviet Union and India are called 
upon to play a major part in this understanding, Indo-
Soviet relations prove that cooperation between states with 
differing social orders can be fmiitful if these countries 
pursue common goals of peace, security and justice for all. 
The Chinese Factor : It is indisputable that Indo-Soviet 
friendship, as it has developed since Bulganin-Khruschev 
visit to India in 1955, has been deeply influenced, if not 
shaped, by two cold wars in which the Soviet Union had been 
caught, one with the West led by the U.S. and the other with 
Communist China. The point about the cold war with China 
needs to be underscored because it has not attracted the 
attention it deserves, especially in discussions of Indo-
Soviet friendship. 
It is to the credit of Nehru, writes Girilal Jain, analys-
ing Indo-Soviet relations, that he was among the first world 
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figures to recognise that Communist China was not and could 
not be a Soviet satellite in view of the strength of Chinese 
nationalism. Nehru was quicX to realise that the Khruschev-
Bulganin visit was intended to reassure him not only in respect 
of U.S.-armed Pakistan but also in respect of Communist China. 
It is ironical, though understandable, feels Girilal Jain, 
that while the fact of Soviet support to India in its conflict 
with Pakistan should have been over-emphasised, it has been 
greatly de-emphasised in relation to our .difficulties with 
China. Ironical because the latter have been by far more 
important in cementing Indo-Soviet bonds than India's con-
flicts with Pakistan, India turned for military supplies 
to the Soviet Union in view of the conflict with China and 
not with Pakistan. 
In the context of the recent efforts for a Sino-Soviet 
rapproachment when Rajiv Gandhi said in the Rajya Sabha that 
China was unimportant in Indo-Soviet relations, The Times of 
India termed his statement as extraordinary. Justifying its 
stance, the paper commented editorially that "to begin with 
the possibility of reasonably cordial relations between India 
and China was one reason for the Soviet overtures to India 
even before Khurshchev emerged as the top leader. Subse-
^ently when Sino-Indian relations began to sour in the latter 
half of the fifties, Indo-Soviet ties grew strong precisely 
on that count. 
By providing a squadron of MIG-21s to India in 1961, both 
India and Soviet Union wanted to give an indirect warning to 
Peking that it must not ptish New Delhi on the border issue. 
Soon after the 1962 war it became evident that Soviet sym-
pathies were engaged on the side of India. In 1965 India 
sought and secured hardware from the Soviet Union. Since then 
10 The Times of India, New Delhi, 22 Nov 1988 
11 Editorial, The Times of India, New Delhi, 24 Nov 1988 
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U.S.S.R. has been India's principal arms supplier.There 
can be little doubt that China will continue to be a 
source of anxiety for India even if there is a visible 
improvement in their relations for the simple reason that 
the Chinese see themselves as being entitled to a pre-
eminent role not only in South-Eaat Asia but also in South 
Asia. 
In an acerbic comment the editorial sayst "Unless 
we are willing to fool ourselves into believing that we 
are about to move into an era of goodwill and harmony in 
our neighbourhood, we have to be vigilant in respect of 
China. It does not, of course, follow that we need Sino-
Soviet hostility in order of look after our interests vis-a-vis 
China. But it does follow that China will remain a factor 
in Indo-Soviet relations**. Geography has made the Soviet 
Union, China and India neighbours and ties between any two 
of them must have a bearing on the third country's relations 
12 
with those two. 
Relations with India are a priority in Soviet foreign 
policy. The most important aspect of Indo-Soviet relations 
is tradition, friendship covering a period of many years 
and cooperation in bilateral and international affairs. 
There is a legal foundation for these relations, the 1971 
Treaty. The tremendous importance of continuous, intensive 
and constructive political dialogue between the Indian and 
Soviet leaders as a factor cannot be ignored. 
Indo-Soviet cooperation could serve the interests of 
both both and continue to contribute to a better world. Ties 
between the two countries have indeed attained a new level 
of haiTOony and mutual xmderstanding in the recent years, 
12 Ibid. 
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The relations are guided in the new objective by the Delhi 
Declaration of November 1986 which symbolises the common 
aspirations. Mr. Gorbachev asserted that the Soviet 
Union is not changing its priorities or becoming cool 
towards India. The relationship rests, he said, on a firm 
foxindation. 
For more than three decades, India and the Soviet 
Union have enjoyed a close relationship. Today it can be 
justly claimed that much of the new thinXing about disarma-
ment and the new world order drives from the relationship 
between India and the Soviet Union. Both the countries 
have been an example to all the world of peaceful coexistence 
at its best, of two different socio-economic systems working 
in close cooperation on the basis of equality, mutual under-
standing and mutual trust. 
Indo-Soviet friendship, in the words of Rajiv Gandhi, 
has benefitted millions and harmed none. It is a relation-
ship built by the peoples of the two countries over decades. 
It is a demonstration, said the Prime Minister, of what 
can be achieved through goodwill, mutual respect and trust. 
The Delhi Declaration has placed the bilateral relationship 
in a larger global context. It signals the joint endeavours 
of the two countries to work together, and with others 
towards world peace and world cooperation. 
Indicating new directions of Indo-Soviet cooperation, 
Gorbachev said that it is significant that at a time when 
mankind stood at the crucial watershed in its development, 
the Soviet Union and India are among those who strive to put 
an end to confrontations and to achieve radical turn for the 
better in world affairs. Science and technology have emerged 
as an important area of Indo-Soviet collaboration with a 
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potential for onward thrust into highly sophisticated fields. 
Major changes taking place in the Soviet Union and 
India present both a challenge and an opportunity. The 
policy of Glasnost and Perestroika (Openness and Restruc-
turing) underway in the Soviet Union is revolutionary in 
content and has a global significance. The Indian people are 
following with deep interest the attempts of the Soviet people 
under Gorbachev's leadership to bring about a second revolu-
tion in the Soviet Union. 
The Soviet Union and India, as representatives of the 
world of socialism and the world of national liberation, the 
world of development, have been fruitfully cooperating for 
years and decades in the interest of their peoples and all 
the people. This cooperation serves as a fine example. Both 
the countries would like to see these relations develop 
further. 
Indo-Soviet relations opened broad vistas for strengthen-
ing political and economic interaction of socialist and non-
aligned states,the East and the South in general. This 
interaction is an example of restructuring international 
economic relations on the basis of equality and Justice. Indo-
Soviet relations help strengthen the potential of peace, 
reason and goodwill, the basis of a new democratic world 
order, the essence of which as Nehru said is "the free coope-
ration of free nations". 
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